Harnessing nature's timekeeper: a history of the piezoelectric quartz crystal technological community (1880-1959) by McGahey, Christopher Shawn
HARNESSING NATURE’S TIMEKEEPER: A HISTORY OF THE PIEZOELECTRIC 
QUARTZ CRYSTAL TECHNOLOGICAL COMMUNITY (1880-1959) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to 
The Academic Faculty 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Christopher Shawn McGahey 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy in the 
School of History, Technology, and Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 
May 2009 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2009 by Christopher Shawn McGahey 
  
HARNESSING NATURE’S TIMEKEEPER: A HISTORY OF THE PIEZOELECTRIC 
QUARTZ CRYSTAL TECHNOLOGICAL COMMUNITY (1880-1959) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by:   
   
Dr. Steven W. Usselman, Advisor 
School of History, Technology, & Society 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. William D. Hunt 
School of Electrical & Computer 
Engineering 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. Gerhard Jean Marie (John) Krige 
School of History, Technology, & Society 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Marco Ceccagnoli 
College of Management 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
   
Dr. August W. Giebelhaus 
School of History, Technology, & Society 
Georgia Institute of Technology 
  
 
Date Approved:  October 20, 2008 
   
   
 iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
 
I would have never completed this dissertation without the help of many highly 
competent and caring people.  Writing a work of this magnitude is somewhat like going 
on a journey full of possible pitfalls and diversions.  To the extent that I have avoided 
these, I thank the following persons for their invaluable guidance.  Of course, any 
remaining flaws or weaknesses of this work are solely my own. 
My greatest thanks go to my committee members (Marco Ceccagnoli, Gus 
Giebelhaus, Bill Hunt, John Krige, Steven Usselman), who are all personally acquainted 
with the travails of writing a dissertation.  Special thanks go to Dr. Hunt, who first 
suggested that a history of quartz crystal technology might be a fruitful project, and to Dr. 
Usselman, my advisor and mentor, who deserves more credit than anyone for 
shepherding this project through to its conclusion.  Thank you. 
At the beginning of this project, several individuals generously answered my 
many questions and convinced me that writing a history of piezoelectric technology was 
a worthwhile endeavor.  Among these individuals were Arthur Ballato and John Vig, 
both associated with Fort Monmouth and the IEEE UFFC, Richard J. Thompson, Jr., 
currently Dean of Mathematics and Sciences at the College of Saint Rose (NY) and the 
author of Crystal Clear: The Struggle for Reliable Communication Technololgy in World 
War II, and Carlene Stephens of the Smithsonian Institution.   
The work of writing history is made possible only because of the dedicated labor 
of countless librarians and archivists, most of whom are invisible to the general public.  
Throughout this project, the staffs of the following libraries and archives very graciously 
 iv 
assisted me in my research: Fort Monmouth Historical Records (Fort Monmouth, NJ), the 
U.S. National Archives (Washington, D.C. and College Park, MD), the Rhode Island 
Historical Society Library (Providence, RI), the Special Collections and Archives of the 
Olin Library (Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT), the Department of Special 
Collections of the Kelvin Smith Library (Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, 
OH), the Special Collections and Archives as well as the Library and Information Center 
of the Georgia Institute of Technology (Atlanta, GA), the Library of Congress 
(Washington, D.C.), and the General Radio Historical Society.  Though I don’t remember 
all of your names, I thank you for your dedicated service to researchers like myself. 
All academic historians need the comments and criticisms of their colleagues to 
sharpen and refine their work.  I am certainly no exception, and I thank the following 
groups for their helpful comments: my fellow students in the Georgia Tech History, 
Technology, & Society (HTS) program, particularly those who attended my talks at the 
HTS Graduate Forum; the sponsors and commenters of the first Business History 
Conference Newcomen Doctoral Colloquium held in Minneapolis, MN in May 2005; 
those who attended my talks at the 2006 Society for the History Of Technology (SHOT) 
Annual Meeting in Minneapolis, MN and at the 2006 Business History Conference in 
Toronto, Canada.  Thanks also to Mr. Phillip Goodman, an e-mail correspondent and 
former student of Walter Cady’s who has shown an avid interest in this project over the 
last couple of years. 
As everyone knows, writing a dissertation is not a paying job.  Throughout this 
project, the following fellowships have allowed me to travel to archives and to support 
myself while researching and writing: the IEEE Fellowship in Electrical History (2005), 
 v 
the Georgia Tech Ivan Allen College Dissertation Fellowship (2006), and the HTS Jones 
Fellowship (2007).  To those who provide the funds for these fellowships as well as to 
those who selected me as a recipient, thank you. 
Finally, special thanks are due to the following persons.  Thanks to Ladonna 
Bowen, administrative assistant for the School of HTS, who graciously assisted me with 
Ph.D. forms and paperwork.  Thanks to Christina Bourgeois, director of the 
undergraduate writing center for Georgia Tech’s School of ECE, who was my boss in 
2005 when I decided to devote myself full-time to working on this dissertation.  Thank 
you for your friendship and for your continued interest in my academic endeavors.  
Thanks to my parents and my sister for their emotional support and good humor as I 
struggled to complete this work.  Last but not least, thanks to my wife, Jenny, who 
entered my life toward the latter stages of this project and who is very glad to see it 
completed. 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...............................................................................................iii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. ix 
LIST OF FIGURES............................................................................................................. x 
SUMMARY .....................................................................................................................xiii 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2: THE PRE-HISTORY OF QUARTZ CRYSTAL TECHNOLOGY 
(1880-1923)....................................................................................................................... 27 
2.1  Introduction ........................................................................................................... 27 
2.2  The Curie brothers discover piezoelectricity......................................................... 28 
2.3  Discovery of piezoelectricity fails to yield any immediate technological 
applications................................................................................................................... 32 
2.4  The scientific study of piezoelectricity ................................................................. 35 
2.5  SONAR – the first technological application of piezoelectricity.......................... 38 
2.6  U.S. Anti-Submarine Warfare research during World War I................................ 40 
2.7  Walter Guyton Cady.............................................................................................. 43 
2.8  Cady’s introduction to piezoelectric technology................................................... 49 
2.9  The legacy of World War I-era Anti-Submarine Warfare research ...................... 53 
2.10  Cady invents the quartz crystal piezoelectric resonator ...................................... 55 
2.11  Cady invents the quartz crystal piezoelectric oscillator ...................................... 58 
2.12  Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 60 
CHAPTER 3: QUARTZ CRYSTAL TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ...................................................................................................................... 64 
CHAPTER 4: THE 1920s – QUARTZ CRYSTAL AND FREQUENCY 
CONTROL........................................................................................................................ 94 
4.1  Introduction ........................................................................................................... 94 
4.2  Walter Cady’s piezoelectric oscillator is without a practical application ............. 96 
4.3  The birth of shortwave and medium-wave radio broadcasting ............................. 97 
4.4  George Washington Pierce improves on Cady’s piezoelectric oscillator ........... 103 
4.5  Quartz crystal research and development at the Naval Research Laboratory ..... 107 
4.6  The radio industry begins investing in quartz crystal technology....................... 111 
4.7  The radio amateur community learns to use quartz crystal ................................. 115 
 vii 
4.8  The geography of quartz crystal invention in the 1920s ..................................... 117 
4.9  Explaining the time lag between the Cady and Pierce piezoelectric 
oscillators.................................................................................................................... 118 
4.10  Quartz crystal technology and independent inventors....................................... 125 
4.11  Summary ........................................................................................................... 129 
CHAPTER 5: THE 1920s – QUARTZ CRYSTAL AND FREQUENCY 
STANDARDIZATION................................................................................................... 131 
5.1  Introduction ......................................................................................................... 131 
5.2  The Status of Frequency Standardization in the Early 1920s ............................. 132 
5.3  The Broadcasting Boom forces the Bureau of Standards to update its 
primary frequency standard........................................................................................ 136 
5.4  John Dellinger and the Bureau of Standards ....................................................... 142 
5.5  The 2nd National Radio Conference pushes for stricter frequency 
adherence.................................................................................................................... 147 
5.6  The Piezo-Electric Oscillator as a Portable Secondary Frequency Standard ...... 150 
5.7  Developing a Quartz Crystal-based Primary Frequency Standard...................... 155 
5.8  Birth of the Commercial Radiofrequency Testing Industry ................................ 162 
5.9  The Institute of Radio Engineers encourages adoption of quartz crystal 
frequency standards .................................................................................................... 165 
5.11  Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 170 
CHAPTER 6: EXPANSION – THE AMATEUR RADIO AND TELEPHONY 
MARKETS FOR QUARTZ CRYSTAL ........................................................................ 174 
6.1  Introduction ......................................................................................................... 174 
6.2  Review of quartz crystal technology during the 1920s ....................................... 177 
6.3  Overview of quartz crystal developments during the 1930s ............................... 183 
6.4  General Radio develops the plug-in quartz plate, preparing the way for 
dedicated QCU companies ......................................................................................... 184 
6.5  Radio amateurs and the rise of dedicated QCU manufacturers........................... 187 
6.6  Walter Cady’s invention of the narrowband quartz wave filter .......................... 191 
6.7  Bell Telephone Labs (BTL) engineers develop the wideband quartz wave 
filter ............................................................................................................................ 194 
6.8  BTL engineers fundamentally advance quartz crystal engineering 
knowledge .................................................................................................................. 201 
6.9  AT&T deploys high-capacity multiplex carrier telephony infrastructure........... 206 
6.10  BTL engineers apply quartz crystal technology to precision timekeeping ....... 209 
 viii 
6.11  General Radio releases a line of quartz crystal clocks ...................................... 212 
6.12  Other quartz crystal developments (and non-developments) during the 
1930s .......................................................................................................................... 218 
6.13  Summary and Conclusions ................................................................................ 221 
CHAPTER 7: MASS PRODUCTION – THE QUARTZ CRYSTAL UNIT IN 
WORLD WAR II ............................................................................................................ 224 
7.1  Introduction ......................................................................................................... 224 
7.2  The U.S. Army Signal Corps’ decision to adopt crystal control ......................... 228 
7.3  Procurement of quartz crystal.............................................................................. 240 
7.4  Alternatives to crystal control ............................................................................. 249 
7.5  Mass Production of quartz crystal plates during World War II........................... 251 
7.6  Quartz crystal patents during the war.................................................................. 256 
7.7  I.R.E. activity during the war .............................................................................. 256 
7.8  The Unqualified Success of Crystal-Control During the War ............................ 258 
7.9  The Move to Cultured Quartz ............................................................................. 258 
7.10  Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 259 
CHAPTER 8: REPLICATING NATURE – THE ARTIFICIAL GROWTH OF 
QUARTZ CRYSTAL ..................................................................................................... 261 
8.1  Introduction ......................................................................................................... 261 
8.2  Industrial intelligence in post-war Germany ....................................................... 263 
8.3  Post-War organization of cultured quartz research ............................................. 272 
8.4  The nature of cultured quartz research ................................................................ 276 
8.5  The Brush Development Company makes a breakthrough................................. 281 
8.6  Bell Telephone Laboratories develops the high-pressure autoclave ................... 285 
8.7  The Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories organizes a parallel approach 
to the cultured quartz problem.................................................................................... 288 
8.8  SCEL selects Brush Development to construct a cultured quartz pilot plant...... 292 
8.9  Brush sells its cultured quartz ............................................................................. 294 
8.10  “…the end of ten years of happy struggle with synthetic quartz”..................... 298 
8.11  The birth of Sawyer Research Products ............................................................ 300 
8.12  Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 304 
CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS ...................................................... 312 
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................... 335 
 ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 
Table 1: Number of Patents Assigned to Private Sector Firms, Government, and 
Individuals for Select Years ............................................................................... 82 
Table 2: Number of Patents Assigned to Private Sector Companies for Select 
Years................................................................................................................... 83 
Table 3: Comparison of the Percentage of U.S. Quartz Crystal Patent Holders 
Having a Foreign Residence With the Percentage of All U.S. Patent 
Holders Having a Foreign Residence................................................................. 90 
Table 4: The Approximate Number of Resonant Quartz Crystal Devices In Use 
Between 1880 and 1959 ................................................................................... 318 
 
 x 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Numbers of Piezoelectric Quartz Crystal Patents Filed and Issued 
Between 1918 and 1959 ....................................................................................... 4 
Figure 2: Number of All Successful Patent Applications Filed Vs. Number of 
Successful Quartz Crystal Patent Applications Filed Between 1918 and 
1959...................................................................................................................... 5 
Figure 3: Largest Owners of Quartz Crystal Patents Issued Between 1918 and 
1959...................................................................................................................... 7 
Figure 4: Hierarchy of Scale for Large Technological Systems ......................................... 8 
Figure 5: Four Forms of Joel Mokyr’s “Useful Knowledge” ........................................... 11 
Figure 6: Types and Average Distribution of All Quartz Crystal Patents Issued 
Between 1918 and 1959 ..................................................................................... 70 
Figure 7: Types and Percentage of Quartz Crystal Patents for Select Years 
between 1927 and 1959...................................................................................... 71 
Figure 8: Types and Numbers of Quartz Crystal Patents for Select Years between 
1927 and 1959 .................................................................................................... 72 
Figure 9: The Hierarchical Structure of Quartz Crystal Technology................................ 74 
Figure 10: Manufacturing Processes of Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) Production ............. 75 
Figure 11: Average Distribution of Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) Process Patents 
Filed between 1918 and 1959........................................................................... 76 
Figure 12: Distribution of Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) Process Patents Filed for 
Select Years between 1927 and 1959............................................................... 76 
Figure 13: Two Popular Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) Packaging Schemes ....................... 79 
Figure 14: Inventor-Assignee Relationships for Select Years between 1927 and 
1959 .................................................................................................................. 86 
Figure 15: The Bureau of Standards’ Standard Wavemeter, Circa 1922........................ 135 
Figure 16: The General Radio Company’s Universal Wavemeter (Model 105 B), 
which sold in 1916 for $105........................................................................... 140 
Figure 17: The General Radio Company’s Type 275 Piezo-Electric Oscillator, 
which sold in 1928 for $60............................................................................. 153 
Figure 18: The Piezoelectric Resonator and Oscillator: Inventors, Patent 
Numbers, Applications, and Popular Names.................................................. 178 
Figure 19: Circuit Demonstrating Operation of the Piezoelectric Resonator ................. 179 
Figure 20: Characteristic Frequency Response of Piezoelectric Resonator Circuit........ 179 
 xi 
Figure 21: Quartz Crystal Oscillator Circuit Used by the U.S. Navy, Circa 1927 ......... 180 
Figure 22: Exploded View of General Radio Co. Quartz Crystal Unit, Circa 1930....... 186 
Figure 23: Bliley Electric Co. VP5 QCU with Standard G.R. Plugs Spaced ¾” 
Apart, Circa 1936 ........................................................................................... 186 
Figure 24: Narrowband Filter: Resonant Frequency = 10 kHz, Quality Factor = 1 ....... 193 
Figure 25: Narrowband Filter: Resonant Frequency = 10 kHz, Quality Factor = 10 ..... 194 
Figure 26: Narrowband Filter: Resonant Frequency = 10 kHz, Quality Factor = 
100 .................................................................................................................. 194 
Figure 27: Frequency Division Multiplexed Telephony Signal...................................... 196 
Figure 28: Frequency Response of a Gradual-Cutoff Wideband Filter Not 
Employing Quartz Crystal Wave Filters ........................................................ 197 
Figure 29: Frequency Response of a Sharp-Cutoff Wideband Filter Employing 
Quartz Crystal Wave Filters ........................................................................... 197 
Figure 30: Bandpass Wave Filter Circuit Employing Quartz Crystals (PE), 
Inductors (L), and Capacitors (C)................................................................... 199 
Figure 31: Bandpass Wave Filter Circuit Employing 3 Parallel Quartz Crystals, 
Each Having Slightly Different Natural Frequencies..................................... 200 
Figure 32: Frequency Response of a Sharp-Cutoff High-Pass Filter Employing a 
Quartz Crystal Wave Filter............................................................................. 202 
Figure 33: Frequency Response of a Sharp-Cutoff Low-Pass Filter Employing a 
Quartz Crystal Wave Filter............................................................................. 202 
Figure 34: Piezo-Electric Shock-Resistant Crystal Mounting, Top View (L) and 
Side View (R) ................................................................................................. 203 
Figure 35: Original Crystal Clock Mechanism, Invented by Joseph Horton and 
Warren Marrison of Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1927 ............................ 211 
Figure 36: William Marrison’s Refined Crystal Clock, Circa 1930 ............................... 212 
Figure 37: General Radio Company’s Type 611 Syncro-Clock, Circa 1935.................. 213 
Figure 38: General Radio Company’s Crystal Clock Design, Circa 1930...................... 214 
Figure 39: General Radio Company’s C-21-H Standard-Frequency Assembly, 
Circa 1930 ...................................................................................................... 216 
Figure 40: Giorgio Spezia’s Autoclave, Photograph of .................................................. 269 
Figure 41: Cross-Section of Spezia’s Autoclave for Implementing the 
Hydrothermal Method of Crystal Growth ...................................................... 270 
Figure 42: A Large, Flawless Cultured Quartz Crystal................................................... 279 
Figure 43: Autoclave Setup Similar to That Developed by Danforth Hale of Brush 
Development Company.................................................................................. 283 
 xii 
Figure 44: Cross-Section of High-Pressure Autoclave Developed at Bell 
Telephone Labs, Circa Late 1940s ................................................................. 286 
Figure 45: Dual-Chamber Rocking Autoclave, Developed by Brush Development 
Company, Circa 1950..................................................................................... 291 
Figure 46: Slab of Large Cultured Quartz Crystal, Shown with Rectangular and 
Circular Blanks............................................................................................... 295 
Figure 47: Cross-Sectional Diagram of Modern Autoclave, Circa 2000........................ 304 
Figure 48: Ideal Logistic Curve of Cumulative Quartz Crystal Patent Growth 
between 1918 and 1959 .................................................................................. 316 
Figure 49: Actual Curve of Cumulative Quartz Crystal Patent Growth between 
1918 and 1959 ................................................................................................ 317 
Figure 50: Estimated Number of Resonant Quartz Crystal Devices in Actual Use 
between 1920 and 1959.................................................................................. 319 
 xiii 
SUMMARY 
 
 
 
In 1880, French brothers Jacques and Pierre Curie discovered the phenomenon of 
piezoelectricity in naturally occurring quartz crystal, sometimes referred to as “nature’s 
timekeeper.”  By 1959, tens of millions of devices that exploited quartz crystal’s 
piezoelectric character were being used in the technologies of radio, telephony, and 
electronic timekeeping.  This dissertation analyzes the rapid rise of quartz crystal 
technology in the United States by looking at the growth of its knowledge base as 
reflected primarily in patents and journal articles.  The major finding of this analysis is 
that the rise of quartz crystal technology cannot be fully understood by looking only at 
individuals, institutions, and technological factors.  Rather, this work posits that the 
concept of technological community is indispensible in explaining rapid technological 
growth and diffusion that would otherwise seem inexplicable.  In the late 1920s, and 
again in the early 1940s, the knowledge base of quartz crystal technology experienced 
exponential growth, partly due to U.S. government patronage and enlightened regulation.  
However, as this study shows, quartz crystal engineers, scientists, and entrepreneurs 
could not have mobilized as quickly and effectively as they did unless a vibrant 
technological community already existed.  Furthermore, the United States’ ability to 
support such a thriving community depended in part on an early 20th century American 
culture that displayed an unmatched enthusiasm for democratic communications media, 
most especially broadcast radio and universal telephone service.  Archival records, 
professional journal articles, government reports, manufacturer catalogs, and U.S. patents 
have been used to document this history of the quartz crystal technological community.  
 xiv 
This dissertation contributes to the literature on technological communities and their role 
in facilitating technological and ecomonic growth by showing that though such 
communities often form spontaneously, their growth may be nurtured and stimulated 
through enlightened government regulation.  As such, this dissertation should be of 
interest to scholars in the fields of history of technology, business history, management 
studies, and public policy.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This is the story of the formation and growth of a technological community – that 
is, a group of like-minded persons dedicated to researching, developing, using, and 
refining a particular technology, such as jet aircraft, gasoline-powered automobiles, or 
mobile telephony.  Such communities are commonplace in the early 21st century.  Yet 
this story tells of a community that has its origins in late 19th century France, began to 
coalesce in early 20th century America, became fully self-conscious during World War II, 
and reached maturity by the 1950s.  This is the community of scientists, engineers and 
technicians dedicated to exploiting the technological potential of quartz crystal, a 
piezoelectric mineral found in abundance in the Earth’s crust.  Piezoelectricity is the 
property of many natural crystallized materials, including cane sugar, Rochelle Salt, and 
quartz, by which an applied mechanical pressure or stress yields an electric potential.  
The converse effect, by which an applied electric potential produces mechanical 
deformation, is also present in piezoelectric materials.  Among all naturally-occurring 
piezoelectric crystals, quartz crystal is unique in the combination of technologically 
useful characteristics it exhibits: structural rigidity, chemical stability, a strong 
piezoelectric response, and a very sharp resonance point, leading some to refer to it as 
“nature’s timekeeper.”  These characteristics have lured technologists into exploiting 
quartz crystal far more than most other piezoelectric materials.   
But “nature’s timekeeper” did not submit readily to technological exploitation.  
Engineers and scientists of the 20th century had to bring all their ingenuity to bear on 
quartz crystal in order to harness its unique powers.  In the course of their efforts, these 
technologists developed and used quartz crystal devices to improve a number of well-
 2 
known technological products and systems: broadcast and two-way radio, long-distance 
telephony, mobile telephony, SONAR, ultrasonics, precision timekeeping, and 
computing.  Most laypersons are blissfully unaware of the importance of quartz crystal 
devices to each of these systems.  To be sure, the quartz crystal technological community 
was and remains a small, niche group of technologists huddled around what most would 
consider an esoteric branch of electrical engineering.  Yet, studying the formation and 
growth of this group over time yields insights that are much broader than this one area of 
technology.  Most importantly, this study provides a rare glimpse of the creation, growth, 
and maturing of a technological community.  It also shows this community acting – 
creating, revising, and preserving a distinct body of technological knowledge.  In so 
doing, this study follows historian Edward Constant’s lead in viewing the technological 
community (i.e., a group of technology practitioners) as the “social locus of technological 
knowledge.”1 
Quartz crystal invention and innovation flourished in the early to middle decades 
of the 20th century.  Some measure of this activity can be gained by studying United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) data.  Figure 1 shows the number of quartz 
crystal-related patents filed with and issued by the USPTO in these years.  Notice first 
that the pattern of the Patents Issued plot generally tracks the pattern of the Patents Filed 
plot with a delay of from three to five years.  This delay reflects the processing time 
required by the U.S. Patent Office.  Notice also that the Patents Filed plot shows only the 
number of patent applications that were ultimately issued.  Unsuccessful patent 
                                                 
1 Edward W. Constant II, "The Social Locus of Technological Practice: Community, System, or 
Organization?," in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and 
History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 1989), 223-42. 
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applications are not shown.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the author considers the 
Patents Filed plot, rather than the Patents Issued plot, to be the most reliable indicator of 
the timing of quartz crystal inventive activity.   
The ebb and flow of quartz crystal inventive activity must be interpreted with 
reference to the larger political and economic events of the early 20th century.  Quartz 
crystal technology first blossomed at the end of World War I as a handful of inventors 
applied lessons learned in the crucible of wartime research.  But the technology was slow 
to attract the interest of others.  In the mid-1920s, when quartz crystal became tied to the 
AM broadcast radio boom, patenting activity rapidly escalated.  With the stabilization of 
the radio market and the arrival of the Great Depression, activity declined and oscillated 
throughout the 1930s, kept alive by the amateur radio market and the growth of multiplex 
telephony.  With the coming of World War II, patenting activity once again escalated as 
quartz crystal was applied to numerous wartime projects, from submarine detection to 
two-way “walkie-talkie” radios.  Also acting as a spur to invention during the war was 
the expiration of many of the earliest, fundamental quartz patents.  After the war, 
patenting activity dropped off to an average of thirty to forty quartz crystal patents per 
year for the remainder of the period shown. 
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U.S. Quartz Crystal Patent Activity (1918-1959)
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Figure 1: Numbers of Piezoelectric Quartz Crystal Patents Filed and Issued Between 
1918 and 1959 
(Note:  Only successful patent applications are shown.  That is, patent applications that were filed but never 
issued are not included.  (Source: Google Advanced Patent Search performed by the author.  Search 
parameters: quartz AND crystal AND (piezo OR piezoelectric))  Figure created by author.) 
 
 
The pattern of inventive activity illustrated in Figure 1 must also be interpreted in 
light of overall U.S. patenting activity.  Figure 2 compares quartz crystal patenting 
activity with all U.S. utility patenting activity.2  As shown, once quartz crystal patenting 
ramped up in the mid-1920s, its pattern did not differ much from that of all utility patents.  
There are, however, a couple of notable exceptions.  First, the late 1920s decline of 
quartz crystal applications anticipated by a few years the precipitous decline of all utility 
patent applications.  This later decline clearly reflected the Great Depression, during 
which companies were less able to invest in patent-generating research and development.  
But, as mentioned above, the decline of quartz crystal patents more likely represented the 
stabilization of AM broadcast radio growth and a tapping out of AM radio-related quartz 
                                                 
2 “Utility” is the class of patents generally thought of as inventions.  The other common patent classes are 
design and plant.  Design patents cover ornamental, non-utilitarian designs, while plant patents cover new 
breeds of botanical plant. 
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crystal technology rather than any economic downturn in the quartz crystal business.  
Second, quartz crystal patenting activity during WWII didn’t quite track overall utility 
patenting activity.  The later experienced a significant trough in the early 1940s, due to 
the large-scale mobilization of the American economy, while the former experienced 
only a slight and temporary downturn.  The rapid rebound in quartz crystal patenting 
activity reflected the importance of quartz crystal technology to the war effort.  The 
patterns of patenting activity in Figures 1 and 2 are further explored and interpreted in 
Chapter 3.  
 
U.S. Utility and Quartz Crystal Patent Applications 
(1918-1959)
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Figure 2: Number of All Successful Patent Applications Filed Vs. Number of Successful 
Quartz Crystal Patent Applications Filed Between 1918 and 1959 
(Note that the All Utility Patents Filed line denotes thousands of patents, while the Quartz Crystal Patents 
Filed line does not.  (Source: Google Advanced Patent Search performed by the author.  Search parameters: 
quartz AND crystal AND (piezo OR piezoelectric))  Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 
Taken as a whole, the intensity of quartz crystal patenting activity observed 
between 1918 and 1959 suggests the historically significant rise of a new and 
economically important area of technology.  During this forty year period, inventors filed 
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for nearly 1200 quartz crystal-related U.S. patents, and around 1000 of these were issued 
by the end of this period.  By way of comparison, in the forty years following Lee 
DeForest’s invention of the “Audion,” inventors filed for roughly 1600 patents related to 
the vacuum tube triode, and nearly 1000 were issued during this period.3  Thus, judged 
strictly by the number of patents it spawned, quartz crystal technology was nearly as 
significant as one of the most influential technological devices of the 20th century.   
The economic significance of quartz crystal technology is hinted at by Figure 3, 
which lists the top owners of quartz crystal patents issued during this period.  The Bell 
System, which encompasses AT&T, Western Electric, and Bell Telephone Laboratories, 
owned nearly twice as many patents as the next largest owner, the Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA).  Together, the Bell System and RCA, two of the largest and most 
powerful American corporations of the 20th century, owned nearly a third of all quartz 
crystal-related patents issued.  Given the core businesses of these corporate giants, it’s 
not surprising that quartz crystal devices were used extensively in radio, television, and 
telephony equipment.  But overall ownership of quartz crystal patents can hardly be said 
to have been concentrated.  Figure 3 shows that the top six patent owners owned only 
38% of all quartz patents, suggesting that quartz crystal invention and innovation didn’t 
occur only in large corporate R&D laboratories.  As further shown in Chapter 3, quartz 
crystal inventors included university professors, engineers for small firms that catered to 
amateur radio operators, and independent professional inventors.  
                                                 
3 Results of a Google Advance Patent Search performed by the author.  Search parameters: “vacuum tube” 
AND (audion OR triode). 
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Largest Owners of Quartz Crystal Patents Issued Between 
1918 and 1959
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Figure 3: Largest Owners of Quartz Crystal Patents Issued Between 1918 and 1959 
(Note: The percentage numbers indicate the percentage of total quartz crystal-related patents issued by the 
U.S. Patent Office between 1918 and 1959.  (Source: Google Advanced Patent Search performed by the 
author.  Search parameters: quartz AND crystal AND (piezo OR piezoelectric)).  All patents with the 
Assignee listed as one of the six organizations shown in this chart were included.  Figure created by 
author.) 
 
 
 
The technological context of quartz crystal technology cannot properly be 
understood without considering the hierarchical nature of modern, large-scale 
technological systems.  These systems display a remarkable degree of organizational 
complexity, beginning with single components and ending with massive super-systems 
that incorporate millions of components and require the support of large corporations to 
run smoothly.4  Figure 4 presents a simple, four-level hierarchy of technological scale, 
each level progressively more complex than the previous.  The operation of each level 
depends on the proper functioning of all lower levels.  Thus, a malfunction in level II will 
                                                 
4 See Thomas Parke Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems," in The Social Construction 
of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Thomas P. 
Hughes Wiebe E. Bijker, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 51-82. 
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lead to failure of levels III and IV.  The lay public generally recognizes levels III and IV 
technology; level III comprises most consumer products, and level IV is often the subject 
of government regulatory action.  But levels I and II technology are usually hidden to the 
public.  Quartz crystal technology, as primarily a level I and II technology, is not widely 
known to non-technologists.  Yet the level III and IV technologies that depend on quartz 
crystal – radio, telephony, computing, and timepieces – are ubiquitous in modern life.  
Hence, there is a hidden aspect to quartz crystal technology that has kept it from being 
widely appreciated. 
 
Level Name Examples (Radio, Housing, Transportation) 
I Component Quartz Crystal Unit, Wall Stud, Piston 
II Sub-system or Circuit Quartz Oscillator, Wall, Engine 
III System Radio transmitter, House, Automobile 
IV Super-System Broadcast radio network, Housing development, 
National transportation system 
    Figure 4: Hierarchy of Scale for Large Technological Systems 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
In examining quartz crystal technology, this study will focus primarily on its 
engineering knowledge base, though other factors such as economics and raw material 
procurement will not be ignored.  This focus on knowledge is in keeping with much of 
the recent literature in both economic history and history of technology.5  One reason for 
this focus is that it goes hand in hand with the study of technological communities.  This 
is because, as Edward Constant has noted, technology as knowledge finds its home in 
                                                 
5 For example, see Jr. Layton, Edwin T., "Technology As Knowledge," Technology and Culture 15, no. 1 
(January 1974): 31-41.  See also Edward W. Constant II, "The Social Locus of Technological Practice: 
Community, System, or Organization?," in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New 
Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and 
Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 223-42.  For a dated but still useful overview of the 
“technology as knowledge” literature, see Chapter 3 of John M. Staudenmaier, Technology's Storytellers: 
Reweaving the Human Fabric (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985). 
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communities of practitioners.  As he puts it, the technological community is the “social 
locus of technological knowledge.”6  And as Edwin Layton, Jr. has stated, “the ideas of 
technologists (i.e., engineering knowledge) cannot be understood in isolation; they must 
be seen in the context of a community of technologists and of the relations of this 
community to other social agencies.”7  Put simply, without a technological community to 
nourish, protect, and add to it, engineering knowledge stagnates and dies. 
Another reason for focusing on knowledge – engineering knowledge in particular 
– is its relation to technological change and economic growth (or decline).  Significant 
economic shifts can often be traced to changes in technological practice, which 
themselves can usually be traced to either the creation of new engineering knowledge or 
the revision of the existing engineering knowledge base.  Economic historian Joel Mokyr, 
in studying the relationship between technology and economic growth, has argued 
persuasively that a society’s economic growth is dependent on and proportional to that 
society’s ability to continuously generate and accumulate new “useful knowledge,” the 
two largest components of which are scientific knowledge and engineering knowledge.8  
Scientific and engineering knowledge, says Mokyr, are mutually reinforcing; they must 
constantly feed into and reinforce one another in order to generate sustained economic 
growth.   
                                                 
6 Edward W. Constant II, "The Social Locus of Technological Practice: Community, System, or 
Organization?," in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and 
History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 1989), 223-42, cited: 240. 
7 Jr. Layton, Edwin T., "Technology As Knowledge," Technology and Culture 15, no. 1 (January 1974): 
31-41, cited: 41. 
8 Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002).  Mokyr acknowledges his borrowing of the “useful knowledge” concept from 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Simon Kuznets. 
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But just what is engineering knowledge, and what does it look like?  Figure 5 
summarizes the following discussion and shows the relationship of engineering 
knowledge to other types of useful knowledge.  To begin with, engineering knowledge 
must be clearly distinguished from scientific knowledge.  As engineer-historian Walter 
Vincenti and others have argued, and this study will confirm, engineering knowledge is 
quite distinct from scientific knowledge.9  While the activities that produce these 
knowledge bases sometimes appear the same, the ends toward which the knowledge 
bases aim is very different.  For one, scientific knowledge is generally propositional 
while engineering knowledge is usually prescriptive.  That is, science, in its purest form, 
says, “This is the way the world is.”  Engineering says, “This is how we’d like the world 
to be, and here’s how we can get there.”  Put crudely, scientific knowledge is “know 
what;” engineering knowledge is “know how.”  Furthermore, scientific and engineering 
knowledge generally differ in their levels of specificity and context dependence.  
Engineers often develop highly contextualized knowledge that applies only to specific 
class of devices or systems.  For example, an engineer may develop a vacuum tube-based 
amplifier circuit along with an equation that defines the amplifier’s gain.  This gain 
equation applies only to this particular amplifier circuit; a new circuit configuration will 
require a new gain equation.  In contrast, scientists usually aim for universal truths about 
nature that are assumed to be true in all times and places.   
 
 
                                                 
9 Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical 
History, ed. Merritt Roe Smith, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1990).   
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Figure 5: Four Forms of Joel Mokyr’s “Useful Knowledge” 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
Engineering knowledge must also be distinguished from another type of non-
scientific useful knowledge – artisanal, craft-based knowledge.  The later is a form of so-
called “tacit” knowledge in that it is not easily codified and communicated to others 
without personal, face-to-face contact.10  Engineering knowledge, on the other hand, is 
explicitly codified and communicated through documents such as journal articles, patent 
applications, and test procedures.  This study’s eschewal of artisanal knowledge is not 
due to its lack of relevance or importance.  To the contrary, artisanal knowledge has been 
vital to the development of quartz crystal technology, such as during World War I when 
the technology first crossed the Atlantic from Europe to America.  But a detailed study of 
artisanal knowledge is beyond the present capabilities of the author.  Moreover, the study 
                                                 
10 The scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi first coined the concept of “tacit knowing.”  Sociologist of 
science Harry Collins later described the characteristics of “tacit knowledge” within a scientific 
community.  Harry M. Collins, "The TEA Set: Tacit Knowledge and Scientific Networks," Science Studies 
of Science 4, no. 2 (1974): 165-85. 
Mokyr’s “Useful Knowledge”  
(a.k.a. Technological Knowledge) 
Engineering Knowledge 
Artisanal Knowledge 
Scientific Knowledge 
(Empirically Based) 
Explicitly  
Codified 
Tacit 
Propositional Prescriptive 
A Priori Knowledge 
(Shared Assumptions; 
Logic) 
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of engineering knowledge is more conducive to historical inquiry given the rich array of 
written documents available.  
Engineering knowledge displays another characteristic that was vital to this study.  
In most countries, engineering knowledge, or at least the parts of it that can be classified 
as “invention,” is subject to limited-term private ownership in the form of patents.  The 
vital connection between patents, technological change, and economic growth has been 
observed by many, including the framers of the U.S. Constitution, who instituted the 
American patent system in order “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”11  
Walter Vincenti, in his classic study of aeronautical design, deliberately downplayed this 
aspect of engineering knowledge, for his concern was primarily with what he called the 
process of “normal design,” in which invention plays a relatively small role.12  This 
study, however, will bring the ownership aspect of engineering knowledge to the fore, 
exploring the role of engineering knowledge in the patenting process and the competition 
that often arises between inventive organizations over the control of patents. 
Finally, engineering knowledge often appears in several easily recognizable 
forms.  Among these are the following: (1) device or system configurations, (2) 
fabrication or manufacturing procedures, (3) chemical composition of materials, (4) 
design criteria, (5) performance specifications, and (6) empirical performance data.  Items 
(1) through (3) are patentable and thus subject to exclusive monopoly control by the 
inventor for a period of time.  The remaining items in the list above, though not 
patentable, are nevertheless important for the creation, verification, and revision of items 
                                                 
11 U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8. 
12 Walter Vincenti, What Engineers Know and How They Know It: Analytical Studies from Aeronautical 
History, ed. Merritt Roe Smith, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore: Johns 
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(1), (2), and (3).  Items (4) and (5) are often placed in the public domain and can play an 
important role in the process of industry-wide standardization.  And item (6), often held 
closely by firms, plays an important role in the testing and verification of engineering 
designs. 
The story of quartz crystal technology suggests that useful knowledge, and 
engineering knowledge in particular, is not continuously generated and accumulated 
unless a technological community forms.  More specifically, the formation of a 
technological community is a necessary but not always sufficient condition for the 
sustained generation and accumulation of engineering knowledge.  Of course, such a 
community must also have adequate resources and training for pursuing knowledge 
generation.  Additionally, the technology in question must be ripe for development, 
regardless of its scale.  That is, the scientific principles underlying the technology, what 
Mokyr calls propositional knowledge, should be understood well enough such that 
engineering work will be productive of useful improvements; but the technology should 
not be so highly developed that its knowledge base has become entrenched and the 
technology considered routine.   
All of this begs the question, “What constitutes a technological community?”  For 
my purposes here, a technological community is simply a group, small or large, of 
technological practitioners (engineers, scientists, technicians, inventors, technology 
regulators or policy-makers) who both contribute to advances and stay abreast of the 
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latest developments in a particular area of technology over a period of time.14  This area 
of technology may be of any scale, from the component level to the mega-system level.  
The practitioners may be amateur or professional technologists, and they may or may not 
work directly with each other; in fact, they often compete directly with one another.  
Furthermore, they may work in other technological fields, beyond their work on the 
shared technology in question; that is, their work on the common technology (quartz 
crystal technology in this case) may constitute only a small part of their total technical 
work.  More importantly, to the extent that a technological community draws members 
from a diversity of other technological fields, members are able to make important 
connections between seemingly different fields.  For example, the quartz crystal 
technological community examined in this study brought together engineers interested in 
standards of measure, broadcast radio, multiplex telephony, precision timekeeping, and 
even stress analysis of materials.  Such cross-fertilization is made possible by a 
characteristic of all technological systems.  Namely, different technologies at a given 
level of scale (see Figure 3) often share in common technologies at a lower scale.  For 
example, both radio and telephone mega-systems, level IV technologies, use oscillator 
circuitry, a level II technology.  Thus, radio and telephone engineers have often shared an 
interest in oscillator design, leading them to share a sustained commitment to developing 
and advancing quartz crystal technology and its associated knowledge base.   
 
                                                 
14 In defining “technological community” in this way, I am broadening Edwin Constant’s use of the term.  
He has defined “technological community” as a group of technological practitioners who adhere to a 
particular tradition of technological practice.  (Edward W. Constant II, "The Social Locus of Technological 
Practice: Community, System, or Organization?," in The Social Construction of Technological Systems: 
New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and 
Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 223-42.)  In the time period covered in this story, 
quartz crystal technology drew practitioners from a variety of traditions.  Thus, it is more useful for me to 
center my definition of community on quartz crystal rather than on particular traditions of practice. 
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The formation and growth of the quartz crystal technological community in early 
20th century America is a rich topic of study for at least three reasons.  First, it sheds light 
on the ways in which the institutional structures of research and development during this 
era affected the formation of technological communities.  Second, it illuminates the 
influence of materials science on communications technologies between Lee DeForest’s 
invention of the Audion and Bell Labs’ invention of the transistor.  And third, it 
illustrates the growth and maturation of engineering knowledge in a particular field of 
technology, illustrating as well the nature of the work required to produce this 
knowledge. 
The story of the quartz crystal technological community cannot be considered 
apart from the early 20th century creation and growth of science-based research and 
development laboratories both in industry and in government.  American businessmen 
created the modern multiunit business enterprise in the second half of the 19th century to 
manage the large and complex operations involved in industries such as railroads, steel, 
oil, telephony, and electric lighting.15  In the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
many large firms, in imitation of pioneering German firms such as Bayer, BASF, 
Hoechst, and Siemens, began conducting science-based research and development in 
order to accomplish a number of objectives: to explore and develop new markets; to 
improve existing products and manufacturing processes; to enhance the enterprise’s 
competitive position vis-à-vis competitor firms; and to extend the enterprise’s market 
control as key patents, such as Edison’s incandescent electric light patent or Alexander 
Graham Bell’s telephone patent, approached expiration.  Five pioneering companies 
                                                 
15 Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1977). 
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played important roles in giving birth to quartz crystal technology.  Three of them, 
American Telephone & Telegraph (AT&T), General Electric (G.E.), and Westinghouse, 
were among the earliest American firms to form in-house R&D organizations.  The 
fourth, the Federal Telegraph Company, was formed in California in 1909 and developed 
its R&D capabilities in the teens.  The fifth and final, the Radio Corporation of America 
(R.C.A.), formed in 1919 through an agreement between the U.S. Navy and G.E., 
initiated its in-house R&D program in the mid-1920s.  
 Competition among these firms for control of radio technology was fierce, and 
quartz crystal patents were an important currency in this competition.  Examining the 
ways that quartz crystal patents were used by firms adds an important dimension to the 
well-known history of radio and the crucial role played by patents there.16  Most histories 
of broadcast radio focus on receiver technology because this was where the largest 
market and financial stakes were.  Consequently, competition for receiver patents, such 
as those for the super-regenerative and superheterodyne circuits, was intense and long-
lasting.  But by looking at quartz crystal patents, this study shows that competition was 
also present in transmitter technology, even though this element of radio was far more 
heavily regulated than receiver technology.  In fact, government regulation of radio 
transmission actually intensified the competition for quartz crystal patents. 
                                                 
16 On the growth of formalized research and development laboratories in early 20th century America, see, 
for example, Encyclopedia of the United States in the Twentieth Century, 1996, s.v. "Industrial Research 
and Manufacturing Technology." by David A. Hounshell.  David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, 
Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
Chapters 2-4.  Leonard Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and Business at G.E. 
and Bell, 1876-1926 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  George Wise, Willis R. Whitney, 
General Electric, and the Origins of U. S. Industrial Research (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1985).  For the fierce competition over control of key radio patents, see Leonard Reich, "Research, Patents, 
and the Struggle to Control Radio: A Study of Big Business and the Uses of Industrial Research," Business 
History Review 51, no. 2 (1977): 208-35. 
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In addition to considering the business climate of early 20th century America, the 
growth of the quartz crystal technological community cannot be understood apart from 
the general growth of materials science research in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.  
Much research in this field was focused upon construction materials – iron, steel, 
concrete, and wood – but some was also directed toward materials that altered 
communications technologies.17  Between 1870 and 1950, a number of advances in 
materials science revolutionized electrically mediated communication.  These advances 
included not only the creation and synthesis of entirely new artificial materials, but also 
the discovery and exploitation of hitherto unknown properties of natural materials.  
Among the most important research efforts were those of Ferdinand Braun, Thomas 
Edison, Ambrose Fleming, and General Electric’s Irving Langmuir on semiconductor 
materials and the phenomenon of thermionic emission.  This work established the base of 
engineering knowledge necessary for the invention and refinement of the vacuum tube 
triode amplifier.  In 1915, AT&T produced over 3200 such amplifiers for its long-
distance telephony system.18  And during World War I, with the U.S. government 
temporarily suspending radio patent rights for the duration of the war, G.E. produced 
roughly 200,000 vacuum tube devices.19  After the war, both G.E. and AT&T improved 
the materials out of which triode filaments were made, significantly extending their 
lifetime and establishing the technological foundation for the radio broadcasting boom of 
                                                 
17 David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and the Pursuit of Economic Growth (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989).  Chapter 3 – The beginnings of the commercial exploitation of 
science by U.S. industry. 
18 Leonard Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and Business at G.E. and Bell, 
1876-1926 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 164. 
19 Ibid., 88. 
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the early 1920s.20  Finally, in the 1930s and 1940s, Bell Labs researchers performed 
pioneering work in semiconductor physics that famously led to the invention of the solid-
state transistor by John Bardeen, Walter Brattain, and William Shockley in 1948.21  The 
transistor enabled electronic communications devices to become smaller, faster, and 
cheaper than would have likely ever been possible with vacuum tube technology.   
An important material has been omitted from this brief chronology.  Quartz 
crystal and the devices fashioned from it greatly influenced the evolution of two 
communications technologies, radio and telephony.  In radio, quartz crystal devices 
impacted radio transmitters in two ways; they enabled operators to measure radio 
frequencies with unprecedented precision, and they enabled operators to adhere to 
specified transmit frequencies with unprecedented stability over time.  In telephony, 
quartz crystal devices allowed AT&T to squeeze an increasing number of simultaneous 
phone conversations onto a single communications cable.  These developments were 
possible only because a vast amount of engineering knowledge concerning quartz crystal 
was discovered, created, and accumulated between the two World Wars.  After World 
War II, materials science research continued as the U.S. Army Signal Corps desired to 
find a synthetic replacement for natural quartz crystal.  Research funded by the Corps and 
performed by the Bell Telephone Laboratories and the Bush Development Company led 
to an economical method for growing quartz crystal in high pressure chambers, thereby 
obviating the need for large, flawless natural quartz crystals.   
                                                 
20 Hugh Aitken, The Continuous Wave: Technology and American Radio, 1900-1932 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 511. 
21 Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age, First ed., Sloan 
Technology Series (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997). 
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In viewing quartz crystal technology from the vantage point of materials science, 
this study follows the lead of recent historical studies of steel, semiconductors, plastics, 
radioactive materials, indigo, and pulp and paper.22  These studies, including this one, 
emphasize a key characteristic of technology in all times and places.  Namely, the known 
properties of available materials often define and delimit the technological possibilities of 
a given time.  The real question of interest then is this.  What are the factors that drive 
scientists and engineers to either better understand the properties of existing materials or 
to develop altogether new materials?  This study yields several answers to this question, 
which are presented in the Conclusions chapter. 
One further consideration is important for understanding the growth of the quartz 
crystal technological community.  This is the nature of the work required to produce 
engineering knowledge within this field of technology.  The first thing to be noted is that 
the technological work dealing with quartz crystal devices did not require large amounts 
of capital.  The raw material, quartz crystal, was not especially expensive or hard to 
obtain, and the tools needed to turn it into a useful artifact were generally available in any 
well-equipped machine shop.  Economists would say that the field of quartz crystal 
technology exhibited low barriers to entry.  Thus, barring patent restrictions, firms both 
large and small were relatively free to enter the field. 
                                                 
22 On steel see Thomas J. Misa, A Nation of Steel: The Making of Modern America, 1865-1925 (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).  On semiconductors, see Christopher Lecuyer and David C. Brock, 
"The Materiality of Microelectronics," History and Technology 22, no. 3 (September 2006): 301-25.  On 
plastics, see Wiebe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical 
Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).  On radioactive materials, see Bettyann Holtzmann Kevles, 
Naked To The Bone (New York: Addison Wesley, 1997).   See also Gabrielle Hecht, The Radiance of 
France: Nuclear Power and National Identity after World War 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).  On 
indigo, see Prakash Kumar, "Facing Competition: The History of Indigo Experiments in Colonial India, 
1897-1920" (Ph.D. diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004).  On pulp and paper, see Hannes 
Toivanen, "Learning and Corporate Strategy: The Dynamic Evolution of the North American Pulp and 
Paper Industry, 1860-1960" (Ph.D. diss., Georgia Institute of Technology, 2004). 
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Second, the technological work described in this study centered on devices, the 
principal one being the quartz crystal unit (QCU).  Invented in its basic form by a 
university physicist just after World War I, the QCU took decades of engineering work to 
refine and perfect.  Much of this work fell into a few general categories: improving the 
QCU’s power efficiency, increasing the QCU’s useful operating life, neutralizing the 
harmful effect of environmental change or extreme environmental conditions on QCU 
performance, increasing the yield of the QCU fabrication process, economizing on the 
raw quartz crystal used in QCU manufacture, and replacing the natural quartz crystal 
used in QCUs up through World War II with artificially grown quartz.  Achieving some 
of these goals required scientific research aiming for a better understanding of quartz 
crystal.  Others required mechanical ingenuity.  Still others required a deep familiarity 
with the methods and practices of radio engineering.  Thus, the effort to improve the 
QCU’s performance was cross-disciplinary.  It brought together engineers and scientists 
from a variety of backgrounds.  In this way, the QCU was not unlike the incandescent 
lamp or the triode vacuum tube.   
Finally, the technological work of quartz crystal technology was stimulated and 
shaped by the fact that much, though not all, of the associated engineering knowledge 
was patentable.  The initial developments within the field were based on non-patentable 
scientific discoveries, but, beginning with World War I, many quartz crystal 
developments were both patentable and cumulative.  A handful of key quartz crystal 
patents (also called basic or fundamental patents) were issued in the early and mid 1920s.  
The owners of these patents, who happened to be independent inventors, were thus in a 
position to exercise a great deal of control over the evolution of quartz crystal devices, at 
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least up until World War II.  For a number of reasons, however, this never happened.  
Instead, a wide range of inventors, firms, and research institutions contributed to the 
growth and accumulation of quartz crystal knowledge.  The reasons for this diversity of 
research sites, as well as for the rich variety of quartz crystal patents issued, is one of the 
key points of interest in this study. 
 
This study is organized into nine chapters.  Chapters 1 through 8 are roughly 
chronological, with the exceptions of Chapters 3 and 5.  Chapter 3 breaks from the 
narrative to provide a broad overview of quartz crystal technology based on extensive 
patent data, and Chapter 5 overlaps considerably with Chapter 4 but presents the narrative 
from a regulatory rather than an industry perspective.  The conclusions of Chapter 9 draw 
from all preceding chapters.  What follows is a very brief synopsis of the chapter 
contents. 
Chapter 2 provides a pre-history of quartz crystal technology, beginning in France 
before the turn of the century with the Curie brothers’ discovery of piezoelectricity and 
ending in the U.S. in the immediate post-World War I years.  For most of this period, 
piezoelectricity remained an area of purely academic interest for a handful of European 
scientists.  In terms of knowledge, much of the foundational propositional knowledge of 
piezoelectricity was discovered at this time.  With the coming of World War I, however, 
piezoelectric technology was born.  The Allied countries, united in their efforts to combat 
the German submarine menace, developed the first piezoelectric SONAR systems.  This 
work began in France and England but was quickly transferred across the Atlantic, where 
American physicists and engineers picked up the work.  The American anti-submarine 
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work brought together many individuals that would greatly influence the course of quartz 
crystal technology for decades to come.  This chapter ends by introducing the post-war 
work of one of these individuals, Walter Guyton Cady.  In the early 1920s, Cady filed for 
and was issued two patents, one for the piezoelectric resonator and the other for the 
piezoelectric oscillator.  These patents provided the technological foundation for all 
subsequent work in quartz crystal technology. 
Chapter 3 departs from the narrative structure of Chapter 2 and presents a long 
view of subsequent developments in quartz crystal technology.  Based heavily on a 
detailed evaluation of quartz crystal patents filed between 1918 and 1959, this chapter 
identifies the essential knowledge and knowledge producers and surveys the entire scope 
of quartz crystal devices and accessories.  It provides a baseline technical background 
useful for understanding the narrative of Chapters 4 through 8 and helpful in exploring 
the thematic issues raised earlier in this introduction.  In addition, this chapter tracks the 
inventive activity of quartz crystal knowledge producers – private firms, government 
labs, and independent inventors – over four decades.  Many of these producers have 
prominent roles in the ensuing narrative. 
Chapter 4 picks up the narrative begun in Chapter 2, beginning with Walter 
Cady’s attempts to find a licensee or buyer for his piezoelectric resonator and oscillator 
patents.  The earliest organizations to express interest were the U.S. Bureau of Standards 
and the newly opened U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).  The Bureau was 
interested in using Cady’s resonator as a new reference standard for measuring high-
frequency radio waves, while the NRL viewed Cady’s oscillator as a means of achieving 
greater frequency stability for its high-powered radio transmitters.  Radio amateurs also 
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adopted Cady’s oscillator, which allowed them to communicate in the newly discovered 
shortwave radio band.  It wasn’t long, however, before Cady’s inventions attracted 
commercial interest.  The early 1920s boom in AM radio broadcasting created an 
enormous consumer market for affordable radio receivers, but the many stations 
crowding the airwaves created a thorny interference problem.  Once it became clear that 
Cady’s quartz crystal oscillator could ameliorate this problem, inventors began building 
on Cady’s foundational patents with scores of improvement patents.  Radio transmitter 
manufacturers – principally RCA and AT&T – began purchasing sizeable portfolios of 
these patents, as well as developing their own through their in-house R&D programs.  
Thus, this chapter presents the initial formation of the quartz crystal technological 
community, comprised largely of radio engineers in the largest American radio 
companies, but also of enterprising radio amateurs.  At this point, quartz crystal 
engineering knowledge was for the most part considered a small subset of radio 
engineering knowledge, interesting as far as it went, but not broad enough to merit study 
apart from the context of radio. 
Chapter 5 examines the same historical period as Chapter 4, yet from the 
perspective of broadcast radio regulation.  This chapter argues that the Radio Section of 
the U.S. Bureau of Standards greatly accelerated the broadcast industry’s adoption of 
quartz crystal technology by developing design criteria and performance specifications 
for broadcast transmitters and by lobbying for strict frequency adherence legislation.  The 
principal figure at the Radio Section was John Dellinger, a prominent radio engineer and 
member of the Institute of Radio Engineers (I.R.E.), from whom he received much 
technical assistance in his regulatory work.  Also assisting Dellinger in his work was the 
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General Radio Company of Cambridge, MA.  This small but influential firm helped the 
Bureau realize its strict frequency adherence guidelines by pioneering the manufacture of 
quartz crystal-based frequency standards for use by broadcast stations, industrial R&D 
labs, government standards agencies, and manufacturers of high precision radio 
equipment.  Without General Radio’s affordable, portable, and highly accurate frequency 
standards, quartz crystal engineering knowledge would have likely reached a plateau by 
the mid-1920s. 
Chapter 6 relates developments in quartz crystal technology from the late 1920s 
up to just before World War II.  During this period, AT&T’s Bell Telephone Laboratories 
developed quartz crystal wave filters, which, along with its newly developed coaxial 
cable, enabled the company to greatly increase the capacity of its multiplex long-distance 
telephony network.  This period also saw the rise of many small, privately owned 
manufacturing firms that specialized in the production of quartz crystal units (QCUs) for 
the thriving amateur radio market.  By the end of the 1930s, a sizeable and diverse quartz 
crystal technological community existed.  This community had created and accumulated 
a great deal of scientific and engineering knowledge pertaining to quartz crystal, and it 
had established the centrality of that knowledge to the two most significant 
communications systems of the day – radio and telephony.  Yet one significant area of 
quartz crystal technology – QCU fabrication and manufacture – remained relatively 
undeveloped, for most QCU production remained small-scale and craft-based. 
Chapter 7 chronicles the rapid escalation of QCU production from small-scale 
batch production to mass production, brought on by the urgency of World War II.  With 
the U.S. mobilizing for war, all private QCU production was placed under centralized 
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management and optimized for satisfying the needs of the Army Signal Corps.  The effort 
to rapidly scale-up QCU production revealed two potentially fatal weaknesses in quartz 
crystal technology.  First, the rigorous demands of mass production exposed areas of 
insufficient engineering knowledge that had gone unnoticed as long as small-scale, craft-
based QCU production methods reigned.  Consequently, engineers and inventors 
developed much new engineering knowledge throughout the course of the war.  Second, 
the vast amounts of raw quartz crystal needed to supply the Army Signal Corps during 
the war made quartz crystal a critical national resource.  But virtually all of the quartz 
used in the war was imported from Brazil.  If quartz crystal technology was to have any 
future in the U.S., one of two things had to happen.  The U.S. would need to either 
discover a significant new domestic source of natural quartz crystal or develop a 
synthetic substitute for natural quartz.  With the former option failing to materialize, the 
latter was the quartz crystal industry’s only hope for the future. 
Chapter 8 tells the story of the decade long Army Signal Corps-sponsored 
research effort to develop a substitute for natural Brazilian quartz crystal.  As part of this 
effort, the Corps created and sponsored an annual Frequency Control Symposium, which 
had the effect of consolidating the scattered quartz crystal technological community and 
imparting to it a self-consciousness that had never quite existed.  The search for a quartz 
substitute was conducted in the U.S. by two firms, Cleveland-based Brush Development 
Company and AT&T’s Bell Telephone Laboratories.  These firms pursued similar but 
distinct paths in which flawless quartz crystals would be artificially grown (i.e., cultured) 
in a laboratory from crushed natural quartz.  By the mid-1950s, two distinct quartz 
culturing processes had been developed, and a new industry – the cultured quartz industry 
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– had been formed.  Now the U.S. quartz crystal industry, after nearly four decades of 
evolution, was finally freed from its dependence on natural Brazilian quartz crystal.  
Furthermore, QCU manufacturers could now tailor the growth of cultured quartz to suit 
certain applications.  In the beginning, Walter Cady harnessed nature’s timekeeper; by 
the late 1950s, engineers could tamper with nature to design and fabricate improved 
timekeepers. 
 Chapter 9 closes the study by analyzing the narrative of the preceding chapters 
along with the patent data of Chapter 3, arriving at a number of conclusions regarding the 
conception, growth, and maturation of the quartz crystal technological community and its 
creation, revision, and preservation of a distinct body of engineering knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PRE-HISTORY OF QUARTZ CRYSTAL TECHNOLOGY (1880-
1923) 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 The scientific study of the phenomenon of piezoelectricity began in 1880, but 
technologies exploiting the piezoelectric property of quartz crystal did not appear until 
World War I.  Thus, the story of the quartz crystal technological community has a nearly 
four decade pre-history.  This chapter tells this pre-history as well as the history of World 
War I piezoelectric research and the beginnings of the post-war quartz crystal 
technological community.  In doing so, this chapter shows that, prior to the war, 
piezoelectricity remained merely an esoteric area of crystal physics due primarily to 
technological limitations of the time.  During the war, these limitations were removed, 
and piezoelectric technology soon appeared.  This chapter also shows that the National 
Research Council, formed in the U.S. during the war, was instrumental in creating the 
beginnings of a piezoelectric technological community.  In the course of the war, quartz 
crystal proved itself to be among the most useful of piezoelectric crystals, leading many 
researchers to focus on it to the exclusion of other crystals, such as Rochelle Salt.  After 
the war, Wesleyan University professor Walter Guyton Cady continued the work begun 
during the war, ultimately developing and patenting the foundational engineering 
knowledge of quartz crystal technology – the piezo-resonator and the piezo-oscillator.  
The originality of Cady’s work was soon contested, leading to a prolonged battle between 
the two giant American radio companies of the time – RCA and AT&T – over the 
ownership of quartz crystal patents.  This rivalry is shown to have established a fruitful 
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dynamic that would lead to a proliferation of quartz crystal engineering knowledge in the 
years to come. 
 
2.2  The Curie brothers discover piezoelectricity 
 The year was 1880; the place, Paris, France.23  Brothers Jacques and Pierre Curie 
were young physicists, both interested in exploring the properties of crystals under 
changing environmental conditions.  Jacques, age 24, served as assistant to a professor of 
mineralogy at the Sorbonne.  3 ½ years his junior, Jacque’s brother Pierre was still a 
novice experimentalist; his only experimental work prior to 1880 was a determination of 
the lengths of heat waves, performed with the help of a professor.  The brothers’ interest 
in crystals was not surprising given the pioneering history of mineralogy and 
crystallography in France.  In 1745, the Jardin du Roi (Garden of the King) established a 
chair of mineralogy, and the French government founded the Ecole des Mines (School of 
Mines) in 1783, dedicated exclusively to the fields of mineralogy and metallurgy.24  
Upon the founding of the French Academy of Sciences in 1795, one of the ten original 
sections was dedicated to mineralogy.  And in 1772, Frenchman Rome de l’Isle (1736-
1790) published one of the first books on crystallography, Essai de Cristallographie, 
which laid the foundation for the highly influential work of Rene-Just Hauy (1743-1822), 
one of two founding members of the Academy’s mineralogy section and regarded today 
as one of the founders of the science of crystallography.25  More recently, Frenchmen 
                                                 
23 What follows is a brief summary of the Curie brothers’ discovery of the piezoelectric effect.  For a 
thorough account of this discovery, written from a history of science perspective, see Shaul Katzir, "The 
Discovery of the Piezoelectric Effect," Archive for History of the Exact Sciences 57, no. 1 (January 2003): 
61-91. 
24 Maurice Crosland, Science Under Control: The French Academy of Sciences 1795-1914 (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
25 Ibid.  Note: The other founding member of the Academy’s mineralogy section was D’Arcet. 
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Charles Friedel (1832-1899) and John Mothee Gaugain had studied the pyroelectric 
properties of crystals, pyroelectricity being the phenomenon in which a crystal generates 
an electric polarity when subjected to changes in temperature.26  The Curie brothers had 
acquainted themselves with these works.  In 1880, based upon their knowledge of 
pyroelectricity and furthered by their own studies, the brothers postulated the existence of 
a similar phenomenon - piezoelectricity, in which the application of pressure on the faces 
of a crystal would produce an electric polarity.   
To test their hypothesis, the Curie brothers took a crystal and cut it in such a way 
that two of its faces were perfectly parallel as well as perpendicular to one of the crystal’s 
three natural axes.27  Next, they took two tin sheets, placed them in contact with each of 
the two faces, and electrically isolated the two tin sheets from each other; these sheets 
were to serve as electrodes.  The entire device was then placed in a vise such that 
pressure could be applied to the two parallel faces.  Finally, the brothers connected the 
two electrodes of an electrometer to the two tin sheets in order to measure the electrical 
potential between them.  Upon tightening the vise, the electrometer’s needle jumped, 
clearly showing the presence of an electric charge.  The greater the pressure applied, the 
higher the needle jumped, indicating that the electrical potential generated was 
proportional to the intensity of the applied pressure.  The Curies observed this effect in 
ten types of crystal, including quartz, cane sugar, and Rochelle salt (potassium sodium 
tartrate).28  
                                                 
26 Jacques Curie and Pierre Curie, "Development, by pressure, of polar electricity in hemihedral crystals 
with inclined faces," Comptes Rendus 91 (2 August 1880): 294. 
27 One of the defining characteristics of a crystal is that its molecules are arranged in a lattice structure, 
making it easy for scientists to impose a set of three axes, similar to those used in a Cartesian coordinate 
system, onto the crystal.   
28 Jacques Curie and Pierre Curie, "Development, by pressure, of polar electricity in hemihedral crystals 
with inclined faces," Comptes Rendus 91 (2 August 1880): 294. 
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 At the time of the Curie brothers’ discovery, quartz crystal was valued primarily 
for its aesthetic beauty, optical clarity, and hardness.  The sparkling clearness of pure 
quartz coupled with its hardness had long inspired people to fashion jewelry, optical 
lenses, and, most famously, crystal balls from it.  The 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica 
listed a number of common applications for quartz crystal, including gems and 
ornaments, balance weights, “pivot supports for delicate instruments,” engraving tools, 
spectacles, and as a grinding and polishing material.29   
Because of its chemical composition (silicon dioxide), quartz was and remains the 
most common mineral in the earth’s crust, often found mixed with other minerals.  But 
despite its ubiquity, large deposits of pure, high-quality quartz crystal are relatively rare 
throughout the world.  Though large single crystals are not uncommon, they often contain 
defects, such as twinning30 and discoloration, which compromise their aesthetic as well as 
their piezoelectric value.   
When the Curies made their discovery, the Dauphine region of France, near the 
Italian border, was known to contain some of the finest deposits of quartz crystal in all of 
Europe.  In fact, this was likely the source of the samples with which the Curies 
experimented.  Across the Atlantic, the U. S. Geological Survey had already noted 
several deposits of high quality quartz.  Its 1882 Annual Survey of U. S. mineral 
resources noted that quartz could be found in New York, the Hot Springs region of 
Arkansas, Colorado, the New Jersey coast, and part of North Carolina.  Most of the 
                                                 
29 The Wikisource 1911 Encyclopedia Project. (Accessed 17 July 2006) available from 
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Main_Page; Internet. 
30 Twinning is a phenomenon in which a crystal possesses two or more distinct orientations.  It is often 
difficult to ascertain from a crystal’s external appearance.  The presence of twinning seriously compromises 
a crystal’s piezoelectric usefulness.  See Walter Guyton Cady, Piezoelectricity; An Introduction to the 
Theory and Applications of Electromechanical Phenomena in Crystals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), 
31-33. 
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specimens collected in these regions, the Survey noted, were sold as souvenirs or 
occasionally turned into jewelry.  Despite these numerous domestic sources, quartz 
crystal used for optical purposes were typically imported from Brazil, “not that the 
American is not fine enough, but the good material found here rarely reaches the proper 
channels, and the Brazilian is cheap.”31  Thus, by the 1880’s, Brazil had gained a 
reputation as having some of the highest quality and least expensive quartz crystal in the 
world.  As will be seen in later chapters, Brazil maintained this reputation well into the 
20th century. 
 The Curies published their discovery of piezoelectricity in the August 2, 1880 
issue of the French journal Comptes Rendus, known for its rapid publication of research 
presented before weekly meetings of the French National Academy of Sciences.32,33 The 
particular form of piezoelectricity observed by the brothers in these first experiments, in 
which the crystal converts applied physical pressure into electrical energy, came to be 
called the “direct” piezoelectric effect.  Upon learning of their work, French physicist and 
mathematician Gabriel Lippmann (1845-1921), arguing from theoretical assumptions, 
hypothesized the existence of a converse piezoelectric effect, in which the application of 
an electric charge to a piezoelectric crystal would produce physical deformation of the 
crystal.  Though the existence of this converse effect was much more difficult to verify 
experimentally than was the direct effect, the Curie brothers succeeded in doing so, 
publishing their results in December of 1881.34   
                                                 
31  U.S. Geological Survey,  Mineral Resources of the United States, (Washington, D. C., 1883). 
32 Jacques Curie and Pierre Curie, "Development, by pressure, of polar electricity in hemihedral crystals 
with inclined faces," Comptes Rendus 91 (2 August 1880): 294. 
33 Maurice Crosland, Science Under Control: The French Academy of Sciences 1795-1914 (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
34 Jacques Curie and Pierre Curie, "Contractions and dilations produced by electric voltages in hemihedral 
crystals with inclined faces," Comptes Rendus 93 (26 December 1881): 1137. 
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 What the Curie brothers had in fact discovered was that all piezoelectric crystals, 
including quartz, are natural transducers, converters of energy from one form to another.  
That is, these crystals can convert physical or mechanical energy into electrical energy.  
Furthermore, the energy conversion process is reversible, allowing electrical energy to be 
converted into mechanical energy.  As later researchers would learn, much energy is lost 
in each conversion35; nevertheless, the fact that quartz is a transducer in its natural state 
made it unique among electromechanical transducers of the time.  Other transducers, such 
as carbon microphones, electromagnets, and DC electric motors were and are very much 
artifacts that require a great deal of human design and fabrication to realize.  By contrast, 
quartz simply requires some cutting and polishing, as well as encasing it such that it can 
be easily interfaced with other electrical components.  Of course, the cutting, polishing, 
and encasing tasks are not always easy to achieve in practice, but they are not 
conceptually difficult. 
 
2.3  Discovery of piezoelectricity fails to yield any immediate technological applications 
Given all the practical applications to which piezoelectric materials were put in 
the 20th century (microphones, frequency stabilizers, phonograph pickups, ultrasonic 
transducers, loudspeakers), it may seem surprising at first glance to see that the Curie 
brothers’ discovery resulted immediately in only one practical application.  The brothers 
developed and patented the piezo-electric quartz electrometer, a device for measuring 
small DC electric potentials.36  This was a fairly straightforward application of the 
converse piezoelectric effect.  Pierre actually used the quartz electrometer years later in 
                                                 
35 It is this fact that makes the perpetual motion machine an impossibility.   
36 Jacques Curie and Pierre Curie, Electrometer System, French Patent Office, Patent No. 183,851, Issue 
Date: 27 May 1887. 
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his experiments with Marie Curie on radio-activity.37  However, no further patents for 
piezoelectric devices would appear until after World War I.38   
Surprising as the nearly four decade gap between the discovery of piezoelectricity 
and the birth of piezoelectric technology may seem, there are at least two solid reasons 
for it.  First and most importantly, full exploitation of piezoelectric quartz crystal had to 
await the development of auxiliary technologies, most notably technologies for 
generating and sustaining continuous radiofrequency electrical oscillations.39,40  
Unbeknownst to the Curie brothers, the true technological value of quartz crystal was to 
lie in its ability to operate at radiofrequencies, ranging from the tens of kilohertz (kHz) to 
hundreds of Megahertz (MHz).41  In the 1880s, electrical oscillators were limited to 
alternating current generators, which generated frequencies no higher than several 
hundred Hertz.  In the 1890s, alternators capable of producing oscillations up to 15 kHz 
were developed.42  The first decade and a half of the 20th century saw the development of 
                                                 
37 Marie Curie, Pierre Curie.  With the autobiographical notes of Marie Curie (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1963). 
38 According to an exhaustive bibliography of piezoelectricity published by Walter Cady in 1928, the next 
piezoelectric-related patent to be awarded was to R.W. Moore of the General Electric Company in 1920 for 
a method of growing piezoelectric crystals from solution. (U.S. Patent 1,347,350)  For a complete 
bibliography of patents up to 1928, see Walter Guyton Cady, "Bibliography on Piezo-Electricity," 
Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio Engineers 16, no. 4 (April 1928): 521-35. 
39 Two words are crucial here – “continuous” and “radiofrequency.”  “Continuous” designates undamped 
sinusoidal waves of the kind that are required for the transmission of voice, music, and other audible 
information.  Methods of producing high-frequency damped waves were developed as early as the 1860s, 
but these waves required the use of Morse code or other forms of pulsed modulation.  (See Chapter 3 of 
Hugh Aitken, Syntony and Spark: The Origins of Radio (New York: Wiley, 1976).)  “Radiofrequency” 
designates frequencies ranging from 10 kHz to 300 GHz.  One GHz is equal to 1,000,000,000 cycles per 
second. 
40 Shaul Katzir has made this point in Shaul Katzir, "Technological and scientific study in the discovery 
and application of the piezoelectric resonance" (paper presented at the The Applied-Science Problem - A 
Workshop, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, NJ, 6-8 May 2005).  Katzir notes that the 
development of the electronic vacuum tube amplifier was a technological pre-condition for the invention of 
the piezoelectric resonator. 
41 One kilohertz (kHz) is 1000 cycles per second; one Megahertz is 1,000,000 cycles per second. 
42 See Nikola Tesla, Alternating Electric Current Generator, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 447,921, 
Filing Date: 15 November 1890; Issue Date: 10 March 1891.  See also Hugh Aitken, The Continuous 
Wave: Technology and American Radio, 1900-1932 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 53. 
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several methods of radiofrequency oscillation.  Canadian Reginald Fessenden, working 
with General Electric engineer Ernst Alexanderson, developed radiofrequency alternators 
capable of producing frequencies as high as 100 kHz, but these devices were very heavy 
and bulky.  Valdemar Poulsen of Denmark developed an arc oscillator capable of 
generating frequencies up to 150 kHz, but this was also heavy and bulky.  Without 
question the most important device for practically producing high frequency oscillations 
was the triode vacuum tube, an extension of Ambrose Fleming’s diode and Lee De 
Forest’s audion.  This device, which had the advantage of being relatively small and 
operating on low power, was perfected as an oscillator by G.E., Westinghouse, and 
AT&T in the mid-teens.  The vacuum tube would allow quartz crystals to be used in 
compact and inexpensive electronic oscillator circuits.  Thus, by the mid to late teens, 
auxiliary technologies had developed to the point where the high frequency capabilities 
of piezoelectric quartz crystal could begin to be explored.43 
A second reason for the nearly four decade gap between the discovery of 
piezoelectricity and the appearance of piezoelectric applications concerns the Curies 
themselves.  The Curie brothers were much more scientists than engineers, and the late 
19th century was a time when the scientist/engineer distinction was still observed by 
many, even though engineers were already beginning to adopt scientific methods in their 
work.44  Both Curie brothers were much more interested in discovering and exploring 
fundamental properties of nature than in developing useful devices or instruments.  Pierre 
would go on to explore the principle of symmetry in nature as well as the behavior of 
                                                 
43 The development of the radiofrequency alternator, the Poulsen arc, and the audion are well-documented 
in Hugh Aitken, The Continuous Wave: Technology and American Radio, 1900-1932 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985). 
44 Jr. Layton, Edwin T., "Mirror-Image Twins: The Communities of Science and Technology in 19th-
Century America," Technology and Culture 12, no. 4 (1971): 562-80. 
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magnetic materials, while Jacques became head lecturer in mineralogy at the University 
of Montpelier, where he served for over thirty years.45  For his individual work, as well as 
for his work with wife Marie on radioactivity, Pierre was elected into the prestigious 
French Academy of Sciences in 1905, just one year before his untimely death.46   
It’s easy to see why the Curies didn’t have a more technological bent, given the 
society in which they lived.  French government and culture of the late 19th century did 
not exactly encourage cooperation between science and industry.  Science was viewed 
more as an intellectual endeavor and as an aspect of the national culture than as a 
practical means to assisting industry.47  Most of France’s universities, where the Curies 
spent their lives, did not have close ties to French industry.  Surely this explains, at least 
in part, the failure of the Curies and other French scientists to more fully exploit the 
practical potential of piezoelectricity.   
 
2.4  The scientific study of piezoelectricity  
The immediate impact of the Curie’s discovery was felt not in the world of 
technology, but in the rarefied world of academic scientific research.48  Notable scientists 
across Europe, including Lord Kelvin of Scotland, Woldemar Voigt of Germany, and two 
future Nobel Prize winners, Wilhelm Rontgen, discoverer of X-rays, and Gabriel 
Lippmann, studied and advanced the new field of piezoelectricity.   Numerous articles on 
the phenomenon appeared in several European scientific journals, most of them French or 
                                                 
45 Walter Guyton Cady, Piezoelectricity; An Introduction to the Theory and Applications of 
Electromechanical Phenomena in Crystals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), footnote on page 2. 
46 Maurice Crosland, Science Under Control: The French Academy of Sciences 1795-1914 (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
47 Ibid. 
48 For an exhaustive and authoritative study of the first two decades of piezoelectric research from a history 
of science perspective, see Shaul Katzir, The beginnings of piezoelectricity: a study in mundane physics, 
vol. 246, Boston studies in the philosophy of science (Dordrecht, Holland: Springer, 2006). 
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German, during the three decades following the Curies’ discovery.  A select bibliography 
of piezoelectricity compiled in 1928 listed twenty-four journal publications appearing 
between 1880 and 1916, but noted that these were only the most important of the early 
literature, which was described as being “very voluminous.”49  Even so, piezoelectric 
research as a field was miniscule compared with the study of phenomena such as X-rays, 
cathode rays, and black-body radiation.  One prominent physicist of the time described 
research in crystal physics, of which piezoelectricity was only a small part, as “hermit’s 
work” because of the small number of scientists interested in it.50 
Notable among the scientific works on piezoelectricity appearing before World 
War I was German physicist Woldemar Voigt’s mathematically rigorous and exhaustive 
964-page Lehrbuch der Kristallphysik (Textbook on Crystal Physics).51  It stands out as a 
testament to the thoroughness with which the scientific theory of piezoelectricity had 
been studied prior to the war.  Voigt’s work is representative of all piezoelectric work 
done during this period in that he treats piezoelectricity as a window onto his primary 
interest – the molecular structure and dynamics of crystals.  He investigated crystals only 
for the light that they could shed on fundamental questions regarding the constitution of 
matter at the molecular level.  Voigt was interested in all phenomena exhibited by 
crystals – piezo- and pyroelectricity, piezo- and pyromagnetism – because, for him, 
crystals displayed the properties of molecules “in their purest and most complete form.”52  
Furthermore, Voigt displayed the “pure” scientist’s disdain for practical application of 
                                                 
49 Walter Guyton Cady, "Bibliography on Piezo-Electricity," Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio 
Engineers 16, no. 4 (April 1928): 521-35. 
50 The physicist was Woldemar Voigt, as cited in Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormmach, 
Intellectual Mastery of Nature: Theoretical Physics from Ohm to Einstein, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
51 Woldemar Voigt, Lehrbuch der Kristallphysik (Leipzig: B. G. Teuner, 1910). 
52 Ibid., 4. 
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physical phenomena.  He considered crystal physics to be “old-fashioned physics in the 
strictest sense,” by which he meant that physicists pursued it for pure understanding apart 
from any possible useful application.53 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the piezoelectric research done between 1880 
and World War I was that all of it was done in Europe, and most of it published in non-
English journals.  Of the significant piezoelectric research done in this period, only Lord 
Kelvin published in English.54  Also striking is that American physicists seem to have 
completely ignored piezoelectricity.  Physics Review, the premier publication for 
American physicists, published its first research article on piezoelectricity only in 1927!55  
This lag was more likely due to the generally backwards state of pre-WWI American 
physics than to any particular avoidance of piezoelectricity. 
 Between 1880 and World War I, virtually no technological or engineering work 
exploited the piezoelectric property.  But these years did see the development of 
technologies, especially radiotelephony and the triode vacuum tube, that would later 
allow piezoelectric quartz crystal to be harnessed to great effect.  Also important was the 
submarine or U-boat, not because it was necessary for the full development of 
piezoelectric technology, but because it provided the stimulus that led to the first high-
frequency, piezoelectric application of quartz. 
 
                                                 
53 Christa Jungnickel and Russell McCormmach, Intellectual Mastery of Nature: Theoretical Physics from 
Ohm to Einstein, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). For description of the pure 
science ideal, see David A. Hounshell, "Edison and the Pure Science Ideal in 19th-Century America," 
Science 207 (8 February 1980): 612-17. 
54 Lord Kelvin, Baltimore Lectures on molecular dynamics and the wave theory of light (London: C. J. 
Clay, 1904).  ———, "On the piezo-electric property of quartz," Philosophical Magazine and Journal of 
Science 36 (1893): 331, 42, 84, 453. 
55 L. H. Dawson, "Piezoelectricity of Quartz Crystal," Physics Review 29 (1927): 532-41.  Dawson was a 
researcher with the Heat and Light Division of the Naval Research Laboratory. 
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2.5  SONAR – the first technological application of piezoelectricity  
 In the Spring of 1915, two physicists began working on a new device in a Paris 
laboratory.  The two men, Russian émigré Constantin Chilowsky and French physicist 
Paul Langevin, hoped to develop a device that would help the French and British navies 
combat the menace of German U-boat (i.e., submarine) warfare.  Chilowsky, upon 
hearing of the need for a countermeasure to the U-boat, had conceived of an echo-ranging 
system based on high-frequency underwater pressure waves.56  Pressure waves would be 
needed because they propagate through water far better than most radio waves.  
Moreover, Chilowsky figured that the frequencies of these pressure waves would have to 
lie in the ultrasonic band, above the range of human hearing (>20 kHz).  These high 
frequencies would allow the waves to be directed with great precision, permitting them to 
be used for locating distant objects. 
Not knowing how to physically realize such an idea, Chilowsky sought out 
Langevin, then a physics professor at the Ecole Municipale de Physique et Chimie 
Industrielles in Paris.  Langevin, who had received his Ph.D. working under Pierre Curie 
at the Sorbonne, was more familiar than most with the phenomenon of piezoelectricity.  
He speculated that piezoelectricity could be exploited to create Chilowsky’s echo-ranging 
system.  Since piezoelectric quartz crystal was a natural transducer converting electric 
waves into mechanical waves, applying a high frequency electric wave to quartz would 
theoretically produce a corresponding high frequency mechanical wave.  When placed 
underwater, this mechanical wave would translate into a propagating pressure wave.  But 
there was a problem.  The minute amplitudes of the electrical signals involved would 
                                                 
56 A pressure wave sets up alternating regions of compression and rarefaction in the transmitting medium.  
When this medium is air, the pressure wave is called a sound wave.  The pressure wave is a kind of 
mechanical wave in that it requires a transmitting medium; pressure waves cannot propagate in a vacuum. 
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require powerful, low-noise amplifiers.  Unfortunately, the primitive vacuum tube 
amplifiers available to Langevin at the time were simply not up to the task. 
In early 1917, the situation suddenly changed.  Physicists and engineers with the 
French agency Radiotelegraphie Militaire had earlier acquired one of American Lee 
DeForest’s Audion amplifiers.  Using the Audion as a starting point, the engineers made 
tremendous improvements to the device, similar to those made by Irving Langmuir of 
G.E.  In early 1917, Langevin convinced the French Signal Corps to loan him several of 
its improved vacuum tube amplifiers.57  He then managed to obtain large slices (10 x 10 x 
1.6 cm) of pure quartz crystal from a Parisian optician.  With all the necessary pieces in 
place, Langevin constructed a novel condenser, known as a “sandwich” transducer, by 
employing a mosaic of thin quartz plates as the dielectric.  When inserted into an 
oscillating circuit, one of the condenser’s plates would vibrate at the driving frequency, 
generating pressure waves in whatever medium the unit was placed – water in this case.  
Conversely, pressure waves traveling toward the condenser’s exposed plate would set up 
electrical oscillations within the connected circuit, thus acting as a receiver rather than a 
transmitter of underwater pressure waves.  Langevin and Chilowsky had built the world’s 
first ultrasonic echo-ranging system, known today as SONAR (SOund Navigation And 
Ranging). 
Langevin’s work with quartz “sandwich” transducers represented a radical 
extension of the way in which piezoelectric quartz had been used up to that time.  The 
Curie brothers, when verifying the existence of the converse piezoelectric effect, had only 
applied static, direct current (DC) voltages to a quartz crystal.  These voltages produced a 
                                                 
57 Willem Dirk Hackmann, Seek and Strike: Sonar, Anti-Submarine Warfare, and the Royal Navy, 1914-54 
(London: H.M.S.O., 1984). 
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physical displacement, or flexure, in the crystal slab, much as the DC current through a 
D’Arsonval meter movement would produce movement of the meter’s needle.58  Little 
did the Curies know that applying an oscillating or alternating current (AC) voltage to 
quartz crystal would open up entirely new applications.   
Langevin discovered that quartz slabs vibrated in resonance when certain 
frequencies of oscillating voltage were applied to the slab, and that these frequencies 
varied with the physical dimensions of the slab.  (Langevin emphasized that the ensemble 
of quartz plate and condenser armatures should possess “une periode proper de vibration 
elastique” (a characteristic period of elastic vibration) equal to those of the excited 
electric oscillations.  He later described this condition as one of elastic resonance.)  If the 
crystal slab was cut such that the resonance frequency lay in the tens of kilohertz, above 
the audible range, then, when submerged in water, the excited slab would generate 
pressure waves that could be easily focused and directed toward particular objects.  These 
were exactly the kind of waves needed to detect submarines at a distance; they could be 
directed with precision and were strong enough to generate detectable echoes.   
 
2.6  U.S. Anti-Submarine Warfare research during World War I 
In April 1917, the U.S. joined the Allied powers in the war against Germany.  In 
preparation, the Americans had already formed two organizations to bring technology 
and science to bear on the problems of warfare.  The Naval Consulting Board (NCB), 
chaired by Thomas Edison and staffed by civilian experts from the business and 
                                                 
58 A D’Arsenval meter movement operates on the principle of electromagnetism, whereby the current 
flowing through an electromagnet sets up a temporary magnetic field.  If the electromagnet is suspended 
between the poles of a permanent magnet, the interaction of the two magnetic fields will produce rotational 
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engineering worlds, solicited new technology proposals from the nation at large.  In 
contrast, the National Research Council (NRC), organized by George Ellery Hale of the 
National Academy of Sciences, sought to coordinate the research efforts of several 
universities and other research institutions.  Upon the U.S. entry into the war, these 
organizations quickly mobilized themselves to address the ongoing threat of U-boat 
warfare, forming anti-submarine warfare (ASW) research efforts.59   
The NCB and NRC ASW research efforts operated largely independently of one 
another, not the least reason for which was the tension between the NCB’s “industrial” 
culture and the NRC’s “academic” culture.  The NCB established a research facility at 
Nahant, MA, under the direction of General Electric’s Willis Whitney, to develop and 
test passive sound-detection systems.  Contributing to the effort were industrial scientists 
and engineers from G.E., Western Electric, and the Submarine Signal Company (today 
known as Raytheon).  For its part, the NRC appointed an anti-submarine committee, led 
by Robert Millikan, then Professor of Physics at the University of Chicago.  Millikan 
established a research facility in New London, CT, where he gathered many academic as 
well as industry scientists to develop and test active echo-detection systems, including 
Paul Langevin’s proposed system.  The firms that contributed to the NCB effort also 
contributed to the NRC effort.60 
On June 1, the NRC held a conference in Washington, D. C. with British, French, 
and American scientists as well as U.S. Navy officers to discuss ASW research goals.61  
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This meeting was followed by a much larger meeting on June 14-16.  Attendees of this 
meeting included representatives of Western Electric, G. E., and Westinghouse, the three 
largest American manufacturers of electrical apparatus at the time and the firms that 
would come together after the war to form the Radio Company of America (RCA).  Also 
present were forty to fifty scientists and engineers, including Walter Guyton Cady, then a 
Professor of Physics at Wesleyan University, a small, mostly undergraduate school in 
Middletown, CT.   
Prior to the NRC conference, Cady had considered the submarine detection 
problem and determined that, among the variety of methods being investigated, a method 
of ultrasonic signal generation and echo detection held the most promise.  As he recalled 
some forty-five years later, “I had been thinking of the submarine problems before the 
meeting in Washington… and came to the conclusion that if I could only think of a good 
way to generate powerful ultrasonic-waves underwater with a frequency high enough for 
the beam to be directed, that would be a good way to pick up the submarine.  Then came 
the call to Washington and immediately I grabbed hold of the piezoelectric idea because 
it seemed to be just what I wanted.”62  The call Cady was referring to came from 
renowned physicist Robert Millikan, who had been appointed to head the NRC’s ASW 
research effort.   
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2.7  Walter Guyton Cady 
Walter Guyton Cady was born on December 19, 1874 in Providence, Rhode 
Island, one of three sons to John Hamlin and Mary Tabitha Cady.  His family had been in 
the shipping business for several generations, doing well enough to move into a large and 
fashionable house near the campus of Brown University.  As a child, Walter showed an 
interest in tools and knew by the time of high school that he wanted to be either an 
engineer or a physicist.  All the Cady boys attended nearby Brown University, where 
Walter graduated with a Master of Arts degree in 1896.  During his senior year there, 
Professor Carl Barus, originally from Germany, encouraged Walter to go to Germany to 
study for his Ph.D. in physics.  Armed with several letters of introduction written for him 
by Dr. Barus, Walter crossed the Atlantic and enrolled at the University of Berlin in 
1897.63   
In pursuing his graduate studies in Germany, Cady was fairly typical of aspiring 
American physicists of his day.64  Most of America’s top physicists of the late 19th 
century, including Henry Rowland, Albert Michelson, Josiah Gibbs, Robert Millikan and 
Michael Pupin had spent time studying in Europe, particularly in Germany.65  In fact, 
Pupin had studied at the University of Berlin just ten years prior to Cady.66  Despite 
growing opportunities for graduate study in the U.S., the options were still limited to a 
handful of institutions, such as Johns Hopkins, Yale, Columbia, Cornell, and the 
University of Chicago.  Between 1873 and 1890, American universities granted only 
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twenty-two Ph.D.s in Physics.67  Furthermore, there weren’t many active physicists in the 
U.S. in the 1890s.  Historian Daniel Kevles has noted that “by the early 1890s only some 
200 Americans were practicing the discipline of physics.”68  Only about 20% of these, he 
notes, published research regularly.  The only American scientific journal dedicated 
exclusively to physics at the time, The Physics Review, wasn’t founded until 1893.69  By 
all accounts, American physics research was still in its infancy when compared with 
European research. 
When Walter Cady arrived at the University of Berlin in 1897, he entered an 
institution with a second-to-none reputation in electromagnetic research, having been the 
university home of pioneering physicists Gustav Kirchhoff (1824-1887) and Hermann 
von Helmholtz (1821-1894).  The Physics faculty at the time included, among others, a 
mid-career theoretical physicist named Max Planck (1858-1947) and the experimental 
physicist Emil Warburg, who was head of the department as well as Cady’s principal 
examiner in physics.70  The late 1890s was an exciting time in the world of physics.  
German physicist William Roentgen had recently discovered a powerful new form of 
radiation, the X-ray.  In Britain, physicist J. J. Thomson, through his study of cathode 
rays, had just announced his discovery of the first subatomic particles, which he called 
corpuscles, but which soon were dubbed electrons.  And many physicists, including 
Planck, were investigating the nature of so-called black-body radiation (i.e., the light 
given off by an opaque and non-reflective body as its temperature increases).  By 
contrast, piezoelectricity was not of particularly great interest to most of the physics 
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community.  Since the Curies’ discovery in 1880, only a handful of European physicists 
had published significant papers on the subject.71  Piezoelectricity was generally 
considered to be a scientific curiosity, but not deserving of much research attention.  
Some researchers considered the phenomenon to be a window into molecular-level 
dynamics, but this was not a major interest to the physics community at large. 
For his dissertation, Cady developed a new method of measuring the energy of 
cathode rays.  The topic was not a novel one; many physicists at the time were 
investigating the characteristics of cathode rays.  The popularity of this research was 
largely due to the prevalence of a laboratory device called the Crookes tube, named after 
English chemist William Crookes.  In 1876, Crookes had developed a glass tube in which 
he placed two metal plates at opposite ends; one plate was called the cathode, the other 
the anode.  After evacuating the tube of air, creating a near vacuum, Crookes set up an 
electric potential between the two plates.  The result was that the tube glowed and turned 
green.  The rays generated in Crookes’ tube were soon dubbed cathode rays.72  
Roentgen’s discovery in 1896 that Crookes tubes were capable of generating X-rays as 
well as cathode rays only increased their popularity.  In early 1897, the periodical 
Electrical World announced that Crookes tubes were so popular in Philadelphia that all 
local suppliers had sold out.73  Thus, Cady did not choose a little-known, esoteric subject 
for his dissertation; by contrast, cathode rays were quite the rage, even outside the 
rarefied world of academic physics. 
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The University of Berlin awarded Cady his Ph.D. in 1900, after which he returned 
to the U.S.  Job prospects for a newly-minted Ph.D. physicist at this time were generally 
limited.  Most became professors in colleges or universities, and many of these 
supplemented their modest salaries by offering consulting services to industry.  Another 
option was to take a government post at one of the scientific bureaus.  The time had yet to 
arrive in America when a large percentage of the nation’s Ph.D. scientists were hired by 
industry as industrial researchers; in fact, such a position did not even exist in 1900.  As 
historian George Wise has shown, General Electric was the first company, in 1900, to 
begin creating such positions.74  But Cady did not have this option when he returned to 
the States. 
Cady chose to take a position in Washington, D.C. as a magnetic observer for the 
U.S. Coast Guard and Geodetic Survey (USCGGS).  His supervisor at the Survey was 
Louis Agricola Bauer.  Like Cady, Bauer had earned his Ph.D. in physics in Berlin.  
While there, he had become interested in terrestrial magnetism, a field that was wide 
open for investigation.75  Upon returning to the U.S., Bauer became convinced that the 
mysterious variation of the earth’s magnetic field could be explained only by collecting 
and analyzing a vast amount of observational data.  As head of the USCGGS, Bauer was 
now in a position to organize the collection of this data.76  Cady, as a member of Bauer’s 
staff, was charged with collecting and analyzing field measurements of terrestrial 
magnetism.  After doing this work for a short time, Cady decided to look for a teaching 
position at a small college or university.  As he would recall many years later, he wrote 
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letters to six colleges,77 receiving a response only from Wesleyan College in Middletown, 
CT, which offered him a position in 1902.  Cady accepted the offer and spent the next 
forty-six years on the Wesleyan faculty.  Though Cady’s formal contact with Bauer 
ended in 1902, the two men would stay in touch over the next decade and a half.   
During his early career at Wesleyan, Cady revealed himself to be what historian 
Shaul Katzir has called a “technologically oriented scientist.”78  At first, this was perhaps 
due simply to Cady’s desire to supplement Wesleyan’s modest budget for research.  Early 
on, he secured several research grants for the school, including one from the Elizabeth 
Thompson Science Fund and another from the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (AAAS).79  But over time, Cady demonstrated a predilection for 
instrumentation and a real talent for invention.  One of his first publications concerned an 
original machine for computing and plotting compound sine waves.80  The machine’s 
primary purpose was for instruction, yet it was an early sign of Cady’s capacity for 
practical invention.   
Cady’s first serious research project investigated the poorly understood 
phenomenon of arc discharge-glow discharge oscillations occurring between metallic 
electrodes, particularly those made of iron.  Lasting for several years, this research 
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yielded seven significant publications in both American and German scientific journals.81  
One of these papers was co-written with a promising young student, Harold Arnold, who 
would go on to become an influential research manager with AT&T.82  Cady’s research 
in this area demonstrated his deep interest in oscillatory phenomena and gave him his 
first chance to develop a working scientific theory from the ground up.  Furthermore, it 
showed his predilection for topics that were rich in technological potential, for arc 
phenomena had already been exploited in numerous technologies, including illumination 
and continuous-wave radio transmission.  Cady then went on from this project to 
investigate a number of topics, including the magnetic behavior of copper and the 
properties of “insulated double connectors.”83  Thus, his pre-war work stayed firmly 
within the realm of electromagnetic phenomena.   
Cady also demonstrated a practical bent in his teaching and extracurricular 
activities.  According to one former student, Cady stayed away from cutting-edge areas 
of theoretical physics, such as quantum mechanics and Einstein’s relativity,84  preferring 
more settled areas of physics theory.  Perhaps this was because these theoretical concepts 
were not yet ripe for being reduced to practice in the form of practical devices.  Not that 
Cady shied away from new and unexplored areas.  Rather, the areas he chose to 
investigate were ones that could be profitably explored using existing theoretical 
frameworks.  Cady was also an amateur radio operator, helping to found Wesleyan’s 
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Radio Club in the fall of 1914.85  He regularly attended the Club’s monthly meetings and 
kept up with the latest developments in radio technology.  By no means did Cady fit the 
stereotype of the “pure” scientist, aloof from using science in the service of industry or 
other utilitarian pursuits. 
From Cady’s fifteen scientific publications prior to World War I can be discerned 
four related interests.  First is his persistent interest in oscillatory phenomena, as 
evidenced by his compound sine wave machine and his investigation of arc oscillations.  
Next is Cady’s interest in the properties of materials, particularly metals, but also 
dielectrics (i.e. insulators).  Third, virtually all of Cady’s pre-World War I research could 
be classified in the general category of electromagnetic phenomena: cathodes rays, 
electric arcs, insulators, and magnetism.  Finally, Cady displayed a strong interest in 
instrumentation and precision measurement, as borne out especially by his doctoral 
research.  These four interests and the experience and knowledge Cady gained in 
pursuing them gave him a distinct and somewhat atypical identity within the world of 
academic physics. 
 
2.8  Cady’s introduction to piezoelectric technology 
In early June of 1917, Cady received a telegram from Robert Millikan asking him 
to report to Washington for a June 14-16 anti-submarine research conference, sponsored 
by the NRC.  Louis Bauer, aware that his former colleague had given the anti-submarine 
problem some thought, had suggested to Millikan that Cady might contribute much to the 
conference, the primary purpose of which was to give British and French delegates a 
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forum for presenting the results of their anti-submarine research, as well as to appeal to 
the U.S. research community to join the ASW research effort.  The French delegation 
consisted of physicist Charles Fabry, radio expert Le Duc de Guiche, and Nobel Prize-
winning chemist Victor Grignard, while the British delegation featured Nobel Prize-
winning physicist Ernest Rutherford.  The combined delegations presented test results 
obtained with two passive sound-detection devices and one active echo-ranging device, 
Paul Langevin’s “sandwich” transducer.86  For most attendees, the passive devices 
attracted the most attention, for they seemed closer to actually working in the field.  But 
Cady was drawn to Langevin’s work, which, despite its promise, was much less 
developed than the passive device work. 
The three-day NRC conference was the initial catalyst for American piezoelectric 
engineering research.  The response of NRC members was quick and energetic.  Teams 
from G.E., Western Electric, the Bureau of Standards, Leland Stanford University (now 
Stanford University), and Columbia University all agreed to work on various aspects of 
Langevin’s proposed underwater echo-ranging system.  Stanford and Columbia agreed to 
work on quartz transmitters, while Western Electric investigated the possibility of 
replacing quartz with Rochelle Salt, a crystal known to exhibit a much stronger 
piezoelectric effect than quartz, but which was also highly water soluble.  General 
Electric was to pursue research on both quartz and Rochelle Salt, and the Bureau of 
Standards agreed to inspect incoming shipments, most of them from Brazil, of raw quartz 
crystal.87   
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Walter Cady quickly involved himself with the NRC’s underwater echo-ranging 
research.  Just four days after the June conference, Cady noted in his personal diary that 
he had begun to work in his lab with piezoelectric crystals.88  Then, at the suggestion of 
long-time friend and G.E. researcher A. W. Hull, Cady traveled to Schenectady, N.Y., a 
140 mile journey, to talk with G.E. scientists regarding the company’s development of 
Rochelle Salt and quartz crystal anti-submarine devices.89  Upon President Wilson’s 
declaration of war on Germany, the G.E. Research Lab, under the leadership of Willis 
Whitney, had suspended its usual activities to focus on war-related research, and no 
research project ranked higher in importance than that aimed at improving submarine 
detection.   
Willis Whitney had established a policy at G.E. of hiring summer research 
associates.90  Those who performed satisfactorily during this short stint were often asked 
to join the Research Lab on a permanent basis.  Whitney’s initial impressions of Cady 
must have been favorable, for he asked the Wesleyan professor to work for the lab until 
classes resumed in the fall.  Though Cady was certainly paid by G.E., money was not 
likely a dominant factor in his deciding to work for the lab that summer.  More than 
anything, Cady probably saw this as a practical way to contribute to the war effort.  Over 
forty and raising a son by himself, Cady was in no position to serve militarily.91  
Furthermore, he had no real responsibilities at Wesleyan until the beginning of fall 
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semester.  From Whitney’s standpoint, it seems likely that he saw Cady as little more 
than a temporary research consultant who could assist with the urgent war effort.  It was 
rare for Whitney to hire any full-time researchers at Cady’s age; he preferred to hire men 
(and women) when they were young and more flexible.92 
As he recalled years later, Cady felt that he was the only “outsider” in G.E.’s 
crystal laboratory.93  Being completely new to the field of piezoelectricity, he spent his 
spare moments in his first month acquainting himself with the existing literature.  Other 
than the Curie brothers’ foundational papers, most work on the topic was in German.  
This included Voigt’s mammoth Lehrbuch der Kristallphysik (1910).94  Cady’s fluency in 
German certainly made this a much easier task than it would otherwise have been.  Most 
of the laboratory work done during this summer seems to have aimed at familiarizing the 
researchers with methods for cutting and shaping bars and plates from large, unformed 
pieces of Rochelle Salt and quartz.95  Cady and the team learned that the most effective 
tool for cutting quartz was a diamond-tipped saw, while the best tool for Rochelle Salt, 
which is water soluble, was nothing more than a wet thread kept in constant motion.96 
Once Cady returned to his teaching duties that fall, he became involved with 
Michael Pupin’s research group at Columbia University.  New York City was only a 90 
minute train ride from Middletown, so Cady could visit Columbia often.  By February 
1918, Pupin’s group had progressed to the point where it was ready to test an apparatus in 
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an actual field setting.  Traveling to the Navy yard in Key West, FL, the group, including 
Cady, successfully tested a quartz transmitter in the Gulf of Mexico.  Buoyed by these 
results, the group returned north to continue tests at the newly opened Naval Experiment 
Station at New London, Connecticut.  Here, in the summer of 1918, Cady worked closely 
with George Washington Pierce, a Harvard electrical engineering professor whom he had 
met a year or two earlier through their mutual involvement in the Institute of Radio 
Engineers (I.R.E.).97 
 
2.9  The legacy of World War I-era Anti-Submarine Warfare research 
Despite the rapid progress made by the Columbia group, the fruits of their labor 
never made it onto actual ships during the war.  At best, the group’s quartz crystal device 
prototypes could detect an approaching submarine up to a distance of about one mile.  
This was much inferior to the performance of the passive sounding devices developed by 
other research groups.98  Even so, the American effort to improve on Paul Langevin’s 
quartz “sandwich” transducer was tremendously important for the far-reaching influence 
it would have on the future of piezoelectric and ultrasonic technology.   
The lasting influence of the wartime NRC and NRB-sponsored research efforts on 
piezoelectric technology lies in at least two areas.  First and most importantly, the NRC 
and the NRB had created a network of scientists and engineers interested in piezoelectric 
devices.  This network spanned academic institutions (Columbia and Stanford), industrial 
R&D labs (Western Electric, Westinghouse, and G.E.), and government bureaus (Bureau 
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of Standards, the Army Signal Corps, the Navy).  Among the American scientists and 
engineers involved in the wartime ASW research effort who would later contribute much 
to quartz crystal technology were Walter Cady, George Washington Pierce, Harold 
Arnold, and Joseph Warren Horton.99  For its part, AT&T, through its manufacturing arm 
Western Electric, immediately began developing commercial devices that exploited the 
piezoelectric effect of Rochelle Salt.  This work was based on a patent filed by Western 
Electric researcher Alexander Nicolson in April 1918 for using Rochelle Salt “in 
telephone transmitters and receivers, repeaters, loudspeakers, generators and modulators 
of alternating currents and the like.”100  On the government end, the Navy was anxious to 
further apply piezoelectric technology to submarine warfare and ship-to-ship 
communications, but work would be delayed until the opening of the new Naval 
Research Laboratory (NRL) in 1923.  Second, the war research effort had helped to 
identify obstacles to piezoelectric devices becoming practical; in this way, it had helped 
to define a piezoelectric research agenda.  Some aspects of this agenda including 
increasing the driving power, and thus the effective range, of quartz transmitters, 
increasing their operating frequency beyond 200 kHz, and improving the sensitivity and 
bearing-detection abilities of hydrophones (i.e. receivers of ultrasonic echoes).  The 
outlines of an engineering knowledge base for piezoelectric technology were beginning 
to take shape. 
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2.10  Cady invents the quartz crystal piezoelectric resonator 
Of the scientists who carried their piezoelectric investigations into the post-war 
period, Walter Cady quickly emerged as the most prominent because of his keen and 
persistent observation of piezoelectric device behavior.  Throughout 1918, as part of the 
New London research effort, Cady had been assigned the task of developing and 
improving Rochelle Salt (RS) hydrophones.  While attempting to measure the 
capacitance of RS plates at various frequencies, Cady observed erratic results.  Finally, he 
realized in early January of 1919, after the war’s end, the cause of his problems: RS had 
an unusually sharp resonance curve.  That is, as Cady applied an AC voltage over a wide 
range of frequencies to an RS plate, he observed that the plate reached a maximum 
amplitude oscillation (i.e. resonance) over an extremely narrow band of frequencies.  
Furthermore, the resonant oscillations exhibited extremely low damping.101 
Cady soon noticed that quartz plates behaved in a similar manner, but that their 
resonance curves were even sharper than those of RS plates.  As an added benefit, though 
quartz’s elastic constant was much lower than that of Rochelle Salt, it was also much 
more stable chemically than RS.102  As Cady recalled years later, while getting ready for 
bed one night in 1919, he realized that the sharpness of quartz’s resonance curve was on 
par with that of a standard tuning fork, which served as a frequency standard for acoustic 
waves in the audible region.  Cady suspected that quartz could serve as a highly precise 
and accurate frequency standard for much higher frequencies – and not just for acoustic 
                                                 
101 Damping refers to the time rate at which a transient oscillation attenuates.  For example, a tuning fork 
with a very low damping factor would continue to vibrate for quite some time (perhaps several minutes) 
after being initially struck. 
102 The elastic constant is an indication of the amplitude of mechanical vibrations produced for a given 
applied voltage.  Materials with higher constants produce more prominent vibrations for a given voltage 
than do materials with lower constants.  The constant for Rochelle Salt is from 4 to 5 times as great as the 
constant for quartz.  Source: Walter Guyton Cady, Piezoelectricity; An Introduction to the Theory and 
Applications of Electromechanical Phenomena in Crystals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946), Chapter 6. 
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waves.  Since quartz was a natural transducer, converting mechanical into electrical 
waves and vice-versa, it could serve as a standard for high-frequency electrical waves 
(i.e., radio waves). 
Realizing the potential scientific value of a new frequency standard, Cady set 
about constructing several quartz resonator prototypes.  Each prototype involved a 
carefully-cut quartz bar sandwiched between brass plates.  When an electrical excitation 
was applied to the brass plates, the entire unit would vibrate.  As the unit’s resonance 
frequency was approached, the magnitude of the vibrations would increase, reaching a 
very prominent maximum at precisely the resonance frequency.  The unit’s resonance 
point was, for the most part, a function of the physical dimensions of the quartz bar and 
brass plates, and thus would not vary unless these were varied.103 
Cady was well-positioned in two respects for fabricating his resonator prototypes.  
First, because of his summer employment with General Electric, he had access to the 
company’s supply of high-quality quartz crystal.  Such crystal was not easy to come by; 
one had to have connections.  Second, Cady was blessed at Wesleyan to have access to a 
well-equipped machine shop, known as the Scott Lab.  The shop was outfitted with 
several lathes, a shaper, planer, drill press, milling machine, grinder, blower, and a 
circular saw, equipment that was needed for precisely cutting and shaping raw quartz 
crystal into thin wafers.  Furthermore, the lab was staffed with an expert “mechanician,” 
as Cady referred to him.104  Apparently, Cady focused on physics and left the actual 
cutting and polishing of crystals to someone more experienced in this type of work. 
                                                 
103 Ibid.  Section 343, Resonator Mountings and Holders. 
104 ———, "Saving Ancestors" [Unpublished Autobiography] 1963, cited: 207.  Available at Walter G. 
Cady Papers, Special Collections and Archives, Olin Library, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT. 
 57 
After completing several resonator prototypes, Cady began showing them to 
colleagues and shopping for a customer.  Among the first to see them was Harold Arnold 
of Western Electric.  Arnold, a former student of Cady’s, was now director of research 
for Western Electric and was thus always on the lookout for useful new techniques, 
materials, and devices.  Arnold had earned both a Bachelor’s degree and an M.S. at 
Wesleyan before pursing his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago.  As mentioned 
previously, Arnold’s M.S. work had led to a jointly authored paper with Cady in the 
American Journal of Science on electric arcs.105  The events of World War I brought 
teacher and student together again when both men became involved in the anti-submarine 
research effort.  In February 1919, Arnold visited Cady in Middletown and was treated to 
a demonstration of his resonator prototypes.106  When Cady asked if Western Electric 
might have some commercial use for the resonator, Arnold said he would think it over, 
only later to say that he saw no use for it at the present time.   
Not deterred by Arnold’s lack of interest, Cady, a year later, sent several 
prototypes to the Bureau of Standards in Washington for demonstration as well as for 
calibration.107  At the Bureau, the prototypes fell into the hands of John Dellinger, head of 
the Bureau’s frequency measurement and standardization efforts.  Dellinger’s 
measurements indicated that Cady’s piezoelectric resonator was capable of an accuracy 
of 1 or 2 parts per 10,000 (i.e. 0.01%) at radio frequencies.108  This was roughly one-
hundred times more accurate than the Bureau’s existing frequency standard – the 
                                                 
105 See page 20 of this chapter. 
106 Walter G. Cady, “Chief Dates on the Piezo-resonator and Oscillator,” 9 March 1945. Walter G. Cady 
Papers, Special Collections and Archives, Olin Library, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT. 
107 Walter G. Cady, Personal Diary entry for 23 April 1920, Folder 25, Box 3, Walter G. Cady Papers 
(Subgroup 3), Cady Family Papers (MSS 326), Rhode Island Historical Society Library, Providence, RI. 
108 See Walter Guyton Cady, "The piezo-electric resonator," Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio 
Engineers 10, no. 2 (April 1922): 83-114. 
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“standard wavemeter,” which consisted of the series combination of a variable condenser 
(i.e., capacitor), a standard coil (i.e., inductor), and an ammeter.109  Not surprisingly, this 
one test of the resonator did nothing to make the Bureau change its primary frequency 
standard.  Standards of measure are never changed overnight.  The Bureau would 
continue using its standard wavemeter for several more years before retiring it. 
 
2.11  Cady invents the quartz crystal piezoelectric oscillator 
Harold Arnold was back to visit Cady’s lab on Dec. 17, 1920, showing renewed 
interest in the prototypes.  Cady presented his first public talk on the resonator at the 
Physical Society in New York on February 26, 1921.  Afterwards, Arnold approached 
Cady and suggested the possibility that the device might be used not only as a frequency 
standard but also as a means of precisely controlling an oscillating circuit’s frequency.  
The implication was that Western Electric would have many uses for such a device.  
Cady immediately went to work on the idea and soon achieved success, noting in his 
personal diary for February 28, 1921, “Made quartz rod serve as master oscillator.”110  He 
did so by inserting a quartz crystal in the feedback loop of a vacuum tube oscillator 
circuit.  Cady called the device the “piezo-oscillator.”  The specific dimensions of the 
crystal governed the frequency at which the entire circuit would oscillate.  When Cady 
notified Arnold of his success, he was still told that Western Electric did not yet have a 
use for such a device. 
                                                 
109 R. T. Cox, "Standard Radio Wavemeter - Bureau of Standards Type R 70B," Journal Of The Optical 
Society Of America And Review Of Scientific Instruments 6, no. 2 (March 1922): 162-68. 
110 Walter G. Cady, Personal Diary entry for 28 February 1921, Folder 25, Box 3, Walter G. Cady Papers 
(Subgroup 3), Cady Family Papers (MSS 326), Rhode Island Historical Society Library, Providence, RI. 
 59 
In the midst of his work, Cady submitted patent applications for both the piezo-
resonator and the piezo-oscillator, both of which were issued in 1923.111  Undaunted by 
Western Electric’s apparent lack of interest, Cady continued to demonstrate his devices 
and shop for potential licensees.  Among those to whom he showed his inventions were 
the U.S. Bureau of Standards, Westinghouse, General Radio Company, and American 
Radio and Research.112  But before Cady could find a taker, he received notice from 
Western Electric that he was being sued for patent infringement.  The company claimed 
that Cady’s patents fell within the claims of Alexander Nicolson’s patent for Rochelle 
Salt devices, thus invalidating Cady’s patent claims.113  Thus began an ugly patent 
infringement case between Cady and Western Electric, one that Cady could not sustain 
for long because of his limited financial resources.  In the mid-1920s, the Wesleyan 
physics professor ended up selling his resonator and oscillator patents to RCA for 
$50,000, a handsome sum at the time, and RCA continued the legal battle with Western 
Electric.114  In 1953, the courts upheld Cady’s precedence, but by this time the issue had 
become one of merely academic interest.115 
By the late 1920s, Cady’s resonator and oscillator patents had acquired 
tremendous economic value.  The worldwide explosion of radio broadcasting that had 
begun in 1922 gave Cady’s piezo-oscillator a value that could not have been foreseen 
                                                 
111 Walter Guyton Cady, Piezo Electric Resonator, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,450,246, Filing Date: 
28 January 1920; Issue Date: 3 April 1923.  ———, Method of Maintaining Electric Currents of Constant 
Frequency, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1472583, Filing Date: 28 May 1921; Issue Date: 30 October 
1923. 
112 Walter G. Cady, “The Story of My Patent Litigation,” 30 June 1967, Box 2, Walter G. Cady Papers, 
Special Collections and Archives, Olin Library, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT. 
113 Alexander Nicolson, Piezophony, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,495,429, Filing Date: 10 April 1918; 
Issue Date: 27 May 1924. 
114 Adjusting for inflation, $50,000 in 1925 roughly corresponds to $1/2 million in 2005. 
115 Walter G. Cady, “The Story of My Patent Litigation,” 30 June 1967, Box 2, Walter G. Cady Papers, 
Special Collections and Archives, Olin Library, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT. 
 60 
earlier.116  Unfortunately, Cady did not share in much of the wealth that flowed from his 
inventions.  In time, however, he was universally recognized by scientists and engineers 
as being the world’s foremost expert on resonant applications of piezoelectric quartz.   
 
2.12  Conclusions 
 This chapter has related the nearly four decade pre-history of piezoelectric quartz 
crystal technology, beginning with the discovery of piezoelectricity by the Curie brothers 
in 1880 and ending with Wesleyan physics professor Walter Cady’s invention of the 
quartz piezo-resonator and piezo-oscillator.  For most of this period, piezoelectricity was 
nothing more than a curious natural phenomenon to a handful of European scientists 
interested in crystal physics.  These scientists developed a considerable body of 
knowledge that explained the source of piezoelectricity, catalogued the types of crystal in 
which it occurred, and described with mathematical precision the piezoelectric effect.  
This knowledge was what economic historian Joel Mokyr would call propositional 
knowledge, as opposed to prescriptive knowledge.117  Its basic goal was to describe and 
understand piezoelectricity.  This knowledge did not, however, aim to exploit the 
piezoelectric effect for human purposes.   
 The scientists who developed the theory of piezoelectricity prior to World War I 
failed to thoroughly investigate the response of piezoelectric crystals to high-frequency 
oscillatory signals.  Had they done so, quartz crystal technology would have likely been 
born before the war.  But, of course, these scientists were incapable of exploring the high-
                                                 
116 The boom in radio broadcasting and the subsequent increase in the value of Cady’s patents is discussed 
further in Chapters 4 and 5. 
117 Joel Mokyr, The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowledge Economy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002). 
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frequency response of crystals because high-frequency electrical oscillators had yet to be 
invented.  Thus, as has always been true, the scientific knowledge of the time was limited 
by the technological capabilities of the time.118   
With the invention of high-frequency vacuum tube oscillators in the second 
decade of the 20th century, a whole new world of scientific inquiry opened up.  For the 
first time, continuous, undamped radio waves could now be generated, studied, and 
exploited without great expense or large, cumbersome equipment.  Realizing this, 
Constantin Chilowsky and Paul Langevin ingeniously used piezoelectric quartz crystal to 
convert a high frequency alternating electric current into a high frequency mechanical 
wave.  That is, an applied AC voltage caused a slab of quartz crystal to alternately flex 
and relax (i.e. vibrate) at a high frequency.  When placed underwater, the mechanical 
waves generated by the quartz slab spawned high frequency pressure waves that could 
travel long distances through water with little attenuation and great directional precision.  
Chilowsky and Langevin found that quartz crystal, of all piezoelectric crystals, was 
uniquely suited to this task because of its chemical stability, its ability to handle relatively 
high-powered signals without cracking, and its ability to resonate at ultrasonic 
frequencies.  Quartz crystal technology had been born. 
World War I saw not only the birth of quartz crystal technology; it also provided 
the context for the birth of the quartz crystal technological community, without which the 
technology itself would have stagnated.  The wartime NRC-sponsored ASW research 
effort brought together a group of scientists and exposed them for the first time to 
piezoelectric crystals, primarily quartz crystal and Rochelle Salt.  Many of these scientists 
                                                 
118 Incidentally, the converse of this statement is only partially true.  The technological capabilities of a 
time are only partially limited by the scientific knowledge of a time.  In all times have there existed 
working technologies that are not fully understood in light of contemporary science. 
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abandoned the study of piezoelectricity after the war, but some, including Wesleyan 
professor Walter Cady, Harvard professor George Washington Pierce, and Western 
Electric research manager Harold Arnold, maintained their interest in this new area for 
years.  These individuals formed the core of what would eventually become a large and 
passionate group of technologists dedicated to nurturing and advancing quartz crystal 
technology. 
Without question, Walter Cady contributed the most to the emerging knowledge 
base of quartz crystal technology.  His first contribution was the discovery that 
piezoelectric quartz crystal, when subjected to a continuous spectrum of AC electric 
signal frequencies, displays an extremely selective resonance curve.  If Cady had stopped 
here, his primary contribution would have been scientific.  But he went further to show 
that quartz crystal’s unique resonance characteristic could be exploited to serve as a 
frequency standard for very high frequencies.  Furthermore, he showed that a quartz 
crystal wafer’s characteristic resonance frequency was a function of its physical 
dimensions.  By varying a wafer’s thickness, width, and depth, different resonance 
frequencies could be obtained.119  With a little prodding by his former student Harold 
Arnold, Cady then went on to show that a quartz crystal wafer could be harnessed to 
precisely control and maintain the frequency of a vacuum tube oscillator.120  In two 
foundational patent applications (U.S. Patents #1,450,246 and #1,472,583), Cady 
presented this prescriptive knowledge and was granted, in essence, a legal twenty-year 
monopoly over its use. 
                                                 
119 Cady’s invention of the “piezo-resonator” is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
120 Cady’s invention of the “piezo-oscillator” is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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No sooner had Cady been granted patents for the piezo-resonator and piezo-
oscillator than AT&T began contesting them, suggesting that the giant 
telecommunications firm saw much commercial potential in quartz crystal technology.  
Not willing to give in easily, Cady fought AT&T’s legal action until the cost became too 
great for him.  He then outright sold the patents for a lump sum to RCA, then AT&T’s 
biggest competitor in radio.  Thus began a decades-long battle between AT&T and RCA 
to control the patents of quartz crystal technology.  This patent battle, though at times 
acrimonious, provided the technology with a profit motive that proved to be healthy for 
its long-term future.   
 In the early 1920s, the future of quartz crystal technology was uncertain.  A small 
community of quartz technologists had begun to form, but the utility of piezoelectric 
quartz was still in doubt.  It seemed to provide great promise as a frequency standard, but 
this was a niche application that would appeal primarily to scientific laboratories, 
manufacturers of precision radio equipment, and government standards agencies.  Quartz 
crystal had also shown itself capable of stabilizing the frequencies of radio oscillators, but 
the usefulness of this application had not yet been demonstrated.  Not until Cady’s piezo-
oscillator became coupled to the survival of AM broadcast radio would the future of 
quartz crystal technology be assured. 
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CHAPTER 3: QUARTZ CRYSTAL TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 
 
 
 Departing from the narrative form of Chapter 2, this chapter presents and 
interprets the results of a qualitative and quantitative study of quartz crystal technology 
patents filed between 1918 and 1959.  The numerous devices, circuits, and manufacturing 
processes that constitute quartz crystal technology are identified and classified into major 
and minor categories.  This classification provides a technical “lay of the land” for 
understanding the technical content of subsequent chapters.  The quartz crystal unit, or 
QCU, is shown to have been the dominant device or component for resonant applications 
of piezoelectric quartz crystal.  Many QCU-related patents cover processes used in the 
manufacture of the QCU, while others cover new variants to the QCU itself.  This chapter 
also shows that ownership of quartz crystal patents was dominated by private firms, 
particularly AT&T and RCA, who engaged in something of a battle for control of quartz 
patents during the 1920s and 1930s.  Nevertheless, quartz crystal invention, because of its 
low cost and the many opportunities available for novel variation of quartz devices, 
consistently attracted a significant number of independent inventors.  The patent data 
suggests that, particularly in the 1920s and to a lesser extent throughout the remaining 
decades of this study, there existed a healthy open market for the selling and licensing of 
quartz crystal patents.  As the technology matured and those in the business established 
in-house R&D labs, this market shrank but never dried up completely.  Finally, this 
chapter shows that foreign quartz crystal inventors, particularly Germans, were active in 
filing for U.S. patents.  Thus, for the period 1918-1959, quartz crystal invention was 
 65 
primarily an American and Western European activity, though Russia and Japan exerted 
a growing influence on the technology beginning after World War II. 
 
The history of inventive and innovative technological activity can be told in a 
variety of ways.  Chapter 2 and Chapters 4 through 8 give a narrative history that focuses 
on actors, individual and collective, acting and reacting over time to effect change in the 
technological use of quartz crystal.  The social and economic contexts of these actors are 
shown to exert a strong influence on the decisions they make and the courses they take.  
This chapter, however, steps away from this detailed narrative to give a different and 
complementary view of quartz crystal technological innovation.  The view taken here is 
from a higher level and spans decades.  The method used entails the careful study of 
aggregate patent records, but the details of individual patents were also studied in many 
cases.  In seeking to broadly characterize inventive activity through the study of patents 
in the aggregate, this study follows a trail blazed by many others, including, for example, 
the U.S. Temporary National Economic Committee (T.N.E.C.), Jacob Schmookler, David 
Noble, Leonard Reich, Robert Merges and Richard Nelson, and Naomi Lamoreaux and 
Kenneth Sokoloff.121  The high-level, somewhat impersonal view of quartz crystal 
invention offered by this chapter complements the nuanced, actor-driven narrative of the 
remaining chapters. 
                                                 
121 George E. Folk, Patents and industrial progress; a summary, analysis, and evaluation of the record on 
patents of the Temporary National Economic Committee (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942).  David F. 
Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press, 1977), Chapter 6.  Leonard Reich, "Research, Patents, and the Struggle to Control 
Radio: A Study of Big Business and the Uses of Industrial Research," Business History Review 51, no. 2 
(1977): 208-35.  Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, "On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope," 
Columbia Law Review 90 (May 1990).  Naomi Lamoreaux and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, "Long-term Change 
in the Organization of Inventive Activity," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America 93, no. 23 (12 November 1996): 12686-92. 
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The patent search methods used in this study were reliable but not immune to the 
occasional error.  Therefore, the patent data used here is comprehensive in scope but not 
exhaustive in depth.  There are surely a handful of quartz crystal related patents from the 
period studied that were overlooked.   Similarly, some of the patents included in the study 
are related only tangentially to piezoelectric quartz crystal technology.  Nevertheless, the 
author is confident that the patent data used sketches a reliable broad outline of quartz 
crystal invention over the four decades studied.   
The patent search method used here can be described as follows.  Google 
Advanced Patent Search was the primary search tool used.  Google has scanned the entire 
database of approximately seven million U.S. patents.  In the process of scanning, 
character recognition algorithms were used to make the patent documents text-
searchable.  These algorithms, while very good, are not perfect, particularly when the 
document being scanned is old and possibly faded.  Thus, some of the text in Google’s 
patent database has been misread.  This is the primary error source in this study. 
A two stage patent search process was used for this study.  Stage one involved 
performing a search for every patent filed between 1918 and 1959 containing the 
following search terms: ((“piezo” OR “piezoelectric”) AND “quartz crystal”).122  The 
patent filing date rather than the patent issue date was used because the former gives a 
more accurate indication of what year the inventive activity occurred.  Patent applications 
that were filed but never issued are not included in Google’s patent database and were 
thus not used.  The stage one search, the results of which are shown in Figure 1 of the 
Introduction, yielded a total database size of 1280 quartz crystal patents.  The stage two 
                                                 
122 Google’s Advanced Patent Search allows for searches by global key words, patent number, patent title, 
name of inventor, name of assignee, date of filing, and date of issue.   
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search consisted in selecting six local maxima in Figure 1 for detailed study.  The years 
selected were 1927, 1933, 1940, 1945, 1953, and 1959.  This selection yielded a total 
sample size of 285 patents, or roughly 1/5 of all quartz crystal patents filed between 1918 
and 1959.  The charts shown in this chapter were derived from this sample. 
Each of the 285 patents in the sample was studied individually.  In order to make 
some sense of the patents, a typological scheme was devised consisting of five categories: 
QCU Design and Fabrication, Oscillator and Transmitter Circuits, Wave Filter Circuits, 
Transducers, and Other.  Each of the 285 patents was then placed in one of these 
categories.  Several other aspects of the patents were also noted: the patent number, the 
inventor, the inventor’s location or residence, the assignee, the assignee’s location, and 
the type of assignment.  The analysis method used on this patent database was designed 
to illuminate both the epistemological and the social aspects of quartz crystal innovation. 
This chapter is organized into two parts.  The first focuses on the “what” of quartz 
crystal technology – the technical content of the patents studied.  A typology of the 
technology is presented and patent data analyzed to show the distribution of patenting 
activity across a number of basic categories.  The data is also analyzed across time to 
illustrate how this distribution changed.  A fundamental distinction is made between 
patents that present a physical apparatus or device and those that present a manufacturing 
process.  Quartz crystal patents covered both categories, sometimes within the same 
patent.  The second part of this chapter focuses on the “who” of quartz crystal technology 
– the inventors and assignees specified on the 285 patents studied.  All of the inventors 
were either individuals or small groups, while the majority of assignees were companies.  
While studying separately the inventors and assignees allows us to see who was doing the 
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inventing and who cared enough about this technology to either sponsor its development 
or purchase it afterwards, studying the relationships between inventors and assignees is 
even more enlightening.  The inventor-assignee relationships observed in this study were 
classified into seven categories, and changes in the distribution of these categories were 
tracked over the selected years.  The results yield insight into the organizational context 
of quartz crystal technological innovation between 1918 and 1959. 
 
With his invention of the quartz “sandwich” transducer during World War I, 
Frenchman Paul Langevin laid the groundwork for using quartz crystal as a piezoelectric 
transducer.  Over the following decades, engineers and inventors patented hundreds of 
quartz transducer devices based on his work.  The American Walter Cady created an 
entirely new class of quartz devices with his inventions of the piezoelectric resonator and 
oscillator.  These inventions exploited the unique resonant properties of quartz crystal in 
a manner that paved the way for the invention of highly stable oscillators and wave filters 
with sharp cutoff bands.  Together, transducer and resonant applications of quartz crystal 
made up roughly four out of every five quartz patents applied for between 1918 and 
1959. 
Figure 6 presents a simple five category typology of quartz crystal technology and 
illustrates the distribution of quartz crystal patents across the categories.  Three of the 
categories – QCU Design and Fabrication, Oscillator and Transmitter Circuits, and Wave 
Filter Circuits – cover resonant applications of quartz crystal.  The remaining two 
categories – Transducers and Other – exploit non-resonant properties of quartz crystal.  
What follows is a brief description of each category.  (1) The QCU in “QCU design and 
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fabrication” refers to Quartz Crystal Unit; this is the fundamental device or system 
component around which all oscillator, transmitter, and wave filter circuits are built.  
QCU’s, however, are not used in transducers or “Other” applications.  QCU engineering 
is an area all its own and includes crystal cutting and polishing, crystal holders, 
mountings, cases, and methods of attaching electrodes to crystals.  (2) Oscillator and 
transmitter circuits are grouped together in one category because of their similarity.  
Transmitters may be considered systems in which the oscillator is an important sub-
system.  Other important transmitter sub-systems include the modulator, the amplifier, 
and the antenna or transmission line.  All of the transmitter and oscillator circuits 
represented in Figure 6 employ the QCU as a crucial component.  (3) The wave filter 
circuits of the next category also employ the QCU as a crucial component.  These circuits 
often served as important sub-systems in multiplex telephony systems.  (4) The 
“Transducers” category includes applications in which the quartz crystal transducer rather 
than the QCU is the fundamental device or system component.  Such applications include 
SONAR, ultrasonic medical imaging, phonograph needles, loudspeakers, vibration 
sensors, and modulators.  Modulators are included here rather than in the previous 
category because the quartz crystal functions in a modulator as a transducer and not as an 
oscillator.  (5) Finally, the “Other” category in Figure 6 includes applications such as 
optical relays, accelerometers, delay lines, light valves, and microwave detectors.  At 
their base, these atypical applications rely on either the transducer or resonant 
characteristics of quartz crystal, but they are difficult to categorize without more detailed 
study.   
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Quartz Crystal Patents: 1918-1959
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Figure 6: Types and Average Distribution of All Quartz Crystal Patents Issued 
Between 1918 and 1959 
(Note: The approximate total number of successful quartz crystal patent applications filed between 
1918 and 1959 is 1280.  This chart is based on a sampling of these patents.  Sample size for the 
data presented is 285 patents, or just over 22% of the total.  Data on unsuccessful patent 
applications (i.e., those that are never issued) are not readily available from the USPTO.  Figure 
created by author.) 
 
 
 
 The distribution portrayed in Figure 6 did not remain static between 1918 and 
1959.  Figures 7 and 8 show how the distribution of quartz crystal patents fluctuated for 
the selected years.   Note firstly that the areas covering resonant applications of quartz 
crystal – QCU Design and Fabrication, Oscillator and Transmitter Circuits, and Wave 
Filter Circuits – always comprised from 50 to 60 percent of all quartz crystal patenting 
activity.  The remaining 40 to 50 percent consisted of transducers and other applications.  
This is noteworthy because the focus of this work is the resonant applications of quartz 
crystal.  Adding transducers and other applications to this work would have lengthened it 
considerably; a later work may focus on these. 
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Figure 7: Types and Percentage of Quartz Crystal Patents for Select Years between 
1927 and 1959 
(It should be noted that the total number of quartz crystal patents (i.e., the number represented by 
100%) varied significantly across these years.  See Figure 2.3 for these numbers.  Figure created by 
author.) 
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Figure 8: Types and Numbers of Quartz Crystal Patents for Select Years between 
1927 and 1959 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 
Figures 7 and 8 show also that patenting activity in QCU design and fabrication 
peaked in 1940 and 1945, both as a percentage of all quartz patenting activity and in 
absolute numbers.  This is not surprising given that, as described in Chapter 7, military 
contractors faced numerous production challenges in producing the millions of QCU’s 
required by the Army Signal Corps during the war.  Also note that though the percentage 
of transducer patents peaked in 1953, the absolute number of transducer patents peaked in 
1945.  This reflects the great amount of anti-submarine warfare research conducted 
during WWII.  Wave filter patents peaked in 1933 both as a percentage and in absolute 
numbers, reflecting the extensive work Bell Labs did in the 1930s to refine this branch of 
quartz crystal technology and apply it to its expanding multiplex telephony system.  This 
work is discussed in detail in Chapter 6. 
 73 
 Quartz crystal devices – QCU’s, transducers, and other – are typically embedded 
within large technological systems.123  As such, quartz crystal technology is hierarchical 
in nature.  The hierarchical structure of Figure 9 illustrates how the two fundamental 
components of quartz crystal technology – the QCU and the quartz transducer – are 
related to higher and lower levels of organization.  It should be noted in passing that 
Figure 9 is merely meant to be representative, and not exhaustive, of quartz crystal-based 
systems and sub-systems.  Furthermore, the figure is historical, characterizing quartz 
crystal technology during the period studied.  Updating Figure 9 to represent post-1960 
developments would alter it significantly.   
Most obvious from Figure 9 are the two separate branches of quartz applications, 
one stemming from the exploitation of quartz’s resonant property, and the other from the 
exploitation of quartz’s transducer property.  Notice also that the QCU and the quartz 
transducer have only one sub-component in common – the quartz blank.  This is a thin, 
polished wafer of quartz whose thickness has been carefully set such that the wafer will 
resonate at a specific frequency.  Some early transducers, such as those made by 
Langevin that used a rough mosaic of quartz slices, did not share even this with the QCU. 
 
                                                 
123 Thomas Parke Hughes, "The Evolution of Large Technological Systems," in The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Thomas P. Hughes 
Wiebe E. Bijker, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 51-82. 
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Figure 9: The Hierarchical Structure of Quartz Crystal Technology 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
While Figure 9 shows the patentable physical apparatus associated with quartz 
crystal technology, patents may be obtained also on methods or processes.  Specifically, 
many manufacturing processes are required to take sub-components and turn them into an 
operational QCU.  These processes are shown in Figure 10.  Work in several of these 
processes yielded a great many patents.  The processes yielding the most patents in the 
time period covered here were 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9.  Figure 11 shows the distribution of 
patents among these processes, while Figure 12 shows how this distribution varied for 
select years.   
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Figure 10: Manufacturing Processes of Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) Production 
(Figure created by author.) 
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Average Distribution of QCU Process Patents (1918-1959)
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Figure 11: Average Distribution of Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) Process Patents Filed 
between 1918 and 1959 
(Like Figure 6, this figure is based on a sampling of all quartz crystal patents during this period.  The 
sample size is 285 patents of a total of 1280 patents.  Only successful patent applications were 
considered.  Figure created by author.) 
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Figure 12: Distribution of Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) Process Patents Filed for Select 
Years between 1927 and 1959 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
A brief description of QCU manufacture processes 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9 will heighten 
appreciation of their importance and aid the reader in interpreting Figures 11 and 12.  
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Process 3, determining the crystal lattice orientation, is crucial in that a raw quartz crystal 
slab cannot be properly cut into wafers without it.  Ignoring a crystal’s lattice orientation 
may produce wafers that are not strongly piezoelectric.  This process was once performed 
by various methods, including submerging a crystal in a special oil bath and shining light 
through it.  During World War II, however, an orientation method using X-rays was 
developed which surpassed all previous methods in convenience and accuracy.  As can be 
seen in Figure 12, the large amount of effort invested in improving process 3 during 
WWII is reflected in the number of Orientation Determination patents filed in 1945.   
Process 4, cutting of the crystal, has also yielded many patents, most relating to 
the angle at which a crystal should be cut relative to its electrical axis in order to achieve 
certain temperature coefficient properties.  If a crystal is cut to certain angles, it can 
exhibit essentially a zero temperature coefficient, neutralizing the tendency of 
temperature changes to alter a QCU’s resonant frequency.  Figure 11 shows that process 
4, Crystal Grinding, Cutting and Cuts, received just over one-quarter of all QCU process 
patents during the years studied.  This reflects both the importance of this process as well 
as the large variety of useful angles at which quartz crystal may be cut.  Figure 12 shows 
that patenting activity on this process peaked in 1940.  This was largely due to the work 
of one man, Warren Mason of Bell Telephone Laboratories.  The most prolific inventor 
in the history of BTL, Mason was granted a total of nearly 200 patents, over 40 of which 
concerned piezoelectric crystal apparatus.124  His work on quartz crystal temperature 
coefficients in the 1930s and early 1940s, which is covered in more depth in Chapter 6, 
yielded many innovative and important crystal cuts. 
                                                 
124 Robert N. Thurston, "Warren P. Mason, 1900-1986," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 81 
(1987): 570-71.  ———, "Warren P. Mason (1900-1986) Physicist, Engineer, Inventor, Author, Teacher," 
IEEE Transactions on Ultrasonics, Ferroelectrics, and Frequency Control 41, no. 4 (July 1994): 425-34. 
 78 
Process 7, connecting electrodes to the quartz blank, is a mundane but clearly 
important process in manufacturing a QCU.  Electrodes that become detached in hot 
weather or when jostled in a shipping truck can ruin an otherwise good QCU.  Bell 
Telephone Laboratories patented several methods for securing metallic electrodes to 
quartz wafers in 1940, as can be seen in Figure 12.  The other years covered in this study 
saw very little patenting activity on process 7. 
As shown in Figure 11, process 8, the mounting of the quartz blank onto a crystal 
holder, produced over 40% of all QCU process patents between 1918 and 1959.  This 
was primarily due to the wide variety of QCU mounting schemes that are possible.  Two 
of the most common schemes are illustrated in Figure 13.  Note that the two-pin scheme 
has a smaller circuit board footprint, while the three-pin scheme is capable of a lower 
vertical profile.  Many “anti-shock” mounting schemes were developed to enable QCU’s 
to operate in vibration-intensive environments such as aircraft.  As Figure 12 shows, 
work in this process area yielded a consistently high number of patents throughout the 
period studied.   
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Figure 13: Two Popular Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) Packaging 
Schemes   
(Reprinted, by permission, from John R. Vig, “Quartz Crystal Resonators 
and Oscillators for Frequency Control and Timing Applications – A 
Tutorial,” Rev. 8.5.3.8, March 2008.  J.Vig@IEEE.org) 
 
 
Finally, process 9, the encasing of the mounted crystal blank, yields the finished 
QCU.  One of the primary aims of this process is to create a hermetic seal around the 
mounted crystal so that moisture and dirt are kept out.  Figure 12 shows that this process 
reached a peak in patenting activity in 1945, suggesting that QCU casing was vital to 
ensuring that the U.S. Army’s radios worked in harsh environment around the world. 
Figure 10, shown earlier, displayed the general order of work involved in 
manufacturing QCU’s up through the mid-1950s.  However, as explained in Chapter 8, 
research conducted after World War II yielded a method for growing perfect quartz 
crystals from crushed quartz.  This method, referred to as the culturing of quartz, 
essentially replaced steps 1 through 3 of Figure 10 and freed the United States from 
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dependence on Brazilian quartz mines.  Thus, new patents on processes 1-3 of Figure 10 
became almost non-existent from the 1950s on. 
 
 Just as understanding the physical apparatus and manufacturing processes of 
quartz crystal technology is crucial to grasping the technical content of the following 
chapters, knowing the patentees behind quartz crystal inventions is essential to 
appreciating the social nature of quartz crystal innovation.  Two types of patentee are 
specified on most patent applications: the inventor, or assignor, and the assignee.  The 
inventor, typically an individual and sometimes a group, is the person or persons who 
first conceived of the invention and reduced it to practice in the form of a working device 
or manufacturing process.  When an assignee is designated on a patent application, the 
inventor is legally assigning the property rights of the patent to the assignee.  That is, the 
assignee, and not the inventor, now owns the patent and may license or sell it to others.  
The assignee may also sue for infringement if another party manufactures, uses, or sells 
the patented invention without the consent of the assignee.  Assignees are typically 
private companies but may also be individuals or the government.  When no assignee is 
designated on a patent application, the de facto assignee is the inventor.   
Figure 2 of the Introduction showed that the Bell System, comprising AT&T, 
Western Electric, and Bell Telephone Laboratories, was assigned far more quartz crystal 
patents than any other single organization during the period 1918-1959.  In second place 
was RCA, holding about half as many patents.  Though the Bell System consistently 
ranked among the most active quartz crystal patent assignees during this period, little else 
remained stable.  Tables 1 and 2 give two ways of looking at changing patent ownership 
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for select years.  Table 1 categorizes patents by type of assignee – private sector firm, 
government, or individual – while Table 2 focuses exclusively on private sector firms, 
showing all firms that were assigned two or more quartz crystal patents in the select 
years.  Table 2 shows that private sector firms represented by far the most common type 
of assignee, followed by individuals.  The government did not appear as an assignee 
before 1940, during which year the government seized several quartz crystal patents from 
Germans, assigning them to Alien Property Custodian.  From there on, the government 
appeared as the assignee for patents invented by employees of military R&D laboratories, 
such as the U.S. Army Signal Corp’s laboratories in and around Fort Monmouth, New 
Jersey.  Chapter 6 tells of the Army Signal Corps’ quartz crystal activity during World 
War II.  Table 2 gives a comprehensive list of private sector firms assigned at least two 
quartz crystal patents during the years of interest.  Note that the Bell System is the only 
firm to be assigned patents in all six years of interest.  RCA appears five times, and 
General Electric and the Submarine Signal Company, later Raytheon, both appear four 
times.  The most patents assigned in any one year to a single firm was eighteen, assigned 
to the Bell System in 1940 and representing an amazing 43% of all quartz crystal patents 
filed that year.  In fact, the Bell System led with the most patents for every year of 
interest except for 1927, when Bell ranked third behind the Federal Telegraph Company 
and RCA.   
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Table 1: Number of Patents Assigned to Private Sector Firms, Government, and 
Individuals for Select Years 
Type of Patent Assignee 1927 1933 1940 1945 1953 1959 Total 
Firms (Private Sector) 47  
(89%) 
29 
(81%) 
44 
(84%) 
44 
(64%) 
29 
(74%) 
30 
(81%) 
223 
(78%) 
Government (Public 
Sector)* 
0 0 4  
(8%) 
8  
(12%) 
2  
(5%) 
3  
(8%) 
17 
(6%) 
Individuals** 6  
(11%) 
7 
(19%) 
4  
(8%) 
16 
(24%) 
8  
(21%) 
4  
(11%) 
45 
(16%) 
* - Includes patents assigned to Alien Property Custodian. 
** - Includes patents that do not specify an assignee. 
(Table created by author.) 
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Table 2: Number of Patents Assigned to Private Sector Companies for Select Years 
Company 1927 1933 1940 1945 1953 1959 Total 
American Bosch Arma Corp. -- -- -- -- -- 2 2 
Bell System 6 8 18 11 4 4 51 
Bliley Electric Co. -- -- 5 -- -- 1 6 
Brush Development Co. (Clevite) 3 -- -- 1 3 -- 7 
Cambridge Thermionic Corp. -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2 
Collins Radio Co. -- -- -- 1 1 -- 2 
Communication Patents, Inc. 2 -- -- -- -- -- 2 
Compagnie Generale de 
Telegraphie sans Fil 
-- 1 -- -- 2 -- 3 
Crystal Research Laboratories -- -- -- 3 -- -- 3 
Endevo Corp. -- -- -- -- -- 2 2 
Federal Telegraph Co. 10 -- -- -- -- -- 10 
Federal Telephone and Radio Corp. -- -- -- 2 -- -- 2 
Galvin Manufacturing Corp. 
(Motorola) 
-- -- -- 5 3 -- 8 
General Dynamics Corp. -- -- -- -- 1 1 2 
General Electric 2 -- 1 2 -- 2 7 
Midland Manufacturing Co. -- -- -- -- 1 2 3 
Radio Corporation of America 
(RCA) 
7 6 10 3 3 -- 29 
Radio Patents Corp. -- -- 2 -- -- -- 2 
Reeves-Hoffman Corp. -- -- -- 1 1 -- 2 
Research Corp. -- -- 2 -- -- -- 2 
Sperry Products, Inc. -- -- -- 2 2 -- 4 
Submarine Signal Co. (Raytheon) -- 4 2 3 -- 1 10 
Telefunken 5 6 2 -- -- -- 13 
Westinghouse 5 -- -- -- -- -- 5 
Wired Radio, Inc. 5 -- -- -- -- -- 5 
Totals 45 26 42 36 20 15 184 
(Note:  Only Companies assigned a total of two or more crystal patents during this period are shown.  Table 
created by author.) 
 
 
 
 An important question not answered by Table 2 is whether each firm purchased 
its patents from an inventor outside its organization or whether it patents were developed 
in-house by an employee-inventor.  This question is difficult to answer with absolute 
certainty from just the information contained in a patent, but an educated guess can 
usually be made by comparing the address of the inventor’s residence with the addresses 
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of known R&D facilities for each company.  For inventors for whom biographical 
information exists, more certain decisions can be made regarding the inventor-assignee 
relationship.  Lastly, some patent applications give further assignment information, such 
as the designation “mesne assignment.”   This legal term, which signifies that 
intermediate assignments occurred prior to the final assignment, strongly suggests that 
the inventor was not an employee of the assignee.  Thus, using these guidelines, Figure 
14 was constructed to show the various types of inventor-assignee relationships occurring 
in the world of quartz crystal patents over the years of interest.   
 The seven categories of Figure 14 require some explanation.  The categories 
represent the types of inventor-assignee relationships observed in this study, and they are 
defined as follows. 
(1) Employee-employer: The inventor is an employee of the assignee, a private firm.  
Thus, the assignee is sponsoring in-house R&D rather than purchasing patents 
from others.  In this scenario, the inventor has usually agreed, as part of the terms 
of employment, to assign all inventions developed on company time and with 
company equipment to the company. 
(2) Non-employee: The assignee is a private firm or occasionally an individual, but 
the inventor is not an employee of this firm or individual.  The inventor is 
typically an independent inventor, a university researcher, or a government 
laboratory employee.  In this scenario, the assignee is purchasing patents from 
outside its organization.  The inventor is not necessarily independent, particularly 
if working for a government laboratory.  That is, the inventor may have no say 
over who the assignee is. 
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(3) Unknown: The assignee is a private firm, but it is unknown from available data 
whether or not the inventor is an employee of this firm.  Thus, both categories (1) 
and (2), but no other categories, are possibilities here. 
(4) Inventor-Broker: The assignee is in the business of buying and selling patents and 
manufactures no products.  An example is Communication Patents, Inc.  In this 
scenario, the inventor may or may not be independent.  Thus, as far as the 
inventor is concerned, this scenario is similar to category (2). 
(5) Government assignee:  The inventor assigns the patented invention directly to the 
U.S. government for governmental or military use.  Many of these patents were 
invented by researchers and engineers for the Army Signal Corps’ laboratories in 
and around Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.  Thus, the inventor is more often than 
not a government employee. 
(6) Government Seizure: The assignee here is always listed as Alien Property 
Custodian.  The invention is seized from an enemy nation, typically during time 
of war.  This practice was common during the two world wars.125 
(7) Non-assignment: The inventor doesn’t assign his or her patent to anyone, 
choosing instead to retain ownership.  The inventor may then license the patent or 
choose to sell it outright.  Inventors that are employees rarely have this option.  
This is the only scenario in which the inventor is always independent.  Some of 
these inventors founded their own companies to manufacture and market their 
inventions.   
 
                                                 
125 Records of the Office of Alien Property, Record Group 131, U.S. National Archives, (Accessed 20 
December 2007) available from http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/131.html; 
Internet. 
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Figure 14: Inventor-Assignee Relationships for Select Years between 1927 and 1959 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 
 Figure 14 illustrates several important trends in quartz crystal technological 
innovation over the four decades studied.  First, employee-employer relationships 
characterize more than one-half but less than three-fourths of the patents for every year 
except 1927 and 1945.  Given the increasing visibility of in-house industrial R&D 
laboratories during these years, one might expect nearly all patents to have been 
developed by employees.126  Yet the “Non-employee” and “Inventor-Broker” sections of 
Figure 14 clearly show the persistent presence of a market for purchasing patents.  1927 
is especially noteworthy for its large percentage of non-employee and inventor-broker 
patents.  During this year, the Federal Telegraph Company purchased all of its quartz 
                                                 
126 As documented by David Mowery, between 1919 and 1936 1150 industrial R&D labs were established 
by U.S. firms, and from 1921 to 1940, the number of scientists and research engineers employed in 
industrial R&D establishments increased tenfold.  David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Technology and 
the Pursuit of Economic Growth (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
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crystal patents from two sources: independent inventor and former Western Electric 
engineer Alexander McLean Nicolson, and the Naval Research Laboratory.  Also during 
this year, RCA purchased five of its seven patents from British or German inventors.  At 
the risk of over-generalizing, these observations suggest the following general rule.  
When a new technology is first emerging, established companies wishing to enter the 
field will attempt to buy their way in by purchasing important patents from others.  If this 
strategy succeeds in helping the company get its foot in the door, it may then go on to 
develop its own patents in-house.127  This was the road taken by RCA.  In 1933, four of 
the company’s six quartz crystal patents were invented by RCA employees.  For the 
remaining years studied, all of RCA’s patents were developed in-house at one of three 
R&D facilities, located at Rocky Point, New York (Long Island); Camden, New Jersey; 
and Harrison, New Jersey.128   
 Other than RCA and Federal Telegraph Company, two other companies bought 
significant numbers of quartz crystal patents.  Wired Radio, Inc., a company launched by 
Army General George Owen Squier in 1922 to exploit Squier’s invention of techniques 
for transmitting music over power lines, bought all five of its quartz crystal patents in 
1927.  The company was transformed in 1934 into the well-known Muzak Corporation.  
Boston-based Submarine Signal Company, later becoming Raytheon, also purchased 
many quartz crystal patents.  By the end of the period studied, however, Raytheon had 
begun developing most patents in-house.   
                                                 
127 For an thorough discussion of the various incentives that led companies to establish in-house R&D 
programs in the early 20th century, see ———, Paths of Innovation: Technological Change in 20th Century 
America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
128 See the entries for RCA Communications, Inc., RCA Victor Company, and RCA Radiotron Company in 
U.S. National Research Council, Research Laboratories in Industrial Establishments of the United States, 4 
ed., Bulletin of the National Research Council (New York: Bowker, 1933). 
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 Several companies included in this study demonstrated a consistent pattern of 
developing their own patents through in-house research and development.  Among these 
firms were the Bell System (primarily Bell Telephone Laboratories), General Electric, 
Westinghouse, Brush Development Company, the German firm Telefunken, Motorola, 
and the Bliley Electric Company.  These firms consciously adopted a strategy of hiring 
engineers and scientists and giving them the resources necessary to innovate.  Among the 
most prolific quartz crystal employee-inventors were Warren Marrison (8) and Warren 
Mason (44) of BTL, Paul D. Gerber (7) and Henry Hawk (6) of RCA, and John Wolfskill 
(17) of Bliley Electric.129  Warren Mason of BTL holds the distinction of being the most 
prolific of all quartz crystal patentees during the period studied, as well as the most 
prolific of all BTL researchers.130 
 Another interesting aspect of Figure 14 is the persistent presence of non-assigned 
patents.  The inventors behind these patents generally fell into one of three categories: 
independent professional inventors, university researchers, and business owners.  One of 
the most prolific independent inventors covered in this study was Alexander McLean 
Nicolson.  Nicolson was born in England but moved to New York at a young age.  He 
worked for Western Electric from around 1914 to 1925, after which he worked 
professionally as an independent inventor.  Between 1914 and 1943, he was granted 93 
patents, 24 of which were piezoelectric-related.131  Then there were the university 
researchers.  Among these were Walter Cady of Wesleyan University and George 
                                                 
129 The numbers in parentheses are the total numbers of piezoelectric crystal-related patents granted to each 
inventor between 1918 and 1959. 
130 Robert N. Thurston, "Warren P. Mason, 1900-1986," Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 81 
(1987): 570-71. 
131 All of the information presented here on Nicolson has been gathered from his patents.  Very little, if 
anything, seems to have been written about him or his career. 
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Washington Pierce of Harvard.  Both of these men figure prominently in Chapters 2, 4, 
and 5.  Finally, there were the quartz crystal inventors who started their own companies 
to develop their inventions.  Representative of this group is Kurt Klingsporn, a German 
physicist who worked for Telefunken for many years before launching his own firm, 
KVG, which specialized in piezoelectric quartz crystal devices.132 
Finally, what can the patents studied tell us about the inventors themselves?  The 
employment status of many inventors is difficult to ascertain with any certainty.  The 
inventor’s residence, however, is clearly indicated on every patent application.  Table 3 
compares the residence, U.S. or foreign, of quartz crystal patentees with the residence for 
all utility patentees for the years studied.133  The largest differences occur in 1927 and 
1933, when the percentage of foreign quartz crystal inventors was much larger than the 
percentage of all foreign utility patent inventors.  This indicates that, more than many 
other areas of technology, early quartz crystal technology was an international endeavor.  
A closer look at the patents from 1927 and 1933 reveals that a plurality of these foreign-
inventor patents was assigned by German inventors to the Telefunken Company.  The 
French and the British had much smaller numbers of quartz inventors.  Also noteworthy 
in Table 3 is the unusually small percentage of foreign quartz crystal inventors in 1945.  
A closer look shows that all of these inventors were British.  This is not surprising given 
that German inventors would have been prohibited from applying for U.S. patents during 
wartime.  Finally, we see the percentage of foreign quartz crystal inventors drop once 
again in 1959.  This drop is hard to fully explain.  One possible reason for it is that some 
                                                 
132 KVG continues manufacturing quartz crystal products to this day.  K.V.G. Quartz Crystal Technology, 
(Accessed 20 December 2007) available from http://www.kvg-gmbh.com/; Internet. 
133 The utility patent is that class of patent typically recognized as an invention.  (The others classes of 
patent are the plant patent and the design patent, the later referring to ornamental design.)  All quartz 
crystal patents are utility patents. 
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talented German quartz crystal engineers, such as Rudolf Bechmann, who is discussed in 
Chapter 8, left Germany during the war and later settled in the U.S., where they went to 
work for private firms or the Army Signals Corps.   
 
 
Table 3: Comparison of the Percentage of U.S. Quartz Crystal Patent Holders Having a 
Foreign Residence With the Percentage of All U.S. Patent Holders Having a Foreign 
Residence 
 1927 1933 1940 1945 1953 1959 Average 
% Foreign (quartz crystal 
patents) 
23 31 15 3 15 8 16 
% Foreign (all utility patents) 12 15 15 8 11 16 13 
Difference +11% +16% --- -5% +4% -8% +3% 
(Table created by author.) 
 
 
 
 This chapter has presented the results of a study of quartz crystal technology 
patents filed between 1918 and 1959.  These results point to a number of important 
conclusions.  First, the body of technological knowledge examined can be divided into 
three broad categories: components and systems that exploit primarily the uniquely stable 
resonant properties of quartz crystal, components and systems that exploit primarily the 
natural transducing property of piezoelectric quartz crystal, and other components and 
systems that do not fit neatly into either of these broad categories.  During the period 
studied, the first of these three categories accounted for 50 to 60 percent of all quartz 
crystal-related patents.  It is partly for this reason that this dissertation focuses on 
resonant applications of quartz crystal, leaving transducer and other applications for a 
future study. 
 Furthermore, this study has shown that the knowledge surrounding resonant 
applications of piezoelectric quartz crystal can be further divided into three more 
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specialized categories: quartz crystal unit (QCU) design and fabrication, radio oscillator 
and transmitter circuitry, and wave filter circuitry.  Quartz crystal technology has been 
shown to be hierarchical and system-based, with the QCU serving as the principal 
component in resonant applications.  As such, the QCU has attracted a significant amount 
of inventive effort.  This effort peaked during World War II, corresponding with the 
important role played by QCU’s in making possible the U.S. Army Signal Corps’ 
wartime mobile communications.   
 This study has also highlighted the distinction between product and process 
patents.  Many QCU patents, particularly those filed during World War II, covered 
processes useful in QCU manufacturing.  Among the processes that have allowed for 
much creative latitude, and that therefore have yielded large numbers of patents, have 
been the grinding and cutting of crystals into wafers and the mounting of crystal wafers 
onto crystal holders.  For the companies involved in QCU manufacture, many of these 
process patents would have been visible to competitors only through the improved 
performance characteristics of their products.  That is, two QCU’s manufactured using 
identical materials but different manufacturing processes might have looked the same.  
The only noticeable difference would have been their performance within a radio or 
telephony system.  Thus, for the companies holding them, process patents may have been 
more difficult to protect against infringement than product patents. 
 In addition to providing insight into the knowledge structure of quartz crystal 
technology, this patent study has also shed light on the social nature of quartz crystal 
invention.  Private sector firms, led by the various parts of the Bell System, were shown 
to be the assignees on nearly four of every five quartz crystal patents issued between 
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1918 and 1959.  The remaining patents either specified the U.S. government as the 
assignee or indicated no assignee at all, resulting in a de factor assignment to the 
inventor.  This dominance of private firms in the ownership of patents is not surprising in 
light of the well-documented rise in intrafirm research and development during the first 
half of the 20th century.134  What is surprising, however, is the persistent presence in 
quartz crystal technology of unassigned patents.  On average, roughly one of every six 
patents filed during the period studied specified no assignee as of the date of issue.  This 
fact, when coupled with the persistent presence of patents for which the inventor was not 
an employee of the assignee, suggests that, for the period studied, there was a healthy 
open market for the selling and licensing of quartz crystal patents.  The patent data 
examined here also suggests that this market was most active in the early years of the 
technology, when large firms such as AT&T, Federal Telegraph Company, and RCA 
were struggling to acquire dominant patent positions.  In particular, RCA and Federal 
Telegraph sought during the 1920s to buy their way into quartz crystal technology by 
purchasing patents developed outside their organizations.  By contrast, AT&T, through 
its Bell Telephone Laboratories, developed an early pattern of developing quartz crystal 
inventions in-house.  As quartz crystal technology matured, most firms that remained in 
the business developed their own in-house R&D capabilities rather than choosing to 
purchase patents from others.135 
 Lastly, this chapter has shown that U.S. quartz crystal inventors were not solely 
American.  As indicated by the patent data, quartz crystal technology was an international 
                                                 
134 David Mowery, "Industrial Research and Firm Size, Survival, and Growth in American Manufacturing, 
1921-46: An Assessment," Journal of Economic History 43 (December 1983): 953-80. 
135 This was consistent with the general trend during the interwar years for manufacturing firms to develop 
in-house R&D capabilities.  See David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, Paths of Innovation: 
Technological Change in 20th Century America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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endeavor, especially in the 1920s and 1930s.  The Germans, and the firm of Telefunken 
in particular, were engaged more than any other foreign people in developing new quartz 
crystal devices and processes.  During World War II, when Germans were prohibited 
from filing for U.S. patents, the percentage of quartz crystals patents filed by foreign 
inventors fell precipitously.  By the early 1950s, this percentage had returned to pre-war 
levels.  British and French inventors filed for a modest number of quartz crystal patents 
during the period studied.  But, on the whole, quartz crystal technology between 1918 
and 1959 was driven by American and German firms. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE 1920s – QUARTZ CRYSTAL AND FREQUENCY CONTROL 
 
 
 
It is indeed most fortunate that just when extremely accurate frequency control is becoming so 
necessary to radio, the instrumentalities for it should become available.  It may be that this is 
putting the cart before the horse and explaining how remarkable it is that great rivers always flow 
past large cities.  Perhaps the modern desire and need and application of constant frequency is the 
result of the crystal oscillator and similar high precision frequency control devices.136 
    Alfred N. Goldsmith, R.C.A. Chief Broadcast Engineer, 1928 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
 By 1921, Walter Cady had invented the two foundational devices of resonant 
quartz crystal technology, the piezo-resonator and the piezo-oscillator.137  Yet, the 
application of these devices to the technology of radio awaited further developments, 
such as the growth of medium-wave broadcasting and the rise of shortwave relaying as a 
means of linking distant stations together.  Furthermore, Cady’s piezo-oscillator, an 
important breakthrough invention in its own right, was too fragile and finicky a device to 
be used in radio.  It required simplification.   
This chapter traces the beginning of the first quartz crystal technology boom to 
early 1924, when George Washington Pierce invented a simplified piezo-oscillator.  
Pierce’s invention found use quickly in shortwave experiments and later in medium-wave 
broadcasting, where it enabled engineers to construct “crystal-controlled” transmitters.  
The highly stable frequencies generated by the Pierce oscillator greatly improved the 
reception characteristics of both shortwave and medium-wave radio signals.  Beginning 
in 1924, quartz crystal technology progressed on several fronts.  The U.S. Naval 
                                                 
136 "Discussions on Harrison Paper," Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 16, no. 11 (1928): 
1470. 
137 The term “resonant quartz crystal technology” is used here to distinguish those quartz crystal devices 
and systems that exploit primarily the unique resonance property of quartz crystal from those that exploit 
primarily the electro-mechanical transducer property of quartz crystal.  See Figure 9 of Chapter 3. 
 95 
Research Laboratory began applying crystal control to high-powered shortwave 
transmitters.  The so-called Radio Group companies began conducting shortwave 
relaying experiments using crystal-controlled transmitters, while AT&T applied crystal 
control to medium-wave transmission, these experiments leading to a number of 
patentable inventions.  Those companies that lacked established R&D facilities, such as 
R.C.A., began purchasing quartz crystal patents on the open market.  Finally, the U.S. 
radio amateur community, which had already made many substantial contributions to 
radio technology, also began adopting the technique of crystal control, creating a large 
and growing market for precisely ground quartz crystals.   
 In relating the experimental and inventive activity following the 1924 invention of 
the Pierce oscillator, this chapter illuminates the growth of a technological community 
and its creation and maintenance of a new engineering knowledge base.  Prior to 1924, 
the quartz crystal technological community comprised alumni of the World War I anti-
submarine warfare research effort and a handful of well-connected radio amateurs.  By 
the late 1920s, this community had grown to include small R&D groups at AT&T, G.E., 
Westinghouse, and the Naval Research Laboratory, as well as increasing numbers of 
radio amateurs.  Forces driving the growth of this community included technological and 
scientific curiosity, competition between AT&T and the Radio Group over the future of 
chain (i.e., network) broadcasting, patent competition between AT&T and R.C.A., and 
the desire to find a technical solution to the problem of radio interference in the U.S.  The 
engineering knowledge base created by this community was disseminated through a 
number of channels, including patents, journal publications, conference presentations, 
and even amateur radio magazines.   
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4.2  Walter Cady’s piezoelectric oscillator is without a practical application 
 
When Walter Cady filed his piezo-oscillator patent in May of 1921, its field of 
application was uncertain at best.  The piezo-oscillator’s primary function was to 
generate a single and highly stable radio frequency.  As Cady had proposed, such a 
device could serve as a frequency standard, but this was a niche application for which a 
few hundred, or at most a few thousand, devices would ever be needed.138  Other possible 
applications for the piezo-oscillator were radio transmission and multiplex telephony, but 
non-quartz based master-oscillator transmitters were performing adequately enough in 
these areas.  In radio, most transmissions were still of the point-to-point variety; 
broadcasting had yet to take hold in the U.S., or anywhere else for that matter.  The 
potential value of what is now called the shortwave band (1500-30,000 kHz) had yet to 
be recognized; most observers considered the useful portions of the spectrum to be 
limited to the low-frequency (30-300 kHz) and medium-frequency (300-1500 kHz) 
bands.  At these frequencies, broadcasters, amateurs, and the military considered master-
oscillator transmitters to be more than adequate for maintaining a stable transmit 
frequency.  For the lowest radio frequencies (≤  100 kHz), the Alexanderson alternator, 
developed by Ernst Alexanderson of General Electric and used by the U.S. Navy for 
land-based transmitters, enabled high-power, continuous wave radio transmission.139  In 
telephony, AT&T had introduced small-scale multiplexing into its long-distance network 
                                                 
138 The use of the piezo-resonator and piezo-oscillator as a frequency standard is discussed in Chapter 5. 
139 Susan J. Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922, ed. Thomas P. Hughes, Johns Hopkins 
Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 155-56.  For 
a thorough study of Ernst Alexanderson, see James E. Brittain, Alexanderson: Pioneer in American 
Electrical Engineering, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1992). 
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in the late teens.  Stable carrier frequencies were needed to prevent simultaneous phone 
conversations from bleeding into each other.  But again, as with radio, non-quartz 
vacuum tube oscillators proved sufficient for this job.  The piezo-oscillator seemed to be 
a device for which a clear need, other than possibly as a frequency standard, did not yet 
exist. 
 
4.3  The birth of shortwave and medium-wave radio broadcasting 
In 1921, a new type of radio transmission – shortwave – was just emerging for 
which non-quartz vacuum-tube oscillators would prove insufficient.  Enterprising radio 
amateurs were the first to demonstrate the value of the shortwave band for long-distance, 
low-power transmissions.140  Among the earliest to experiment with shortwave 
transmission was Westinghouse engineer Frank Conrad, famous for orchestrating 
Westinghouse station KDKA’s radio broadcast of the 1920 presidential election 
results.141  Throughout 1921 and 1922, Conrad, who was an avid radio amateur in his 
spare time, used his personal “ham” station to relay KDKA’s broadcast signal on 
frequencies ranging from 2,000 to 5,000 kHz, much higher than most transmissions of the 
time.  Conrad and others quickly came to realize that the sensitivity of a radio 
transmitter’s frequency to small variations in transmitter components increased linearly 
with increasing frequency.  In other words, as transmitter frequency increased through the 
shortwave band, it became more and more difficult to maintain a stable frequency to 
which listeners could easily tune in.  But of course, in 1922 there were hardly any 
                                                 
140 Hugh Aitken, The Continuous Wave: Technology and American Radio, 1900-1932 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1985), 512. 
141 Jerome S. Berg, On the Short Wave, 1923-1945: Broadcast Listening in the Pioneer Days of Radio 
(Jefferson, N. C.: McFarland & Co., 1999), 14, 48, 50. 
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shortwave receivers with which listeners could tune in, so the problem was not 
considered acute.  Nevertheless, by 1922, the radio amateur community had identified 
improved frequency stability as one of the technical goals that must be achieved if 
shortwave radio was to have a future. 
1922 was also the year that radio broadcasting took America by storm.  This so-
called radio boom was not completely unanticipated; General Electric and Westinghouse 
had begun ramping up production of affordable home radio receivers throughout 1921.142  
At the end of that year, there were fewer than thirty broadcast stations in the U. S.143  By 
March of 1922, this number had grown to sixty-seven.144  Then, in the late spring and 
summer months, the U. S. Department of Commerce was inundated with hundreds of 
broadcast license applications.  By August, 253 stations had been licensed, and by 
October, 546.145  The exuberant enthusiasm with which Americans greeted radio 
broadcasting over the course of a few months in 1922 has few parallels in the nation’s 
history.  As Herbert Hoover would say in 1925, “There have been few developments in 
                                                 
142 At the 1st Radio Conference, Herbert Hoover estimated that the number of radio receivers in public use 
in Feb. 1921 was 50,000; by Feb. 1922, he estimated that this number had grown to 600,000.  See page 15 
of Hugh Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation: Broadcast Technology in the United States, 1920-1960 
(Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).  RCA introduced its Radiola Super-Heterodyne, 
the first receiver housed in a “handsome cabinet,” in 1923.  By 1924, it has been estimated that 10.1% of 
American families owned radio receivers.  See page 69 of Philip T. Rosen, The Modern Stentors: Radio 
Broadcasters and the Federal Government, 1920-1934 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980). 
143 5 stations are listed as being licensed on Jan. 1, 1922 by Christopher H. Sterling and John Michael 
Kittross, Stay Tuned: A History of American Broadcasting, 3rd ed. (Mahwah, NJ: Laurence Erlbaum 
Associates, 2002).  8 stations are listed in Captain Linwood S. Howeth, History of Communications-
Electronics in the United States Navy, 1 ed. (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 
382-3.  28 stations are listed in Hugh Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation: Broadcast Technology in 
the United States, 1920-1960 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).   
144 See the list of broadcast stations in "List of stations broadcasting market or weather reports (435 meters) 
and music, concerts, lectures, etc. (360 meters)," Radio Service Bulletin, no. 59 (1 March 1922): 13-14. 
145 See "Broadcasting Still Increasing," Radio News  (August 1922): 237.  See also "Broadcasting Increases 
500-Fold in One Year," Radio News  (December 1922): 1156. 
 99 
industrial history to equal the speed and efficiency with which genius and capital have 
joined to meet radio needs.”146 
The 1922 radio boom brought a number of permanent changes in the ways that 
Americans communicated, entertained themselves, and received their news.  For one, 
Americans no longer viewed radio as a means of point-to-point communication only, 
used mostly by the military, big business, and radio amateurs.  Radio was now a means of 
bringing the latest news and the most popular forms of entertainment into the home.  But 
the radio boom also changed forever the way that the radio spectrum was used.  The 
increasing demand for broadcast station licenses, the willingness of the Dept. of 
Commerce to grant them, and the finite size of the usable radio spectrum all combined to 
ensure that spectrum would quickly become a scarce resource.  By 1923, Secretary of 
Commerce Herbert Hoover declared that radio interference, caused by broadcasters 
crowding the airwaves, had become “simply intolerable.”147   
One source of the severe radio interference problem was the difficulty most 
broadcast stations experienced in holding their transmitters to their assigned frequencies.  
The non-crystal vacuum tube master-oscillator transmitters used by stations of the day 
were quite sensitive to small changes in temperature.  As vacuum tubes heated up, a 
transmitter’s frequency tended to drift.  One way to remedy this was to have a technician 
vigilantly monitor the station’s outgoing frequency, resetting the transmitter’s frequency 
dial when necessary.  The master-oscillator transmitter was the state-of-the-art in early 
1920s radio technology.  If taken care of, its performance was admirable.  But broadcast 
                                                 
146  U.S. Department of Commerce, Proceedings of the 4th National Radio Conference, by U. S. 
Department of Commerce, (Washington, D.C., 1925). 
147 Herbert Hoover, "The Urgent Need for Radio Legislation," Radio Broadcast  (January 1923): 211. 
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engineers would have welcomed a way to automatically control the station’s frequency 
without having to check it every few hours. 
Theoretically, broadcast engineers could have used Walter Cady’s piezo-oscillator 
to hold a transmitter’s frequency constant.  Practically, however, there were many 
problems with the device.  For one, it was somewhat finicky and required careful 
selection of circuit component values in order for oscillation to occur.  Furthermore, the 
use of Cady’s device essentially locked a station in to one and only one frequency.  
Precise tweaking of the frequency would no longer be an option, as it was with master 
oscillators.  Thus, in 1923, no serious broadcast engineer would have considered using 
Cady’s oscillator in a medium-wave broadcast transmitter. 
 Meanwhile, experimentation with shortwave radio transmission continued.  In 
1923, Westinghouse began using shortwave to extend the reach of its flagship medium-
wave station, KDKA.148  Transmitting on a wavelength of 64 meters, equal to a 
frequency of 4687 kHz, Westinghouse shortwave station 8XS had a much broader 
geographic reach than KDKA.149  The company built station KFKX in Hastings, 
Nebraska to receive the signals from 8XS and re-transmit them on a medium-wave 
frequency for local reception, making KFKX the first shortwave relay station in the 
U.S.150  In the same year, General Electric and the Crosley Corporation also built 
                                                 
148 KDKA’s initial broadcast wavelength was 360 meters, corresponding to a frequency of 833 kHz.  All 
commercially available receivers could pick up this frequency, but few at this time could pick up shortwave 
frequencies higher than 1500 kHz.  Source: Susan J. Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-
1922, ed. Thomas P. Hughes, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 300. 
149 See Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the United States.  A Tower In Babel, 3 vols., vol. 1 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 151.  See also "Important Events in Radio - 1923," Radio 
Service Bulletin, no. 141 (31 December 1928): 22. 
150 Jerome S. Berg, On the Short Wave, 1923-1945: Broadcast Listening in the Pioneer Days of Radio 
(Jefferson, N. C.: McFarland & Co., 1999), 49.  Alice Brannigan, "KFKX: A Most Historic Broadcast 
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 101 
shortwave transmitters for relaying their medium-wave broadcasts, G.E.’s signal being 
strong and clear enough to be regularly picked up in England.  None of these early 
shortwave relay stations, however, used Cady’s piezo-oscillator, making the signals 
moderately difficult to receive as the transmit frequencies drifted.  Nevertheless, these 
experimental stations established the feasibility of using shortwave to instantaneously 
link broadcast stations separated by hundreds and even thousands of miles, a practice that 
ultimately came to be known as interconnection.   
 What driving motive lay behind these early shortwave experiments?  Were radio 
engineers driven solely by curiosity to explore the communications potential of higher 
frequencies, or was there something more strategic going on?  Curiosity certainly played 
a role, for shortwave was poorly understood at this time, but fierce competition between 
AT&T and the so-called Radio Group, comprising R.C.A., G.E., Westinghouse, and 
United Fruit, also drove shortwave experimentation.151 
For the first two decades of radio, AT&T saw the new technology, which was 
used primarily for point-to-point communication, as a potential threat to its wired 
telephone network.  Thus, the company invested heavily in radio technology throughout 
the first two decades of the 20th century.  With the rise of broadcasting in the early 1920s, 
AT&T stayed in radio, establishing station WEAF in Manhattan.152  Then, attempting to 
parlay its nationwide network of telephone wires, over which it had exclusive control, 
into a competitive advantage over the Radio Group, the company began experimenting 
                                                 
151 Susan J. Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922, ed. Thomas P. Hughes, Johns Hopkins 
Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 290. 
152 See Chapters 5 and 6 of William Peck Banning, Commercial Broadcasting Pioneer: The WEAF 
Experiment (1922-1926) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1946). 
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with “chain broadcasting” in the summer of 1923.153  Chain broadcasting involved 
simultaneous broadcasts over multiple geographically-dispersed stations, each connected 
to the chain via dedicated telephone wires.  The first chain in the summer of 1923 
included only three stations, WEAF plus two New England stations, one in Providence, 
RI and the other in South Dartmouth, MA.  Three more stations were added by the end of 
1923, and by the end of 1924 AT&T could boast of a 26-station coast-to-coast radio 
network, all connected by the company’s proprietary telephone wires.154 
These developments seriously threatened R.C.A.’s position in the growing 
broadcast industry, for neither R.C.A. nor any other member of the Radio Group had 
access to AT&T’s telephone wires.  The Group would have to find another way to 
interconnect its stations.  Between 1923 and 1926, R.C.A., G.E., and Westinghouse 
experimented with three interconnection techniques: Western Union telegraph lines, 
superpower transmitters, and, as already described, shortwave relays.  Western Union 
telegraph lines provided adequate geographic coverage but were found wanting in sound 
quality.155  Superpower transmitters, which aimed to make interconnection unnecessary 
by building stations powerful enough to reach the entire nation, produced unacceptable 
levels of interference with smaller stations.  Lastly, shortwave relays proved much more 
effective than telegraph lines, but were plagued by a couple of technical problems – the 
variable propagation characteristics of shortwave frequencies at different times of day, 
and the difficulty of maintaining a shortwave transmitter at a constant frequency.  Radio 
                                                 
153 Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the United States.  A Tower In Babel, 3 vols., vol. 1 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 144.  See also Chapters 9, 15, and 17 of William Peck Banning, 
Commercial Broadcasting Pioneer: The WEAF Experiment (1922-1926) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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154 Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the United States.  A Tower In Babel, 3 vols., vol. 1 (New 
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Group engineers saw these problems as difficult but not insurmountable.  Shortwave thus 
seemed to give the Radio Group the best chance of constructing a nationwide chain of 
broadcast stations to rival that of AT&T. 
While the Radio Group was experimenting with shortwave relays, amateur 
interest in shortwave was increasing.  This interest intensified when, in November of 
1923, amateurs in the U.S. and France conducted the first trans-Atlantic two-way 
conversation via shortwave.156  One amateur attracted to the possibilities of shortwave 
radio made evident by this remarkable demonstration was George Washington Pierce, a 
professor of electrical engineering at Harvard.  Pierce had been acquainted with Walter 
Cady, another radio amateur, since at least 1917, when the two met at a regional meeting 
of Institute of Radio Engineers (I.R.E.) members.157  On the basis of their friendship and 
mutual interest in radio, Cady disclosed his piezo-resonator and piezo-oscillator 
inventions to Pierce after filing patent applications.158  Pierce was immediately attracted 
to the possibilities of the piezo-oscillator. 
 
4.4  George Washington Pierce improves on Cady’s piezoelectric oscillator 
 
Walter Cady’s invention of the piezo-oscillator had occurred before anyone quite 
knew what to do with such a device.  In early 1920, Cady had invented the piezo-
resonator, a passive device consisting of a thin quartz crystal wafer, a pair of conducting 
electrodes, and a mechanical holder, the combination which served as a highly frequency-
                                                 
156 See Bob Raide and Ed Gable, Celebrating the First Transatlantic QSO (1998, Accessed 2 January 2007) 
available from http://www.arrl.org/news/features/1998/1102/2/?nc=1; Internet. 
157 Walter G. Cady, Personal Diary entry for 18 January 1917, Folder 24, Box 3, Walter G. Cady Papers 
(Subgroup 3), Cady Family Papers (MSS 326), Rhode Island Historical Society Library, Providence, RI. 
158 Frederick A. Saunders and Frederick V. Hunt, "George Washington Pierce," in Biographical Memoirs.  
National Academy of Sciences (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1959), 351-80, cited: 361. 
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selective electrical resonator.159  At this time, America’s radio broadcasting boom was 
still in the future, and the utility of the shortwave radio band for long-distance 
communication had yet to be demonstrated.  Cady was giving public talks on the topic of 
using the piezo-resonator as a frequency standard.  After one such talk at Columbia 
University in early 1921, Harold Arnold, director of research for the Western Electric 
Research Laboratories and a former student of Cady’s, approached Cady with a novel 
suggestion.  Perhaps the piezo-resonator could be used, Arnold conjectured, to precisely 
control the frequency of a vacuum tube oscillator.160  Within days, Cady had confirmed in 
his laboratory that the idea was indeed feasible.161  After presenting these exciting results 
at a Physical Society meeting held at the U.S. Bureau of Standards in April of 1921, Cady 
filed a patent application for his “piezo-electric oscillator.”  The title of the application, 
“Method of Maintaining Electric Currents of Constant Frequency,” hints at the 
uncertainty as to utility with which the patent was drafted.162  Nowhere in text of the 
patent did Cady explicitly propose that his “method” be used to control the frequency of a 
radio transmitter; the closest he came was stating that the method “may be employed in 
the transmission or the reception of intelligence by means of high frequency currents.”163  
Precisely what Cady meant by the term “high frequency” is not entirely clear, but in 
using such general language, he and his patent attorneys were seeking to keep the scope 
of the patent claims as broad as possible.   
                                                 
159 See Chapter 5 for more on the piezo-resonator. 
160 R. Bruce Lindsay and W. J. King, "Walter G. Cady Oral History Interview" 28-9 August 1963, Center 
for History and Philosophy of Physics.  Available at Box 2, Walter G. Cady Papers, Special Collections and 
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Though no one was sure how to use Cady’s piezo-oscillator, word of it spread 
rapidly through the scientific and engineering communities.  In August 1921, Physical 
Review published a summary of Cady’s Physical Society talk.164  Then, in November of 
the same year, Cady presented a talk before a New York meeting of the Institute of Radio 
Engineers (I.R.E.) entitled “The Piezo-Electric Resonator,” the text of which was re-
printed in the April 1922 issue of Proceedings of the I.R.E.165   In this talk, Cady 
explicitly proposed using the piezo-resonator as a frequency stabilizer, but never 
suggested the utility of this for radio transmission.  In fact, despite the wide dissemination 
of Cady’s ideas and inventions, no public record exists of anyone using quartz crystal to 
control the frequency of a radio transmitter until Pierce’s work in early 1924.166   
Pierce, much more the electrical engineer than Cady, felt that the Wesleyan 
professor’s piezo-oscillator could be substantially improved.  The Harvard professor first 
devised a way to used Cady’s oscillator to calibrate the university’s frequency meters.167  
Then, working from his home amateur station as well as from his university lab, Pierce 
conducted shortwave transmission experiments in which the piezo-oscillator was used to 
stabilize the transmitter’s frequency.  The resulting device came to be known as the 
crystal-controlled transmitter.  Within a few months, Pierce had developed significant 
modifications to Cady’s piezo-oscillator.  These modifications, embodied in a circuit that 
came to be known as the Pierce oscillator, produced a device that was simpler and more 
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reliable than Cady’s.  The Pierce oscillator still employed a quartz crystal wafer to 
regulate the oscillating frequency, but it required fewer passive components and used 
only two electrodes rather than the piezo-oscillator’s four.  Furthermore, unlike Cady’s 
circuit, Pierce’s circuit would not oscillate without the crystal inserted, making it more 
stable and robust in operation.  Finally, the Pierce oscillator was capable of oscillating at 
frequencies well into the shortwave band, beyond the operational range of the piezo-
oscillator.168  In sum, the Pierce oscillator represented a material advance in quartz crystal 
technology.  Cady’s piezo-oscillator had demonstrated the feasibility of using a quartz 
crystal wafer to control the oscillating frequency of a vacuum tube oscillator, but the 
circuit itself was difficult to use in practice.  In contrast, the Pierce oscillator could easily 
be built into a radio transmitter, medium-wave or shortwave, to reliably control the 
transmitted frequency.  In modern engineering terms, Cady’s contribution to crystal-
control oscillation was proof-of-concept; Pierce’s contribution was reduction of concept 
to practice in the form of a practical, robust, and easy-to-use circuit. 
In February of 1924, Pierce filed a patent application for his new invention (U.S. 
Patent 2,133,642), initiating a period of frenzied activity in the realm of quartz crystal 
technology.  Within a matter of months, experimental shortwave stations began using 
crystal-controlled transmitters, R&D organizations intensified their work in quartz crystal 
                                                 
168 See ———, Electrical System, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,133,642, Filing Date: 25 February 
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technology, and the U.S. Patent Office began receiving unprecedented numbers of quartz 
crystal patent applications.  In 1924 alone, the Patent Office received ten quartz crystal-
related applications that resulted in issue, more than all quartz crystal-related patents 
issued prior to 1924.  As shown in Figure 1 of the Introduction, this number increased to 
twenty-three in 1925, thirty in 1926, and fifty-three in 1927.  Many of these inventions 
were modest extensions of the Pierce oscillator, but some, such as a multiplex telephony 
system employing crystal-controlled oscillators, were altogether new.169  The relationship 
between the appearance of the Pierce oscillator and the creative burst in quartz crystal 
technology beginning in 1924 is of course impossible to determine definitively.  Perhaps 
the Pierce oscillator itself stimulated this creative outpouring.  Maybe the Pierce 
oscillator just happened to be the first response among many to the merging of Cady’s 
work and developments in shortwave radio.  Whatever the case may be, the appearance 
of the Pierce oscillator marked the beginning of a remarkably fruitful five-year period in 
quartz crystal technology. 
 
4.5  Quartz crystal research and development at the Naval Research Laboratory 
 
Among the R&D organizations most active in researching quartz crystal 
technology in 1924 was the newly opened U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL).  In 
the spring of that year, NRL researchers Albert Hoyt Talyor, head of the Lab’s radio 
division, and Alfred Crossley were attempting to replicate and improve on Pierce’s 
experiments with crystal-controlled shortwave transmission.  The two men wanted to 
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increase transmission power beyond the meager 50 Watts used by Pierce.  Their first 
success came in May 1924 with a 100 Watt experimental unit.170  Throughout the 
summer, the NRL researchers received help from Walter Cady and his protégé, Karl Van 
Dyke, in producing crystal-controlled units of higher power.171  This led to the group 
constructing, by early 1925, a 10 kW transmitter operating at 4015 kHz.  At the time, this 
was a unique combination of high power and high frequency.  Used for Naval 
communications between Washington and Australia, this unit was likely the first crystal-
controlled transmitter to be used by anyone for routine communications work.172  The 
NRL’s work on crystal-controlled shortwave transmitters led to nearly twenty quartz 
crystal patents before the decade was out.173 
 The NRL’s 1924 experiments with crystal-controlled shortwave transmission 
were motivated by the Navy’s desire to expand the radio bandwidth available to it for 
ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship communications.  In the spring of 1923, Congress had 
chosen to reserve the 500-1350 kHz medium-wave band for AM broadcasting, effectively 
restricting Naval communications to the long waves below 500 kHz.  The Navy, feeling 
the need for more bandwidth, was given permission to experiment at frequencies greater 
than 3000 kHz, well into the then mysterious shortwave, or high frequency (HF), band.  
Several senior officials expressed misgivings about basing the future of Navy 
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(November 1925): 41-44. 
171 See page 24 of Albert Hoyt Taylor, The First Twenty-Five Years of the Naval Research Laboratory 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Navy, 1948). 
172 See page 43 of John M. Clayton, "Navy Developments in Crystal-Controlled Transmitters," QST 9, no. 
11 (November 1925): 41-44.  See also page 52 of Louis A. Gebhard, Evolution of Naval Radio-Electronics 
and Contributions of the Naval Research Laboratory (Washington, D.C.: Naval Research Laboratory, 
1979). 
173 Between 1924 and 1928, N.R.L. engineers filed for 19 quartz crystal patents that were eventually issued.  
The assignee on all of the patents was Wired Radio, Inc., a company begun by Army General George Owen 
Squier for transmitting music over power lines.  In 1934, Wired Radio became the well-known Muzak 
Corporation.  Source: Muzak, Inc.: Company History, (Accessed 7 January 2008) available from 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Muzak-Inc-Company-History.html; Internet. 
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communications on such a poorly understood phenomenon as shortwave radio.  Still, 
others suspected that the move to shortwave might bring many benefits.  By arguing, 
rightfully so, that its existing radio equipment would not operate at the higher 
frequencies, the Navy could easily justify new appropriations for developing shortwave 
radio equipment.  This is precisely what happened.174  Upon the opening of the NRL in 
the summer of 1923, one of the Lab’s first charges was to develop equipment for 
exploring and exploiting the shortwave band.175  Taylor, Crossley, and other NRL 
researchers quickly learned what the radio amateur community already knew – reliable 
shortwave communications required extremely stable carrier frequencies.  After the 
invention of the Pierce oscillator in early 1924, the way to achieve such stable 
frequencies was obvious to the NRL staff.176   
Nevertheless, despite its advantages, crystal-control was seen by some Navy 
officials, including the head of the Navy’s Radio Division, Stanford C. Hooper, as having 
several serious drawbacks, particularly since crystal-control was being advocated not 
only for transmitters but also for receivers, allowing for pushbutton reception .177  First 
and most importantly, Hooper was concerned about the supply and cost of quartz crystal.  
                                                 
174 Some authors (see Gebhardt – page 44 and Howeth) have stressed the Navy’s reluctance to yield the 
500-1350 kHz band to broadcasters.  Others (see Rosen – pages 58-59 and Slotten – page 22) have 
portrayed the Navy as more compliant, knowing that, in the long run, the change would work to its 
advantage. 
175 Hugh Aitken has effectively argued that spectrum scarcity has been a recurrent feature of radio history, 
one that has served to push technological development toward higher and higher frequencies.  In the 1920s, 
the spectral frontier was the HF band (3,000-30,000 kHz).  In the 1930s and ‘40s, the frontier moved to the 
VHF (above 30,000 kHz) and UHF (above 300,000 kHz).  Finally, in the 1950s and ’60, the frontier moved 
into the microwave region.  See Hugh Aitken, "Allocating the Spectrum: The Origins of Radio Regulation," 
Technology and Culture 35, no. 4 (October 1994): 686-716, cited: 687. 
176 See Captain Linwood S. Howeth, History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy, 1 
ed. (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963).  See also Louis A. Gebhard, Evolution of 
Naval Radio-Electronics and Contributions of the Naval Research Laboratory (Washington, D.C.: Naval 
Research Laboratory, 1979). 
177 Captain Linwood S. Howeth, History of Communications-Electronics in the United States Navy, 1 ed. 
(Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963).  Howeth cites a letter from Hooper to 
Commander H. P. LeClair, dated July 20, 1926, in which he advises that the Navy not adopt crystal-control. 
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Outfitting all of the Navy’s HF transmitters and receivers with crystal-control would 
require an enormous quantity of quartz.  He was concerned that Brazilian mines were the 
only known adequate source of electronics-grade quartz and that, in the event of this 
source being blocked, the cost of quartz would become prohibitive.  Furthermore, he was 
concerned with the ability of crystal-controlled transmitters and receivers to be precisely 
tuned with one another.  A failure in this regard would, he believed, “endanger the 
reliability of communications by increasing the likelihood of unit and force commanders 
losing contact with their ships.”  Thirdly, Hooper worried that building radio equipment 
at very high frequencies (> 9 MHz) would subject on-board radio receivers to “internally 
generated disturbances,” preventing clear reception.  Lastly, Hooper worried that high-
frequency radio equipment would be inherently more susceptible than lower frequency 
equipment to jamming by the enemy.  This concern was based partly on the ability of 
low-power HF transmitters to transmit their signals over very long distances, and partly 
on the relatively low cost and ease of construction of HF transmitters.  Thus, an enemy 
would theoretically be capable of assembling and positioning a jamming HF transmitter 
very quickly and at little cost.  Hooper’s objections eventually carried the day, keeping 
the Navy from adopting crystal control on a large scale.  In the early 1930s, the Navy 
developed and adopted a moderately successful non-crystal technique of frequency 
stabilization.178  In the end, the Navy’s rejection of crystal control did little to dissuade 
the radio industry and the amateur radio community from adopting the technique.   
 
 
                                                 
178 This technique, employing a device called the Dow electron-coupled oscillator, is described in J. B. 
Dow, "A Recent Development in Vacuum Tube Oscillator Circuits," Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio 
Engineers 19, no. 12 (December 1931): 2095-108. 
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4.6  The radio industry begins investing in quartz crystal technology 
 
The appearance of the Pierce oscillator led all the major radio companies of the 
day to invest in quartz crystal technology.  At least three visible developments manifested 
this investment: radio stations owned by these companies began transmitting with crystal-
controlled transmitters, companies with internal R&D organizations began developing 
and patenting new quartz crystal devices, and companies without internal R&D 
organizations began purchasing quartz crystal patents on the open market.  Each of these 
developments marked a permanent change to the radio landscape.  From 1924 on, the 
number of stations broadcasting with crystal-controlled transmitters would only grow 
with each year, while non-crystal-controlled transmitters would gradually become 
antiquated.  Furthermore, 1924 marks the point at which radio companies began caring 
about their patent positions in quartz crystal technology.  A strong position meant 
independence and freedom from having to license the technology from others.  A weak 
position meant the payment of licensing fees or, worse yet, being shut out of the latest 
radio technology. 
Starting in 1924, the Radio Group companies (R.C.A., G.E., and Westinghouse) 
began equipping their shortwave relay transmitters with Pierce oscillators.  This 
technique, called “crystal control,” aimed to stabilize the very high frequencies being 
generated, resulting in more reliable communications.  The most successful of these 
experiments were conducted by Westinghouse.  In April of 1925, the Supervisor of Radio 
for the Great Lakes region wrote to his superior in Washington, “At the present time the 
short wave transmitter at Pittsburgh is controlled, experimentally of course, by a piezo-
crystal oscillator, and from observations I have made I am convinced that the 
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Westinghouse engineers have met with considerable success along this line.”179  Later 
that year at an I.R.E. meeting in New York, Westinghouse engineers described the results 
achieved with their 5100 kHz crystal-controlled transmitter as follows.  “The results have 
been very gratifying.  Our transmissions have been relayed in England, France, Germany, 
South Africa and Australia.  The use of the quartz crystal as a frequency stabilizer has 
gone a long way in improving the quality of transmission at short wavelengths.”180 
AT&T was also experimenting with crystal-controlled transmitters, but its motive 
had nothing to do with shortwave communication.  The telephone giant’s extensive 
network of telephone wires interconnected its broadcast stations, and international radio, 
made possible by shortwave, wasn’t of particular interest to the company.  AT&T rather 
grew interested in crystal-control out of concerns over the quality of its AM medium-
wave broadcast transmissions.  Throughout 1923 and 1924, the company’s Development 
and Research arm conducted field strength studies in WEAF’s listening area.  These 
studies revealed several spots of highly localized nighttime distortion and fading which 
could not be explained with reference to the terrain or the positioning of buildings and 
other man-made structures.  Through experiments performed with experimental stations 
2XB and 2XY, the company discovered that its standard AM broadcast transmitters 
produced a small amount of frequency modulation; in other words, the transmitter 
frequency would waver slightly over a small range during the course of a broadcast.  
While usually unnoticeable, after dark this frequency modulation was contributing 
significantly to spotty reception and, in some areas, severe distortion.  As reported in the 
                                                 
179 S. W. Edwards to Commissioner of Navigation, 8 April 1925, Box 59, File 933, Records of the FCC and 
Predecessor Agencies, Record Group 173, U.S. National Archives, College Park, MD. 
180 D. G. Little and R. L. Davis, "KDKA," Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio Engineers 14, no. 4 
(August 1926): 479-506. 
 113 
February 1926 issue of the Proceedings of the I.R.E., the use of a crystal-controlled 
transmitter almost completely removed the distortion, thereby increasing the station’s 
effective listening area.181 
AT&T’s finding proved highly influential to the radio broadcast industry.  Up to 
1926, broadcast engineers generally believed that medium-wave stations could maintain 
adequate frequency stability by using a non-crystal, master-oscillator transmitter.182  But 
with the publication of AT&T’s findings in February of that year, it became clear that the 
lack of crystal control in an AM broadcast transmitter could potentially limit a station’s 
good-service area.  From this point on, broadcast stations throughout the U.S. rapidly 
began converting master-oscillator transmitters to crystal control.  By early 1927 nine 
stations in the Chicago area alone had adopted crystal control, and by 1932 the Federal 
Radio Commission was mandating crystal control for all licensed broadcast stations.183  
The reasons for the rapid adoption of crystal control are more fully explored in Chapter 5.  
The important point here is that the application of crystal control to AM medium-wave 
broadcasting began with AT&T’s demonstration of its technical utility. 
                                                 
181 Ralph Bown, DeLoss K. Martin, and Ralph K. Potter, "Some Studies in Radio Broadcast Transmission," 
Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio Engineers 14, no. 1 (February 1926): 57-130.  See also William 
Peck Banning, Commercial Broadcasting Pioneer: The WEAF Experiment (1922-1926) (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1946).  On page 186, Banning says of WEAF, “Thus there came into being in 
1924 … the first crystal-controlled broadcast transmitter, employing a technique that was to set the pace 
thereafter in broadcast transmission generally.” 
182 At the Fourth National Radio Conference, held in November 1925, no mention was made of the need for 
crystal-controlled transmitters in AM medium-wave broadcasting.  Source: U.S. Department of Commerce,  
Proceedings of the 4th National Radio Conference, (Washington, D.C., 1925).  Section 3, Report of 
Committee No. 7. 
183  "List of broadcasting stations in Chicago and vicinity equipped with piezo crystal oscillators calibrated 
to their designed frequency," Radio Service Bulletin, no. 107 (27 February 1926): 12.  The statement 
regarding crystal control in 1932 was surmised from a 1932 Application for Radio Broadcast Station 
Construction Permit Or Modification Thereof found in the archives of Atlanta station WGST.  The 
application asks the applicant to “state what apparatus is included as an integral part of the transmitter that 
will automatically hold frequency within the required limits.”  Source: “Application for Radio Broadcast 
Station Construction Permit Or Modification Thereof ,” Folder 5, Box 6, WGST Radio Station Records, 
1928-1975 (MS 8), Special Collections and Archives, Library and Information Center, Georgia Institute of 
Technology, Atlanta, GA. 
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As the use of crystal control for AM medium-wave broadcasting increased, the 
use of crystal control for shortwave relaying declined.  Ironically, shortly after AT&T 
engineers convinced the radio community of the value of crystal control, the company 
withdrew from broadcasting, selling off station WEAF and agreeing to lease its telephone 
lines to a newly formed company – the National Broadcasting Company (NBC).  Jointly 
owned by the members of the Radio Group, NBC used AT&T’s phone lines to realize 
chain broadcasting on a national scale, thus setting the technical pattern for the creation 
of America’s two other broadcasting networks, ABC and CBS.  Never again would 
American broadcasters use shortwave relays to form networks of independent stations. 
The appearance of the Pierce oscillator not only stimulated the major radio 
companies to experiment with crystal-controlled transmission; it also encouraged those 
companies with internal R&D organizations to invent new quartz crystal devices.  The 
earliest and most active company here was AT&T, acting initially through the Western 
Electric Research Laboratories and, after 1925, through the Bell Telephone Laboratories 
(BTL).184  Between 1924 and 1928, AT&T engineers filed thirty-one quartz crystal patent 
applications that were ultimately issued, more than twice as many as the next most active 
industrial R&D lab, that of General Electric.185  Among the most prolific AT&T 
inventors at this time were Canadian-born Warren Marrison and Joseph Warren Horton, 
who play a prominent role in Chapter 6 as inventors of the quartz crystal clock.  In 1924 
alone, Marrison filed for four piezo-oscillator related patents.  But, though AT&T was 
both the earliest and the most prolific generator of quartz crystal patents, it was not alone.  
                                                 
184 Western Electric was the wholly owned manufacturing subsidiary of AT&T.  Leonard Reich, "Industrial 
Research and the Pursuit of Corporate Security, Early Years of Bell Labs," Business History Review 54, no. 
4 (1980): 504-29. 
185 During this five year period, G.E. engineers filed for fourteen quartz crystal patents that were ultimately 
issued. 
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General Electric and Westinghouse, both pioneers of industrial R&D, also focused on 
developing new quartz crystal technology.186   These companies, however, gradually 
withdrew from quartz crystal development once R.C.A. began fortifying its in-house 
R&D in the late 1920s and 1930s.187 
Radio companies also began purchasing quartz crystal patents in 1924.  The five 
years following the appearance of the Pierce oscillator (1924-1928) saw over 150 quartz 
crystal patents filed with the U.S. Patent Office that were eventually issued, and a large 
percentage of these were sold through a thriving market for radio patents.  R.C.A., Wired 
Radio, and Federal Telegraph, all companies that lacked a well-established internal R&D 
lab during this period, purchased many quartz crystal patents.188  Of these firms, only 
R.C.A. survived as a radio firm.  It did so largely because it developed its own in-house 
R&D facilities.  Continual purchase of quartz crystal patents on the open market was not 
a strategy consistent with long-term competitiveness. 
 
4.7  The radio amateur community learns to use quartz crystal 
 
Quartz crystal activity after Pierce’s oscillator was not restricted to the Naval 
Research Laboratory and the large radio companies; the radio amateur community was 
also eagerly experimenting with crystal control.  In July of 1924, just five month’s after 
Pierce filed for his oscillator patent, H.S. Shaw, Treasurer of the General Radio Company 
of Cambridge, MA, published an article in the magazine QST entitled, “Oscillating 
                                                 
186 Between 1924 and 1928, Westinghouse engineers filed for eight quartz crystal patents that were 
ultimately issued. 
187 Before it began conducting its own quartz crystal research and development, R.C.A. had access to all 
quartz crystal patents of G.E. and Westinghouse, both which were part owners of R.C.A.   
188 Between 1924 and 1928, RCA purchased 14 quartz crystal patents and developed 2 in-house.  In the 
same period, Wired Radio purchased 24 patents, and Federal Telegraph purchased 15 patents. 
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Crystals.”189  In the course of the article, Shaw, who lived in Newton Center, MA, 
announced that on May 20, 1924 he had succeeded in sending a message from a crystal-
controlled transmitter, tuned to 3150 kHz, over a distance of approximately 85 miles.  
The recipient was one S. Kruse of Hartford, CT.  Shaw, an active radio amateur, had built 
the transmitter himself.  The article gave a schematic of the transmitter, but was short on 
details of construction and operation; its main purpose was to establish precedence rather 
than to instruct the reader in how to build an actual crystal-controlled transmitter.  Shaw 
in fact said as much himself in the article’s last sentence.  “From a technical point of 
view, this article is, perhaps, premature, but I have written it in self-defense to protect 
myself from the onslaughts of the Technical Editor who has been on my trail for some 
time for the story.”190  The Technical Editor referred to was none other than Kruse, 
recipient of Shaw’s crystal-controlled transmission. 
Shaw’s QST article may have been a bit premature for those amateurs wanting to 
construct their own crystal-controlled transmitters, but they didn’t have to wait long.  In 
1925, ads began appearing in QST’s classifieds section for companies offering to grind 
raw quartz crystals to a specified frequency.191  Additionally, QST and other publications 
ran articles explaining in detail how to grind one’s own crystals and assemble a crystal-
controlled oscillator.192  As Chapter 6 shows, the coming years would see the radio 
                                                 
189 See H. S. Shaw, "Oscillating Crystals," QST 7, no. 12 (July 1924). 
190 Ibid. (cited: 33. 
191 Patrick R. J. Brown, "The Influence of Amateur Radio on the Development of the Commercial Market 
for Quartz Piezoelectric Resonators in the United States" (Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Frequency 
Control Symposium, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Forth Monmouth, NJ, 5-7 June 1996), 58-65.  
According to Brown, QST ran 2 quartz crystal ads in 1925, 2 in 1926, and 3 in 1927.  After this, the 
number of ads grew every year through 1931. 
192 For example, see John M. Clayton, "Crystal Control For Amateur Transmitters," QST 9, no. 11 
(November 1925): 8-13. 
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amateur community grow to become one of the largest markets for precisely ground 
quartz crystals, with a handful of them even developing patented inventions.193 
 
4.8  The geography of quartz crystal invention in the 1920s 
 
The development of quartz crystal technology in the 1920s, particularly as it 
relates to crystal-controlled radio transmission, began in and was largely confined to the 
United States, with one major exception.  Berlin, Germany was a hot spot during this 
time for radio technology in general and quartz crystal technology in particular.  The 
Berlin-based Telefunken Company, founded in 1903, was the premier German radio 
company, but there were also a number of independent inventors at work in the city.  
Between 1924 and 1929, German inventors filed for a total of twenty-three U.S. quartz 
crystal patents that were eventually issued.  Of these, nine were assigned to Telefunken, 
nine to R.C.A., and five to the inventors themselves.  No other European country came 
close to this level of activity in quartz crystal technology.194 
The reasons for the concentration of early quartz crystal inventive activity in the 
U.S. to the exclusion of most other industrialized nations are many and complex.  One 
major reason is that American radio companies pioneered in the area of shortwave 
relaying and broadcasting.  Non-amateur use of shortwave didn’t begin in other nations 
until 1927.195  Another factor was the size and strength of the radio amateur community 
                                                 
193 Patrick R. J. Brown, "The Influence of Amateur Radio on the Development of the Commercial Market 
for Quartz Piezoelectric Resonators in the United States" (Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Frequency 
Control Symposium, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Forth Monmouth, NJ, 5-7 June 1996), 58-65.  An 
example of a quartz crystal patent developed by an amateur is James J. Lamb, Piezoelectric Filter, U.S. 
Patent Office, Patent No. 2,054,757, Filing Date: 24 August 1933; Issue Date: 15 September 1936. 
194 As shown in Chapter 3, English and French inventors filed for a very few U.S. quartz crystal patents 
during this period. 
195 Jerome S. Berg, On the Short Wave, 1923-1945: Broadcast Listening in the Pioneer Days of Radio 
(Jefferson, N. C.: McFarland & Co., 1999), 52. 
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in the U.S.; no other nation could boast of amateurs who were as knowledgeable or as 
well equipped as American amateurs.  Yet another reason, the severity of the broadcast 
radio interference problem in the U.S., is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
 Before concluding this chapter, let us consider the following two questions in 
order.  First, what accounts for the nearly three-year time lag between Cady’s invention 
of the piezo-electric oscillator and Pierce’s experiments with crystal-controlled 
transmitters?  Second, what is the significance of the fact that, during a time when radio 
was quickly coming to be controlled and directed by large corporate interests, the three 
fundamental patents of quartz crystal technology – Cady’s piezo-resonator, Cady’s piezo-
oscillator, and the Pierce oscillator – were held by independent inventors?   
 
4.9  Explaining the time lag between the Cady and Pierce piezoelectric oscillators 
 
The technical leap from Cady’s piezo-oscillator to Pierce’s oscillator seems small, 
but the time gap between these two events is not difficult to explain when a few factors 
are considered.  First, Pierce’s oscillator circuit was much easier to construct and operate 
than Cady’s, and it was capable of higher frequency operation.  Second, the ability to 
hold one’s radio transmitter precisely to one frequency was not of particular interest to 
most radio operators in 1921, before medium-wave broadcasting or shortwave relaying 
had become popular.  By 1924, this ability had become a crucial interest, especially for 
Radio Group companies that were trying to achieve chain broadcasting by using 
shortwave relays.  Third, in mid-1921, the potential value of the shortwave band had yet 
to be recognized.  At long-wave and medium-wave frequencies, broadcasters, amateurs, 
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and the military considered the master-oscillator method of maintaining a stable 
transmitter frequency to be adequate.  Fourth and finally, Cady was, by and large, an 
experimental physicist, while Pierce was an electrical engineer.  Factors one and three 
above may be seen as technological reasons for the delayed introduction of crystal-
controlled transmitters; that is, these reasons lay within radio technology itself rather than 
with external factors.  Factor two, on the other hand, lay more in the social realm, having 
to do with popular practice and legislation, factor four lies within the realm of personal 
psychology and socially-defined roles.  Each factor is discussed in order.   
First, Cady’s piezo-electric oscillator was not easy to construct and operate.  One 
version of Cady’s oscillator circuit contained a vacuum tube, an inductive coil, and a 
variable condenser, meaning that the circuit had to be tuned until resonance was 
achieved.196  Cady also presented a circuit that didn’t require tuning, but this version 
required at least three vacuum tubes.  In both versions, the circuit was capable of 
oscillating without the crystal inserted; the crystal simply acted as a stabilizer of 
frequency.  If any circuit parameters were varied slightly, including the voltage of the 
power supply, the circuit could begin oscillating at a frequency other than that determined 
by the quartz crystal.  In engineering terms, Cady’s circuit was not particularly stable.  
Furthermore, because Cady’s oscillator utilized lengthwise vibrations of a quartz crystal 
wafer, high frequency oscillations in the shortwave band were difficult to achieve.197  By 
contrast, Pierce’s oscillator circuit was much simpler, consisting of a quartz crystal, a 
single vacuum tube, and a load resistance, and was more robust, the frequency of the 
                                                 
196 See Walter Guyton Cady, Method of Maintaining Electric Currents of Constant Frequency, U. S. Patent 
Office, Patent No. 1472583, Filing Date: 28 May 1921; Issue Date: 30 October 1923. 
197 See George Washington Pierce, Electrical System, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,133,642, Filing 
Date: 25 February 1924; Issue Date: 18 October 1938, cited: 2, Column 1, lines 3-16. 
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oscillator being determined entirely by the dimensions of the quartz crystal.  The 
frequency of oscillation was nearly constant over changes in temperature, vacuum tube 
plate voltage, and circuit resistance.  Absolutely no tuning was required, and because 
Pierce’s oscillator utilized thickness rather than lengthwise vibrations of the quartz 
crystal, it was capable of frequencies as low as 35 kHz and as high as 3,000 kHz.198  
Furthermore, it was impossible for Pierce’s circuit to oscillate with the crystal removed; 
in Pierce’s words, the circuit was “stably non-oscillatory in the absence of the crystal.”199  
In summary, the Pierce oscillator was more practical, robust, and versatile than Cady’s, 
making it far more likely to be adopted by amateurs and radio engineers. 
Second, crystal control meant different things to radio operators in 1921 and in 
1924.  To fully understand this difference requires a brief discussion of one of quartz 
crystal technology’s fundamental characteristics.  The chief technological value of 
piezoelectric quartz crystal, whether used as a resonator or an oscillator, lies in four 
characteristics: the extremely high selectivity or sharpness of its resonant frequency200, 
the remarkable stability of this resonant frequency over time, the possibility of cutting 
quartz crystal in such a way that the effects of temperature change upon its resonant 
frequency is almost completely neutralized, and the chemical stability of quartz crystal.201  
Other minerals, such as Rochelle salt, demonstrate a much more pronounced piezo-
electric effect, but none can come close to matching quartz in all four areas.  The chief 
drawback of quartz crystal, or for that matter any piezoelectric material, when used as a 
                                                 
198 Ibid., cited: 2, Column 1, lines 24-30. 
199 Ibid., cited: 4, Column 2, line 39. 
200 Engineers refer to this as the quality factor, or Q, of the crystal.  Graphically, it is represented as the 
sharpness of a resonance curve, where the abscissa is frequency and the ordinate is the amplitude of 
oscillations. 
201  9th ed., 2002, s.v. "Piezoelectricity." Piezoelectricity. 
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resonator or oscillator, is its lack of flexibility.  Generally speaking, a piezoelectric quartz 
crystal will oscillate at one frequency and any harmonic of that frequency; no other 
frequencies are readily attainable unless the crystal is re-cut and/or re-mounted in its 
holder.202  Thus, fine-tuning of a quartz crystal’s resonant frequency is ruled out once it 
has been cut and mounted.  The continuously-variable tuning available with standard LC 
and master-oscillator tuning circuits is not possible with a crystal-controlled oscillator 
circuit.  This is the price paid for the crystal’s stability.  Of course, a transmitter may be 
outfitted with an array of crystals having different resonant frequencies, but this still 
leaves one with discrete rather than continuous frequency selection.   
By and large, radio operators in 1921 wanted continuous rather than discrete 
frequency selection.  To begin with, most stations at the time were not required by the 
Department of Commerce to restrict operation to one frequency.  The station licenses 
issued by the Department of Commerce at the time allowed each station to transmit on 
multiple wavelengths, even though they required one particular wavelength to be 
designated as the “normal sending and receiving wavelength.” 203  When the Department 
created the broadcast class of station license in December, 1921, stations operating under 
this license were authorized to operate on only two wavelengths: 360 meters for music 
and entertainment programming, and 485 meters for crop and weather reports.  Months 
later, in August 1922, Commerce created the Class B broadcast license, which allowed a 
station only one transmit wavelength – 400 meters (750 kHz).204  But even broadcast 
station operators restricted to one, or at most two, transmitter frequencies typically 
                                                 
202 One exception to this is the variable frequency quartz crystal units developed by Bliley Electric in the 
1930s.  These variable units were a commercial failure. 
203 See Radio Communication Law of the United States.  License for Radio Station, (15 August 1919). 
204 “The wavelength of 400 meters only will be assigned for the use of stations of this class …”  See 
"Amendments to Regulations," Radio Service Bulletin, no. 65 (1 September 1922): 10-11. 
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strayed from their assignments.  Their refusal to stay on frequency was only an attempt to 
avoid a very real problem of the time – destructive interference among broadcast stations.  
This problem of interference is discussed further in Chapter 5. 
The third reason for the delayed appearance of crystal-controlled transmitters has 
to do not with medium-wave broadcast radio, but with shortwave radio.  Crystal-control 
was used first with shortwave transmitters because of the difficulty of holding the 
transmitter’s frequency stable at high frequencies.  The earliest experiments with 
shortwave transmission began only in December 1921; before this time, the frequencies 
above 1500 kHz were thought to be almost useless.  But as the value of the shortwave 
band for long-distance communication became evident throughout 1922 and 1923, 
amateurs and radio engineers began looking for a way to achieve more stable transmitter 
frequencies.  This was what led Pierce to his pioneering experiments in early 1924.  Thus, 
it was clearly the development of short-wave radio, and not AM broadcast radio, that 
initially pushed the development of crystal-controlled transmitters.  As Stanford 
engineering professor Fred Terman noted in his classic text Radio Engineering, standard 
master-oscillator radio transmitters (i.e. without crystal-control) were capable of 
maintaining their frequency constant “to better than 0.1 per cent over long periods of time 
if the ambient temperature is constant.”205  Thus, within the medium-wave broadcast 
band (500-1500 kHz), the stability of non-crystal-controlled oscillator circuits was more 
than sufficient for keeping stations close to their assigned frequencies.  Had short-wave 
radio not developed when it did, it may have been a while before anyone questioned the 
adequacy of existing oscillator techniques for AM broadcasting. 
                                                 
205 Frederick Emmons Terman, Radio Engineering, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1932), 253. 
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The final possible reason for the delay of crystal-control has to do with the 
differing aims of Walter Cady and George Washington Pierce as evidenced by their 
selection of technical problems and approach to solving them.  On the surface, Cady and 
Pierce appear to have been remarkably similar.  Cady authored or co-authored thirty-four 
peer-reviewed journal articles and was issued between fifty and sixty patents, while 
Pierce authored or co-authored thirty-eight papers and was issued fifty-three patents.206  
Both men were university professors, Cady at Connecticut’s Wesleyan University and 
Pierce at Harvard, and both were, to some extent, independent inventors.  That is, they 
enjoyed a large degree of freedom in choosing the technical problems on which they 
worked, and they both patented and profited from their inventions.207  But neither was a 
professional inventor a la Thomas Edison or Elmer Sperry; neither man’s primary source 
of income derived from their inventive activities.  Both were quite content to remain 
university professors, where they were assured a steady income and the freedom to 
follow their own inventive muses.  Finally, both Cady and Pierce were amateur radio 
enthusiasts, or “hams,” involved in the amateur radio clubs at their respective institutions.  
But despite these similarities, these two men approached quartz crystal technology in 
fundamentally different ways, leading to distinctive contributions for each. 
In a nutshell, the differences between Walter Cady and George Washington Pierce 
can be summarized as follows.  Cady, in his selection of problems and approach to 
solving them, was what Shaul Katzir has called a “technologically oriented scientist.”208   
                                                 
206 "Obituary - Walter G. Cady," Wesleyan University News Bureau 1974.  Dictionary of Scientific 
Biography (1974), s.v. "Pierce, George Washington." 
207 Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: a century of invention and technological enthusiasm, 1870-
1970 (New York: Viking, 1989), 20-21. 
208 Shaul Katzir, "Technological and scientific study in the discovery and application of the piezoelectric 
resonance" (paper presented at the The Applied-Science Problem - A Workshop, Stevens Institute of 
Technology, Hoboken, NJ, 6-8 May 2005). 
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He looked for natural phenomena that were poorly understood and thus not subject to 
human control, his goal being to develop just enough knowledge of a phenomenon such 
that it could be harnessed for human ends.  But Cady usually stopped short of developing 
fully formed technological devices.  The piezo-resonator and piezo-oscillator are cases in 
point.  With the later, he did just enough to show that a quartz crystal could be used to 
control an oscillator’s frequency.  Later in his life, Cady described himself as follows.  
“I’ve never really considered myself an inventor.  It was just a big hobby because a 
research laboratory happened to have some devices that looked as though they might be 
practical.”209  On the other hand, Pierce was an inventor and an engineer’s engineer.  
Starting with a practical problem, such as that of keeping a shortwave transmitter’s 
frequency stable enough for reliable communications, he would use his knowledge of 
science and engineering techniques to systematically develop a solution, drawing from 
whatever fields of knowledge were necessary.  Furthermore, Pierce was concerned that 
the devices he developed satisfy engineering standards of performance, such as 
simplicity, efficiency, and robust operation under a variety of operating conditions.  
Pierce’s contribution to quartz crystal technology was thus practical, workable devices, 
some of which are still used by engineers today.  Cady’s contribution was more 
fundamental and less practice-oriented.  Not only did he prove that devices such as the 
Pierce oscillator were feasible, but he also, throughout his later career, constructed a large 
                                                 
209 R. Bruce Lindsay and W. J. King, "Walter G. Cady Oral History Interview" 28-9 August 1963, Center 
for History and Philosophy of Physics.  Available at Box 2, Walter G. Cady Papers, Special Collections and 
Archives, Olin Library, Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT. 
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body of engineering knowledge that laid the foundation for all subsequent quartz crystal 
technology.210 
 
4.10  Quartz crystal technology and independent inventors 
Our second question is the following.  What is the significance of the fact that, 
during a time when radio was quickly coming to be controlled and directed by large 
corporate interests, the three fundamental patents of quartz crystal technology – Cady’s 
piezo-resonator, Cady’s piezo-oscillator, and the Pierce oscillator – were held by 
independent inventors?211  Three things are of note here.  First, it was possible for Cady 
and Pierce to develop their inventions independently only because early quartz crystal 
inventions did not require great investments in capital or manpower.  The only material 
resources needed for these inventions were access to an electronics laboratory, with its 
associated instrumentation, and access to a machine shop for grinding and polishing 
crystals.  As professors at colleges with well-endowed science departments, both men had 
these resources.  Furthermore, a professorship gave them the time and the freedom to 
pursue this line of research before any private firms were willing to invest in it. 
Second, corporate interests did not foresee the eventual importance of either the 
piezo-resonator or the piezo-oscillator.  This is evident in the fact that Cady tried in vain 
to license or sell these patents after filing the applications.  Among the companies that 
turned down a chance to buy his piezo-oscillator was AT&T, which began to see the light 
in 1923.  This brings us to our third and last point.   
                                                 
210 Walter Guyton Cady, Piezoelectricity; An Introduction to the Theory and Applications of 
Electromechanical Phenomena in Crystals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946). 
211 This question is explored in more depth in Chapter 9. 
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The experiences of Cady and Pierce in the 1920s show us that corporate interests 
of that time fought tooth and nail against the right of independent inventors to license 
their inventions to whomever they chose.212  When AT&T began to see the importance of 
crystal control, it sued both Cady and Pierce, claiming the two men’s patents interfered 
with one of its own pending patents.  With the assistance of Boston-based patent attorney 
David Rines, both men initially fought the claims.  Cady eventually tired of the legal 
proceedings, selling his patents to R.C.A. in 1925 for a $50,000 lump sum.213  Pierce was 
more successful.  Throughout his long career, Pierce became a millionaire through 
licensing fees paid by AT&T, R.C.A., the Navy, and others.214 
As independent inventors, Cady and Pierce appeared at the tail end of what 
Thomas Hughes has referred to as the “era of the independent inventors,” a period, 
beginning in the mid-1870s, of extraordinary inventive activity in the U.S.215  Hughes 
sees this period ending due, in part, to the rise of industrial R&D laboratories at 
companies such as G.E., Dupont, and AT&T. With the rise of large technological systems 
and companies for managing them, the nature of invention began to change.  So-called 
“radical invention,” the kind that establishes new and upsets old technological systems, 
was gradually being replaced by “conservative invention,” which was characterized by 
the incremental improvement of existing technological systems.216  Independent inventors 
excelled at radical invention, as demonstrated by Bell’s telephone, Edison’s light bulb, 
and the Wright brothers’ airplane.  But, once a new technological system was established 
                                                 
212 Under U.S. patent law, compulsory licensing does not exist.  That is, the assignee of any patent is not 
compelled by law to license that patent to others. 
213 This is roughly equivalent to $571 million in 2006 dollars. 
214 Frederick A. Saunders and Frederick V. Hunt, "George Washington Pierce," in Biographical Memoirs.  
National Academy of Sciences (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1959), 351-80. 
215 Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: a century of invention and technological enthusiasm, 1870-
1970 (New York: Viking, 1989), 15. 
216 Ibid., 53. 
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and had begun growing, a new type of invention (and inventor) was called for.  These 
conservative inventions often depended upon proprietary knowledge that was held 
closely within private firms, thus making it very difficult if not impossible for 
independent inventors, not privy to the inside knowledge of these firms, to contribute.  
Many independent inventors, unable to find markets for their radical inventions and 
unable to participate in conservative invention, resorted to joining the engineering staffs 
of large industrial R&D labs (e.g., General Electric, AT&T, Westinghouse, etc.).   
So how did Cady and Pierce manage to make fundamental contributions to quartz 
crystal technology as independent inventors?  There are at least two answers to this.  
First, piezoelectric engineering was a completely new field in the late teens and early 
1920s.  In fact, both men’s primary quartz inventions were “radical” in the sense that they 
essentially helped to found this new field.  Second, the radio broadcasting industry, where 
quartz crystal had such a large impact, was still in its infancy.  The enormous 
technological system that would soon form around broadcast radio did not yet exist.  As 
Hughes has shown, it is in the formation of a new technological system where 
independent inventors can have the most influence.  As systems grow and acquire 
momentum, the influence of business structures formed to tend the system grows while 
the influence of those outside of these business structures diminishes.  Cady and Pierce 
were fortunate enough to be professionally active during a period in American history 
when an unusually high number of large technological systems (and accompanying 
business structures) were still being formed.  Examples given by Hughes include electric 
light and power systems, the automotive and airline industries, telephony, and radio.217 
                                                 
217 Ibid., 5. 
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Though Walter Cady’s timing was fortunate in the sense of his being in a position 
to found a new technical field, he was not immune to the pressures sometimes exerted by 
large, powerful corporations.  Cady had an invention that would ultimately prove to be of 
enormous economic value to radio firms; initially, however, it seemed to have little value.  
AT&T eventually realized the potential value of the piezo-oscillator but didn’t want to be 
bothered with licensing fees.  With its unmatched financial and legal resources, the 
initiated patent infringement proceedings against Cady, claiming that a prior and similar, 
but different, AT&T patent was being infringed.  Cady, though confident that he would 
ultimately win the case, had limited financial resources for defending his patents.  Unable 
to afford a lengthy legal battle, he was forced to sell off his patents to RCA, letting its 
legal department continue the battle.  Here we see that companies with deep pockets 
could initiate patent infringement cases of doubtful merit against independent inventors.  
With such legal pitfalls awaiting the independent inventor, it’s not surprising that many 
of them found it difficult to remain free from organizational allegiances. 
Cady’s story is similar to, though not nearly as tragic as, Edwin’s Armstrong’s 
well-known battle with RCA over frequency-modulation (FM) technology.218  A big, 
powerful corporation leverages its influence to expropriate valuable technology from 
independent inventors.  Yet, Cady’s story also shows that in industries where 
oligopolistic competition prevailed, a fairly lucrative market still existed for the patents 
of independent inventors.  Had RCA not been in competition with AT&T in the radio 
transmitter market, this would indeed have been a tale of the triumph of a powerful 
monopoly over an independent inventor.  Instead, RCA’s purchase of Cady’s patents 
represented a partial victory for Cady.  Pierce was, however, even more successful with 
                                                 
218 Lawrence Lessing, Man of High Fidelity: Edwin Howard Armstrong (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1956). 
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his Pierce oscillator circuit.  When AT&T brought an infringement suit against him, 
Pierce fought back and won a decisive victory.  Consequently, he was able to maintain 
ownership of his patent and license its use out to AT&T and others.  These two examples 
show that the independent inventor was not completely dead after World War I, but the 
terrain in which he/she operated had become much more treacherous.   
While some may mourn the declining influence of the independent inventor in the 
early 20th century, this development can in no way be said to have hurt the development 
of quartz crystal technology.  To the contrary, just the opposite seems to have been the 
case.  As we’ve seen, the laboratories of firms such as General Electric and AT&T were 
establishing quartz crystal research groups staffed by highly-trained scientists and 
engineers.  These men, who would likely have been independent inventors in earlier 
decades, now worked for and had to assign all their patentable inventions to their 
employers.219  As shown in Chapters 6 through 8, this change in the inventor-society 
relationship would have many salutary effects on the subsequent growth of quartz crystal 
technology. 
 
4.11  Summary 
This chapter has briefly chronicled the development of the first popular 
application of quartz crystal technology – the crystal-controlled radio transmitter.  The 
dominant circumstances providing the demand for this application were the rapid rise of 
shortwave radio and the growing popularity of AM medium-wave broadcasting.  The 
technique of crystal control stabilized the transmit frequency of radio transmitters, 
                                                 
219 The word “men” is used here because there were in fact very few women inventors in the world of early 
radio R&D. 
 130 
making feasible reliable shortwave communications and improving the sound quality of 
medium-wave broadcasting.  Crystal-controlled transmitters first appeared following 
George Washington Pierce’s invention of an improved piezo-oscillator in early 1924.  
The technique spread rapidly in shortwave radio, where its utility was obvious, but it 
spread in medium-wave broadcasting only after AT&T engineers demonstrated its 
benefits.  By the late 1920s, crystal control had become common in both shortwave and 
medium-wave transmitters, and large numbers of radio amateurs had begun 
experimenting with the technique, creating a market for precisely ground quartz crystals. 
An important factor in the rise of crystal-controlled transmitters in the 1920s has 
been underemphasized in this chapter.  This is the issue of radio interference, particularly 
a type of interference known as heterodyne.  Because of the severity of this problem in 
the early and mid-1920s, the U.S. Bureau of Standards began advocating in 1926 the 
mandatory adoption of crystal control for all licensed medium-wave broadcast stations.  
The subsequent actions of the Bureau of Standards, and later the Federal Radio 
Commission, were instrumental in accelerating the adoption of crystal-controlled 
transmitters in the U.S.  This important story is related in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE 1920s – QUARTZ CRYSTAL AND FREQUENCY 
STANDARDIZATION 
 
 
 
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know 
something about it: but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you 
have scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science. 
 Lord Kelvin, Popular Lectures and Addresses (1891-1894) 
 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
 Chapter 4 showed the efforts of radio amateurs and professional radio engineers 
of the 1920s to apply quartz crystal technology to radio transmitters.  The primary 
advantage of the resulting technique of “crystal control” was that it greatly improved the 
frequency stability of both medium-wave and shortwave radio transmitters.  This 
improved stability made shortwave communications more reliable and medium-wave 
communications clearer.  A related and no less important development was the 
application of quartz crystal technology to radiofrequency measurement and 
standardization.  This chapter recounts the efforts of independent inventors, government 
institutions, private firms, and a professional engineering society to develop and widely 
disseminate quartz-based radiofrequency standards and measurement instruments.   
 By the end of the 1920s, the efforts of these individuals and groups had led 
indirectly to the formation of a distinct quartz crystal technological community.  A real 
commercial demand for quartz crystal technology now existed, and this demand helped 
support a growing commercial radio testing industry.  Greatly helpful to the process of 
community formation were the Radio Division of the U.S. Bureau of Standards and the 
Institute of Radio Engineers.  Through their publications and meetings, these 
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organizations allowed piezoelectric engineers scatters across many institutions – private 
firms, universities, and government research labs – to communicate with one another and 
steadily advance the base of engineering knowledge undergirding quartz crystal 
technology. 
 
5.2  The Status of Frequency Standardization in the Early 1920s 
When Walter Cady filed a patent application for the piezo-electric resonator in 
January 1920, he suggested a number of uses for it.  “The piezo-electric resonator may be 
used in various ways, as for example, to produce a large reactance in an alternating 
circuit at a certain particular frequency or frequencies, to serve as a standard of frequency 
or wave length in high frequency circuits, or even for such purposes as coupling one high 
frequency circuit to another, in order to transmit energy from one to the other circuit at a 
certain particular frequency.”220  The second suggested application – “to serve as a 
standard of frequency or wave length in high frequency circuits” – hinted at Cady’s 
conviction that existing frequency standards were inadequate.  As head of the physics 
department at Wesleyan University and an active radio amateur, Cady would have known 
that the dominant frequency standard of the day for high frequency circuits was the 
standard wavemeter, maintained by the U.S. Bureau of Standards.  With the piezo-
electric resonator, he had stumbled upon a device that he suspected might one day replace 
the wavemeter.221   
                                                 
220 Walter Guyton Cady, Piezo Electric Resonator, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,450,246, Filing Date: 
28 January 1920; Issue Date: 3 April 1923. 
221 “Stumbled upon” is an accurate description of Cady’s invention of the piezo-resonator, for he was 
certainly not actively looking to develop an improved frequency standard.  Source:  Shaul Katzir, 
"Technological and scientific study in the discovery and application of the piezoelectric resonance" (paper 
presented at the The Applied-Science Problem - A Workshop, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, 
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The wavemeter, which could measure frequencies as low as 3.5 kHz and up to 
nearly 5000 kHz, had been the principal instrument of frequency measurement and 
standardization since the U.S. Bureau of Standards (BOS) had begun its frequency 
studies in 1911.  Limited in 1920 to an accuracy of approximately 1%, the wavemeter 
was a fairly simple device, comprising a variable condenser (i.e. capacitor) connected in 
series with a fixed coil (i.e. inductor).  An ammeter or galvanometer was used to indicate 
the current flowing through the circuit.222  The series condenser and coil combination 
formed a “tank” circuit that would resonate at a particular frequency; that is, the 
magnitude of electrical current flowing through the circuit would reach a maximum at a 
certain frequency.  Adjusting the value of the variable condenser would change the value 
of this frequency.  Thus, with a source signal of unknown frequency applied to one of the 
wavemeter’s terminals and with the wavemeter’s second terminal connected to electrical 
ground, the variable condenser could be adjusted until the ammeter or galvanometer 
indicated maximum current flow.  The setting of the variable condenser, if properly 
calibrated, would then indicate the unknown signal’s frequency. 
As with any measurement instrument, the accuracy of a wavemeter in 1920 was 
limited by the accuracy of the primary standard with which it was calibrated.  The Bureau 
of Standard’s primary frequency standard at this time was the “standard wavemeter,” 
shown in Figure 15.  The capacitance (C) of the condenser and the inductance (L) of the 
coil shown in Figure 15 were known with a high degree of accuracy.  These two values 
                                                                                                                                                 
NJ, 6-8 May 2005), cited: 5.  “[Cady’s] finding that the piezo-resonator can be used as a standard of 
frequency did not originate in a search for such a standard.”  Also see §2.10 of this dissertation. 
222 See R. T. Cox, "Standard Radio Wavemeter - Bureau of Standards Type R 70B," Journal Of The 
Optical Society Of America And Review Of Scientific Instruments 6, no. 2 (March 1922): 162-68. 
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were then used to calculate the wavemeter’s resonant frequency (f) with the following 
formula. 
LC
f
π2
1
=     (Equation 1) 
Thus, if one desired a standard frequency of 100 kHz, one would adjust the value of the 
variable condenser such that Equation 1 yielded f = 100 kHz.  If one wanted to go a step 
further and actually generate a pure 100 kHz radio frequency, one would need a 
continuously variable master-oscillator circuit.  Connecting this circuit to the standard 
wavemeter, one would then adjust the master-oscillator’s tuning dial until the standard 
wavemeter’s ammeter indicated maximum current flow. 
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Figure 15: The Bureau of Standards’ Standard 
Wavemeter, Circa 1922 
(Source: R.T. Cox, “Standard Radio Wavemeter Bureau 
of Standards Type R 70B,” Journal of the Optical Society 
of America, Vol. 6, No. 2, March 1922.  Public Domain.) 
 
 
With the accuracy of the BOS’s standard wavemeter limited to approximately +/- 
1%, radio wave frequencies in what are now known as the low-frequency (30 kHz – 300 
kHz) and medium-frequency (300 kHz – 3000 kHz) bands could be only loosely 
measured.  Based on his early experiments, Cady suspected that the piezo-resonator, 
when used as a frequency standard, was capable of much greater accuracy than this.  Yet, 
as described in Chapter 2, he was initially unable to convince others of the need for a 
more accurate frequency standard.  In 1920, the low-frequency radio band was not 
densely populated with stations, and the occupancy of the medium-frequency band was 
even sparser.  As for the high-frequency or short-wave band (3000 – 30,000 kHz), its 
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value for long-distance communications had yet to be shown.  The need to measure 
frequencies in any of these bands with extreme accuracy simply did not exist.   
 
5.3  The Broadcasting Boom forces the Bureau of Standards to update its primary 
frequency standard 
 
In 1922, America’s so-called “radio boom” changed forever the occupancy of the 
medium-frequency (MF) band.  At the end of 1921, there were fewer than thirty MF 
stations broadcasting in the U. S.223  By October of 1922, there were 546 stations on the 
air.224  Predictably, radio interference in the MF band quickly became a severe problem.  
Exacerbating this problem was the fact that in 1922 only two frequencies were available 
to American radio broadcasters – 618.6 kHz (485 meters) and 833.3 kHz (360 meters).  
The former was reserved by the Department of Agriculture for crop and weather reports, 
while the latter could be used for entertainment and news programming.225  In cities 
where multiple stations were licensed to broadcast on 360 meters, the stations had to 
work out time-sharing arrangements to prevent the frequency from becoming a garbled 
mess.  Even with such arrangements, interference was often intolerable, leading broadcast 
executives and listeners alike to call for government regulatory action. 
Anticipating the interference problem, Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover 
convened the First National Radio Conference in Washington, D.C. in February of 1922.  
In his opening address, Hoover observed, “The comparative cheapness … of receiving 
sets … bids fair to make them almost universal in the American home.”  “The time has 
                                                 
223 Hugh Slotten lists twenty-eight stations in Hugh Slotten, Radio and Television Regulation: Broadcast 
Technology in the United States, 1920-1960 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000). 
224 See "Broadcasting Increases 500-Fold in One Year," Radio News  (December 1922): 1156. 
225 In mid-1922, the Dept. of Commerce reserved a third frequency – 750 kHz (400 meters) – for radio 
broadcasters. 
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arrived … when there must be measures to stop the interferences … between even the 
limited number of sending stations … The problem is one of most intensely technical 
character … Even if we use all the ingenuity possible I do not believe there are enough 
permutations to allow unlimited numbers of sending stations.”226  Thus, Hoover 
characterized radio interference as largely a technical problem, implying that ingenious 
radio engineers could develop techniques to remedy the situation.  But he also felt that 
some type of regulation, imposed either by the broadcasting industry itself or by the 
government, should supplement engineering technique.  Radio bandwidth, limited at the 
time to the low-frequency and medium-frequency bands, was not an infinite resource and 
could therefore not support an unlimited number of broadcasting stations. 
 Qualitatively, radio interference circa 1922 came in many forms.  Perhaps the 
most common form, crosstalk, resulted from two or more stations broadcasting on the 
same frequency within each other’s geographic listening areas.  The straightforward 
solution to crosstalk was to keep same-frequency stations separated by enough distance 
such that they lay outside each other’s listening areas.  A much more insidious form of 
radio interference was known as heterodyne interference.  Manifesting itself in 
superheterodyne receivers in the form of an audible whistling or howling, heterodyne 
interference resulted partly from the transmitter frequencies of two of more stations 
differing by only 0.2 – 3 kHz.  This frequency difference would produce an audible tone 
loud enough at times to drown out regular station programming.  The insidious aspect of 
heterodyne interference was that its ill effects were detectable over a much wider 
geographic region than the standard listening areas of each station.  Thus, two stations 
                                                 
226 Herbert Hoover, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920-1933, 3 vols., 
vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1952), 140-41. 
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separated by enough distance such that crosstalk was not present could still produce 
heterodyne interference over a large portion of the station’s listening areas.  In 1922, the 
accuracy limits of the BOS’s standard wavemeter and the difficulty of achieving a high 
level of frequency stability with non-crystal controlled transmitters (see Chapter 4) 
combined to make heterodyne interference a widespread problem.227 
In response to the interference problem, attendees at the 1922 Radio Conference 
recommended that the BOS develop technical methods of interference reduction, 
including “the study and standardization of wavemeters.”228  The “wavemeters” referred 
to here were those used by radio transmitter operators to set their carrier frequencies.229  
This worked roughly as follows.  A station operator would first adjust his wavemeter’s 
variable condenser such that the instrument was tuned to resonate at the desired 
frequency.  The operator would then electrically connect his radio transmitter in series 
with the wavemeter.  Finally, he would adjust the transmitter tuning dial until the 
wavemeter was in maximum resonance, indicating that the transmitter was set to the 
desired frequency.  When used in this manner, the wavemeter was serving as a secondary 
frequency standard, just as a yardstick serves as a secondary standard of length every 
time it is used to measure an unknown length.230  In calling for the standardization of 
                                                 
227 C. B. Jolliffe, "When Broadcast Stations Interfere," Radio Broadcast 7, no. 5 (September 1925): 586-90. 
228 U. S. Department of Commerce, "Report of the Department of Commerce Conference on Radio 
Telephony," Radio Service Bulletin  (1 May 1922): 23-30.  See Section V – Technical methods for the 
reduction of interference.  Recommendation C9.   
229 A carrier frequency is the frequency that “carries” the information signal.  This is equal to a broadcast 
station’s transmit frequency. 
230 A secondary frequency standard is one that “does not have inherent accuracy, and therefore must be 
calibrated against a primary frequency standard.”  A primary frequency standard is “a frequency source that 
meets national standards for accuracy and operates without the need for calibration against an external 
standard.”  Source: National Communications System Technology and Standards Division. 
"Telecommunications: Glossary of Telecommunication Terms (Federal Standard 1037C)." General 
Services Administration Information Technology Service, 1996), Available at 
http://www.its.bldrdoc.gov/fs-1037/, Accessed 13 June 2008.  See entries for “secondary frequency 
standard” and “primary frequency standard.” 
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wavemeters, the radio conference attendees were essentially calling for better and more 
frequent calibration of wavemeters.  Indirectly, this was also a call to improve the 
accuracy of the BOS’s primary frequency standard, since all wavemeters used as 
secondary frequency standards had to be calibrated with reference to a primary standard. 
One of the most prominent American manufacturers of high-quality wavemeters 
in the early 1920s was the General Radio Company (GR), based in technologically-
progressive Cambridge, MA.  GR had been founded with an initial capitalization of only 
$9000 by Melville Eastham in 1915 as the first U.S. firm expressly devoted to supplying 
test equipment for the nascent wireless telephony (i.e., radio) industry.  Prior to this time, 
the most well-known manufacturer of wavemeters and other frequency measurement 
equipment was Germany’s Telefunken.  With the escalating tensions of World War I, the 
British had blockaded all German ships in 1915, creating the need for the U.S. to 
domestically produce many manufactures that it had formerly imported from Germany.  
Eastham and GR quickly stepped in to fill the niche for frequency measurement 
equipment, becoming the U.S. marketplace leader in this field for decades to come.231 
Among GR’s first products was the Model 105B Universal Wavemeter, shown in 
Figure 16 and capable of measuring radio frequencies between 33 and 2,000 kHz.  
Selling for $105, the 105B was by far the most expensive device in the firm’s 1916 
product catalog.  With U.S. entry into WWI, GR began producing a much less expensive 
($34 in 1918) portable wavemeter; the U.S. military purchased many of these for field 
use during the war.  By 1923, the firm was offering four models of wavemeter: the “Type 
224 Precision” for close to $200, the “Universal” for $133, the “Type 174 Direct-
                                                 
231 Arthur E. Theissen, A History of the General Radio Company, 1915-1965 (West Concord, MA: General 
Radio Company, 1965). 
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Reading” for $60, and the “Type 145B Direct-Reading” for $38.  While the latter three 
instruments were capable of frequency accuracy around +/-1%, the Precision was capable 
of +/-0.25% accuracy.  On the strength of these and other precision radio instruments, GR 
became the undisputed U.S. leader in commercial frequency measurement equipment, a 
position it would hold for most of the 20th century.232 
 
 
Figure 16: The General Radio Company’s Universal 
Wavemeter (Model 105 B), which sold in 1916 for 
$105 
(Reprinted, by permission of the General Radio Historical Society, 
from General Radio Company, Radio Laboratory Apparatus: 
Catalogue A, 1916.  http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/) 
 
 
 
                                                 
232 See General Radio Company. "Catalog A." (Cambridge, MA, 1916), Available at 
http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/, Accessed 14 August 2006.  ———. "Catalog B." (Cambridge, MA, 
1918), Available at http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/, Accessed 14 August 2006.  ———. "Catalog C." 
(Cambridge, MA, 1919), Available at http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/, Accessed 14 August 2006.  —
——. "Catalog E." (Cambridge, MA, 1928), Available at http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/, Accessed 14 
August 2006.  Available from the General Radio Historical Society. 
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The call issued by the 1922 Radio Conference for “the study and standardization 
of wavemeters” reflected the hope that more accurate wavemeters in the hands of radio 
operators would materially reduce the amount of heterodyne interference on the airwaves, 
but it also reflected the direction in which radio spectrum management was moving.  
Though broadcast stations at the time were given only two frequencies (618.6 kHz and 
833.3 kHz), regulators wanted to move to a system whereby scores of channels (i.e., 
fixed frequency bands) would be available for broadcasting, with any given station 
licensed to broadcast on just one of these channels.  To maximize usage of the available 
radio spectrum, the spectral distance (D) between two broadcast channels adjacent in 
frequency would need to be as small as possible without producing crosstalk interference. 
In general, three technical factors govern the minimum possible spectral distance 
(D) between adjacent AM broadcast channels.  First, the spectral width, or bandwidth 
(BW), required for an AM broadcast signal sets the absolute minimum possible value for 
D.  Thus, in an ideal radio transmission system, D is equal to BW.  In all non-ideal, real-
world systems, however, two other factors inflate the value of D.  First is the accuracy 
with which radio frequencies may be measured, and second is the stability with which 
AM signal carrier frequencies may be maintained.  Thus, 
tabilityFrequencySccuracyFrequencyABWD ++= .    (Equation 2) 
The 1922 Radio Conference identified frequency accuracy as the primary technical 
bottleneck preventing more efficient use of the radio spectrum.  The task before the 
Bureau of Standards was thus twofold: to improve the ± 1 % accuracy of its standard 
wavemeter, and to improve the procedures for calibration of wavemeters used as 
secondary frequency standards. 
 142 
 
5.4  John Dellinger and the Bureau of Standards 
The Chief of the Radio Section of the Bureau of Standards in the early 1920s was 
John Howard Dellinger.  A native of Cleveland, Ohio and a Ph.D. physicist, Dellinger 
had received his training from Western Reserve University, George Washington 
University, and Princeton.  The Bureau of Standards was his first and only employer 
throughout his long and fruitful career.  Beginning work at the Bureau in 1907 at the age 
of 21, Dellinger showed early signs of the initiative and foresight that would come to 
mark his career.  In 1911, because of his recent training in electromagnetic theory, he was 
assigned a novel project.  Someone had submitted a wavemeter to the Bureau requesting 
that it be calibrated and “standardized.”  Dellinger impressed his superiors by the skill 
with which he handled the project.  Soon he began working on high-frequency ammeters, 
which became the topic for a doctoral dissertation that he completed at Princeton in 
1913.233  In 1921, at the age of 35, Dellinger was promoted to Chief of the Radio Section, 
a position which he held for the next 25 years.  Throughout his career at the Bureau, he 
wrote numerous important articles for both the technical community and the general 
public, and was involved in the processing of nearly 50 patents.234 
In response to the 1922 Radio Conference’s call for study and standardization of 
wavemeters, Dellinger initiated two new BOS programs.  The first aimed to improve the 
± 1% accuracy of the Bureau’s primary frequency standard.  The second program 
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involved a novel scheme to disseminate the primary frequency standard over the airwaves 
via “standard frequency transmissions.”  This would allow wavemeter owners to calibrate 
their instruments without having to send them to Washington for direct calibration with 
the standard wavemeter. 
Dellinger’s first program aimed to improve the accuracy of the primary frequency 
standard from ± 1% to ± 0.1%.  He was keenly aware of the importance of this task, 
stating, “The whole success of American broadcasting is tied up with the placing of 
broadcasting stations on the correct frequencies to an accuracy approaching 99.9 per 
cent.”235  To accomplish this goal, Dellinger decided to place the Bureau’s primary 
frequency standard on a four instrument basis.  Prior to this time, the standard had been 
based on a single instrument – the standard wavemeter.  The three new and independent 
bases were the tuning fork, a device called the multi-vibrator, and a pair of parallel wires 
that could be used to directly measure radio waves of very short wavelength.  With four 
independent bases, the Bureau could now use any one of them as a self-check on the 
other three.  As Dellinger put it in 1923, “When the present series of measurements is 
completed, the Bureau of Standards frequency basis will be certainly accurate well within 
0.1 per cent.”236  Furthermore, the accuracy of ± 0.1 % would apply to frequencies as low 
as 3.5 kHz or as high as 33,000 kHz, extending the range of the old Bureau standard (3.5 
– 5000 kHz) more than six times. 
Dellinger’s decision to exclude the piezoelectric resonator as one of the new bases 
for the Bureau’s primary frequency standard reflected the still immature status of Cady’s 
invention in 1922.  Dellinger likely suspected that the invention would undergo many 
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improvements before stabilizing.  He didn’t want to make the resonator the new basis for 
the frequency standard, only to have to change it a year later.  Furthermore, though Cady 
had filed for his resonator patent in early 1920, the patent had yet to issue.237  The 
invention might still encounter interference with a prior patent.  Lastly, Cady knew that 
the resonator would have to be subjected to more extensive and rigorous testing before 
Dellinger would consider adding it as a frequency standard basis.  To this end, Cady 
began making plans to travel to some of the great physical laboratories of Europe with his 
resonator in the summer of 1923.  In the meantime, he continued giving talks and 
publishing papers on the resonator, including a Proceedings of the I.R.E. paper in which 
he presented five methods by which the device could serve as a frequency standard.238  
One of these methods was noteworthy in that it mentioned the possibility of using the 
resonator to calibrate a wavemeter.  Cady did not elaborate, however, stating, “… the 
method is difficult and not generally to be recommended.”239 
Dellinger’s second program initiated in response to the 1922 Radio Conference 
aimed to use the Bureau’s radio station WWV to disseminate the primary frequency 
standard over a large portion of the nation.  Those able to receive the so-called “standard 
frequency transmissions” could use them to precisely and frequently calibrate their 
wavemeters.  Dellinger realized the uniqueness of a standard of measurement that could 
be disseminated wirelessly and without physically transporting anything.  As he was to 
put it some eight years later before a hearing of the Federal Radio Commission, 
“Frequency is a unique physical quantity, in that the standard can, by transmission of 
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radio signals, be made available everywhere at once.  It is the only super-portable 
standard in existence.”240 
On January 29 and 30, 1923, Dellinger oversaw the first tests of standard 
frequency transmissions from BOS station WWV in Washington, D. C.  The stated 
purpose of these tests was “to show the degree of agreement between wave frequency 
standards used in this country, and the need for more frequent standardization of such 
instruments.”  Several different frequencies between 200 and 545 kHz were transmitted 
from WWV, while eighteen radio laboratories throughout the East, South, and Midwest 
measured the transmitted frequencies.  Showing early cooperation between academia, 
industry and government, the measurements were made at both industrial R&D labs (e.g., 
AT&T, General Radio Co., Westinghouse) and university labs (e.g., Harvard, Georgia 
Tech, University of Illinois).  Results showed that 1/3 of the measurements fell within +/- 
0.5 % of the actual transmitted frequency, but some measurements differed from the 
actual transmitted frequency by as much as 4.2%.  Dellinger was not discouraged by the 
mixed results.  In fact, he found them good enough to state, “The results of the 
measurements as reported were quire satisfactory when all points are considered.”  This 
comment probably referred more to the performance of the WWV transmitter and the 
strength of its signal at the various measurement locations rather than the performance of 
the various measuring instruments used by participants.  As for the latter, the test results 
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clearly showed that much room remained for improvement in the accuracy of wavemeters 
used as secondary frequency standards.241 
Dellinger was satisfied enough with the tests of Jan. 29-30 that he decided to 
inaugurate a periodic standard frequency transmission service on March 6, 1923.  
Transmitting at a power of 1 kW from WWV and guaranteeing its frequency accuracy 
within +/- 0.3 %, the Bureau hoped with this service to “make it possible for any person 
having suitable apparatus to use these signals for calibrating his own wave meter and 
transmitting and receiving equipment.”  Furthermore, the Bureau hoped “that the system 
of standard wave transmission will have as a result the more accurate measurement and 
adjustment of radio apparatus of all kinds.”242 
The initiation of WWV standard frequency transmissions provided easy and 
efficient dissemination of standard frequencies to radio stations throughout the eastern 
United States, meaning that station operators in receiving range of WWV’s signal no 
longer had to ship their wavemeters off to Washington or elsewhere for calibration.  
Since a range of frequencies (from 200 to 550 kHz) were included in the transmission, 
the operator simply chose a calibration frequency and adjusted his wavemeter 
accordingly.  Dellinger’s hopes were high that this single act – the establishment of 
standard frequency transmissions – would go a long way toward addressing the 1922 
Radio Conference’s concerns over wavemeter standardization. 
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5.5  The 2nd National Radio Conference pushes for stricter frequency adherence 
On March 20, 1923, Herbert Hoover convened the Second National Radio 
Conference in Washington.  At the top of the agenda was radio interference, which had 
worsened considerably over the preceding year.  The WWV standard frequency 
transmissions had been in place for less than a month, not long enough to make a 
noticeable difference in interference.  Still, there were other interference-related actions 
the Conference could take to improve the situation.  With more than five-hundred 
licensed stations in operation throughout the country, most broadcasting on 360 meters 
(833.3 kHz), interference had become, in Hoover’s words, “simply intolerable.”  The 
Conference produced three interference-related recommendations.  The first was to open 
for broadcasting the entire 222-545 meter (550-1350 kHz) band, which had previously 
been reserved for Navy fleet tactical communications.243  The second, in accordance with 
BOS studies, was to set the frequency separation between adjacent broadcast stations, D, 
to 10 kHz.  This meant that there would now be eighty-six distinct channels by which 
broadcast stations could be organized.  Lastly, the Conference recommended that 
licensed broadcasting stations be equipped with a frequency-indicating instrument “for 
the purpose of maintaining the operating wave frequency within 2 kilocycles of the 
assigned wave frequency.”244   
The 1923 Conference’s recommendations did not carry the force of law, but they 
did lead to Congress passing legislation implementing the first two aforementioned 
recommendations.  The third, concerning frequency-indicating instrumentation, was 
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actually impossible to meet at the time of the Conference.  At the upper end of the AM 
broadcast band (1350 kHz), the +/-2 kHz accuracy recommended by the Conference was 
equivalent to +/-0.15%.  Given that the BOS guaranteed the accuracy of its new standard 
frequency transmissions to only +/-0.3%, stations placed in the upper end of the AM 
broadcasting band would have found it impossible to meet the Conference’s 
recommendation.   
The Conference’s attendees didn’t make a mistake in issuing the +/-2 kHz 
recommendation.  They were simply setting a technical goal for the radio industry.  This 
is very similar to what in the late 20th century came to be called “technology-forcing 
regulation.”  This type of regulation “specifies a standard that cannot be met with existing 
technology,” the hope being that the regulation will stimulate technological innovation.245  
The Conference’s attendees wanted the BOS and the radio industry to develop 
instruments and techniques that would enable all broadcast stations to stay within +/-2 
kHz of their assigned frequencies.   
Meanwhile, Walter Cady was certain that in his piezoelectric resonator lay at least 
a partial answer to the radio interference problem.  In the summer of 1923, he traveled to 
Europe with several of his quartz resonators.  At laboratories in Italy, France, and 
England, Cady compared the +/-0.01% accuracy of his resonators with those of various 
European frequency standards.246  He was encouraged to find that the European standards 
agreed to within 0.1% of each other, but his primary objective was to gather solid 
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evidence with which he could demonstrate the superiority of the quartz resonator as a 
frequency standard.  Writing of his findings in the Proceedings of the I.R.E., Cady stated, 
“In constancy and sharpness of tuning, as well as in simplicity, the piezo-electric 
standards are already superior to any type of wave-meter in use at present, except for the 
multi-vibrator.”247, 248   
While Cady was touring the laboratories of Europe, John Dellinger was feeling 
pressure from multiple sources to increase the accuracy of the Bureau’s primary 
frequency standard.  The 1923 Radio Conference had made it clear that the broadcasting 
industry needed the BOS to improve the +/-0.3 % accuracy of its WWV standard 
frequency transmissions.  But the broadcasting industry was not alone in needing a more 
accurate frequency standard.  Dellinger learned later that year that the Navy wanted an 
even higher standard of frequency accuracy, +/-0.01 %, than did broadcasters.  The 
Navy’s reason for wanting this was related to the 1923 Radio Conference’s decision to 
reserve the 500-1350 kHz band for commercial broadcasting.  This decision effectively 
pushed the Navy into experimenting with the higher shortwave band, where the BOS’s 
current +/-0.1 % frequency standard simply did not permit efficient use of the spectrum.   
Dellinger was confident that the Bureau could satisfy the needs of both 
broadcasting and the Navy.  Writing to Dr. J. M. Miller of the newly opened Naval 
Research Laboratory (NRL) in June of 1923, Dellinger stated, “The establishment of a 
frequency basis which shall be accurate to 0.3 kilocycle, or say 1/100 per cent over the 
radio range, is a definite part of the program of the radio laboratory of this Bureau.”  
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Dellinger went on, however, to request the financial support of the NRL.249  The Bureau, 
he argued, needed this support to research the feasibility of including Cady’s quartz 
resonator in its frequency standardization activities. 
 
5.6  The Piezo-Electric Oscillator as a Portable Secondary Frequency Standard 
Around this time, a third individual in addition to Walter Cady and John Dellinger 
joined the effort to improve frequency standardization through the use of piezoelectric 
quartz crystal.  George Washington Pierce, a professor of electrical engineering at 
Harvard, had come across Cady’s 1922 Proceedings of the I.R.E. paper, “The 
Piezoelectric Resonator,” while attempting to calibrate the university’s wavemeters.  
Finding Cady’s resonator not ideally suited for performing calibrations, Pierce developed 
a simple calibration method that instead used Cady’s piezoelectric oscillator.250  In 
October 1923, the method was disseminated in a widely read Proceedings of the A.A.A.S. 
article descriptively entitled, “Peizoelectric Crystal Resonators and Crystal Oscillators 
Applied to the Precision Calibration of Wavemeters.”251 
The appearance of Pierce’s article quickly galvanized the frequency 
standardization community.  Within nine months of its publication, two independent 
development efforts, one at the BOS and the other at the General Radio Company (GR), 
yielded the first practical quartz crystal-based secondary frequency standards.  The goal 
in both cases was not to make the wavemeter obsolete, but to supplement it in a way that 
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would better enable broadcast transmitter operators to closely adhere to their assigned 
frequencies.  In mid-1924, the Bureau announced that it had completed development of 
the Type C Frequency Indicator.  When used by a broadcast station, the passive Indicator, 
equipped with a quartz crystal ground to resonate precisely at the station’s assigned 
frequency, would indicate whether or not the station’s transmitter was operating within 2 
kHz of this frequency.  Essentially, the Indicator was Cady’s piezo-electric resonator 
adapted for broadcast station use.  Dellinger summarized the new instrument’s 
advantages as follows.  “This frequency indicator eliminates all the possibilities of error 
due to the change of coil or condenser constants, requires no shielding, is much less 
expensive, and is much more accurate.”252  Intended primarily for the use of BOS 
personnel and regional Radio Supervisors, the Type C was not produced in quantity or 
sold on the open market, but the Bureau did make available detailed specifications and 
schematics so that station operators could build their own.253 
Also in mid-1924, GR released its Type 275 Piezo-Electric Oscillator, an active 
quartz-based instrument that the company had developed with the assistance of Drs. Cady 
and Pierce.254  Intended to be used as a portable secondary frequency standard for 
precisely calibrating wavemeters, the Type 275 generated a single radiofrequency tone at 
a frequency specified by the customer.  As its name indicated, the instrument was in 
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essence one of the circuits included in Pierce’s 1924 patent for the piezo-electric 
oscillator.  The instrument, shown in Figure 17, was similar in size, weight (9.75 lbs.), 
and price ($135) to GR’s Universal Wavemeter.255  Capable of holding to its specified 
frequency with an accuracy of +/- 0.05 %, the Type 275 was clearly an improvement over 
WWV transmissions, accurate only to +/- 0.3%.256  GR felt that the instrument would 
contribute significantly to ending the interference problem, stating, “The development of 
a small, reliable frequency standard, suggests the possibility of uniform frequency 
standards, provided by a central laboratory, ending the present interference between 
stations due to a difference in standards.”257 
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Figure 17: The General Radio Company’s Type 
275 Piezo-Electric Oscillator, which sold in 
1928 for $60 
(Reprinted, by permission of the General Radio Historical 
Society, from General Radio Company, Catalog E, 
September 1928.  http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/) 
 
 
The appearance of GR’s Piezo-Electric Oscillator did more than any journal 
article or technical conference presentation could do to advance the case for quartz 
crystal as frequency standard.  In October of 1924, the Department of Commerce’s Radio 
Service Bulletin, read by all broadcast station operators, printed its first article dedicated 
to quartz crystal.  Entitled “Piezoelectric Crystals as Radio Standards,” the article stated 
that quartz crystal “appears to be a standard of greater constancy than the best 
wavemeters.”258  In the same issue and for the first time, the Bulletin’s monthly list of 
“standard frequency stations,” which included broadcast stations demonstrating 
exceptional frequency stability, showed that all listed stations were maintaining a 
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frequency constancy of +/- 2 kHz, indicating that many if not most of these stations were 
already using either the GR Type 275 or the BOS’s Type C frequency indicator.259   
GR’s Piezo-Electric Oscillator also made a splash among radio regulators.  In late 
1924, the BOS’s August Hund traveled to San Francisco with a Type 275.  A Colonel 
Dillon, the Supervisor of Radio for the West Coast, was intrigued by the oscillator and 
requested to keep it for a trial period; Hund complied.  In January 1925, Dillon wrote 
enthusiastically to Washington, “The quartz crystal oscillator was brought here by Dr. 
August Hund of the BOS, and is really the most convenient and accurate means of 
checking the wave lengths or frequencies of instruments that we have yet found.  
Therefore, if it can consistently be arranged, we are very anxious to keep the same.”260  In 
response, the Bureau, wishing to have enough piezo-oscillators for all twelve Supervisors 
of Radio, began taking bids from several manufacturers for delivery of eighteen 
oscillators - six for BOS personnel and the remaining twelve for the Supervisors. 
General Radio was the first and largest but not the only manufacturer of piezo-
electric oscillators.  Walter Cady, who owned the fundamental patents to the device and 
had assisted GR with the Type 275’s design, granted the company a non-exclusive 
license to use his patents.261  He was equally willing to license other manufacturers.  
Among these was the D.C.-based American Instrument Company, which won the BOS 
contract with a low bid of $61.50 per oscillator.262  Writing in December of 1925 to the 
Bureau, Arthur Batcheller, Supervisor of Radio for New York and New Jersey, was 
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delighted with the performance of his American Instrument piezo-electric oscillator.  “I 
believe the utilization of the new crystal oscillator for checking our wave meters is most 
ideal and that the conditions in the future as regards uniform settings of the stations 
throughout the various districts will more closely approximate true settings than any 
practice we have heretofore carried out. … The use of Piezo crystal oscillators for 
checking our wave meters is a big step forward and should materially aid in standardizing 
the frequency settings of all the stations throughout the U.S.”263   
In early 1926, the BOS began publicly endorsing the piezo-electric oscillator for 
use by broadcast stations.  An article in the Radio Service Bulletin read as follows.  
“Experience has shown that the use of an ordinary frequency meter (wave meter) is not a 
satisfactory means of fulfilling this requirement [that broadcast stations maintain a 
constant station frequency].  The most satisfactory constancy of frequency has been 
attained by stations which use a special frequency standard adjusted to the licensed 
frequency of the particular station.”264  The article went on to state that the best such 
frequency standard was a piezo-electric oscillator and that the oscillator could be used 
“either as a master oscillator controlling the frequency of a station’s output or as a 
frequency indicator.”265 
 
5.7  Developing a Quartz Crystal-based Primary Frequency Standard 
The piezo-electric oscillator provided radio transmitter operators a very accurate 
and constant secondary frequency standard, one that could be used to calibrate any 
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continuous frequency measuring instrument, such as a wavemeter.  But commercially 
available piezo-oscillators did nothing to improve the fundamental accuracy of the 
nation’s primary frequency standard.  John Dellinger’s 1923 promise to increase the 
accuracy of the Bureau’s primary frequency standard to 0.01 % was fulfilled not with the 
piezo-oscillator but by coupling a multi-vibrator (i.e., harmonic amplifier) to a tube-
driven 1025-cycle tuning fork.266  The multi-vibrator generated precise multiples of the 
tuning fork’s frequency.  Thus, the standard frequencies available with this setup were 
1025⋅N  Hz, with N being any positive integer.  By using wave filters on the multi-
vibrator’s output signal, particular values of N could be selected to produce any desired 
multiple of the tuning fork’s frequency. 
The tuning fork/multi-vibrator provided the BOS with a primary frequency 
standard accurate to +/- 0.01 %, but Dellinger knew that quartz crystal, if harnessed 
properly, could provide much greater accuracy.  Not only was greater accuracy possible; 
it was becoming necessary for the further stabilization of broadcasting and for the further 
development of the shortwave band.  Among the technical obstacles preventing the 
Bureau from devising a quartz-based primary standard were the adverse effects of 
temperature and humidity changes on the frequency stability of the piezo-oscillator.  By 
1926, General Radio had developed a non-temperature-controlled piezo-oscillator 
accurate to +/- 0.03 %, but this was felt to be the technology’s limit.267  Further 
improvement in accuracy would require precise temperature control.   
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John Dellinger knew that any effort to improve the accuracy of the national 
primary frequency standard beyond +/- 0.01 % would likely require many months of 
concentrated research involving not only the Bureau, but also the Naval Research 
Laboratory and private industry.  Organizing such a cooperative effort during peacetime 
would be no easy task.  Dellinger needed some type of external stimulus to convince 
others of the urgency of this task.  Just such a stimulus presented itself when the U.S. 
State Department invited representatives from seventy-nine countries to participate in the 
Third International Radiotelegraph Conference, the first since 1912.268  The Conference 
was to be held in Washington during October and November of 1927.   
The stated purpose of the 1927 Radiotelegraph Conference was to update the 
international radio agreements last set forth in London in 1912, long before AM 
broadcasting and short-wave transmission had appeared.  The rising popularity of 
shortwave radio in the early and mid-1920s made the Conference especially crucial 
because of the worldwide range of shortwave signals.  Dellinger saw the Conference as 
the perfect opportunity for showcasing U.S. progress in the standardization of frequency, 
but he also knew that a more precise frequency standard was critical in the international 
allocation of shortwave frequencies.  Using the approaching Conference as a prod, he 
sent a letter in January of 1927 to representatives of the following organizations: Bell 
Telephone Labs, AT&T, Westinghouse, General Radio Company, RCA, G.E., the U.S. 
War Department, and the Naval Research Laboratory.  In the letter, Dellinger invited the 
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recipients to a special conference on the status of frequency standardization, to be held at 
the Bureau of Standards.269 
On February 7, 1927, twenty-three men and one woman met at the Bureau to 
devise a plan for increasing the accuracy of the nation’s primary frequency standard.  The 
meeting seems to have been remarkably productive; its chief resolution was stated by the 
NRL’s Dr. Albert H. Taylor as follows.  “It was resolved that … the several organizations 
join in a cooperative endeavor, centered at the Bureau of Standards, to develop concrete 
standard (sic) in terms of which radio frequencies may be measured to an absolute 
accuracy not poorer than one part in one hundred thousand (0.001%).”270  This level of 
accuracy represented an improvement of ten times over the present accuracy of 0.01%.  
Moreover, it was recommended that this work be expedited so that “maximum progress” 
could be made in “securing a unified world basis of frequency measurement” by the time 
of the International Conference.   
To accomplish the February meeting’s ambitious goal, the attendees decided that 
seven complete temperature-controlled piezo-oscillators were to be constructed: two by 
the NRL, two by G.E., two by Westinghouse, and one by the Bureau of Standards.  The 
oscillators would all be sent to the Bureau for testing, after which they would be sent to 
the NRL and the Bell Telephone Laboratories for inter-comparison.  The method of 
“temperature control,” in which piezo-oscillators were placed in thermostatically-
controlled temperature chambers to avoid temperature-related frequency variations, was 
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still new in early 1927, but hopes were high that this technique alone would go a long 
way toward reaching the accuracy goal of 0.001%.   
When the International Radiotelegraph Conference convened in Washington in 
October, 1927, the seven experimental piezo-oscillators had yet to be completed.  What 
had been completed, however, was an important demonstration of the technique of 
precision temperature control as well as the close degree of agreement between 
international frequency standards.  During the summer of 1927, Dellinger had personally 
traveled to several European countries with a temperature-controlled piezo-oscillator for 
the purpose of performing laboratory comparisons with each country’s frequency 
standard.271  Understanding the importance of these tests requires a brief review of the 
Bureau’s earlier efforts at international frequency comparison.   
The Bureau’s first attempt at comparing various national frequency standards had 
been in 1924, when it had coordinated the simultaneous measurement in several countries 
of a number of high-power short-wave transmissions.  The results had been somewhat 
disheartening, indicating an agreement of only ~0.2%, much less than the known degree 
of certainty of each national standard.  The second attempt was a series of measurements 
begun in 1925 and not fully completed until late 1927; six countries had participated – 
England, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, and the U.S.  Dellinger had chosen to 
use a different method for these tests than was used for the 1924 tests; a number of piezo-
oscillators, not temperature-controlled, would be carefully packaged and shipped to the 
participating countries for direct laboratory comparison with each nation’s standard.  This 
series of tests were far more accurate than the earlier one, showing an agreement to 
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within 0.03%.  Dellinger saw these results as proof of the superiority of the piezo-
oscillator method of international frequency comparison.272 
When Dellinger performed his European frequency tests during the summer of 
1927, he hoped that the addition of temperature-control to the piezo-oscillator used in the 
comparisons would allow for improvement over the +/-0.03% accuracy of non-
temperature-controlled oscillators.  To his delight, the addition of temperature-control 
allowed for a 10-fold increase in accuracy, moving Dellinger to state that “it has been 
demonstrated that the several national laboratories are measuring frequencies with an 
accuracy satisfactorily in advance of the immediate requirements of radio practice.”273  
Continuing, “The standards of frequency of the larger countries agree sufficiently well to 
insure against interference provided the transmitting stations are accurately adjusted 
according to their national standards.”  Even so, Dellinger observed that “the accuracy 
attained in these comparisons is not by any means the limit attainable.”274  He still hoped 
that the Bureau’s program of reaching 0.001% accuracy would succeed.   
The 1927 International Radiotelegraph Conference had acted as a spur to kick-
start teamwork on developing a more accurate primary frequency standard, but the 
research team assembled by Dellinger ended up going much farther than originally 
planned.  This was likely the result of at least a couple of factors.  First, once the research 
team and a suitable division of labor had been organized, remarkable progress was made.  
Considering how difficult it was to put the team together in the first place, it is unlikely 
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that anyone was willing to disband the group immediately after the Conference ended, 
particularly since one of the team’s key deliverables – seven temperature-controlled 
piezo-oscillators – had yet to be completed.  Second, early test results indicated that the 
promise of temperature-control was much greater than the team had initially expected.  
Full realization of the potential of temperature-control required a significant extension of 
the research effort. 
In January of 1928, Dellinger’s frequency standard research group began 
disseminating monthly status reports to all group members.275  The reports continued to 
be written through December of 1929, by which time a remarkable new primary 
frequency standard had been installed at the Bureau.  The standard, assembled at Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, comprised four temperature-controlled piezo-oscillators which 
were compared daily and averaged to give the actual standard.  Its accuracy of 0.00001%, 
or one part in 10 million, was a remarkable hundred-fold improvement over the group’s 
original goal of 0.001%.276 
The accuracy of the Bureau’s new primary frequency standard was much higher 
than needed for full development of the medium-wave and shortwave radio bands, but the 
significance of the new standard lay in the much higher, unexplored regions of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, such as the microwave band that would become important 
during the Second World War.  The new primary frequency standard, the very first one of 
the Bureau’s to be quartz based, served the nation’s radio needs for thirty years.  In 1959, 
the quartz standard was replaced with one based on the oscillations of a cesium atom.  
During its thirty year reign, the Bureau’s quartz standard was modified and refined 
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several times.  Nevertheless, the frequency standard installed in late 1929 established the 
paradigm of quartz crystal frequency standardization until atomic-based standardization 
replaced it.277 
 
5.8  Birth of the Commercial Radiofrequency Testing Industry 
In early 1927, as Dellinger and the BOS were developing plans for improving the 
nation’s primary frequency standard, the Bureau was beginning to grapple with a serious 
problem related to the increasingly popular use of piezo-oscillators as secondary 
frequency standards.  Once an initial calibration was performed, these instruments held to 
their calibrated frequency remarkably well over time.  However, the initial calibration 
required a very precise reference standard with which to compare the piezo-oscillator.  
Furthermore, if the instrument’s user ever wanted to increase its oscillating frequency, a 
completely new calibration was required.278  For both initial calibrations and 
recalibrations, many users began sending their piezo-oscillators to the Bureau’s 
Washington office so that calibrations with respect to the primary frequency standard 
could be performed.  The Bureau was happy to perform these calibrations for a nominal 
fee. 
Until mid-1927, the Bureau did not find the job of calibrating piezo-oscillators too 
burdensome.  Then the U.S. Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927, part of which 
contained a new frequency adherence measure for broadcast stations.  General Order No. 
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7, issue by the newly formed Federal Radio Commission (FRC) on April 17, ordered all 
licensed broadcast stations to stay within +/- 0.5 kHz of their assigned frequencies.  
Following a short grace period, violators of the order were to be fined $500 a day, and 
repeated violation would result in license revocation.  The only possible way for station 
operators to consistently comply with General Order 7 was to use a piezo-oscillator for 
checking station frequency.  Thus, those stations that didn’t already own a piezo-
oscillator quickly ordered one or attempted to make their own.  Of course, all of these 
piezo-oscillators required calibration, so the BOS began seeing a rapid rise in the number 
of instruments it received for calibration.   
In 1928 the calibration situation reached a crisis state.  In January, the Bureau 
reported, “There is just at present an exceptional demand for radio tests of this kind [i.e. 
crystal calibration] which is greatly in excess of the capacity of the bureau for immediate 
service.  For this reason it has been necessary to schedule pending tests. … Tests already 
scheduled will require about 2 months to complete.”  The Bureau also announced the 
discontinuation of its monthly publication of a “Standard Frequency Stations” list, citing 
“the demands on the bureau for testing and other urgent work.”279   
What the Bureau really needed and desired was the creation of a commercial 
radiofrequency testing industry, one which would be able to perform piezo-oscillator 
calibrations as well as many other types of routine radio tests.  The beginnings of such an 
industry were already in place, but the quality of testing was not sufficient to assist 
stations in complying with General Order No. 7.  In an FRC internal memo dated 
February 8, 1928, nine testing laboratories were identified as offering, for a nominal fee, 
some types of radiofrequency tests; six of these were located at universities or technical 
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institutes.280  Yet, in a February 23, 1928 letter to Radio Chief William Dandrige Terrell, 
BOS Director George Kimball Burgess made it clear that none of these labs were yet 
qualified to perform frequency measurements and calibrations with sufficient accuracy.  
“At the present time commercial testing laboratories are farther than ever from being able 
to measure station frequency standards with the necessary accuracy. … The Bureau will 
be glad to have the routine testing of frequency standards taken over, when possible, by 
laboratories which can handle this business on a commercial basis.  In fact, we have been 
trying for several years to get such laboratories to take up the work of accurate calibration 
of wavemeters.”281 
The situation described by Burgess continued for several years.  By the early 
1930s, however, a commercial radio testing industry capable of the same level of 
frequency accuracy as the BOS had been established.  Perhaps the major factor enabling 
this development was the proliferation of quartz-based primary frequency standards 
beyond the walls of the BOS’s Washington headquarters.  In testimony before the FRC 
on April 20, 1931, John Dellinger testified that there were currently three laboratories in 
addition to the BOS that maintained a quartz-based primary frequency standard to an 
accuracy of at least one part per million, or +/- 0.0001%.282  These laboratories, located at 
the General Radio Company, the Naval Research Laboratory, and the Bell Telephone 
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Laboratories, lightened the BOS’s calibration load and allowed the Bureau to focus on 
non-routine standardization issues.   
Of these three laboratories, only General Radio manufactured primary frequency 
standards for sale on the open market.  The company’s Class C21-H Standard Frequency 
Assembly, released in 1930 and selling for $1860, gave anyone who could afford it a 
primary frequency standard accurate to at least one part per million.283  By 1932, GR 
could state in its catalog, “Once developed for use in our own calibration work, this 
assembly has since been installed by more than fifteen universities, communication 
companies, and government agencies in the U.S. and abroad.”284  And by 1935, the 
company could boast, “More than thirty-eight [C21-H] units have been installed and are 
operating in all parts of the world in industrial organizations, research laboratories, 
observatories, and frequency monitoring stations.  Many of them are used as national 
standards of frequency by communications administrations in North American, 
European, and Asiatic countries.”285  More than any other single company, the General 
Radio Company facilitated the spread of quartz-based primary frequency standards not 
only throughout the U.S. but throughout the world.   
 
5.9  The Institute of Radio Engineers encourages adoption of quartz crystal frequency 
standards 
 
Thus far this narrative has shown quartz crystal-based frequency standardization 
as being influenced and implemented by independent inventors (Walter Cady, George 
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Washington Pierce), government institutions (Bureau of Standards, Naval Research 
Laboratory, Federal Radio Commission), and private firms (General Radio Company, 
Bell Telephone Laboratories, General Electric, Westinghouse).  One other group that was 
instrumental in promoting quartz standards has yet to be mentioned.  Most of the 
individuals mentioned in the narrative thus far were members of the Institute of Radio 
Engineers (I.R.E.), a professional engineering society that played a prominent role in 
influencing early broadcast radio policy.286  In mid-1927, just after the formation of the 
F.R.C., the I.R.E. offered its technical consulting services to the Commission; the 
Commission soon accepted.  In 1928, the I.R.E. leadership formed the Committee on 
Broadcasting “as a means by which the Institute might assist the government as well as 
the Institute membership in the solution of some of the technical problems involved in the 
development of broadcasting.”287 
Shortly after its formation, the I.R.E. Committee on Broadcasting received a 
request from John Dellinger, the then Chief Engineer of the Federal Radio Commission.  
Dellinger asked the Commission to study certain broadcasting subjects of urgent concern, 
including the matter of “permissible deviation of carrier frequency from licensed 
frequency.”288  Within a few months, the Committee had issued a report on the topic.  
Beginning with the acknowledgement that the primary purpose of precise carrier 
frequency stability was the elimination of heterodyne (or “beat-note”) interference, the 
report confessed that the complete elimination of such interference “is not believed to be 
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a practical possibility at the present stage of the art.  It can be achieved only by highly 
refined apparatus, which is yet beyond the resources of many of the smaller stations that 
occupy the channels under discussion.”289  Nevertheless, noting that even partial 
elimination of heterodyne interference would improve broadcasting quality, the 
Committee recommended a new frequency adherence requirement of +/-0.05 kHz.  “An 
effort on the part of the industry to meet a plus or minus 50-cycle requirement, while it 
may not be a complete solution, and while its effect may only be temporary, will 
nevertheless serve as a powerful stimulus to the development of the more refined 
apparatus and improved technique ultimately required.”290 
As earlier, we see again here an example of legislation very close to what it today 
known as “technology-forcing regulation.”291  Yet, the +/-0.05 kHz recommendation was 
not impossible to meet.  As the Committee’s report noted, “the maintenance of 
frequencies in the broadcast band with a maximum permissible deviation of plus or 
minus 50 cycles is believed to be both technically and economically feasible, at the 
present state of the art.”  The report went on to suggest means for meeting the new 
recommendation.  “The required degree of accuracy and stability can hardly be attained, 
however, without resorting to automatic frequency control by means of tuning forks, 
piezo crystals, and similar devices.  Such devices must not only be accurately adjusted to 
the required frequency but should be enclosed in constant temperature chambers.”292  
Clearly, the Committee chose not to mandate that quartz crystal equipment be used.  
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Practically speaking, however, this was the most feasible way for most stations to comply 
with the +/-0.05 kHz recommendation.   
The I.R.E. Committee on Broadcasting’s recommendation was eventually put into 
law as General Order No. 116.  Passed in 1931 and taking effect in 1932, this Order 
tightened the F.R.C.’s frequency adherence regulation from +/- 0.5 kHz to +/- 0.05 kHz.  
As predicted by the Committee, broadcast station operators found it necessary to use not 
only a well-calibrated piezo-oscillator, but also a crystal-controlled transmitter equipped 
with precision temperature control in order to comply with the order.293  Thus, by directly 
influencing frequency adherence legislation, the I.R.E. Committee on Broadcasting 
effected the widespread adoption of quartz crystal technology among American 
broadcasters.  
 
By the mid-1930s, a small but healthy industry had formed to help broadcast 
stations comply with F.C.C. (formerly F.R.C.) frequency adherence regulations.  At least 
five American manufacturers made F.C.C.-approved quartz-based frequency monitors.294  
Furthermore, in 1936 thirteen manufacturers were producing F.C.C.-approved automatic 
frequency control units, eleven manufacturers were producing F.C.C.-approved crystal-
controlled transmitters, and five manufacturers were making F.C.C.-approved automatic 
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temperature control units.295  The BOS worked closely with some of these manufacturers 
in determining the feasibility of new F.C.C. frequency adherence regulations as the radio 
art moved into higher frequencies.  For example, in 1936 the acting secretary of the BOS 
wrote the following to the General Radio Company.  “The F.C.C. is interested in 
frequency measurement equipment suitable for measuring any frequency in the range 
from 1 cycle to 500 megacycles.”  What followed were some proposed specifications 
pertaining to frequency accuracy and stability in the higher frequencies.  The letter then 
continued, “Progress in the design of equipment for higher frequencies has been less 
rapid with the result that the question of the best method to be used and the feasibility of 
manufacturing components having the required electrical performance cannot be easily 
answered.  It is desired that your engineering department give this matter some 
consideration and advise the Commission whether the tentative specifications enumerated 
above can be successfully approached and submit information covering a practical 
apparatus layout, together with the performance that can be anticipated.”296  Ten years 
earlier, in 1926, the BOS would have hardly approached private industry with such a 
request, for industry was simply not producing quartz-based frequency measurement 
equipment in large numbers.  By 1936, however, the Bureau could boast of a highly 
skilled and knowledgeable American radiofrequency testing industry, one that the Bureau 
routinely consulted when the F.C.C. wanted to update radio spectrum regulations. 
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5.11  Conclusions 
During the 1920s, the Radio Division of the U.S. Bureau of Standards and the 
Institute of Radio Engineers, moved to action by the growth of shortwave band radio, the 
growing presence of destructive interference in the broadcast band, and the 
communications requirements of the U.S. Navy, endeavored successfully to encourage 
widespread adoption of quartz crystal-based frequency standards and measurement 
instruments.  The efforts of these two organizations culminated in the passage of 
frequency adherence legislation in 1927 and 1931.  These laws required licensed 
broadcast stations to employ a quartz-based frequency measurement device (General 
Order No. 7 – 1927) as well as a crystal-controlled transmitter (General Order No. 116 – 
1931).  Consequently, a small but technologically vital industry grew up around the 
manufacture and calibration of precision quartz crystal radio instruments.  The earliest 
and most influential American firm to emerge in this industry was the General Radio 
Company of Cambridge, Massachusetts.  Over time, General Radio developed a close 
consultant-like relationship with the Bureau, advising it on the feasibility of proposed 
frequency adherence legislation.   
The relationship between the Bureau of Standards and the General Radio 
Company embodied the kind of public sector/private sector partnership encouraged in the 
1920s by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover.  Hoover’s regulatory philosophy, 
which has since come to be labeled “associationalism,” encouraged industry self-
regulation.297  In the absence of self-regulation, however, Hoover had no qualms about 
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stepping in with government regulation, as he had to do when radio broadcasting 
interference became intolerable.  In the wake of the 1927 Radio Act and General Order 
No. 7, which imposed a strict frequency adherence regulation on broadcasters, the Bureau 
of Standards, which was part of the Department of Commerce, found that many 
broadcasters found it difficult to comply with the order because of the lack of a 
commercial radio testing industry.  In countries less committed than the U.S. to private 
sector ownership of capital, the government itself would have probably stepped in to 
produce the needed instrumentation and perform much needed calibrations.  The Bureau, 
however, agreed to provide calibrations only until private industry proved itself up to the 
task.  Over several years, in accordance with Hoover’s associationalism, the Bureau 
patiently nurtured the growth of a private radio testing industry.  By the mid-1930s, a 
flourishing and competitive U.S. commercial radio testing industry, of which General 
Radio was only one player among many, existed. 
The commercial radio testing industry was an important sector of a growing 
quartz crystal technological community.  Some of the firms in this industry, such as 
General Radio, did not generate many quartz-related patents.298  The importance of these 
firms was not as inventors, but as innovators.  They brought inventions into the 
marketplace and consequently into widespread use in the form of commercial products, 
such as the revolutionary GR Type 275 Piezo-Electric Oscillator.  These products then 
made it possible for others to continue inventing in the area of quartz crystal technology, 
creating a self-reinforcing cycle of invention-innovation-invention. 
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While firms such as General Radio turned quartz crystal engineering knowledge 
into quartz crystal commercial products, the Institute of Radio Engineers, a professional 
engineering society formed in 1912 in New York, served as a crucial nexus linking 
piezoelectric engineers from private industry, independent inventors such as Cady and 
Pierce, government engineers such as John Dellinger, and military researchers from the 
NRL.  The I.R.E.’s meetings allowed engineers from all of these institutions to meet and 
collaborate, while the I.R.E.’s principal publication, Proceedings of the I.R.E., facilitated 
the broad dissemination of quartz crystal engineering knowledge. 
Also serving in the 1920s as a nexus for the growing quartz crystal technological 
community was the Radio Division of the Bureau of Standards.  By virtue of its twin 
mandate to both maintain the nation’s primary radiofrequency standard and to 
standardize frequency measurement equipment, the Bureau necessarily worked closely 
with all of the individuals and groups that were at the forefront of quartz crystal 
technology.  The best example of this was the Bureau’s initiating and organizing the three 
year research and development effort to develop a quartz crystal-based national primary 
frequency standard.  Through the monthly Radio Service Bulletin, the Bureau also 
effectively disseminated quartz crystal engineering knowledge to broadcast station 
operators who were primarily interested in keeping their stations on the air.  Notable 
among Bureau employees was John Dellinger, whose passionate pursuit of ever more 
accurate frequency standards involved the relentless promotion of quartz crystal-based 
standards.  Like the General Radio Company, Dellinger’s legacy to quartz crystal 
technology is one of innovation, bringing quartz crystal instruments and standards into 
widespread use. 
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The great quartz crystal independent inventors that we have seen in previous 
chapters, Walter Guyton Cady and George Washington Pierce, appeared also in this 
chapter.  Chapter 4 showed that the engineering contributions of these two men were 
conceptually distinct.  Cady was fundamentally a technologically oriented scientist, while 
Pierce was an inventive electrical engineer.  These distinctions appear once again in this 
chapter.  Cady first demonstrated that piezoelectric quartz crystal could serve as the basis 
of a radiofrequency standard, but his idea of using the quartz piezo-electric resonator as a 
frequency standard never gained much traction in practice.  Pierce first proposed that 
Cady’s piezo-electric oscillator rather than his resonator be used as a practical frequency 
standard.  This idea quickly took hold and led within a few years to the piezo-electric 
oscillator replacing the wavemeter as a portable secondary frequency standard.  Pierce’s 
familiarity with the needs of working engineers and technicians allowed him to refine 
Cady’s initial ideas, making them more usable by the radio industry. 
 
By the early 1930s, quartz crystal technology had come to pervade the 
transmission side of radio technology, particularly among licensed broadcasters.  The 
new decade, one that would bring the Great Depression but that has also been called “the 
most technologically progressive decade of the century,” saw the widespread application 
of piezoelectric quartz crystal to telephony as well as the birth of an industry that catered 
to the quartz crystal needs of radio amateurs.299  The following chapter relates these 
stories. 
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CHAPTER 6: EXPANSION – THE AMATEUR RADIO AND TELEPHONY 
MARKETS FOR QUARTZ CRYSTAL 
 
 
 
…the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market.  
Adam Smith, 1776300 
 
In the past the man has been first.  In the future the System must be first. 
       Frederick Winslow Taylor, 1911301 
 
 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
The late 1920s and 1930s witnessed the tremendous expansion of the nascent 
quartz crystal technological community as well as the significant extension of quartz 
crystal engineering knowledge.  This growth proceeded, as the two quotes above suggest, 
along two very different paths.  The first path, made possible by the growing number of 
radio amateurs in the U.S., was characterized by increasing specialization in quartz 
crystal device production.  The second path, supported by the growing American demand 
for accessible and affordable long-distance telephony service, was characterized by 
centralized planning and organization of telephony research.  This research was possible 
only because of AT&T’s government-regulated monopoly over U.S. telephony.  Though 
these two paths were distinct, they did not work against each other.  Rather, they both 
contributed to the technological and economic growth of quartz crystal technology during 
the decade that economic historian Alex Field has recently called “the most 
technologically progressive … of the century.”302 
                                                 
300 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Fifth ed. (New York: Bantam Classics, 2003), Chapter 3. 
301 Frederick Winslow Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management: and Shop Management (London: 
Routledge/Thoemmes Press, 1993), Chapter 1. 
302 Alexander J. Field, "The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century," The American 
Economic Review 93, no. 4 (November 2003): 1399-413. 
 175 
While much of the American economy became mired in depression after 1929, 
the quartz crystal industry actually grew.  In numbers, the largest addition to the quartz 
crystal community during this time was the swelling ranks of American radio amateurs, 
most of whom began adopting the technique of crystal control for their transmitters.  The 
growth of this market led to the formation of many small firms specializing in the 
manufacture of quartz crystal units, or QCU’s.  By the end of the 1930s, specialized QCU 
firms were producing a total of as many as 100,000 QCU’s a year, far more than the 
broadcast radio industry alone could have supported.  By and large, these firms were 
strictly manufacturing outfits, not research and development organizations.  Nevertheless, 
at least one firm – Bliley Electric of Erie, Pennsylvania – made important contributions to 
quartz crystal engineering knowledge by developing innovative QCU designs and labor-
saving manufacturing processes. 
Despite the contributions of Bliley Electric and other specialized QCU 
manufacturers, the most significant additions to quartz crystal engineering knowledge 
during the late 1920s and 1930s were made by Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL), the 
research division of American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T).  In the course of a 
long-range effort to expand the company’s long-distance telephony network, BTL 
engineers developed two new technologies – quartz crystal wave filters and coaxial cable 
– that allowed AT&T to develop and deploy a high-capacity, multiplex carrier telephony 
system.  Additionally, BTL engineers developed important quartz crystal temperature 
compensation techniques as well as the quartz crystal clock.  Consonant with Alex 
Field’s aforementioned assessment of the 1930s, the body of quartz crystal engineering 
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knowledge expanded greatly during this time, largely due to the efforts of BTL 
engineers.303   
For most of the 1920s, as Chapters 4 and 5 have shown, the growth of the 
emerging quartz crystal technological community was centrally orchestrated by the U.S. 
Bureau of Standards and, to a lesser extent, the Institute of Radio Engineers.  In contrast, 
this chapter shows that growth of the amateur radio community and the concurrent rise of 
dedicated QCU manufacturing firms was largely a decentralized, grass roots 
phenomenon.  There were no government regulations forcing radio amateurs to adopt 
quartz crystal control.   
The growth of quartz crystal engineering knowledge during the 1930s tells a 
different story.  The significant advances made by BTL engineers would likely not have 
been possible had not AT&T enjoyed a government-regulated monopoly over long-
distance telephony in the U.S.  The company’s large and secure profits allowed it to fund 
one of the world’s most advanced industrial research and development labs.  The quartz 
crystal work performed at BTL was not undirected, blue sky research; rather, it was 
carefully planned to fit the needs of the Bell System and its customers.  BTL managers 
were trained to focus on the needs of the system above the needs of particular scientific 
or engineering disciplines.  The invention and refinement of quartz crystal wave filters, as 
well as the work on temperature compensation, functioned first and foremost to expand 
and economize Bell’s telephony infrastructure, but this work also expanded quartz crystal 
engineering knowledge far beyond what it had been in the late 1920s. 
By the late 1930s, the quartz crystal technological community was much larger 
than it had been a decade earlier, but it was still quite fragmented.  Most quartz crystal 
                                                 
303 Ibid. 
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inventors and engineers focused primarily on their company’s needs or the needs of their 
customers.  That is, they were not self-consciously advancing the body of quartz crystal 
engineering knowledge.  This was the legacy of a decade in which quartz crystal 
technology grew in two very different contexts: the free-market, entrepreneurial 
capitalism of radio amateurs and the QCU manufacturing industry; and the world-class 
research and development laboratory of BTL, supported by AT&T’s government-
regulated monopoly of telephony. 
 
 
6.2  Review of quartz crystal technology during the 1920s 
 
 For most of the 1920s, piezoelectric applications of quartz crystal remained 
limited in large measure to two areas: frequency standards, both primary and secondary; 
and precise frequency control of radio transmitters.  The principal devices employed in 
these applications were the piezoelectric resonator and the piezoelectric oscillator, 
invented by Wesleyan University professor Walter Cady, and the Pierce oscillator, 
invented by Harvard University professor George Washington Pierce.304  These 
inventions, their areas of technological application, and the popular names of these 
applications are summarized in Figure 18.  This table includes two applications, wave 
filters and crystal clocks, that have yet to appear in this dissertation.  The present chapter 
introduces these two applications. 
 
 
                                                 
304 Walter Guyton Cady, Piezo Electric Resonator, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,450,246, Filing Date: 
28 January 1920; Issue Date: 3 April 1923.  ———, Method of Maintaining Electric Currents of Constant 
Frequency, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1472583, Filing Date: 28 May 1921; Issue Date: 30 October 
1923. 
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Invention Inventor(s) Fundamental 
Patents (U.S.) 
Applications Popular or Brand Names 
Frequency Standards Piezoelectric 
Resonator 
Walter Cady 1,450,246 
 Wave filters 
- Quartz Plate 
- Crystal 
- Quartz Crystal Unit (QCU) 
Frequency Standards Piezo-oscillator 
Frequency 
stabilization of radio 
transmitters 
Automatic Frequency 
Control Unit (AFCU) 
Piezoelectric 
Oscillator 
Walter Cady 
G. W. Pierce 
1,472,583 
2,133,642 
Crystal Clocks Syncro-Clock 
Figure 18: The Piezoelectric Resonator and Oscillator: Inventors, Patent Numbers, 
Applications, and Popular Names 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
The quartz resonator is the more basic device, consisting essentially of a thin slice 
of quartz crystal sandwiched between two conducting electrodes, such that the 
combination might be inserted in an electrical circuit.  As such, the piezoelectric 
resonator is a passive electrical component, akin to a capacitor, inductor, or resistor.  In 
fact, a very helpful way of thinking of the resonator is as a capacitor with a quartz crystal 
dielectric. 
 The quartz crystal of the piezoelectric resonator is cut to physical dimensions that 
would allow it to resonate mechanically at its so-called natural frequency.  Because of 
quartz’s piezoelectric property, this mechanical resonance simultaneously produces 
electrical resonance.  In the 1920s, a common demonstration of the resonator’s operation 
was to connect it in series with a variable frequency alternating current (AC) source and 
an AC ammeter, as shown in Figure 19.  As the frequency of the AC source was allowed 
to increase gradually, it would pass through the piezoelectric resonator’s natural 
frequency, at which point the circuit’s AC series current would drop to a sharp minimum, 
represented in Figure 20.  The distinctive technological value of the resonator in the 
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1920s lay in the sharpness of this curve and the stability of its natural frequency.  No 
other existing passive electrical component exhibited such a sharp resonance curve or 
such a stable natural frequency.  Indeed, because of these two characteristics, the quartz 
piezoelectric resonator could serve as a stable and reliable standard of frequency.   
 
 
 
Figure 19: Circuit Demonstrating 
Operation of the Piezoelectric Resonator 
1 - Quartz Crystal Plate; 2 - Conductive coating 
for electrically connected crystal plate to rest of 
circuit; 3 - Conducting wires; 4 - High-
Frequency AC Current Source; 5 – AC 
Ammeter. (Source: Walter Cady, U.S. Patent 
1,450,246) 
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Figure 20: Characteristic Frequency Response of Piezoelectric Resonator Circuit 
(Figure created by author.) 
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The quartz piezoelectric oscillator was a cumulative invention that built on and 
added to the piezoelectric resonator.  An electrical circuit rather than a simple 
component, the oscillator embeds the resonator in the feedback loop of any one of many 
well-known oscillator circuits employing one or more triode vacuum tubes as amplifiers.  
(See Figure 21 for a commonly-used quartz oscillator circuit.)  By doing so, the 
embedded resonator prevents the circuit from oscillating at any frequency other than the 
resonator’s natural frequency.  Moreover, because of the stability of this natural 
frequency, the piezoelectric oscillator produces extremely stable electric oscillations at 
one and only one frequency. 
 
 
Figure 21: Quartz Crystal Oscillator Circuit 
Used by the U.S. Navy, Circa 1927 
(Reprinted, by permission of the IEEE, from A. Crossley, 
“Piezo-Electric Crystal-Controlled Transmitters,” 
Proceedings of the I.R.E. 15, no. 1 (January 1927): 19, 
Figure 11.  ©1927 IEEE) 
 
 
Like the piezoelectric resonator, the oscillator can easily serve as a standard of 
frequency, but it has another use as well.  When used in the oscillator circuit of a radio 
transmitter, it stabilizes the transmitter’s carrier frequency.  In practice, the piezoelectric 
oscillator was used in the 1920s for both frequency standards and precision frequency 
control of radio transmitters, while the piezoelectric resonator saw very limited use.  This 
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disparity was largely due to George Washington Pierce’s development in 1924 of a 
simplified and robust crystal oscillator circuit.305  The piezoelectric oscillator was known 
by different names depending on its application.  When used as a frequency standard, the 
device came to be known simply as the piezo-oscillator.  The U.S. Bureau of Standards 
played a crucial role in developing this application, and the General Radio Company was 
the first to manufacture and sell piezo-oscillators intended for use as primary or 
secondary frequency standards.  When used to precisely control the frequency of radio 
transmitters, the piezoelectric oscillator went by the name of the Automatic Frequency 
Control Unit, or AFCU.  This application was developed extensively in the 1920s by the 
Naval Research Laboratory and commercialized by many firms, including Western 
Electric, RCA, General Electric, and Westinghouse.   
As Chapters 4 and 5 have shown, a small community formed around the 
technological use of piezoelectric quartz crystal in the 1920s.  This community consisted 
of three classes of participants: users, producers, and regulators.  The users of quartz 
crystal technology included licensed broadcast stations, the U.S. Navy, radio networks or 
chains, the Department of Commerce’s Radio Inspection Service, the Bureau of 
Standards, scientific and engineering laboratories conducting radiofrequency research, 
and radio amateurs.  The producers of quartz crystal technology in the 1920s were, in 
many cases, also the users.  That is, many users had to make their own quartz crystal 
devices and instruments, because the quartz crystal technology industry did not exist for 
most of the decade.  This was especially true for amateurs on limited budgets.   
                                                 
305 George Washington Pierce, Electrical System, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,133,642, Filing Date: 25 
February 1924; Issue Date: 18 October 1938. 
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There was, however, at least one dedicated producer of quartz-based instruments 
during the 1920s – the General Radio Company (GR).  The Company produced 
piezoelectric oscillators, plug-in quartz plates, and, by 1930, quartz-based primary 
frequency standards.  GR sold these quartz crystal instruments on the open market.  Their 
customers included the U.S. Bureau of Standards, radio broadcast stations, industrial 
research and development laboratories, and probably a handful of affluent radio 
amateurs.  Most of the large radio firms of the 1920s (AT&T, G.E., Westinghouse, 
R.C.A.) also produced quartz crystal equipment, but primarily for internal use only.  In 
other words, they were user-producers rather than dedicated producers. 
Regulation of 1920s quartz crystal technology was the principal focus of Chapter 
5.  Before 1927, regulation was in the hands of the Radio Division of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce.  Through a series of national radio conferences, the 
Department made recommendations concerning wavemeter standardization and carrier 
frequency adherence, but it lacked the authority to turn these recommendations in binding 
law.  In 1927, the Federal Radio Commission (F.R.C.) became the principal regulator of 
quartz crystal technology.  The Commission regulated the use of quartz devices, leaving 
production to the private sector.  With General Order No. 7 (1927), the F.R.C. effectively 
forced licensed broadcasters to employ piezoelectric oscillators as secondary frequency 
standards.  In 1931, General Order No. 116 forced broadcasters to employ quartz crystal-
control in their transmitters.  In developing these technical regulations, the F.R.C. was 
heavily influenced by the expert advice of the Bureau of Standards and the I.R.E. 
Committee on Broadcasting.  Engineers with these two organizations did much to effect 
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the widespread adoption of quartz crystal technology throughout the broadcast radio 
industry. 
 
6.3  Overview of quartz crystal developments during the 1930s 
Some economic historians have recently argued that the label typically ascribed to 
the 1930s – the Great Depression – belies the great technological advances that were 
made during that decade.306  This study confirms this argument by showing that great 
advances were made in piezoelectric quartz crystal technology in the 1930s.  These 
advances were stimulated by two significant developments in American society occurring 
in the late 1920s.  First, the number of radio amateurs increased rapidly.  From 1925 to 
1935, the number of licensed radio amateurs in the U.S. trebled.307  This stimulated the 
growth of a new industry that catered to radio amateur needs.  In particular, many small 
firms formed in the late 1920s and early 1930s that specialized in the production of 
quartz crystal units (QCU’s) for amateur use.  The General Radio Company had 
developed the standardized QCU, a hermetically sealed, plug-in quartz resonator, in the 
mid-1920s for use with its piezoelectric oscillators.  The QCU quickly became the most 
popular form of quartz resonator.  Some of the QCU manufacturing firms forming during 
this time proved to be highly innovative, developing devices and methods that catered to 
budget-minded amateurs.  By World War II, radio amateurs represented the single largest 
commercial market for QCU’s. 
                                                 
306 For example, see Alexander J. Field, "The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the Century," 
The American Economic Review 93, no. 4 (November 2003): 1399-413. 
307 Patrick R. J. Brown, "The Influence of Amateur Radio on the Development of the Commercial Market 
for Quartz Piezoelectric Resonators in the United States" (Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Frequency 
Control Symposium, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Forth Monmouth, NJ, 5-7 June 1996), 58-65. 
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The second significant development occurring during the late 1920s was AT&T’s 
withdrawal from broadcast radio and the company’s subsequent focus on expanding the 
capacity of its long-distance telephony network.  Bell Telephone Laboratory (BTL) 
engineers soon learned how to use quartz crystal technology to achieve the desired 
network expansion.  The solution lay in using quartz resonators to construct highly 
selective wave filters.  These quartz wave filters allowed AT&T to develop on paper a 
highly efficient multiplex carrier telephony distribution system.  The development in the 
mid 1930s of high bandwidth coaxial cable allowed this system to be implemented in 
practice.  The quartz filters Western Electric manufactured during the 1930s were for Bell 
System use only, so the marketplace never saw them.  Nevertheless, the size of this 
internal market was enormous, requiring a vast amount of quartz crystal.   
One additional change occurring in the late 1920s and early 1930s was BTL’s 
invention of the quartz crystal clock.  This technology quickly made the pendulum clock 
obsolete, a change which affected only the scientific and military communities for the 
next several decades.  In the late 1960s, however, the technical groundwork laid by the 
crystal clock made possible the development of the affordable quartz wristwatch.  
Developments in miniaturization and integrated circuitry were necessary to make the 
quartz wristwatch a practical reality, but the original crystal clock proved the feasibility 
of quartz-based timekeeping. 
 
6.4  General Radio develops the plug-in quartz plate, preparing the way for dedicated 
QCU companies 
 
It didn’t take long for designers of the piezoelectric resonator in the 1920s to 
realize the utility of offering it in a hermeticall
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designing it as an easy-to-use plug-in component, engineers at the General Radio 
Company transformed the resonator from an experimental curiosity into a reliable, off-
the-shelf component.  Electronics research labs desiring a reliable local frequency 
standard could now purchase a piezo-oscillator having a standard plug-in slot for 
inserting the quartz resonator.  If one resonator went bad or cracked, a new one could 
easily be inserted.  And radio broadcast stations could similarly purchase transmitters 
having a standard plug-in slot for the resonator; all stations routinely kept a backup 
resonator on hand so that a cracked resonator wouldn’t keep the station off the air. 
 The General Radio Company (GR) of Cambridge, MA pioneered the manufacture 
of standardized piezoelectric resonators in 1925, the same year that the company released 
the first commercially available piezoelectric oscillator.308  Calling them “quartz plates,” 
GR’s product, shown in Figure 22, consisted of a carefully cut, grounded and polished 
quartz crystal wafer, a crystal holder or mounting, and a pair of electrical plugs for 
inserting the unit into the desired device, whether that be a piezo-oscillator or a broadcast 
transmitter.  For the remainder of the 1920s, GR dominated the U.S. market for quartz 
plates; most were used in broadcast radio or in primary and secondary frequency 
standards.  One mark of this dominance was the establishment of the General Radio 
quartz plate plug style as a de facto industry standard.  By the early 1930s, all quartz plate 
manufacturers were conforming to this standard, using GR plugs spaced ¾” apart, as 
shown in Figure 23.  Yet, the markets that GR catered to – broadcast radio stations and 
scientific and engineering laboratories - were never large.  Most radio stations needed 
only two plates, the one in use and a backup.  The same held for laboratories that used 
                                                 
308 Bulletin 715 of the General Radio Company, November 1925, Box 3, Records of the National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, General Records of J. Howard Dellinger, Record Group 167, U.S. National 
Archives, College Park, MD. 
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piezo-oscillators as frequency standards.  By 1926, however, a market for quartz plates 
had begun to emerge that would, for a time, dwarf these and all others.  The size of this 
market, consisting of amateur radio operators, would allow for a greater division of labor 
among producers of quartz crystal technology. 
 
 
Figure 22: Exploded View of General Radio Co. 
Quartz Crystal Unit, Circa 1930 
(Reprinted, by permission of the General Radio Historical 
Society, from General Radio Company, Catalog F, 1930. 
http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/) 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Bliley Electric Co. VP5 
QCU with Standard G.R. Plugs 
Spaced ¾” Apart, Circa 1936 
(Reprinted, by permission of C. Bliley, from 
Bliley Electric Catalog G-9, 1936, ©2009, 
C. Bliley, Bliley.net/XTAL) 
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6.5  Radio amateurs and the rise of dedicated QCU manufacturers 
In 1926, American amateur radio was already well over a decade old, with the 
American Radio Relay League (ARRL), the premier organization for amateur radio 
operators, having been established in 1914.309  The number of licensed operators had 
since grown to over 15,000.  In 1926, the number of U.S. licensed broadcast stations was 
just over 600.310  Thus, the potential amateur market for quartz plates was roughly 
twenty-five times that of the broadcast market, and growing.  Yet amateurs were slow to 
purchase manufactured plates.  The prevailing ethic among amateurs of the time was 
experimentation and do-it-yourself.  When faced with the option of purchasing a ready-
made plate or making one’s own, many amateurs opted for the latter, not the least reason 
for which was the high cost of early quartz plates (as high as $50 for a crystal ground to 
within +/- 0.1% of a specified frequency) and the limited budgets of most amateurs.311 
 Adventurous amateurs were aided in making their own plates by a number of 
articles appearing in amateur-focused magazines.  These articles showed how to cut and 
finish a crystal plate, how to construct a crystal holder, and how to design and build 
crystal-controlled transmitter circuits.312  But GR guessed that not all amateurs were 
patient enough to build their own plates from scratch.  For these users, GR began offering 
in 1926 quartz plates ground to approximate frequencies in the 160 meter (1715-2000 
                                                 
309 American Radio Relay League Home Page, (Accessed 10 June 2007) available from 
http://www.arrl.org/aarrl.html; Internet. 
310 ———, "The Influence of Amateur Radio on the Development of the Commercial Market for Quartz 
Piezoelectric Resonators in the United States" (Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Frequency Control 
Symposium, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Forth Monmouth, NJ, 5-7 June 1996), 58-65. 
311 General Radio Company. "Catalog E." (Cambridge, MA, 1928), Available at 
http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/, Accessed 14 August 2006. 
312 Patrick R. J. Brown, "The Influence of Amateur Radio on the Development of the Commercial Market 
for Quartz Piezoelectric Resonators in the United States" (Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Frequency 
Control Symposium, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Forth Monmouth, NJ, 5-7 June 1996), 58-65. 
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kHz) amateur band.  At $15 each, the GR Type 276-A quartz plate was not ready to 
use.313  The amateur still had to mount the plate in a suitable holder.  Nevertheless, the 
purchase of a pre-ground plate saved the amateur the considerable hassle of cutting and 
grinding his or her own plate from a chunk of raw quartz.   
 General Radio found a sizeable and growing market among amateurs for pre-
ground quartz plates.  It had this market to itself for a few years, but in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s numerous specialty firms formed to meet the growing demand for 
inexpensive quartz crystal units (QCU’s), as quartz plates had come to be called.  These 
firms were scattered throughout the country, and many of them were started by 
entrepreneurial radio amateurs grinding crystals for their friends.  Among the more 
successful of these firms were A.E. Miller Laboratories (est. 1928), Monitor Piezo 
Company (est. 1928), Bliley Electric (est. 1930), Valpey-Fisher (est. 1931), and Standard 
Piezo Company (est. 1938), most of which remain in business in the early 21st century.314   
Among the most successful of the dedicated QCU manufacturers was Bliley 
Electric, established in 1930 by F. Dawson Bliley, himself an amateur radio operator.315  
Though the U.S. had just entered the most severe economic depression in its history, 
amateurs still wanted crystals, and often more than one.  In contrast to broadcast stations, 
amateur operators were not limited to only one transmitter frequency.  Thus, the more 
                                                 
313 "Quartz Plates Available to Amateurs," The General Radio Experimenter 1, no. 3 (December 1926). 
314 ———, "The Influence of Amateur Radio on the Development of the Commercial Market for Quartz 
Piezoelectric Resonators in the United States" (Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Frequency Control 
Symposium, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Forth Monmouth, NJ, 5-7 June 1996), 58-65.  Also, see 
Chapter 4 of Richard J. Thompson Jr., Crystal Clear: The Struggle for Reliable Communications 
Technology in World War 2 (New York: Wiley-IEEE Press, 2006).  According to company websites, Bliley 
Electric and Valpey Fisher are still in business today.  Standard Piezo is now Hoffman Materials, and 
Monitor Piezo was purchased in 2002 by MMD Components.  No current information can be found on 
A.E. Miller Laboratories. 
315 Charles A. Bliley, The Bliley Electric Company: The Early Years 1930-1955 (2001). [Web site] 
(Accessed 28 May 2007) available from http://www.bliley.net/XTAL/; Internet. 
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experience an amateur had, the more crystals he or she was likely to own.  A Bliley 
survey of amateur operators in 1936 indicated that most amateurs owned between three 
and five QCU’s.316   
Through the early 1930s, Bliley’s business thrived, and in 1935 the company 
hired a staff engineer by the name of John Martin Wolfskill.  A former BTL engineer 
who had been laid off as the Depression worsened, Wolfskill was already familiar with 
QCU design when he came to work for Bliley.317  Over the next several years, this 
talented and creative engineer invented a number of devices and techniques that would 
come to strongly influence the art of QCU design and manufacture.  Most of these 
inventions aimed at either giving amateurs more value for their money or at economizing 
the QCU production process.  Thus, it is easy to see why organizations not focused on the 
budget-minded amateur market – the Bureau of Standards, the Naval Research 
Laboratory, or Bell Telephone Laboratories – failed to innovate in these areas.   
Perhaps Wolfskill’s single most influential invention was the overtone crystal, so 
named because it was cut in such a way that the crystal could be operated at an overtone 
or harmonic of its fundamental frequency.318  This permitted operation of the QCU in the 
then-popular 20 meter (~15 MHz) amateur band without the need for a costly and 
cumbersome frequency doubler or multiplier.  The commercial value of this patent was 
suggested by an interference suit that R.C.A. filed against Wolfskill.319  The suit was 
                                                 
316 ———, A Survey of the Use of Quartz Crystals in the Amateur Radio Service, Produced July 1936 by 
The Bliley Electric Company. (Accessed 28 May 2007) available from http://www.bliley.net/XTAL/; 
Internet. 
317 Sallie Wolfskill Smith, The Life of John Martin Wolfskill (2002). [Web site] (Accessed 28 May 2007) 
available from http://www.bliley.net/XTAL/; Internet. 
318 John M. Wolfskill, Piezoelectric Crystal, U.S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,157,808, Filing Date: 27 
August 1935; Issue Date: 9 May 1939. 
319 Sallie Wolfskill Smith, The Life of John Martin Wolfskill (2002). [Web site] (Accessed 28 May 2007) 
available from http://www.bliley.net/XTAL/; Internet. 
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eventually decided in Wolfskill’s favor, but the issuing of the patent was delayed by at 
least two years.   
Among other of Wolfskill’s inventions was a series of variable frequency QCU’s, 
which allowed the user to combine crystal-controlled precision with the freedom to vary 
the unit’s natural frequency over a pre-determined range.320  These units showed some 
commercial promise in the late 1930s, but failed to take hold within the amateur market 
before the onset of World War II.  After the war, single-frequency surplus military 
QCU’s glutted the amateur market, effectively dooming Bliley’s variable frequency 
QCU. 
 One other Wolfskill invention, the acid etch-to-frequency process for setting a 
quartz crystal wafer to a specified frequency, achieved widespread use during the Second 
World War.321  Referred to by Bliley in late 1930s marketing campaigns as the 
mysterious-sounding “X-Lap” process, the company attributed the high reliability, long 
life, and high accuracy of its QCU’s to the etch-to-frequency process.  But the process 
had another very practical benefit for the company.  It reduced the number of persons 
hired to hand polish, or lap, quartz plates, thereby reducing Bliley’s labor costs.  
Wolfskill was working within a highly competitive, relatively high volume, and budget-
minded industry – providing affordable QCU’s to tens of thousands of amateur radio 
operators.  The pressures to economize acting upon Wolfskill created a favorable 
environment under which labor-saving techniques were likely to develop.  Talented 
                                                 
320 See U.S. patents (2,079,540), (2,224,700), (2,240,449), and (2,240,450).   
321 John M. Wolfskill, Piezoelectric Crystal Apparatus, U.S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,364,501, Filing 
Date: 4 April 1941; Issue Date: 5 December 1944.  The use of this patent during World War II is discussed 
further in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
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engineers such as Wolfskill were perfectly positioned to respond creatively to these 
pressures. 
 The experience of Bliley Electric in the 1930s shows that invention and 
innovation in the quartz crystal industry was not limited to government laboratories or 
lavishly funded industrial R&D labs.  Important innovation occurred among small 
producers catering to the amateur radio market.  Not surprisingly, however, innovation 
also occurred in large R&D labs, most notably AT&T’s Bell Telephone Laboratories 
(BTL).  Toward the end of the 1920s, BTL engineers began experimenting with a new 
quartz application – wave filters – that by the 1940s would come to consume nearly as 
much raw quartz as all other piezoelectric quartz applications combined. 
 
6.6  Walter Cady’s invention of the narrowband quartz wave filter 
To appreciate the use of quartz in electric wave filters, it is necessary to first give 
a brief and highly simplified introduction to wave filter technology.  Electric wave filters 
are two-port, frequency-selective electrical circuits.  One port is referred to as the input 
port; the other is the output port.  If a complex electrical signal containing multiple 
frequencies is applied to the input port, then the signal available at the output port is a 
filtered version of the original signal.  That is, the frequency content of the output signal 
will generally be more restricted than that of the input signal.  A common example is the 
use of a low-pass filter (i.e., a filter that passes low frequencies while blocking high 
frequencies) to remove the high-frequency hiss produced by magnetic audio cassette 
tapes, as illustrated later in Figure 33.  Another common example is the bandpass filter, 
shown earlier in Figure 29, which passes frequencies lying in a given band but blocks all 
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frequencies lower and higher than this band.  In general, the band of frequencies passed 
by a wave filter is referred to as the passband, while the band or bands of frequencies 
blocked by a filter are known as stopbands.   
Before the invention of the quartz wave filter, most electric wave filters were 
constructed using only capacitors (a.k.a. condensers) and inductors (a.k.a. coils).  As 
shorthand, electrical engineers represented a capacitor with the letter “C” and an inductor 
with the letter “L.”  Thus, these filters were known as L-C filters.  For many applications, 
L-C filters worked well, but the physical limitations of inductor construction made it very 
difficult for engineers to design and build filters exhibiting sharp transitions between the 
passband and stopband.  Wave filters constructed with quartz crystals promised to 
remove this difficulty. 
 Walter Cady was the first, in 1920, to conceive of using piezoelectric crystals as 
wave filters.  In his patent application for the piezo-electric resonator, he suggested that it 
could be used “for such purposes as coupling one high frequency circuit to another, in 
order to transmit energy from one to the other circuit at a certain particular frequency.”322  
A year later, in a presentation before the New York meeting of the Institute of Radio 
Engineers (I.R.E.), Cady referred to this application as a “tuned mechanical coupling 
between two circuits.”323  Radio engineers of Cady’s time referred to this use as a “single 
signal” filter.324  Today’s engineers would use the term narrowband filter, meaning that it 
passes only a very narrow range of signal frequencies while blocking all others, as shown 
                                                 
322 Walter Guyton Cady, Piezo Electric Resonator, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,450,246, Filing Date: 
28 January 1920; Issue Date: 3 April 1923. 
323 ———, "The piezo-electric resonator," Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio Engineers 10, no. 2 
(April 1922): 83-114. 
324 Bliley Electric Company, General Catalog G9 (1939). [JPEG File] (Bliley Electric Company, Accessed 
28 May 2007) available from http://www.bliley.net/XTAL/; Internet. 
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in Figures 24-26.  The degree to which a bandpass filter selects out one frequency while 
rejecting others (i.e., its frequency selectivity) is measured by a parameter known as the 
quality factor, or Q.  While the filters in Figures 24-26 have Q values of 1, 10, and 100 
respectively, the Q of a quartz crystal wave filter can be one million or higher.  Such a 
highly selective bandpass filter had some uses (e.g., as a “single signal” intermediate 
frequency filter in a super-heterodyne radio receiver) in the 1920s, but most applications 
required filters having a wider bandwidth.  Even so, Cady’s idea was intriguing, for if the 
bandwidth of the quartz filter could somehow be widened while still preserving sharp 
frequency cutoffs, the potential uses would be many.   
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Figure 24: Narrowband Filter: Resonant Frequency 
= 10 kHz, Quality Factor = 1 
(Figure created by author.) 
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Resonant Narrowband Filter with Q=10
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Figure 25: Narrowband Filter: Resonant Frequency 
= 10 kHz, Quality Factor = 10 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
Resonant Narrowband Filter with Q=100
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Figure 26: Narrowband Filter: Resonant Frequency 
= 10 kHz, Quality Factor = 100 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
6.7  Bell Telephone Labs (BTL) engineers develop the wideband quartz wave filter 
 The value of bandpass wave filters with extremely sharp cutoffs was well-known 
to Bell System engineers in the 1920s.  During World War I, AT&T had developed the 
concept of the carrier multiplex telephony system, in which multiple and independent 
telephone messages were sent simultaneously over a single wire or cable.  The system 
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worked as follows.  At the transmitting end of a cable, a number of messages (e.g., 
conversations, music, data, etc.) were brought together and each message assigned its 
own communications channel.  To be placed on its channel, a particular message was 
used to modulate that channel’s carrier frequency (e.g., 60 kHz).  The channel’s carrier 
frequency was designated as such because it, in a sense, carried its message safely to the 
reception end of the cable.  To prevent crosstalk between adjacent channels, each channel 
was separated in frequency from its two neighbors by a guard band, as illustrated in 
Figure 27, where a message bandwidth of 3.2 kHz and a guard bandwidth of 0.8 kHz 
(i.e., 0.4 kHz on either side of the message band) have been assumed.  This method of 
bringing multiple messages together, assigning each its own carrier frequency, and 
placing them all on a common transmission medium is today called frequency division 
multiplexing (FDM).325  In theory, this method was identical to the way that broadcast 
radio stations came to be allocated in the radio spectrum, the only difference being the 
transmission medium.  In radio, the medium was free space; in multiplex telephony, the 
medium was an electric wire or cable. 
 
 
                                                 
325 Dennis Roddy and John Coolen, Electronic Communications, Third ed. (Reston, VA: Reston Publishing 
Company, 1984), 311-13. 
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Figure 27: Frequency Division Multiplexed Telephony Signal 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 
At the receiving end of the transmission cable, the composite FDM signal, 
comprised of many message channels, was de-multiplexed.  That is, each channel was 
separated out from the composite signal so that it could be received and listened to 
independently of the others.  The crucial component that performed this separating 
function was the bandpass filter.  If this filter exhibited a gradual transition from 
passband to stopband, as illustrated in Figure 28, valuable bandwidth was wasted because 
the width of the guard band between adjacent channels had to increase in order to prevent 
crosstalk.  Such was the case with most L-C filters.  By contrast, sharp transitions 
between the passband and stopband, as illustrated in Figure 29, conserved bandwidth by 
permitting narrower guard bands.  Consequently, channels could be packed more tightly 
together, allowing more simultaneous telephone conversations to be transmitted over a 
given spectral band.  Herein lay the value of the quartz wave filter for AT&T.  By 
making possible the design of sharp cutoff bandpass filters, this small, inconspicuous 
device had the power to significantly increase the capacity, and hence lower the cost, of 
the company’s long-distance telephony service. 
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Figure 28: Frequency Response of a Gradual-Cutoff 
Wideband Filter Not Employing Quartz Crystal 
Wave Filters 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
Wideband Filter with Sharp Cutoff
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Figure 29: Frequency Response of a Sharp-Cutoff 
Wideband Filter Employing Quartz Crystal Wave 
Filters 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 
 AT&T built the first successful carrier multiplex system between Pittsburgh and 
Baltimore during the First World War.326  It employed open wire transmission lines, 
                                                 
326 E. H. Colpitts and O. B. Blackwell, "Carrier Current Telephony and Telegraphy," Transactions of the 
American Institute of Electrical Engineering  (1921): 205-300. 
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which could accommodate up to four simultaneous voice channels.327  Prior to this 
development, long-distance telephony had been, in many cases, prohibitively expensive, 
as each long-distance telephone call had to reserve an entire transmission line to itself for 
the duration of the call.  The development of carrier multiplex telephony made long-
distance service more economical, but AT&T’s long-distance capacity was still quite 
limited. 
In the 1920s, AT&T engineers began investigating technical strategies for 
increasing the capacity of its long-distance transmission lines beyond three or four voice 
channels.  Engineers faced two major technical hurdles.  First, they needed to find a 
higher bandwidth and more electrically secure replacement for open wire transmission 
lines, which exhibited moderate bandwidth and were susceptible to electrical 
interference.  Second, engineers had to develop means for more efficiently using the 
spectrum available on their transmission lines; in others words, they had to find a way to 
more tightly pack voice channels into the available bandwidth.  One means for achieving 
this was to employ bandpass wave filters having very sharp cutoffs.  At the time, 
however, no one knew how physically to realize such filters. 
 In 1927, two men, one working for AT&T and the other for R.C.A., 
independently developed bandpass wave filter circuits having very sharp cutoffs similar 
to those shown in Figure 29.  Lloyd Espenschied of AT&T developed circuits employing 
multiple quartz crystals as well as standard capacitors and inductors, as shown in Figure 
30.  These circuits exhibited much wider bandwidths than those of Cady and were thus 
                                                 
327 Lloyd Espenschied and Herman A. Affel, Concentric Conducting System, U. S. Patent Office, Patent 
No. 1,835,031, Filing Date: 23 May 1929; Issue Date: 8 December 1931.  See lines 36-59. 
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more practical for telephony circuits.328  Clarence Hansell of R.C.A. had a different idea.  
Working in the context of radio rather than telephony, Hansell placed several quartz 
crystals in parallel, as illustrated in Figure 31, each crystal having slightly different 
natural frequencies, such that the total effect was that a range of frequencies were passed 
rather than a single frequency.329  Whether used in telephony or in radio, these quartz 
filters helped to increase the message capacity of transmission media.  Though the 
transmission media differed in the two cases, both systems employed FDM to 
simultaneously transmit multiple messages. 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Bandpass Wave Filter Circuit 
Employing Quartz Crystals (PE), 
Inductors (L), and Capacitors (C) 
(Source: Lloyd Espenschied, U.S. Patent 1,795,204; 
“Electric Wave Filter”; March 3, 1931.) 
 
 
 
                                                 
328 Lloyd Espenschied, Electrical Wave Filter, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,795,204, Filing Date: 3 
January 1927; Issue Date: 3 March 1931. 
329 Clarence W. Hansell, Filter, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,005,083, Filing Date: 7 July 1927; Issue 
Date: 18 June 1935. 
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Figure 31: Bandpass Wave Filter Circuit 
Employing 3 Parallel Quartz Crystals, 
Each Having Slightly Different Natural 
Frequencies 
(Source: Clarence W. Hansell, U.S. Patent 2,005,083; 
“Filter”; June 18, 1935.) 
 
 
 The work of these two men showed that their employers – AT&T and R.C.A. – 
were investing significant R&D dollars into quartz crystal.  In fact, AT&T had begun 
investing in quartz and other piezoelectric crystals just after World War I, when 
Alexander Nicolson developed his pioneering Rochelle Salt devices.  By the early 1920s, 
Bell Labs had established an independent department dedicated to piezoelectric 
research.330  The early interest of these two firms in quartz crystal was tied to their heavy 
investments in broadcast radio, as shown in Chapter 4.  But AT&T sensed that quartz 
might also prove of value to its telephony business.  Thus, when AT&T withdrew from 
the broadcast radio business in 1926, the company continued its R&D investment in 
piezoelectric materials.   
 
 
                                                 
330 Virgil E. Bottom, "A History of the Quartz Crystal Industry in the USA" (Proceedings of the 35th 
Annual Frequency Control Symposium, Philadelphia, PA, 27-29 May 1981), 3-12. 
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6.8  BTL engineers fundamentally advance quartz crystal engineering knowledge 
Over the next decade and a half, numerous Bell Labs researchers made important 
contributions to quartz crystal technology.  Warren P. Mason developed high-pass and 
low-pass quartz wave filters, whose frequency responses are shown in Figures 32 and 33, 
adding flexibility to the company’s multiplex carrier telephony systems.331  The 
company’s quartz innovations also influenced applications other than telephony.  For 
example, researcher George Thurston tackled the problem of quartz crystal units (QCU’s) 
changing their frequency as they were shipped from factory to place of installation.  This 
problem stemmed from the fact that a QCU’s frequency was partly a function of the 
electrical coupling between the crystal and the electric circuit in which it was used.  This 
coupling was governed largely by the QCU’s mounting mechanism.  If the crystal shifted 
in its mounting while being transported, its frequency would change.  Thurston developed 
a shock-resistant crystal mounting, shown in Figure 34, in which the crystal plate was 
firmly clamped along its edges.332  This mounting turned out to be effective enough to 
allow QCU’s to be used for the first time in high-vibration environments such as 
airplanes.333  Consequently, Thurston’s invention proved enormously important to the 
nascent commercial airline industry.   
 
                                                 
331 W. P. Mason, Wave Filter, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,921,035, Filing Date: 30 September 1931; 
Issue Date: 8 August 1933. 
332 George M. Thurston, Piezo-Electric Crystal Mounting, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,883,111, Filing 
Date: 14 August 1929; Issue Date: 18 October 1932. 
333 Raymond A. Heising, ed., Quartz Crystals for Electrical Circuits, Their Design and Manufacture (New 
York: Van Nostrand Company, 1946), 5. 
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Figure 32: Frequency Response of a Sharp-Cutoff 
High-Pass Filter Employing a Quartz Crystal Wave 
Filter 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 
Low Pass Filter With Sharp Cutoff
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Figure 33: Frequency Response of a Sharp-Cutoff 
Low-Pass Filter Employing a Quartz Crystal Wave 
Filter 
(Figure created by author.) 
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Figure 34: Piezo-Electric Shock-Resistant Crystal Mounting, Top View 
(L) and Side View (R) 
(The circular crystal (4) is clamped at its edges by conducting electrodes 1 and 5.  
Electrodes do not make physical contact with crystal other than at its edges.  The 
pressure of clamping is set by spring retainer (6) and screw (7). Source: George M. 
Thurston, U.S. Patent 1,883,111, “Piezo-Electric Crystal Mounting,” October 18, 
1932.)  
 
 
 
Probably the single most consequential Bell Labs quartz breakthrough of the 
1920s occurred in 1928.  Engineer Warren Marrison was drawn to the problem of a 
quartz crystal wafer’s temperature coefficient of frequency.  Measured in Hertz per 
degree Celsius, the temperature coefficient of frequency quantitatively characterized the 
drifting of a quartz wafer’s natural resonant frequency as its ambient temperature 
changed.  Because of this drift, applications requiring highly stable frequencies, such as 
broadcast radio, required that the QCU controlling the frequency be placed in a costly 
thermostatic temperature control chamber.  If a wafer’s temperature coefficient of 
frequency could somehow be made very close to zero, then the need for such a chamber 
would diminish.  This would have the effect of both lowering the cost and increasing the 
mobility of crystal-controlled radio transmitters.  Marrison found that he could do 
precisely this by cutting crystal wafers from a raw quartz slab in a way that achieved 
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certain angles with respect to the quartz slab’s intrinsic crystal lattice orientation.334  
Furthering Marrison’s research, several researchers, including Raymond Heising, F. R. 
Lack, G. W. Willard, I. E. Fair, Roger Sykes, and Warren Mason developed new crystal 
orientations, or “cuts,” throughout the 1930s that progressively lowered crystal wafer 
temperature coefficients.335  This line of research culminated in 1940 with the 
development of the GT-cut crystal, a zero-temperature coefficient cut which altogether 
eliminated the need for thermostatic temperature control of QCU’s.336   
AT&T’s focused piezoelectric quartz research efforts thus yielded tremendous 
returns.  More than any other single organization, AT&T, and specifically its Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, advanced the art of piezoelectric quartz technology during the 
interwar years.  One major reason for this is that few, if any, organizations had either an 
R&D budget or a cadre of scientific and technical personnel equal to those of AT&T 
during these years.  As Lillian Hoddeson and Michael Riordan have noted, “nothing on 
the scientific landscape at the time compared with Bell Labs.  It combined intellectual 
power equal to that of the nation’s best science departments with technical resources and 
manpower that none of them could come close to matching.”337  While Hoddeson and 
Riordan were speaking specifically of the late 1940s, their characterization also applies in 
                                                 
334 Warren A. Marrison, Piezo Electric Crystal, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,899,163, Filing Date: 19 
December 1928; Issue Date: 28 February 1933.  This method of cutting quartz wafers was used in the 
construction of the primary frequency standard that Bell Labs developed for the Bureau of Standards.  See 
Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  See also Marrison patents 1,907,425-1,907,426. 
335 Raymond A. Heising, Piezo-electric Crystals having low temperature coefficients of frequency, U. S. 
Patent Office, Patent No. 1,958,620, Filing Date: 2 April 1929; Issue Date: 15 May 1934.  F. R. Lack, G. 
W. Willard, and I. E. Fair, "Some Improvements in Quartz Crystal Circuit Elements," Bell System 
Technical Journal 13 (1934): 453-63.  W. P. Mason and R. A. Sykes, Piezoelectric Apparatus, U. S. Patent 
Office, Patent No. 2,173,589, Filing Date: 14 December 1933; Issue Date: 19 September 1939. 
336 W. P. Mason, "New Quartz Crystal Plate, Designated the GT, Which Produces a Very Constant 
Frequency Over a Wide Temperature Range," Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio Engineers 28 (May 
1940): 220-23. 
337 Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age, First ed., Sloan 
Technology Series (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 280. 
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large extent to the 1930s.  AT&T’s “lucrative monopoly on the nation’s telephone 
services,” which was in place by the second decade of the 20th century, was largely 
responsible for the generous funding received by BTL.338   
Yet, just as important as AT&T’s unparalleled resources was its commercial 
motivation to develop quartz technology.  BTL engineers found an application of quartz 
wave filters that contributed directly to expanding the capacity of AT&T’s long-distance 
telephony system.  Other firms, such as G.E., Dupont, and Westinghouse, had scientific 
and technical resources that, while not equal to those of AT&T, were formidable 
nonetheless.  Yet none of these firms had a similar commercial motivation for developing 
quartz technology.339  Furthermore, in conducting its quartz research, Bell Labs 
succeeded in converting the fruits of fundamental scientific research into technological 
development and the expansion of AT&T’s telephony network.  The design and 
development of quartz wave filters exemplified this conversion process.  Other firms of 
the time, such as Westinghouse, were less successful in linking fundamental and applied 
scientific research.340 
 
 
 
                                                 
338 Ibid., 281. 
339 General Electric began large-scale production of QCU’s in 1935.  As most of these were likely used for 
frequency stability in radio transmitters, an application that was fairly mature by this time, quartz 
innovation was not as strong at G.E. as at Bell Labs.  Source: Virgil E. Bottom, "A History of the Quartz 
Crystal Industry in the USA" (Proceedings of the 35th Annual Frequency Control Symposium, 
Philadelphia, PA, 27-29 May 1981), 3-12. 
340 See Leonard Reich, The Making of American Industrial Research: Science and Business at G.E. and 
Bell, 1876-1926 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).  On research and development at 
Westinghouse during the interwar period, see Thomas C. Lassman, "Industrial Research Transformed: 
Edward Condon at the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, 1935-1942," Technology and 
Culture 44, no. 2 (April 2003): 306-39. 
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6.9  AT&T deploys high-capacity multiplex carrier telephony infrastructure 
 After its invention by Espenschied and Hansell, the quartz crystal wave filter 
languished for roughly a decade before AT&T integrated it into its existing multiplex 
carrier telephony system.  In order to fully exploit the gains in capacity made possible by 
the filters, AT&T needed to develop transmission lines of higher bandwidth and more 
electrical security.  The approach upon which the company placed its money and hopes 
was a new transmission system, patented by Espenschied and Herman Affel in 1931, that 
featured coaxial cable.341  The bandwidth of coaxial cable was, at minimum, many 
Megahertz (i.e., thousands of kilohertz), ensuring that hundreds of simultaneous voice 
channels could be transmitted.  Furthermore, coaxial cable carried the added advantage of 
being immune to ambient electrical interference. 
The combination of quartz crystal wave filters and coaxial cables promised to 
make high-capacity multiplex carrier telephony a commercial reality for AT&T.  But it 
took several years before practical systems could be built and operated.  In the meantime, 
quartz wave filter technology found its way into the amateur radio community.  In 1932, 
an article appeared in QST magazine written by James Lamb, the magazine’s technical 
editor.342  This article described how to use a highly frequency-selective quartz wave 
filter in the intermediate frequency (IF) stage of a super-heterodyne receiver.  Serving as 
a narrowband wave filter, the quartz device allowed the receiver to pick up only one 
coded station (i.e., the signal was in Morse code rather than voice) at a time and to filter 
out all others.  In 1934, Bliley Electric began offering its BC3-SSF 525 kHz single signal 
                                                 
341 Lloyd Espenschied and Herman A. Affel, Concentric Conducting System, U. S. Patent Office, Patent 
No. 1,835,031, Filing Date: 23 May 1929; Issue Date: 8 December 1931. 
342 James J. Lamb, "Short-Wave Receiver Selectivity to Match Present Conditions: Constructional and 
Operating Features of the Signel-Signal Superhet," QST 16, no. 8 (1932). 
 207 
filter for $5.90, allowing average amateurs to replicate Lamb’s receiver design.343  The 
BC3 was a success, leading many amateurs to use quartz crystals not only in their 
transmitters, but also in their receivers. 
As AT&T engineers continued developing multiplex carrier telephony in the 
1930s, they realized that, in addition to using quartz wave filters on the reception end of 
the transmission system, it would be necessary to use highly-stable quartz oscillators, 
identical to the ones used in broadcast radio transmitters, for generating the high-
frequency carrier waves at the transmitting end of the system.  Throughout the 1930s, 
AT&T conducted experimental trials with the new system, including a highly publicized 
trial linking the cities of New York and Philadelphia in 1936.  This system, employing 
coaxial cable as well as quartz filters at both transmission and reception ends, proved 
capable of transmitting 240 simultaneous telephone conversations.344   
Bolstered by the success of the New York-Philadelphia trial, AT&T proceeded to 
implement multiplex carrier telephony on a massive scale.  In 1938, Western Electric 
(W.E.) began the full-scale manufacture of twelve different quartz wave filter designs.345  
These filters were used to construct channel banks, systems for multiplexing twelve voice 
channels and using them to modulate carrier frequencies.  Tens of thousands of such 
channel banks were installed throughout the Bell system to bring long-distance multiplex 
carrier telephony online.  W.E.’s quartz wave filters did not employ QCU’s as used in 
piezo-oscillators and AFCU’s.  One reason for this was that there would have been little 
point in providing a standardized plug-in connection for the filter’s crystals.  Wave filters 
                                                 
343 November 20, 1934 Bliley Electric Company catalog.  http://www.bliley.net/XTAL  
344 "Radio Progress during 1936: Part IV – Report by the Technical Committee on Television and 
Facsimile," Proceedings of the Institute of Radio Engineers 25, no. 2 (February 1937): 203-4. 
345 Thomas H. Simmonds Jr., "The Evolution of the Discrete Crystal Single-Sideband Selection Filter in the 
Bell System," Proceedings of the IEEE 67, no. 1 (January 1979): 109-14. 
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were installed in channel banks and placed in operation in the field.  The units were 
designed to be very low maintenance.  Barring a malfunction, there would have been no 
need to insert new crystals having different natural frequencies.  Another reason why 
W.E.’s wave filters didn’t employ QCU’s was the degree of vertical integration that the 
company employed.  With the exception of the mining of raw materials, W.E. built 
everything in its system, from the channel bank down to the quartz wafers used in the 
wave filters.  There was no incentive for the company to use QCU’s whose plug style 
conformed to a de facto industry standard (i.e., General Radio plugs spaced ¼” apart).   
In June 1941, AT&T placed into commercial service a permanent coaxial cable 
telephony service linking Stevens Point, Wisconsin with Minneapolis, Minnesota.  Called 
the type L-1 carrier system, the service was the first of its kind in the United States and 
featured a capacity of 480 simultaneous voice channels.346  The service was quickly 
replicated throughout the U.S.  Such a system would have been inconceivable without 
both highly-stable quartz oscillators and quartz crystal wave filters, which allowed for 
dense packing of voice channels into coaxial cable’s available bandwidth. 
 By the time of America’s entry into World War II, the amount of piezoelectric 
quartz crystal used in AT&T’s telephony system was on par with that used for frequency 
stabilizers in broadcast and amateur radio.  Furthermore, the numbers of quartz wave 
filters produced was approaching parity with the number of quartz oscillators, estimated 
to be 100,000 units in 1939.347  One Bell Labs engineer noted in 1946 that “at the time of 
the entry of this country [U.S.A.] into the war, the use of crystal filters in the telephone 
                                                 
346 K. C. Black, "Stevens Point and Minneapolis Linked by Coaxial System," Bell Laboratories Record  
(January 1942): 127-40. 
347 Virgil E. Bottom, "A History of the Quartz Crystal Industry in the USA" (Proceedings of the 35th 
Annual Frequency Control Symposium, Philadelphia, PA, 27-29 May 1981), 3-12. 
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plant was growing so that the rate of manufacture of quartz plates for the filters was about 
the same as for radio oscillators.”348 
  
6.10  BTL engineers apply quartz crystal technology to precision timekeeping 
 Until the late 1920s, the piezoelectric oscillator’s only applications were 
frequency standards and the precise and stable control of radio transmitter carrier 
frequencies.  But engineers, particularly those at Bell Telephone Laboratories, knew that 
if quartz could be used as a highly precise standard of frequency, then it should 
theoretically be possible to use it also as a highly precise timekeeper.  The fundamental 
unit of frequency, the Hertz, is simply the number of cycles of an oscillatory phenomenon 
per second.  Thus, the piezoelectric oscillator’s ability to hold with remarkable stability to 
one frequency could be exploited to serve as a standard for the fundamental unit of time, 
the second.  When used as a timekeeper, the piezoelectric oscillator would exhibit 
marked advantages over the pendulum clock, heretofore recognized as the most accurate 
and reliable standard of time.  One problem with the pendulum clock was that its period 
(i.e., the time required for one oscillation) was a function of both elevation above sea 
level as well as latitudinal distance from the equator.349  Because of this, the pendulum 
clock had to be re-calibrated every time it was physically moved.  In contrast, the 
piezoelectric oscillator’s period was only a function of the quartz wafer’s physical 
dimensions.  Thus, if the oscillator’s crystal were mounted securely, it was relatively 
mobile. 
                                                 
348 Raymond A. Heising, ed., Quartz Crystals for Electrical Circuits, Their Design and Manufacture (New 
York: Van Nostrand Company, 1946), 5. 
349 Warren A. Marrison, "The Evolution of the Quartz Crystal Clock," The Bell System Technical Journal 
27 (1948): 510-88. 
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 The two inventors of the piezoelectric oscillator, Walter Cady and G. W. Pierce, 
were almost certainly aware of quartz’s timekeeping potential but were stymied from 
realizing it by a technical obstacle.  Quartz crystal wafers cut to practical sizes of 1” or 
less usually resonate at frequencies ranging from several kilohertz to several Megahertz.  
In order to be useful in a clock, however, these high frequencies have to be subdivided 
low enough to drive a mechanism oscillating at 1 Hertz (i.e., one cycle per second).  For 
Cady and Pierce, ways of accomplishing this were neither intuitive nor simple. 
As early as 1924, two researchers at the newly established Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, Warren Marrison and Joseph W. Horton, were just beginning to work in the 
area of quartz-based frequency standards.350  Realizing that a highly accurate and stable 
frequency standard could also serve as a time standard, the two men identified and set out 
to solve the frequency subdivision problem.  By 1927, they had done so.  Their solution 
employed a current-controlled variable low-frequency oscillator, a harmonic generator 
and amplifier, and a temperature-controlled piezoelectric oscillator designed to produce a 
precise 50 kHz output.  These elements were arranged in a feedback control loop, shown 
in Figure 35, such that the piezoelectric oscillator acted to control the frequency of the 
low-frequency oscillator, ensuring that it operated at a pre-determined sub-multiple, 
usually 1/50th, of 50 kHz.  Marrison designed this feedback control circuit, for which he 
filed a patent application in 1927.351   The output of the low-frequency oscillator, 
typically a 1 kHz pure sine wave, was then used to control the speed of a synchronous 
electric motor, which drove the clock’s train of gears.  Marrison and Horton presented 
their results at the 1927 annual meeting of the International Union of Scientific Radio 
                                                 
350 Ibid. ( 
351 ———, Frequency-Control System, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 1,788,533, Filing Date: 28 March 
1927; Issue Date: 13 January 1931. 
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Telegraphy.352  Three years later, in 1930, Marrison disseminated a refined version of his 
and Horton’s work, shown in Figure 36, to a much broader audience by presenting a 
paper before the National Academy of Sciences entitled “The Crystal Clock.”353 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 35: Original Crystal Clock Mechanism, Invented by 
Joseph Horton and Warren Marrison of Bell Telephone 
Laboratories in 1927 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
                                                 
352 Joseph W. Horton and Warren A. Marrison, "Precision Determination of Frequency," Proceedings of the 
Institute of Radio Engineers 16, no. 2 (February 1928): 137-54. 
353 Warren A. Marrison, "The Crystal Clock," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America 16, no. 7 (15 July 1930): 496-507. 
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Figure 36: William Marrison’s Refined 
Crystal Clock, Circa 1930 
(Source: W. A. Marrison, “The Crystal Clock,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, Vol. 16, No. 7.  July 15, 
1930.  Public Domain) 
 
 
6.11  General Radio releases a line of quartz crystal clocks 
Though Horton and Marrison’s ultra-precise clock may have at first seemed little 
more than a scientific curiosity, a variant of it was soon being manufactured and sold on 
the open market.  The clock was not manufactured by AT&T or its manufacturing 
subsidiary, Western Electric, but by the same firm that had first commercialized the 
piezoelectric oscillator.  In its Catalog F, published in 1930, the General Radio Company 
(GR) made available a series of quartz-controlled “syncro-clocks,” shown in Figure 37 
and ranging in price from $160 to $400, not including the quartz plate or special 
amplifiers that were needed to drive the clock.  According to the company’s catalog, 
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syncro-clocks were particularly useful for those wishing to precisely measure short time 
intervals, as might be required in many types of laboratory experiments.   
 
 
 
Figure 37: General Radio Company’s Type 611 Syncro-
Clock, Circa 1935 
(Reprinted, by permission of the General Radio Historical Society, 
from General Radio Company, Catalog H, 1935. 
http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/) 
 
 
The migration of crystal clock technology from BTL to GR was greatly facilitated 
through a single person.  In 1928, Joseph Horton, who had worked for the Bell System 
since 1916, left BTL to become GR’s Chief Engineer.  Horton was originally from 
Ipswich, Massachusetts, located about twenty-five miles northeast of Cambridge, and he 
was a graduate of M.I.T.  Thus, he was returning home by going to work for General 
Radio.354  Horton’s experience with quartz crystals began in the same manner as with 
several other quartz technology pioneers; he had been involved with the World War I 
anti-submarine warfare research in Nahant, Massachusetts.  Because of this experience, 
                                                 
354 James E. Brittain, "Scanning the Past: Joseph Warren Horton," Proceedings of the IEEE 82, no. 9 
(September 1994). 
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Horton was assigned to work on quartz crystal devices when BTL was founded in 1925.  
During the 3 ½ years that Horton and Marrison worked together there, Horton was 
Marrison’s supervisor.355 
In designing the company’s syncro-clocks., Horton managed to avoid patent 
infringement with Marrison’s earlier patent by designing a different circuit, shown in 
Figure 38.  GR’s syncro-clocks were designed to keep true time when driven by a precise 
1 kHz signal; the more accurate and stable this drive signal, the more accurate and stable 
would be the clock’s time.  The 1 kHz drive signal was derived by sending a 100 kHz 
piezoelectric oscillator’s output through two or more multivibrators, each which could 
effectively divide the input frequency by an integer factor of up to ten.356 
 
 
Figure 38: General Radio Company’s Crystal Clock 
Design, Circa 1930 
(Reprinted, by permission of the General Radio Historical Society, 
from General Radio Company, Catalog F, 1930. 
http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/) 
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For those desiring the highest possible standard of precision timekeeping, GR 
offered its C-21-H standard frequency assembly, which included a 1 kHz synchro-clock 
and had a remarkable frequency accuracy of “better than +/-5 parts in 10 million over 
periods of several months.”357  Shown in Figure 39, the C-21-H was the first commercial 
unit that could be used not only as a highly precise primary standard of frequency, but 
also as a crystal-controlled clock of high precision.  At $1860, the unit was relatively 
high-ticket and low-volume, but by 1935, GR had sold more than thirty-eight C-21-H 
units, mostly to large industrial R&D laboratories, observatories, and government 
standards organizations in North America, Europe, and Asia.358 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
357 Ibid. 
358 Ibid. 
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Figure 39: General Radio 
Company’s C-21-H Standard-
Frequency Assembly, Circa 1930 
(Reprinted, by permission of the General 
Radio Historical Society, from General Radio 
Company, Catalog F, 1930. 
http://www.teradyne.com/corp/grhs/) 
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One of GR’s customers for the C-21-H was the U. S. Naval Observatory.  In 
1931, the Observatory, located in Washington, D. C., was concerned with the stability of 
the pendulum clock that it used to control time signals transmitted to vessels at sea.  
Engineers at the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) had convinced the Observatory that it 
could do better than its pendulum clock, which had an estimated deviation from its 
average rate ranging from two to five parts in 100 million over a period of several 
months.359  Captain J. F. Hellweg, Superintendent of the Observatory, stated in a May 7, 
1931 letter to the NRL that it was “the earnest desire of the Observatory to obtain a 
crystal clock at the earliest practicable date.”360  Initially, the NRL agreed to develop and 
construct the desired clock in-house for an estimated cost of $5,000.361  By the summer of 
1933, however, with construction still ongoing, the NRL began lowering expectations for 
the clock.362  It appeared that its final accuracy was going to far fall short of the original 
specifications.  Furthermore, the NRL was working on so many simultaneous projects 
that it was unable to devote the resources necessary to finish the clock on schedule. 
By December of 1933, Captain Hellweg’s patience with the NRL had run out.  On 
the 13th of that month, in a letter to the General Radio Company (GR), he stated, “I 
cannot afford to permit their [i.e., the Naval Research Laboratory’s] procrastination to be 
continued further.”363  He proceeded to inquire as to GR’s ability to construct quickly the 
desired crystal clock, which would need to be considerably more accurate than its 
standard C-21-H.  He inquired the same of Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL).  Both GR 
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and BTL claimed to be capable of constructing the clock to the desired accuracy, but 
BTL was not prepared to deliver the clock to the Observatory within the specified time of 
120 days.  GR, on the other hand, agreed to the strict deadline and was awarded the clock 
contract on January 6, 1934.  By May 1 of that year, the Observatory had received a 
customized GR C-21-H crystal clock and placed it into operation.  Buoyed by this 
success, General Radio continued for years selling its C-21-H crystal clock and primary 
frequency standard to demanding customers throughout the world.  
 
6.12  Other quartz crystal developments (and non-developments) during the 1930s 
As has been suggested by the contents of this chapter thus far, the most 
consequential quartz crystal developments in the late 1920s and 1930s were made by 
small QCU manufacturing firms catering to the amateur market, Bell Telephone 
Laboratories, and the General Radio Company.  Nevertheless, some development did 
occur elsewhere, particularly in the radio broadcast industry and among broadcast 
regulators, such as the Bureau of Standards and the Federal Communications 
Commission (F.C.C.).  Conspicuously absent for most of the 1930s were military use or 
development of resonant quartz crystal technology as well as any effort by the Institute of 
Radio Engineers (I.R.E.) to organize the growing quartz crystal technological 
community. 
Other than the Bell System, comprising AT&T, Western Electric, and BTL, the 
large corporations most actively involved in advancing quartz crystal technology during 
the 1930s were R.C.A. and German radio giant Telefunken.  The patent data presented in 
Chapter 3 shows that these firms developed a substantial number of quartz patents during 
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these years.  Upon closer inspection, almost all of them can be seen to be refinements of 
quartz crystal devices that were already in use in the 1920s.  Among the most common of 
these inventions were improved quartz oscillators and improved crystal holders or 
mountings.  The only fundamentally new patents related to synchronous broadcasting, 
which is discussed below.  The continued involvement of Telefunken in quartz 
technology would come to play an important role in World War II, as discussed in 
Chapter 7. 
Chapter 5 discussed the role of quartz crystal technology in the regulation of 
broadcast radio throughout the 1920s and into the early 1930s.  This was a period of great 
activity in which the level of frequency accuracy and stability available with quartz 
crystal oscillators was improving dramatically every one or two years, requiring 
frequency adherence regulations to be updated often.  General Order No. 116, passed by 
the F.R.C. in 1931 and requiring broadcast stations to stay within 50 Hz of their assigned 
frequencies, held throughout the 1930s.  Thus, there was virtually no regulatory activity 
during the decade related to frequency adherence.  The F.R.C. became the F.C.C. in 
1933, and the Commission continued to compile approved equipment lists containing 
commercial quartz crystal instruments and devices that met federal frequency standards. 
There was, however, one regulatory development occurring during the late 1920s 
and early 1930s that has yet to be mentioned.  Synchronous broadcasting, also known as 
common-frequency broadcasting, was a technique developed in the late 1920s by which 
all stations broadcasting the programming of a particular network (e.g., NBC, CBS) 
would transmit on a single carrier frequency.  If all participating stations adhered to this 
frequency with extreme precision, no heterodyne interference would result and the 
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network’s programming would be available in an unbroken chain across the country.  The 
purpose of the scheme, which was technically impossible before the development of 
thermostatic quartz crystal-controlled transmitters, was to free up the crowded radio 
spectrum and to simplify channel allocation.  Despite receiving the support of many 
prominent radio engineers, including the BOS’s John Dellinger, synchronous 
broadcasting was consistently opposed by the major radio networks because of the 
serious disruption it would cause their existing affiliates.  Thus, while several European 
countries ended up adopting synchronous broadcasting in the 1930s, it was dead in the 
U.S. by 1932.364 
The U.S. military was conspicuously absent from quartz crystal development for 
most of the 1930s.  As Chapters 4 and 5 showed, the U.S. Navy’s Naval Research 
Laboratory (N.R.L.) was very active in quartz crystal patenting in the mid 1920s, and the 
N.R.L. participated in the BOS’s 3 year effort to develop a quartz-based primary 
frequency standard.  By 1930, however, the Navy had decided not to adopt crystal control 
for either its land-based or its fleet radio transmitters.  The decisive factor was the 
uncertain supply of raw quartz crystal imported from Brazil.  Were the U.S. to become 
engaged in another war, the Navy didn’t want to be dependent on Brazil for a vital raw 
material.  An extensive search for domestic quartz deposits was conducted throughout the 
1920s, but no adequate replacement for Brazilian quartz was found.365  Thus, the Navy 
looked to alternate frequency stabilization techniques for its fleet transmitters.366  In the 
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late 1930s, the U.S. Army began investigating quartz crystal technology.  This story is 
told in Chapter 7. 
Also conspicuously absent from quartz crystal developments in the 1930s was the 
Institute of Radio Engineers (I.R.E.), one of two premier professional societies for 
electrical engineers, the other being the American Institute of Electrical Engineers 
(A.I.E.E.).  The organization’s flagship journal, Proceedings of the I.R.E., continued to 
publish articles on the latest quartz crystal devices or techniques.  However, there were 
no formal acts by the Institute in the 1930s to promote quartz technology, as there had 
been by the Committee on Broadcasting in the late 1920s and as there would be in the 
early 1940s as the U.S. entered World War II.  (See Chapter 7.)  Thus, electrical 
engineers interested in quartz crystal technology during the 1930s remained somewhat 
fragmented, bound largely to the firms or organizations for which they worked and with 
little opportunity to network with like-minded engineers across the country. 
 
6.13  Summary and Conclusions  
 The 1930s witnessed dramatic changes in quartz crystal technology, both in the 
size and composition of its technological community as well as in its engineering 
knowledge base.  Before the decade began, a quartz crystal industry catering to the 
frequency control and standardization needs of radio amateurs can hardly be said to have 
existed.  General Radio sold a few quartz products aimed at amateurs, but most amateurs 
made their own crystal resonators.  By the end of the 1930s, a true industry existed, 
comprising scores of specialized QCU firms.  The telephony industry also saw 
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tremendous strides made during the 1930s.  According to data compiled by economic 
historian John Kendrick, between 1929 and 1941 the U.S. telephone industry experienced 
a compound annual average growth rate in multi-factor productivity of 2.01, higher than 
either the period preceding it (1919-1929) or after it (1941-1948).367  As this chapter has 
shown, a large portion of this growth was likely due to AT&T’s development and 
expansion of its multiplex carrier telephony infrastructure, a system that relied heavily on 
quartz crystal wave filters.  By the end of the 1930s, the technological groundwork had 
been laid for the post-war explosion of affordable long-distance telephony.   
The quartz crystal engineering knowledge base was expanded during this decade 
primarily by the Bell Telephone Laboratories, but also by the small QCU manufacturer 
Bliley Electric.  The technical goals driving BTL engineers were to widen the bandwidth 
of quartz wave filters and to make wave filters environmentally robust by neutralizing the 
harmful effects of temperature change and mechanical vibration.  Achievement of the 
first goal allowed AT&T to integrate quartz wave filters into its multiplex carrier 
telephony system, while achievement of the last two goals allowed the company to 
dispense with expensive temperature chambers and elaborate anti-vibration measures.  
The technical goals driving Bliley Electric’s QCU work were to expand the possible 
frequency range of QCU’s, to make them user-tunable within a narrow range around the 
nominal resonant frequency, and to reduce the amount of skilled labor required in QCU 
production.  The first and third goals were lasting additions to quartz crystal engineering 
knowledge, while the second goal was a commercial failure. 
                                                 
367 This data is summarized in Alexander J. Field, "The Most Technologically Progressive Decade of the 
Century," The American Economic Review 93, no. 4 (November 2003): 1399-413.  The corresponding 
number for the period 1919-1929 was 1.60.  For the period 1941-1948, the number was 0.53. 
 223 
 The advances made by BTL and Bliley Electric in the 1930s were made in very 
different economic contexts.  BTL was the research arm for AT&T, a government-
regulated monopoly.  Had the telephone giant been subject to free market competition for 
telephone customers, it is uncertain whether or not it could have supported a world-class 
research and development laboratory.  Within its protected sphere, BTL managers and 
engineers were able to rationally organize a systematic research program aimed at 
making long-distance telephony more accessible and more affordable for the American 
public.  By contrast, Bliley Electric operated in a free market environment that was 
relatively unregulated.  The company, which had many competitors in the QCU business, 
sought to distinguish itself through the high quality of its products and by developing 
innovative variations on the standard QCU.  Also, competitive pressures forced Bliley to 
search for labor-saving production techniques, such as the “X-lap” process.  These 
developments would profoundly influence QCU production during World War II, as 
discussed in Chapter 7.  
  By the end of the 1930s, a sizeable and diverse, though fragmented, quartz 
crystal technological community existed.  This community had created and accumulated 
a great deal of scientific and engineering knowledge pertaining to quartz crystal, and it 
had established the centrality of that knowledge to the two most significant 
communications systems of the day, radio and telephony.  Yet one significant area of 
quartz crystal technology, high-volume fabrication and manufacture, remained relatively 
undeveloped.  Most quartz crystal production remained small-scale and craft-based.  
Chapter 7 recounts the U.S. struggle to achieve mass production of QCU’s during World 
War II. 
 224 
CHAPTER 7: MASS PRODUCTION – THE QUARTZ CRYSTAL UNIT IN WORLD 
WAR II 
 
 
 
Quantity production must rely for its success upon quantity consumption; and nothing 
ensures replacement like organized destruction.  In this sense, war is not only, as it has 
been called, the health of the State: it is the health of the machine, too.368   
 
The army is in fact the ideal form toward which a purely mechanical system of industry 
must tend.369 
Lewis Mumford, Technics and Civilization (1934) 
 
7.1  Introduction 
Some fifteen months before the U.S. entered World War II, one of the great 
discontinuities in the history of quartz crystal technology occurred.  Counter to the U.S. 
Navy’s experience with quartz crystal, the Army Signal Corps chose to officially adopt 
the technique of crystal control for two types of Armored Force mobile radios.  By 
December 1941, this decision had been extended to most of the Army’s mobile radios.  
Each radio set was to be equipped with anywhere from ten up to one hundred QCUs, 
each having a different resonant frequency.  Almost overnight, an enormous new market 
had opened up to QCU manufacturers.  The fifteen or so QCU manufacturers existing 
before the war, which together had never produced more than 100,000 units per year, 
were now swamped with orders that they couldn’t meet.370  In response, the Signal Corps 
formed a Washington-based committee called the Quartz Crystal Section (QCS), whose 
job was “to expedite the production of quartz crystal units to meet the requirements of 
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our Armed Services and those of the Allies.”371  Largely due to the efforts of the QCS, 
roughly one hundred U.S. firms began manufacturing QCU’s, producing at the peak of 
the war some 30 million QCU’s per year.372  Most of these firms, entirely new to the field 
of quartz crystal technology, had to climb a steep learning curve in a very short time. 
The process of ramping up QCU production presented many opportunities for 
disseminating as well as expanding the existing quartz crystal engineering knowledge 
base.  First, there was the difficult problem of standardizing QCU production practices 
across some one-hundred and fifteen manufacturing firms.  Before doing this, however, 
what are now called “best practices” had to be identified and disseminated.  Most of these 
practices related to specialized QCU fabrication methods, such as chemical etching of 
crystal wafers or electrode coating.  Just as important were improvements to the 
procedures for inspecting raw quartz.  Because of the severe shortage of natural quartz 
experienced during the war, raw quartz had to be economized, leading to efficient 
inspection procedures.  Finally, there were the technical problems encountered in mass 
producing an item that had heretofore been produced on a relatively small scale by skilled 
technicians.  The solving of these problems led to a significant growth of quartz crystal 
engineering knowledge, similar to the rapid growth in metallurgical knowledge that 
resulted once the scale of steel production, catalyzed by the introduction of the Bessemer 
and open hearth processes, accelerated in the latter 19th century.373  The rigorous demands 
of mass production tend to expose areas of insufficient technical or scientific knowledge, 
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while simultaneously creating the economic incentive to generate or refine the needed 
knowledge.   
World War II also witnessed a new phase in the growth of the quartz crystal 
technological community.  Many of the hundred-odd firms that began manufacturing 
QCU’s during the war were temporary additions to the community, reverting back to 
their pre-war line of business after the war ended.  Some firms, however, such as 
Motorola, became permanent additions to the community.  In the military, the Army 
Signal Corps Electronics Laboratory (S.C.E.L.), based in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, 
became the epicenter of quartz crystal engineering during the war.  After the war, the 
S.C.E.L. continued to play a very important role in facilitating a broad-based and 
centrally organized quartz crystal research program.  In the private sector, the Institute of 
Radio Engineers (I.R.E.) formed a technical committee dedicated to piezoelectric crystals 
in 1941.  By publishing comprehensive yearly progress reports for the quartz crystal 
field, this committee provided direction and unity to the quartz crystal community.  Also, 
for the first time, members of the community received recognition from the broader 
community of radio engineers.   
The Army Signal Corps’ decision to adopt crystal control on a massive scale 
changed forever the field of quartz crystal technology.  Because of the undisputed success 
of crystal-controlled FM mobile radio on the battlefield, crystal control became a 
permanent feature in the two-way radios that were produced in large numbers for the 
civilian market after the war.  Also, the Corps’ unprecedented demand for high-quality 
raw quartz crystal exposed the greatest weakness in quartz crystal technology – the 
uncertain supply of Brazilian quartz.  After the war, the most active area of quartz 
 227 
research for at least a decade was the chemical synthesis of artificial quartz crystal.  Had 
this research failed, piezoelectric engineers would have had to abandon quartz crystal for 
most applications.  Thus, World War II placed quartz crystal technology in something of 
a crisis state that would remain unresolved until the mid-1950s.   
The economic and technological forces driving quartz crystal technology during 
World War II broke sharply from the forces that had been prevalent during the 1930s.  
For much of that decade, engineers and inventors had advanced quartz crystal technology 
in response to free-market capitalist forces.  The growing markets of radio amateurs and 
long-distance telephone users stimulated talented engineers to innovate in the areas of 
economical QCU design and manufacture, as well as quartz wave filters.  During World 
War II, however, free market forces were replaced by a war economy characterized by 
centralized planning and control.  One market, the market for military QCU’s, now 
prevailed above all others.  Consequently, engineers during the war focused almost 
exclusively on QCU mass production techniques.  Inter-firm competition and the pursuit 
of market share were replaced by cooperation and centralized planning in pursuit of 
Allied victory.  Indeed, this was probably the only way at the time that American industry 
could have produced tens of millions of standardized QCU’s.  In the immediate post-war 
years, the wartime forces driving quartz crystal technology did not disappear.  Rather, 
they persisted as the nation’s scientific and technological communities were permanently 
mobilized in preparation for the Cold War. 
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7.2  The U.S. Army Signal Corps’ decision to adopt crystal control 
 
 Because of the significant historical ramifications of the Army Signal Corps’ 
decision to adopt quartz crystal control, the way in which the decision was made is worth 
a close look.  Before the mid-1930s, both the U.S. Navy and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. 
Army had experimented with crystal-control of radio transmitters.  The Navy saw great 
potential in quartz crystal for providing reliable communication with ships at sea.  
Among the first projects undertaken at the Naval Research Laboratory when it opened in 
1923 was the design and construction of high-powered crystal-controlled radio 
transmitters.  However, primarily because of concerns over Brazil being the only known 
abundant source for natural electronics-grade quartz crystal, the Navy had abandoned 
crystal-control on a large scale by the early 1930s.374  For its part, the Army, in the late 
1920s, included crystal-control in a limited number of transmitting stations built as part 
of the nationwide War Department Radio Net.375  However, the Army couldn’t do much 
more with crystal at this time without using expensive thermostatic temperature 
chambers.   
By the mid-1930s, however, quartz crystal technology had fundamentally 
changed with Bell Labs’ development of the zero temperature coefficient quartz crystal 
plates.376  Prior to this development, quartz plates had to be kept in a controlled 
environment, often by means of a thermostatic temperature chamber, to ensure stable 
operation.  Such elaborate temperature control equipment was impractical for field radio 
units.  Zero temperature coefficient plates, however, enabled the development of mobile 
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crystal-controlled radio sets capable of operating in the harsh environmental conditions 
typical of combat.   
In 1936, attempting to exploit this development, the Signal Corps began 
investigating the possible inclusion of crystal-control in its field radio units.377  
Legislators had recently boosted the budget of the Corps, which had been scraping by on 
scant resources since the end of World War I.378  In February of that year, the Army’s 
Chief Signal Officer, Major General James B. Allison (CSigO from 1935-1937), issued a 
general policy calling for all field radio equipment to be equipped with both master-
oscillator and crystal-control capabilities whenever weight and space limitations 
permitted.379  Master-oscillator operation – then the dominant method of frequency 
selection for radio transmitters required to operate at multiple frequencies – provided 
continuous frequency variation via tuning dials, while crystal control quantized the 
frequency spectrum, limiting communication to a discrete number of pre-determined 
frequencies.  The relative merits and drawbacks of these two techniques soon became the 
topic of vigorous discussions between senior Signal Corps personnel and Signal Corps 
Laboratory engineering staff. 
 One of the first branches of the Army to consider designing crystal-control into its 
radio sets was the Air Corps.  In December 1938, the Sub-Committee of the Air Corps 
Technical Committee thoroughly investigated the possibility of outfitting many of its 
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aircraft with exclusively crystal-controlled radio sets.  Weight and space limitations 
prevented these sets from containing both crystal-control and master-oscillator circuitry.  
The committee eventually decided to adopt crystal-control on a very limited basis, 
agreeing to outfit two types of radio sets with four crystals per set.  The reasoning for 
such a tentative commitment to crystal-control was summarized in a report as follows.  
“Crystal controlled radio equipment is too inflexible to meet war-time demands and even 
if it could be made flexible enough by procurement of sufficient crystals it would be 
exceedingly costly for tactical purposes.”380  This statement contains three important 
objections to the large-scale adoption of exclusive crystal-control.  Each is worth 
examining in detail.   
First, the Air Corps committee criticized crystal-control for its inflexibility.  This 
argument can be intuitively understood by considering that master-oscillator operation 
theoretically provides for infinite frequency flexibility since it permits continuous 
variation over the frequency spectrum, while crystal-control, by breaking the spectrum 
into a discrete number of frequencies, limits communication to these frequencies.  The 
distinction has a couple of important ramifications.  First, consider a master-oscillator 
transmitter that, while attempting to transmit at a carrier frequency of 2400 kHz, 
encounters unintentional interference (i.e., interference not deliberately caused by the 
enemy).  The radio operator can then change the transmitter’s carrier frequency slightly 
to, say, 2405 kHz, which might be enough to escape the harmful interference and allow 
communication to proceed.  On the receiver side, a continuously variable frequency unit 
allows the listener to shift with the transmitter, though the operator must guess in which 
direction to shift frequency.  By contrast, a system in which both transmitter and receiver 
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are crystal-controlled is incapable of side-stepping the interference at 2400 kHz.  The 
only valid option is to change the communications channel altogether.  In summary, a 
master-oscillator system in which both transmitter and receiver are capable of continuous 
frequency variation allows for fine-tuning; a crystal-controlled system does not.  With 
crystal-control, both the transmitter and receiver crystals must be ground to precisely the 
same frequency; there is precious little room for error.  If a receiver’s crystal having a 
nominal frequency of 2400 kHz is actually ground to a frequency of 2399 kHz, while the 
transmitter’s crystal is ground to 2401 kHz, the two units will likely find communicating 
difficult, especially as the distance between them increases.  And, unless these units are 
also equipped with master-oscillator operation that allows for fine tuning, this 
communications channel (2400 kHz) has limited or no utility when interference is 
present.  Some Signal Corps officials, such as Colonel Clyde Eastman, doubted the 
ability of crystal manufacturers to achieve in practice the high level of manufacturing 
precision and accuracy required by crystal-controlled operation.   
The inflexibility of crystal-control is also seen when we consider intentional 
interference, commonly referred to as enemy jamming.  At the time of the Signal Corps 
debates, some argued that crystal-controlled sets would be more susceptible to 
jamming.381  To see this, consider the following two cases.  In the first case, the Air 
Corps chooses to conduct its radio communications in the spectral band covering 2000 to 
3000 kHz with master-oscillator sets.  An enemy wishing to jam the Corps’ 
communications must blanket the entire 2000-3000 kHz band with wideband 
interference.  Such an act would make this radio band just as unusable to the enemy as to 
the Air Corps; thus, though the Corps has lost its communications, the enemy has not 
                                                 
381 “Routing and Work Sheet,” 19 August 1940, Subject “Crystal for Tactical Radio Sets,” Ibid. 
 232 
gained a net advantage.  On the other hand, consider a second case.  The Air Corps uses 
crystal-controlled sets, which effectively subdivide the 2000-3000 kHz band into one 
hundred distinct channels, with adjacent channels separated by 10 kHz.  Furthermore, 
let’s assume that the Corps has purchased aircraft radio sets that can accommodate ten 
crystals at a time.  In other words, at any given time, an operator can select between only 
ten of one hundred total channels.  This is a realistic assumption, since sets that can 
accommodate one hundred crystals would have been far too heavy to place in aircraft.  
(In fact, the greatest number of crystals included in any aircraft radio set during the war 
was seven.)382  In this case, it is theoretically much easier for an enemy to determine 
which 10 channels are in use and to jam them, leaving the rest of the band open for its 
own communications.  The most obvious and direct way for the Air Corps to counter this 
jamming would have been to increase the total width of the communications band and 
hence the total number of channels requiring monitoring by the enemy.  This tactic, 
however, becomes quite costly as the increase in channels means a commensurate 
increase in the number of different crystal plates that must be produced.  Since jamming 
was (and remains today) one of the principal concerns of battlefield communications, this 
argument against crystal-controlled operation was of great concern to the Army.383  
During and after WWII, many other counter-jamming methods, such as spread spectrum 
modulation, were developed.384  But prior to 1942, jamming was a very real vulnerability 
of crystal-controlled communications systems. 
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 The Air Corps’ second criticism of crystal-control was its doubt over the U. S. 
government’s ability to procure a sufficient number of crystals for making crystal-control 
a standard feature in Air Corps radio units.  The issue of the scarcity of electronics-grade 
quartz crystal was not a new one.  The U. S. Navy, after discovering the value of quartz 
for frequency control in the mid-1920s, conducted an extensive search for domestic 
sources of quartz.  Possible sources in Arkansas, Colorado, and California were examined 
but found to be insufficient even for the Navy’s peacetime needs.385  In the late 1920s, the 
Navy concluded that Brazil was the only viable source for large amounts of high-quality 
quartz, leading it to largely abandon crystal-control in favor of master-oscillator 
operation.  Yet crystal-control continued to have supporters, some of who persuaded the 
Naval Research Laboratory to begin research into the artificial production of quartz 
crystals in 1931.386  This research had not yielded any tangible results by the late 1930s, 
leaving Brazil as the only known source of large quantities of electronics-grade quartz 
crystal.  Thus, the Air Corps had every right to question the U.S. government’s ability to 
procure a sufficient quantity of quartz crystals for its radio units, particularly since the 
Air Corps depended upon radio far more than any other individual Corps within the 
Army.387  Though Brazil was at the time a U.S. ally, no one could guarantee that friendly 
trade relations would continue, particularly in time of war. 
                                                                                                                                                 
involved the message signal modulating a pre-determined sequence of rapid carrier frequency hops.  The 
exact sequence was known only by the transmitter and the intended receiver.  No other receiver would be 
able to demodulate the signal. 
385 Box 81, Historical Records of the Naval Research Laboratory, Record Group 19, U.S. National 
Archives, Washington, D.C.  The documents in this box trace the NRL’s search for a domestic supply of 
electronics-grade raw quartz from 1925 to 1928.   
386 C. S. Barrett to the NRL Director, 25 February 1931, Subject “Artificial production of quartz crystals,” 
Folder “S67/40 Quartz Research B,” Box 79, Ibid. 
387 Richard J. Thompson Jr., Crystal Clear: The Struggle for Reliable Communications Technology in 
World War 2 (New York: Wiley-IEEE Press, 2006), 33. 
 234 
 Finally, the Air Corps committee had concerns over the potential cost of 
supplying every aircraft with a set of crystals.  If purchased in very large quantities, the 
per-unit cost of crystal plates could be quite low.  But in the event of a shortage in 
crystals, this cost could escalate quickly.  The bottom line was that crystal cost was an 
unknown quantity, depending upon a very uncertain supply.  By contrast, the cost of 
master-oscillator circuitry was known and depended upon no scarce materials.  Thus, 
master-oscillator designs promised a degree of predictability and reliability not possible 
with crystal designs. 
 Despite the Air Corp’s hesitant stance toward crystal control, the technique was 
enthusiastically endorsed by others.  Perhaps the technology’s most effective advocate at 
this time was the Director of the Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories (S.C.E.L.), 
Roger B. Colton.  Colton, who held electrical engineering degrees from Yale and M.I.T., 
had long been a believer in the strategic value of wireless communications for the armed 
forces.  As SCEL Director, he was in a position to introduce new technologies to the 
forces from time to time.  In October 1939, upon a visit to Fort Knox, Kentucky, 
headquarters of the Mechanized Cavalry Board, Colton oversaw testing of a modified 
SCR-245 radio set that incorporated crystal-control as well as a set utilizing frequency 
modulation (FM), still a relatively new technique at the time.388  Colton had obtained 
both sets with the assistance of Dr. Edwin H. Armstrong, then a professor of electrical 
engineering at New York’s Columbia University and the world-renowned inventor of the 
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regenerative feedback circuit, the superheterodyne radio receiver, and frequency 
modulation.389   
 Armstrong had patented frequency modulation in 1933 and, against the opposition 
of RCA and others with a vested interest in preserving the dominance of AM radio, 
championed its adoption for the remainder of the 1930s.390  Because FM required more 
radio bandwidth than AM, Armstrong was forced to conduct his early experiments in 
what we today call the VHF (Very High Frequency) band, consisting of frequencies 
above 30 MHz.  Practically speaking, the only possible way to achieve the necessary 
frequency stability at these frequencies was through crystal-control.  Thus, FM radio 
transmitters quickly became associated with crystal-control.  Though crystal-control was 
much broader than FM, FM could not exist in practice without crystal-control.  By the 
late 1930s, the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) had reserved the 42-50 MHz 
band for FM broadcasting.391  Thus, the FM radio unit that Armstrong provided Colton in 
1939 likely operated somewhere in this vicinity of the radio spectrum.   
 Upon introducing FM and crystal-control to the Mechanized Cavalry at Fort 
Knox, Colton learned that radio enthusiasts within the Cavalry were already well-
acquainted with these two technologies.392  Apparently, these enthusiasts had recently 
heard of a pioneering radio experiment being conducted by the Connecticut State Police.  
The Link Radio Corporation of New York had begun supplying the department with two-
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way, crystal-controlled FM radio sets for use in an innovative statewide two-way mobile 
radio system.393  The radio sets and the system were the brainchild of Dr. Daniel Noble, a 
professor of electrical engineering at the University of Connecticut.  Noble had been 
keenly interested in FM for several years and had obtained Edwin Armstrong’s approval 
before recommending the statewide system to the Connecticut police.394  The system 
Noble proposed was to be the first practical two-way FM radiotelephone mobile network 
in the world, and it received widespread recognition at the time – so much so, apparently, 
that the Mechanized Cavalry had heard of it.  When contacted by Cavalry radio 
enthusiasts, Link Radio agreed to lend them a few experimental sets similar to the 
Connecticut police units.  The enthusiasts found these new sets so vastly superior to their 
old, master-oscillator AM sets that they didn’t need much persuading by Colton at Fort 
Knox.  In fact, it wasn’t long before the Mechanized Cavalry began requesting of the 
SCL at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey that all future radio set designs contain both crystal-
control and frequency-modulation.395 
 In late 1939 and early 1940, both the Infantry and the Mechanized Cavalry, soon 
to be consolidated as the Armored Force, requested crystal-controlled FM sets for field 
testing.  Having either witnessed firsthand or heard of the Fort Knox demonstration, these 
divisions were anxious to try crystal-control for themselves.  Though there was some 
opposition to one of the requests from within the Signal Corps, Chief Signal Officer 
Joseph Mauborgne (CSigO from 1937-1941) ended up approving both requests.  The new 
                                                 
393 I.E.E.E. History Center: F.M. Police Radio Communication, 1940. [Web site] (Accessed 2 August 
2006) available from http://www.ieee.org/web/aboutus/history_center/police_radio.html; Internet. 
394 Man from Mars Productions, Daniel E. Noble (2006, Accessed) available from 
http://www.wdrcobg.com/noble2.html; Internet. 
395 Signal Corps Director Roger B. Colton to Major David E. Washburn, 13 August 1940, Records of the 
Office of the Chief Signal Officer [Unclassified Central Decimal Files], Record Group 111, U.S. National 
Archives, Washington, D.C. 
 237 
sets would be engineered and produced by the SCEL, but, since this involved 
modification of existing AM sets rather than a complete re-design, the divisions had the 
sets in hand in a matter of weeks.     
The response of the Infantry and Mechanized Cavalry forces to the new crystal-
controlled sets was swift and predictable; they loved them.  As Colton observed this 
response, he became convinced that crystal-control was the way to go, but only if every 
set could be equipped with a full complement of crystals covering all communication 
channels for which that set was designed.  Otherwise, the sets would be hampered by the 
inflexibility that the Air Corps had noted.  This was a bold proposal, as some sets would 
require one hundred or more crystals each.  In January 1940, anticipating the troops’ 
positive response to crystal-control, Colton had ordered the SCL to prepare a detailed 
report comparing master-oscillator to crystal-control for field radio sets.396   
The resulting report highlighted three advantages of crystal-control.  First was its 
superior frequency accuracy, which was estimated to be ten to twenty times that of a 
master-oscillator set.  This allowed there to be no ambiguity as to where a particular 
communication channel would be found in the spectrum.  With master-oscillator sets, a 
certain amount of searching or fine tuning was almost always necessary to locate a 
channel at full-strength.  In the midst of an intense armed conflict, the time spent fine-
tuning could be just the time needed for an enemy to gain the upper hand.  With crystal-
control, instant push-button tuning of transmitters and receivers was possible.  The 
second advantage of crystal-control was a direct consequence of the first.  The superior 
frequency accuracy of crystal-control allowed communications channels to be packed 
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more tightly into a limited portion of the frequency spectrum, making possible an 
increase in the total number of channels.  Because of the built-in ambiguity of a master-
oscillator set’s frequency setting, the minimum acceptable frequency separation between 
adjacent AM voice channels was estimated to be 50 kHz.  By contrast, the report asserted 
that crystal-control allowed channel separation of “as little as 6 kHz,” which, for a given 
frequency spectrum, would allow a crystal-controlled set to have roughly eight times as 
many voice channels as a master-oscillator set.  In reality, this analysis proved to be 
overly optimistic.  Crystal-control did allow for more channels, but only about 2 ½ times 
as many as a master-oscillator system.  Even so, this represented a significantly more 
efficient use of the radio spectrum.  Third, crystal-controlled sets were ready to operate 
immediately upon being powered up while master-oscillator sets required as much as 
twenty minutes of warm-up time before adequate frequency stability was achieved.  The 
latter would work fine for planned maneuvers, but in the event of an enemy surprise 
attack, only crystal-controlled sets would do the job.   
In its summary, the SCL concisely stated the advantages of crystal-control in its 
report as follows.  “Generally speaking, approximately 5 to 10 times as much 
communication, quality and quantity considered, or a corresponding reduction of 
transmission time, can be obtained with crystal-operated field sets as compared to master 
oscillator-operated field sets, but this increase in communication efficiency is not 
obtainable in the field unless an adequate number of crystals is issued with each set.”397 
Colton’s advocacy for crystal-control, though well-considered and based for the 
most part on solid field data and supply estimates, was nevertheless bold and somewhat 
risky.  Those opposing large-scale crystal-control, such as Colonel Clyde L. Eastman, 
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often pointed to the troubles that the Air Corps had experienced since adopting small-
scale crystal-control (four crystals per set) in two of its radio sets.  The Air Corps had 
apparently experienced significant difficulties with the distribution, supply and 
maintenance of quartz crystals.398  Colton, while acknowledging these difficulties, argued 
that they could be overcome and, more importantly, that the radio needs of the new 
Armored Force, combining the Infantry and the Mechanized Cavalry, should be 
considered separate from those of the Air Corps.  He was also highly critical of the Air 
Corp’s meager allocation of four crystals per set, arguing that such sets were 
“substantially useless for military combat purposes, except in very special situations.”399  
Furthermore, he argued that the cost of crystal-controlled sets should be considered only 
in relation to the cost of master-oscillator sets designed for an equivalent number of 
communication channels.  With such a comparison, Colton demonstrated that a one 
hundred channel crystal-controlled set would, at $1600, cost only $300 more than a one 
hundred channel master-oscillator set ($1300).  The added performance gained with 
crystal-control was, he argued, well worth the 23% cost increase.  Finally, Colton noted 
that crystal-controlled sets, because of their push-button operation and their ability to 
operate at a stable frequency immediately upon powering up, would be much easier for 
personnel without special radio training to operate.  As he put it, “If we are trying to get 
practically automatic radio sets at the present time, only crystals fill the bill.”400 
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7.3  Procurement of quartz crystal 
 
 Colton’s arguments for crystal-control were persuasive to Chief Signal Officer 
Mauborgne, but the Air Corp’s chief criticism still worried him.  Before committing to 
Army-wide adoption of crystal-control, Mauborgne insisted that the quartz procurement 
issue be addressed.  In an attempt to do this, Colton organized and convened in August 
1940 two meetings of the Committee for the Procurement of Quartz Crystal, composed of 
representatives from industry and government.  The companies represented were Western 
Electric, Bendix Radio, R.C.A., Bausch & Lomb, and Bliley Electric.  Also present were 
representatives of the Bureau of Mines, the Army Signal Corps, the Navy, the Army and 
Navy Munitions Board, and the Treasury Department’s Procurement Division.401  The 
major outcome of these meetings was the decision to loosen the existing specification 
governing raw quartz crystal purchase and inspection.  The attendees generally agreed 
that the existing spec was considerably stricter than necessary and was thus exacerbating 
the quartz supply problem.  They determined therefore that a more lenient spec, with 
regard to crystal size and the number of natural exposed faces, would allow many 
heretofore rejected crystals to be profitably used.  The new spec allowed for the purchase 
of crystals much smaller than those previously accepted and permitted many crystals with 
just one natural face and some with no faces to pass inspection.  One important aspect of 
the new specification – the definition of the “usability” of a raw quartz sample – did not 
change.  This definition stated that samples judged by the inspector to contain less than 
60% usable material be rejected.   
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 While the official minutes of these two meetings highlight consensus and 
downplay disagreements or disputes, the subsequent correspondence of one committee 
member, C. B. Hamilton of the Treasury Department, reveals a suspicious attitude toward 
several of the industrial representatives.  Hamilton felt that four of the firms present – 
Western Electric, RCA, Bendix Radio, and Bausch & Lomb – had attempted to slant the 
new quartz specification in their favor.  These firms, referred to by Hamilton as “the Big 
Four,” allegedly possessed cutting equipment that allowed them to process very large 
crystals; Bliley and other smaller manufacturers did not have such equipment.  Hamilton 
argued that, by seeking to include an item in the new specification defining crystal 
samples smaller than a certain size as unusable, these four firms were attempting to 
squeeze smaller firms out of lucrative wartime crystal contracts.402 
Whether or not “the Big Four” were actually conspiring to keep valuable 
government contracts away from the smaller quartz manufacturers may likely never be 
known.  If they were conspiring, they failed, for the new quartz specification allowed for 
the purchase of crystals as small as 0.88 lbs.; all manufacturers agreed that crystals 
smaller than this were unusable.  Nevertheless, this incident emphasizes the inherently 
political nature of procurement specifications in a nation where the military routinely 
contracts with private firms for supplies and munitions.403  Assuming that there are a 
number of firms wishing to win a contract, the final form taken by a procurement 
specification can and often does favor one or a number of firms to the exclusion of 
others.  Of course, this may be because some firms are much more qualified to perform 
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the contract than others.  But, in the event that a specification ends up being far more 
strict or rigorous than called for by the ultimate use or application, the possibility exists 
that the spec has been crafted to favor the wealthiest and/or best-equipped firm or firms.  
The term “specification inflation” is perhaps a helpful name for this phenomenon.  To the 
U. S. Army’s credit, “specification inflation” did not happen with quartz crystal, one 
reason being that a smaller crystal manufacturer, Bliley Electrical, was invited onto the 
Procurement Committee.  The Signal Corps had probably already realized that it would 
need the contributions of both large and small crystal manufacturers if it was to have any 
chance of supplying the military’s enormous quartz needs.  Had Bliley and C. B. 
Hamilton not been present at the two committee meetings, it’s possible that “the Big 
Four” and perhaps a few other large firms would have gotten most of the wartime crystal 
business. 
Questions of “specification inflation” notwithstanding, the most important 
outcome of these meetings was that the quartz procurement specification was relaxed and 
that this served to somewhat ease the concerns of many over the quartz shortage problem.  
Another concurrent development acted to even further ease these concerns.  Colton and 
Major J. D. O’Connell of the SCEL arranged a meeting with representatives of Western 
Electric in early August to discuss possible means of expediting quartz procurement.404  
The two men, fully confident in the SCEL’s ability to develop crystal-controlled FM 
radio set prototypes and produce them in small numbers, nevertheless knew that the 
Army would need a very large and well-established manufacturing firm to help produce 
vast quantities of crystal plates if the U. S. was to ever enter the war.  Western Electric’s 
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Hawthorne Works, an enormous manufacturing facility in suburban Chicago, was ideally 
suited to this type of large-scale production.  Moreover, Western Electric, as the 
manufacturing arm of AT&T, had roughly two decades of experience with piezoelectric 
crystals and nearly as much experience with quartz.  The company had first worked with 
piezoelectric materials through its involvement in the anti-submarine warfare research 
effort of World War I.  (See Chapter 2)  In the 1920s and 1930s, AT&T pioneered the use 
of quartz for frequency control in both broadcast radio and carrier multiplex telephony.  
Furthermore, the company had a well-established trade relationship with Brazilian mines.  
Thus, Colton and O’Connell were confident in the Company’s ability to assess and 
address the quartz supply problem. 
 Upon meeting with Fred Lack, manger of Western Electric’s Specialty Products 
Division, Colton and O’Connell learned that the company had already been supplying the 
U.S. Coast Guard with crystal plates for frequency stabilization.  They were disappointed 
to learn that these plates were quite large (1 ½ square inches rather than the usual 1 
square inch) and sold for $100 a piece.  Furthermore, prior to this meeting, Western 
Electric’s projections of quantities and prices for supplying the Army with quartz plates 
were based on these large plate sizes.  Colton and O’Connell informed Lack that SCEL 
engineers had already worked out a method for greatly reducing plate size, thereby 
conserving quartz.  The Lab’s engineers had discovered that quartz plates of only ¼ 
square inch could be used in transmitters if an extra radio-frequency amplification stage 
was added.  With the old 1 square inch plates, roughly ten plates could be extracted per 
pound of raw quartz; the new ¼ square inch plates allowed as many as forty plates to be 
extracted.  After demonstrating the feasibility of this method to skeptical Western 
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Electric representatives, the Company agreed to shrink its standard quartz plates.  
Moreover, taking into account the shrinking of plate size as well as the large number of 
crystals that the Army would need, Company representatives agreed that the per-unit 
price could drop to as low as $5.405  Years later, Fred Lack wrote, “If it had not been for 
[the Signal Corps’] experience with the small crystals purchased from other companies, 
we [Western Electric] would have never persuaded the Bell Laboratories that the large 
crystal slab of the Coast Guard type was not essential.”406   
Contrary to the Bell System’s justified reputation as a technological innovator, 
here is a case of Western Electric and BTL learning directly from its smaller competitors 
in the quartz business.  One probable reason for this was the different customer bases 
served by Western Electric and smaller crystal manufacturers, such as Bliley Electric of 
Erie, PA or the Monitor Piezo Company of Los Angeles.  Western Electric was selling to 
the Coast Guard, which was likely willing and able to pay top dollar for reliable, high-
performance quartz plates.  By contrast, Bliley and Monitor sold mostly to amateur radio 
enthusiasts (a.k.a. “hams”) who were often working from a limited budget and were 
willing, unlike the Coast Guard, to experiment with novel and untested designs.  Another 
probable reason is that Western Electric, with its vast resources and the backing of 
AT&T, could purchase the larger Brazilian raw crystals from which it cut its 1 ¼ square 
inch wafers.  Bliley and other small firms often had to make do with smaller raw crystals, 
many of which would have been too small for cutting wafers of 1 square inch, much less 
                                                 
405 Roger Colton to Major David E. Washburn, Subject “Cyrstal Controlled Radio Sets,” 13 August 1940, 
Ibid.  In particular, see Item 6b.  A conservative estimate at the time put the Army’s crystal needs at well 
over one million QCUs. 
406 Western Electric Vice President Fred Lack to Major General Roger B. Colton, 4 December 1951, 
Miscellaneous Correspondence, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories Collection, Historical Files of Fort 
 245 
1 ¼ square inch.407  In fact, during the war Monitor owner Herbert Blasier made it a point 
to purchase the smaller raw crystals that were rejected by the larger manufacturers.408  
Thus, it was the smaller QCU manufacturers, rather than Western Electric, who 
innovatively developed ¼ square inch quartz plates out of sheer necessity and their 
customers’ willingness to experiment with new designs.  It was only later that this 
technique was seen as a valuable strategy for coping with the wartime shortage of 
Brazilian quartz.  In fact, had it not been for this reduction in standard plate size, it is 
questionable whether or not the Signal Corps would have eventually committed to 
crystal-control. 
The combination of these two developments in August 1940 – the relaxation of 
the government’s quartz procurement specification and Western Electric’s adoption of ¼ 
square inch quartz plates – acted to convince Mauborgne and other Signal Corps officials 
that quartz procurement was not the insurmountable problem that it had appeared earlier 
that year.  In September, with his concerns eased and with Colton’s persuasive arguments 
for crystal-control in mind, Chief Signal Officer Mauborgne gave his approval for 
incorporating crystal-control in two types of Armored Force sets.409  One type was to be 
equipped with one hundred crystals per set, and the other with fifty.  The primary 
justification given for crystal-control was its ability to provide “accurate frequency 
selectability and stability instantly on any one of the preset channels.”  At this time, 
Mauborgne’s approval only extended to these two Armored Force sets, not to all military 
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radio sets.  Nevertheless, many felt that the die had been cast; there was no turning back 
now.  Once other divisions began to see the enhanced performance of Armored Force 
radio sets, there would be no stopping all divisions from demanding them. 
Signal Corps officials estimated in early September 1940 that roughly 800,000 
crystals, the equivalent of approximately 87,200 pounds of raw quartz, would be needed 
over the coming two years if the U. S. were to enter the war, and Colton, partly based 
upon data received from Western Electric, estimated this amount to be only 10 % of the 
total number of crystals then available in the United States.  The 800,000 crystal estimate 
not only turned out to be far lower than the number of crystals needed in the coming two 
years, but, more importantly, American involvement in the war lasted 3 ½ years rather 
than 2.  Inaccurate forecasts aside, Mauborgne’s September 1940 decision committed the 
SCEL to begin designing crystal-controlled FM radio sets for the Armored Forces.  How 
these sets would actually be produced in the quantities needed was another problem 
altogether, one that will be briefly recounted below, but which has been much more 
thoroughly researched and written on by Richard Thompson, Jr.410 
The new quartz specification crafted by the Committee for the Procurement of 
Quartz Crystal in August 1940, though a considerable improvement over the old 
specification, did not stand long.  In December 1940, Major General Mauborgne 
reassessed the military’s wartime requirements for quartz.  Many changes had occurred 
over the previous four months, including a request from the Air Corps, in a reversal of its 
former position, that crystal-control be incorporated into its new UHF (Ultra-High 
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Frequency) command radio set.411  This was an enormous development, for it was well-
known that the Air Corps’ radio needs were and would likely remain vastly larger than 
the Armored Force needs.412  In fact, the Air Corps’ demand for quartz crystal would 
come to swamp all other force demands during the war.  With this in mind, Mauborgne’s 
reassessment increased the estimated quartz need for the coming two years from 87,200 
pounds to 309,103 pounds, a staggering increase of over 300%.413  At the time, the 
Assistant Secretary of War bluntly and pessimistically declared that this requirement 
would be impossible to meet prior to about 1950.  In response, C. B. Hamilton went to 
work once again crafting a new quartz procurement specification.  The new spec, which 
he proposed in April of 1941, dropped the quartz “usability” definition from 60% down 
to 40%, increasing tremendously the sheer volume of raw quartz accepted by government 
inspectors.  The risk of this action was that the U.S. government would end up with a 
great deal of scrap quartz not usable in radio oscillators.  It was decided, however, that 
this outcome was preferable to running short of quartz radios for troops. 
 After the U. S. officially entered the war in December 1941, the need for crystal-
controlled radio sets, and thus raw quartz, only increased.  By this time, new Chief Signal 
Officer Dawson Olmstead (CSigO from 1941-1943), motivated in part by a dramatic Fort 
Knox field test of crystal-controlled radios in January 1941, had committed the SCEL to 
incorporating crystal-control in almost all new tactical radio sets.  The Fort Knox test had 
demonstrated beyond all doubt the tactical advantages of crystal-controlled sets over 
master-oscillator sets, leading Mauborgne and then Olmstead to commit the Army to 
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high-volume use of quartz.414  Vastly more raw quartz was now needed than the initial 
1940 forecasts had indicated.  Consequently, further steps were taken to make the most of 
the quartz that the U. S. could get from Brazil.  These steps won’t be recounted in detail 
here.   
Ultimately, the success of the U. S. quartz crystal procurement effort can be 
attributed to four actions.  First was the loosening of the overly strict initial quartz 
procurement specification, allowing many Brazilian quartz samples to be purchased that 
would have previously been rejected.  It is unlikely that an adequate amount of quartz 
could have ever been purchased from Brazil had this change not been made.  Second was 
the reduction of the standard crystal plate size from 1 square inch to ¼ square inch, 
essentially quadrupling the number of plates that could be cut from a given amount of 
raw quartz.  The remaining two actions, though important, are only briefly mentioned 
here.  Third was the widespread adoption of X-ray crystallography for inspecting crystals.  
This technique, which Western Electric began employing early in the war, enabled crystal 
cutters to quickly and reliably ascertain a raw crystal’s lattice orientation before 
beginning cutting.  This single step saved enormously on the amount of scrap quartz 
discarded during the quartz plate production process.415  Fourth and last was the U. S. 
government’s decision to allow the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, through its 
subsidiary, the Metals Reserve Corporation, to pay Brazilian mining companies a 
premium for the quartz that had been going to the Axis powers.416  Though much of this 
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quartz was of questionable quality, the MRC’s actions both ensured a larger supply of 
raw quartz for the U. S. and limited the amount of quartz available to Germany and 
Japan. 
 
 
7.4  Alternatives to crystal control 
 
Neither Major General Mauborgne’s September 1940 decision nor the persuasive 
Fort Knox demonstration of January 1941 ended the Army’s search for alternatives to 
crystal-control.  The fragile quartz procurement situation still had many officials worried, 
and rightfully so.  Any reasonable equivalent to crystal-control itself or to Brazilian 
quartz would have been quickly adopted by the Signal Corps.  The search for alternatives 
proceeded along two parallel paths: finding ways to improve the frequency stability of 
traditional master-oscillator sets, and finding a substitute material for natural quartz 
crystal.   
The SCEL’s effort to improve the frequency stability of master-oscillator sets 
drew a number of unsolicited proposals from radio manufacturers.  One such proposal 
came from the Jefferson-Travis Manufacturing Corporation, which, in February 1941, 
sent the Corps a proposal for a “method for the elimination of crystal control in radio 
transmitters.”417  The central aim of the method, which employed “electron coupling” of 
a master oscillator to a power amplifier, temperature control, and precision tuning 
mechanisms, was to eliminate the tendency of master-oscillator circuits to drift in 
                                                 
417 Edward J. Hefele, “Proposed Method for the Elimination of Crystal Control in Radio Transmitters,” 28 
January 1941, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer [Unclassified Central Decimal Files], 
Record Group 111, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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frequency over time.418  The method, while reasonably successful on a technical level, 
received a cool reception from the Roger Colton, who knew that no matter how stable a 
master oscillator circuit could be made, it still required manual tuning.  It could never 
provide the push-button tuning made possible by crystal-control.   
As for the Army’s other option, finding an equivalent material substitute for 
natural quartz crystal, prospects appeared dim.  The Navy had begun such a search in 
1931 but had abandoned it in favor of master-oscillator sets.419  The Army, unsatisfied 
with the Navy’s outcome, began its own search by visiting companies such as the 
Corning Glass Works to query their chemists on the feasibility of developing a synthetic 
quartz substitute.420  Responses were negative and timeframe projections for finding or 
developing a substitute were usually in years rather than months.  The Army wisely 
decided to sideline its synthetic quartz project for the time being, focusing instead on 
improving the procurement and efficient use of natural quartz.  After the war, the search 
for a quartz substitute would become a central focus of the SCL’s research efforts.  (See 
§7.9 as well as Chapter 8.) 
 For the duration of the war, these two alternatives, as well as others, failed to 
supplant crystal-control as the dominant method of radio frequency control or Brazilian 
mines as the primary source for radio-grade quartz crystal.  In spite of the grave quartz 
procurement risk, troops in both the Armored Force and the Air Corps championed 
                                                 
418 The “electron-coupling” method had been developed by Navy engineer J. B. Dow in 1931.  See J. B. 
Dow, "A Recent Development in Vacuum Tube Oscillator Circuits," Proceedings Of The Institute Of Radio 
Engineers 19, no. 12 (December 1931): 2095-108. 
419 C. S. Barrett to the NRL Director, Subject “Artificial production of quartz crystals,” 25 February 1931, 
Folder “S67/40 Quartz Research B,” Box 79, Historical Records of the Naval Research Laboratory, Record 
Group 19, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
420 Memorandum to J. D. O’Connell, Subject “Report of Visit to Corning Glass Works, Corning, New 
York,” 3 October 1942, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer [Unclassified Central Decimal 
Files], Record Group 111, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.   
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crystal-controlled sets for a simple reason.  Crystal-controlled sets provided entirely new 
capabilities that could be achieved in no other way at the time.  They allowed for push-
button tuning of both transmitter and receiver, rapid and precise switching between 
channels, and an overall increase in the number of channels available for a given portion 
of radio spectrum.  Furthermore, they required no warm-up period; frequency stability 
was achieved immediately after switching on the power.  Master-oscillator sets, though 
having an advantage in scenarios where fine-tuning would be an asset, simply could not 
duplicate the capabilities of the crystal-controlled set, capabilities that, once the forces 
experienced them in the field, could not be resisted.  The only problem now, other than 
the quartz procurement dilemma, was how to produce enough crystal-controlled radios 
for satisfying the military’s enormous demand. 
 
 
7.5  Mass Production of quartz crystal plates during World War II 
 
 Up until around mid-1942, the principal bottleneck to supplying the American 
military with adequate numbers of crystal-controlled radios was the supply of electronics-
grade quartz crystal.421  In late 1942, with the supply situation relieved by the actions 
discussed above, the enormous challenge of manufacturing millions of quartz crystal 
units (QCUs) became the military’s most pressing quartz-related problem.  The effort to 
ramp up production has been discussed extensively by others and will thus be covered 
here in only a summary fashion. 
                                                 
421 Ensuring an adequate supply of electronic-grade quartz crystal encompassed many sub-tasks, including 
procuring raw quartz from Brazil, inspecting raw quartz for its quality, and cutting raw quartz in wafers that 
could be used in quartz crystal units.  Each of these sub-tasks proved to be more challenging than 
anticipated by Signal Corps officials. 
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 The quartz production effort involved the coordination of at least one hundred 
American QCU manufacturers, both large and small and spread across the U.S.422  Since 
Congress had banned amateur radio for the duration of the war, these manufacturers were 
concerned with satisfying only one customer, the U.S. military.  Most of the new QCU 
manufacturers were complete novices in quartz crystal technology, requiring extensive 
training before production could begin.  Among the largest firms to take up QCU 
production during the war were Chicago-based Motorola and Baltimore-based Bendix 
Radio.  Unlike many of the new wartime producers, these firms continued producing 
QCU’s after the war.   
The tasks of coordinating QCU producers and disseminating crucial engineering 
and manufacturing knowledge fell to the Washington-based Quartz Crystal Section 
(QCS), formed in late 1941 by the Office of the Chief Signal Officer.  One member of the 
QCS, physicist Virgil Bottom, later described the Section’s mission as follows: “to 
expedite the production of quartz crystal units to meet the requirements of our Armed 
Services and those of the Allies.”423  The logistics of fulfilling this mission were 
daunting.  Many severe problems arising during the production effort were tackled.  
Among the more crucial of these were the problem of standardizing the QCU production 
process across manufacturers and the so-called “ageing problem,” in which QCU’s 
placed in tropical climates began drifting in frequency after only a few days.  Both 
problems were eventually solved through the diligence and cooperation of thousands of 
                                                 
422 Richard J. Thompson Jr., Crystal Clear: The Struggle for Reliable Communications Technology in 
World War 2 (New York: Wiley-IEEE Press, 2006).  See Appendix 2, in which Thompson lists 139 
wartime American QCU manufacturers. 
423 Virgil E. Bottom, "A History of the Quartz Crystal Industry in the USA" (Proceedings of the 35th 
Annual Frequency Control Symposium, Philadelphia, PA, 27-29 May 1981), 3-12. 
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civilian workers and military personnel.  For extensive discussion of the entire quartz 
production effort, see works by Virgil Bottom and Richard J. Thompson.424 
 From the standpoint of numbers alone, the swift ramping up of QCU production 
during the war was quite remarkable.  During 1941, the average production rate was only 
a few thousand QCU’s per month.425  By May 1942, the rate had increased to roughly six 
thousand QCU’s per day.426  Finally, by late 1943 or early 1944, the production rate was 
approximately 2 ½ million QCU’s per month – an increase of roughly one thousand times 
over 1941 levels.427  By the end of the war, Western Electric had produced nearly 10 
million of one crystal type alone – the FT-241A, which was used in most tanks and in 
many field sets.428  The total number of QCU’s produced by all manufacturers during the 
war is difficult to ascertain; estimates have ranged from 30 million to over 70 million 
QCUs produced by American manufacturers between 1941 and 1945.429   
Whatever the exact number of QCU’s produced, the wartime QCU production 
effort represented a huge investment for the Signal Corps.  One Signal Corps official 
estimated in early 1945, before the war was over, that the Corps had already spent “in 
                                                 
424 Ibid.  See also Richard J. Thompson Jr., "The Development of the Quartz Crystal Oscillator Industry of 
World War 2," IEEE Transactions on Ultrasonics, Ferroelectrics, and Frequency Control 52, no. 5 (May 
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entitled, Frequency Control Units. 
426 O’Connell to Walter Cady, 14 May 1942, Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer 
[Unclassified Central Decimal Files], Record Group 111, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
427 SCEL Annual Report for FY 1945, SCEL Annual Reports, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories 
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excess of $200 million for crystals alone since the outbreak of the war.”430  Based on this 
number, the Corps paid, on average, anywhere from $3 to $7 per QCU.  This was a very 
reasonable price, given that Bliley Electric, in 1936, had been charging a minimum of 
$25 for a single QCU ground exactly to a specified frequency.431  The low per unit prices 
were made possible by the industry-wide standardization of QCU types as well as the 
very high production runs for the various QCU resonant frequencies required by the 
Corps.  As the size of a given production run increased, economies of scale allowed the 
per-unit cost to drop.  Thus, entire factories could afford to tool their manufacturing 
operations to produce QCU’s having a single resonant frequency, saving the time and 
expense required to retool their equipment for a variety of frequencies. 
Another significant wartime concern for the Signal Corps was the area of QCU 
patent rights.  The Corps wanted any company using a superior manufacturing process or 
technique to make it available to all QCU manufacturers for the duration of the war.  This 
was in the spirit of broadly disseminating best practices so that QCU production could be 
performed as efficiently as possible.  One of the best examples of this was an acid etching 
technique used by Bliley Electric to perform the final calibration of a crystal wafer.  The 
technique, labeled cryptically by Bliley personnel as the “X-Lap” process, allowed the 
company to produce higher quality QCU’s than most other manufacturers.432  When 
Signal Corps officials noticed, they demanded the process be made available to all 
                                                 
430 "Institute News and Radio Notes: Winter Technical Meeting, New York, New York," Proceedings of 
the Institute of Radio Engineers 33, no. 1 (January 1945): 49-59.  See item 14, “Quartz-Crystal Supply 
Program,” by Major Edward W. Johnson. 
431 Bliley Electric Company, General Catalog G9 (1939). [JPEG File] (Bliley Electric Company, Accessed 
28 May 2007) available from http://www.bliley.net/XTAL/; Internet. 
432 John M. Wolfskill, Piezoelectric Crystal Apparatus, U.S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,364,501, Filing 
Date: 4 April 1941; Issue Date: 5 December 1944. 
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manufacturers.433  Unfortunately, it is not known whether Bliley and the other 
manufacturers offering patented processes were justly compensated for their intellectual 
property.  It is likely that many firms or individuals, out of a sense of patriotism and duty, 
offered their patented inventions free of charge to the government.  This was true of at 
least one independent inventor, Edwin Armstrong, who allowed the government to use 
frequency modulation free of charge for the duration of the war.434  Whether important 
quartz crystal patents were freely donated out of patriotism or were commandeered by the 
Signal Corps, the result was the same.  The state of the art in quartz crystal engineering 
knowledge was disseminated much more widely during the war years than it had ever 
been. 
The General Radio Company, the pioneer of commercial piezo-oscillators, 
primary quartz frequency standards, and quartz clocks, was quite active during the war, 
but not making QCU’s.  The company continued manufacturing frequency measurement 
instruments and standards, many of which were used by the more than one hundred 
dedicated QCU manufacturers.  General Radio’s official history notes that the company 
saw a more than four-fold increase in output during the war, with annual sales increasing 
from $1.2 million is 1940 to $5.3 million in 1944.  Moreover, the company’s permanent 
staff increased from about 220 to 440.435  Without the quartz-based instruments provided 
by GR, the Signal Corps QCU production effort would have quickly ground to a halt. 
 
                                                 
433 This story is told in detail in a couple of places.  Charles A. Bliley, The Bliley Electric Company: The 
Early Years 1930-1955 (2001). [Web site] (Accessed 28 May 2007) available from 
http://www.bliley.net/XTAL/; Internet.  Richard J. Thompson Jr., Crystal Clear: The Struggle for Reliable 
Communications Technology in World War 2 (New York: Wiley-IEEE Press, 2006), 70-72. 
434 Tom Lewis, Empire of the Air: The Men Who Made Radio (New York: Harper Collins, 1991). 
435 Arthur E. Theissen, A History of the General Radio Company, 1915-1965 (West Concord, MA: General 
Radio Company, 1965), 51. 
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7.6  Quartz crystal patents during the war 
 In the process of realizing mass production of QCUs, wartime engineers 
developed many patentable inventions.436  Most of these related in some way to QCU 
production, including the inspection of raw quartz, determining the electrical orientation 
of a piece of quartz, the cutting of quartz wafers, the final calibrating of a wafer to the 
desired frequency, the attachment of electrodes to the quartz wafer, and the mounting of 
the wafer within a holder or housing.  The most active large firm in patenting new 
inventions was the Bell Telephone Laboratories, but R.C.A. was also quite active at the 
beginning of the war.  Among small firms, Bliley Electric was by far the most inventive, 
filing at least six QCU-related patents during the war years.  By the end of the war, new 
players had entered the picture and quartz crystal invention had become less concentrated 
in a few large firms.  Among the most important of the new firms were Motorola and the 
Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories, based in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.  In 1945 
alone, sixteen quartz crystal patents were filed by independent inventors.  This was 
almost certainly due to the broad dissemination of quartz crystal engineering knowledge 
during the war.  Many more people with inventive tendencies became aware of the 
technical problems to be solved. 
 
 
7.7  I.R.E. activity during the war 
 
As shown in Chapter 6, the Institute of Radio Engineers (I.R.E.) made no 
deliberate effort to organize the growing quartz crystal technological community during 
the 1930s.  This changed with the approach of war.  In 1941, with war clouds on the 
horizon and the Army Signal Corps already having committed itself to crystal control for 
                                                 
436 This section is based on the patent data examined for Chapter 3. 
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mobile radio units, the I.R.E. formed a Piezoelectric Crystals technical committee.  The 
Institute already had eight technical committees, covering areas such as electronics, 
transmitters and antennas, television, and radio wave propagation.  The addition of a 
ninth committee indicated the perceived importance of piezoelectric crystals to both the 
radio engineering community and the Army Signal Corps.  Walter Cady, still professor of 
Physics at Wesleyan University, was named chairman of the new committee.  Committee 
membership included between ten and fifteen engineers drawn mostly from BTL, 
General Radio, Bliley Electric, and Wesleyan University. 
The creation of the I.R.E. Technical Committee on Piezoelectric Crystals did two 
things that helped to formally organize the quartz crystal technological community and 
give technical direction to its work.  For one, the Proceedings of the I.R.E. began 
devoting a section of its annual feature, “Radio Progress During 19--,” to piezoelectric 
research.  Important papers published during the prior year were listed, and a summary of 
developments in each specialized area of piezoelectric technology, including quartz 
crystal technology, was provided.  Second, the Institute began paper sessions on quartz 
crystal technology at its semi-annual technical meetings, as it did at its 1945 Winter 
Technical Meeting.437  At this meeting, a technical session featured six papers on various 
aspects of quartz crystal technology.  These two actions laid the groundwork for the post-
war consolidation of the quartz crystal technological community that will be discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
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 258 
7.8  The Unqualified Success of Crystal-Control During the War 
 
 In the summer of 1944, Roger Colton, now Chief of the Engineering and 
Technical Service within the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, made the following 
assessment of the Signal Corp’s decision to adopt crystal-control.  “Our decision to go 
into crystal controlled radios for widespread tactical use has been more than justified by 
the results obtained.  The Army had radio before they had crystal.  Now the Army has 
communications.  That’s the difference.  Crystals gave us communications.  The 
advantage of precise and constant frequency control, together with the ease of reading, 
have given a reliability to our radio communications, which make them second to none in 
the World.”438  Crystal-control was unquestionably an important factor in the Allied 
forces’ ultimate victory, but just how large a role quartz crystal played is quite difficult to 
determine and not the primary goal here.  A persuasive case can be made that the D-Day 
invasion of June 6, 1944 would have been a disaster for the Allies without crystal-
controlled radios.439  Whatever the case, it can reliably be said that crystal-controlled 
radio contributed crucially to ensuring reliable communications for the U. S. military 
throughout the war.  Without it, an Allied victory, though still conceivable, would have 
been considerably more difficult to achieve. 
 
 
7.9  The Move to Cultured Quartz 
 
 With the conclusion of the war, American manufacturers had successfully 
produced tens of millions of QCUs and Allied soldiers had become accustomed to the 
quick, reliable, simple and static-free operation of FM crystal-controlled mobile radio 
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sets.  There was clearly no going back to the old days of master-oscillator AM units, but 
the Brazilian supply of quartz crystal remained a serious concern.  Now, with the pressure 
to keep producing millions of QCU’s every month gone, the Signal Corps Engineering 
Laboratories decided to resume its earlier effort to find a synthetic substitute for natural 
quartz.  Beginning in 1946, the SCEL began investing millions of taxpayer dollars in an 
intensive R&D effort aimed at solving this problem.  As will be recounted in Chapter 8, 
the ultimate results of this effort stand as one of the most lasting and consequential 
outcomes of the Signal Corp’s decision to adopt crystal-control in 1940. 
 
 
 
7.10  Conclusions 
World War II represented a watershed for quartz crystal technology.  Before the 
war, its two largest markets were QCU’s for the amateur radio market and quartz wave 
filters for AT&T’s carrier multiplex telephony network.  Relatively small-scale, batch 
production techniques were sufficient for supplying these markets.  The quartz crystal 
technological community, to the extent that it could be said to exist, was fragmented.  
Quartz engineers had little opportunity to network with like-minded engineers outside 
their own organizations.  Quartz crystal engineering knowledge diffused through the 
community primarily via articles in Proceedings of the I.R.E. and the amateur journal 
QST, as well as personal contacts.  A few well-connected individuals were particularly 
important for spreading the quartz crystal gospel.  These included Walter Cady, George 
Washington Pierce, John Dellinger of the Bureau of Standards, Joseph Horton of the Bell 
Telephone Labs and later General Radio, Melville Eastham of General Radio, and John 
Wolfskill of BTL and later Bliley Electric. 
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After the war, the landscape of quartz crystal technology had almost completely 
changed.  The war had required the development of QCU mass production techniques.  
Before the war, quartz technology had been developed mostly by private industry.  Now 
the U.S. military was committed to advancing the technology.  The War saw the 
beginnings of what came to be called the “military-industrial complex,” characterized by 
a tight coupling between private industry and military needs.  During the War, the I.R.E. 
had formed a Piezoelectric Crystals technical committee, providing the quartz crystal 
community with its first official recognition by the wider radio engineering community.  
Quartz engineers now had their own technical sessions at I.R.E. conferences.  In many 
ways, the quartz crystal technological community was beginning to look like a scientific 
community.  Community members were beginning to talk of advancing the field and the 
state of quartz engineering knowledge rather than simply advancing the interests of the 
firm or organization for which they worked.  The importance of key individuals in 
disseminating knowledge was diminishing, while the importance of formal institutional 
structures was increasing.  The body of quartz crystal engineers was becoming a self-
conscious technological community driven by a collectively agreed upon research 
agenda. 
However, quartz crystal technology faced a crisis at the end of the Second World 
War.  The War had highlighted the scarcity of Brazilian quartz.  If the field was to have 
any future, either new sources of natural quartz would have to be found, or a substitute 
for natural quartz would have to be developed.  Chapter 8 relates the story of the birth of 
the cultured quartz industry and its ramifications for quartz crystal technology. 
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CHAPTER 8: REPLICATING NATURE – THE ARTIFICIAL GROWTH OF QUARTZ 
CRYSTAL 
 
 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
 American industry produced massive quantities of supplies and munitions during 
the years of World War II.  Indeed, some observers have even attributed the ultimate 
Allied victory primarily to American industrial might.  No single production effort was 
more impressive than the one that turned out thirty million or more quartz crystal units 
(QCUs) between 1942 and 1945.  These QCUs, when installed in Allied two-way radios, 
made tactical communications far quicker, more reliable, and less reliant on trained radio 
operators than would have otherwise been the case, thus setting the stage for the rapid 
post-war growth of the commercial mobile two-way radio market. 
 Yet, the wartime QCU production feat also revealed an Achilles’ heel in the 
quartz crystal industry.  The very material used to fabricate QCUs – high quality 
Brazilian quartz crystal – became the limiting factor in the industry’s growth.  The 
Brazilian quartz mining industry proved resistant to rationalization, meaning uncertain 
quantities and long delivery times.440  After the war, the U.S. Army Signal Corps and 
private industry invested millions of dollars in a research effort aimed at finding a 
substitute for natural quartz.  Aided by industrial intelligence gathered from post-war 
Germany, this effort yielded fruit in the 1950s.  The result, called cultured quartz, was 
grown from natural quartz “seeds” in high-pressure chambers called autoclaves.  The 
Signal Corps generously nurtured this new technology for ten years, culminating in the 
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construction of a pilot plant.  At this point, in the late 1950s, the Corps handed over the 
commercialization and further production of cultured quartz to private industry. 
 The story of the transformation of the post-war quartz crystal industry from sole 
reliance upon natural Brazilian quartz to the controlled production of cultured quartz 
illustrates a number of important themes in the history of 20th century American 
technological practice.  The most far-reaching of these is the centrality of the U.S. 
military in helping to rationalize post-war American industry and transform it from full-
time mobilization to joint civilian-military production, thus laying the foundation for 
what Eisenhower would later ominously call the “military-industrial complex.”  Another 
theme is the important role played by post-war industrial intelligence efforts, notably the 
Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee, in exploiting the Allied victory and 
stimulating American research and development in the late 1940s and early 1950s.  
Thirdly, this story gives a detailed view of a decade-long R&D effort whose aim was the 
substitution of a naturally occurring substance with an artificially produced one.  The 
efforts of scientists and engineers to convince users that the later was equivalent and even 
superior to the former shed light on engineering views of “nature” and the criteria that 
engineers use to assess technical performance.  Finally, this chapter illustrates the 
maturation of the body of resonant quartz crystal engineering knowledge and the 
consolidation of a vibrant quartz crystal technology research community.  This 
community was something of a prototype for the many technological communities that 
would be formed during the early years of the Cold War. 
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8.2  Industrial intelligence in post-war Germany 
 During World War II, the U.S. government secured enough raw quartz for 
meeting wartime radio needs only by developing quartz conservation techniques and by 
paying the Brazilian government to divert quartz shipments bound for Germany and 
Japan to U.S. ports.  As the U.S. emerged from the war, the unreliable supply of Brazilian 
raw quartz threatened both to restrict the Army’s continued use of crystal-controlled radio 
and to impede the growth of the nascent commercial two-way radio market.  In most 
observers’ eyes, the U.S. had to find a reliable and equivalent substitute for Brazilian 
quartz.  Some suspected that a solution might lie in the hands of German scientists and 
engineers. 
 In 1945, as Nazi Germany fell and Allied forces occupied the country, America 
and Great Britain viewed Germany as a potential bonanza of valuable scientific and 
technical knowledge.  Even before Germany’s surrender, Allied powers began forming 
intelligence teams, such as the Combined Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (CIOS), 
to move into German states as they fell.  Great Britain and the U.S. formed their own 
teams, the British Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee (BIOS) and the Technical 
Industrial Intelligence Committee (TIIC), respectively.  The early purpose of these 
organizations was essentially two-fold: to gather scientific, technological, and industrial 
intelligence that might be of military value, and to interrogate and possibly even intern 
German scientists and technicians who might try to escape and continue their wartime 
work elsewhere.441  Conducting this work for the TIIC were some three hundred and 
eighty “Scientific Consultants,” civilians representing seventeen U.S. industries and 
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possessing special scientific or technical training as well as competency in the German 
language.442    After the German surrender, Britain and the U.S. consolidated their teams 
to form the Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT), an organization which existed 
until mid-1947.443  Over its two-year lifespan, FIAT’s work gradually assumed more of 
an industrial and less of a military character as the agency’s workers realized the potential 
commercial value of the German “secrets” they were uncovering.   
 Even before TIIC teams first entered Germany, it was no secret to American 
scientists that Germany had a strong scientific tradition of augmenting or replacing 
natural resources with synthetic or artificially grown ones.  In the late 19th century, the 
German firm BASF had developed a synthetic blue dye to replace the expensive natural 
indigo dye cultivated in British-controlled India.444  During World War I, the German 
chemists Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch, motivated by a British blockade of natural nitrate 
imports from Chile, had developed an industrial process for synthesizing nitrogen 
compounds.445  And after the war, the formation of the German conglomerate I.G. Farben 
had made Germany a global leader in synthetic chemistry.  Thus, the TIIC teams entering 
Germany in the early summer of 1945 fully expected to find new materials and 
production processes developed in response to the country’s wartime trade disruptions.   
 One of the seventeen U.S. industries chosen for the TIIC’s initial investigations 
was the quartz crystal industry.  Researchers in the field of crystallography were aware of 
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German research in the field of artificial crystal growth, and some suspected that wartime 
pressures had provided German scientists with the incentive and urgency needed to 
develop a process for mass producing artificial quartz crystal.  To lead this investigation, 
the TIIC selected Charles Baldwin Sawyer, a Ph.D. physicist with expertise in the fields 
of crystal growth and beryllium production.   
 Charles B. Sawyer, not to be confused with Charles W. Sawyer, Secretary of 
Commerce in the Truman administration, came to the TIIC with over twenty years of 
industrial experience.  Having earned his Ph.D. from MIT at the age of twenty-six, 
Sawyer moved to the great industrial city of Cleveland, Ohio in 1921 to co-found Brush 
Laboratories with Charles F. Brush, Jr., son of the famous inventor of the arc lamp and 
founder of the Brush Electric Company.  Brush Laboratories quickly established itself as 
the leading American manufacturer of microphones, phonograph pickups and 
loudspeakers made from piezoelectric Rochelle Salt crystals.446  Sawyer published a 
handful of technical papers here and there, but his primary interests laid in patenting 
inventions and building companies for developing and commercializing them.447  In the 
1920s and early 1930s, he published two technical articles on Rochelle Salt, one of which 
was eventually cited more than five-hundred times, an indication of its great influence 
within the scientific and technical communities.448  Then in 1930, Sawyer played a 
prominent role in establishing two new organizations, the Brush Development Company, 
formed to commercialize the inventions of Brush Laboratories, and the Brush Beryllium 
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Company.  Beryllium, a somewhat obscure chemical element, may be mixed with copper 
to make it both stronger and more tensile, similar to the manner in which carbon may be 
added to or removed from iron to create steel.449  As such, the nascent aircraft and 
electronics industries quickly came to value beryllium, generating a sizeable market for 
the element.  Because of his extensive experience with both piezoelectric crystals and 
beryllium, the TIIC was essentially getting two “Scientific Consultants” for the price of 
one in Charles Sawyer.   
 The TIIC arranged as one of Sawyer’s first tasks in Germany a visit with 
Professor Richard Nacken of the University of Frankfurt am Main.  As director of the 
university’s Mineralische and Petrographische Institut (Institute of Mineralogy and 
Petrography), Nacken was as likely as anyone to be acquainted with recent German 
developments in artificial quartz crystal production.450  As it turned out, he was more than 
acquainted with such work.  Sawyer learned that the Nazi government had appointed 
Nacken in late 1943 to head up a research effort aimed at developing an economical and 
scalable method for growing quartz crystal.  The effort had nearly succeeded when the 
Nazi regime fell in May 1945.  Furthermore, Sawyer learned of the events that led to 
Germany’s quartz crisis. 
 Prior to 1939, ten private German firms produced a total of roughly ten thousand 
QCUs per year, many of which were probably sold internationally for commercial use.451  
The two largest of these, Telefunken and Zeiss, obtained the vast majority of their raw 
                                                 
449 Charles Baldwin Sawyer and B. R. Kjellgren, "Newer Developments in Beryllium," Industrial and 
Engineering Chemistry 30, no. 5 (May 1938): 501-05. 
450 Petrography is “the description and systematic classification of rocks.”  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (2008), s.v. "Petrography." 
451 Technical (U.S Army) Field Information Agency, Office of the Military Government for Germany (US), 
FIAT Final Report on the Interrogation of German Scientists Regarding Quartz Crystals and Other 
Piezoelectric Materials, Report 641, by Allyn C. Swinnerton, (1945). 
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quartz from Brazil.  With the start of the war, these firms and others mobilized their 
plants for wartime production; all manufactured QCUs now went into radios for use by 
Nazi troops.  Over the first two years of the war, Germany’s Brazilian source of quartz 
crystal evaporated as the U.S.-backed Metals Reserve Company paid Brazil to divert 
quartz shipments bound for Germany to U.S. ports.  For a time, the Nazis turned to the 
Ukraine for raw quartz, but soon discovered that both the quantity and quality of this 
quartz was insufficient.  Even given these severe limitations, German firms managed to 
produce in the neighborhood of one million QCUs during the war years, including 
400,000 units in 1944 alone, all using natural quartz.452  They did this by taking a number 
of measures: reducing the size of their quartz wafers, as did the U.S.; using low-grade 
raw quartz, as evidenced by some German radio sets captured by the U.S.; and working 
from quartz stockpiles built up prior to the war.453  But by 1943, with their stockpile of 
natural quartz dwindling, Nazi officials saw no choice other than to find a natural quartz 
substitute.  With his knowledge of artificial crystal growth, Richard Nacken seemed the 
best hope for rescuing Germany’s QCU producers from their dire predicament.454 
Prior to 1943, little is known of Richard Nacken other than that he had published 
a number of scientific papers on crystals and had been experimenting with the artificial 
                                                 
452 Ibid. 
453 A consultant deemed the crystal in a captured German QCU to be “much inferior to American-made 
crystals.”  U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Publication Board, Report PB 1565.  Foreign 
Crystals (Captured Enemy Equipment Report, 63, compiled by Camp Coles Signal Laboratory), by U.S. 
Army Signal Corps, (Washington, D.C., 1945). 
454 See Charles Baldwin Sawyer Collection, Department of Special Collections, Kelvin Smith Library, Case 
Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH.  See also Technical (U.S Army) Field Information Agency, 
Office of the Military Government for Germany (US), FIAT Final Report on the Interrogation of German 
Scientists Regarding Quartz Crystals and Other Piezoelectric Materials, Report 641, by Allyn C. 
Swinnerton, (1945). 
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growth of quartz crystal since the mid-1930s.455  In late 1943, government officials 
provided generous funding to move the scientist out of his cramped university laboratory 
and into a space once used by the Nungens Watch Company.  Equipped with a machine 
shop, a furnace, a diamond saw, two x-ray cameras, a darkroom and several microscopes, 
Nacken’s new lab spanned at least six rooms and opened in early 1944.456   
 The artificial growth of quartz crystal, referred to by scientists as the culturing of 
quartz, was hardly uncharted scientific territory in the early 1940s.  At least thirty 
researchers had published on the topic since the early 19th century.457  Most notably, 
between 1898 and 1908 Giorgio Spezia, a mineralogist at the University of Turin, Italy, 
pioneered a technique of quartz crystal growth called the hydrothermal method, which he 
believed was quite similar to the process occurring in the Earth’s mantle to produce 
natural quartz crystals.  At a very basic level, this method consisted of the following: a 
hermetically sealed metal chamber, called a bomb or, less ambiguously, an autoclave; a 
heating element for raising the autoclave’s internal temperature; a tiny “seed” of flawless 
quartz crystal; a solid nutrient, typically crushed quartz or glass, which provided the raw 
material for seed growth; and an alkaline solvent solution for dissolving the nutrient 
(Figures 40 and 41.).  Before beginning the growth process, the crystal seed was 
suspended in the solvent solution.  After being sealed, the autoclave was heated to a pre-
determined temperature.  As the temperature and internal pressure of the autoclave rose, 
the solid nutrient dissolved in the solvent solution.  Once the desired temperature-
                                                 
455 Ernest Buehler and A.C. Walker, "Growing Quartz Crystals," The Scientific Monthly 69, no. 3 
(September 1949): 148-55.  The authors state that Nacken had been working with cultured quartz crystal 
for “about 12 years” when the war ended. 
456 Technical (U.S Army) Field Information Agency, Office of the Military Government for Germany (US), 
FIAT Final Report on the Interrogation of German Scientists Regarding Quartz Crystals and Other 
Piezoelectric Materials, Report 641, by Allyn C. Swinnerton, (1945). 
457 P.F. Kerr and E. Armstrong, "Restricted Supplement 1," Geological Society of America, Bulletin 54 
(1943): 1-34. 
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pressure level had been reached, the autoclave was held in steady state while the solvent 
solution, now enriched with dissolved nutrient, slowly deposited crystallized silica onto 
the crystal seed, gradually producing a large and defect-free quartz crystal.  By using this 
method, Spezia succeeded in growing several quartz crystals, each about ¼-inch in 
length.  Because the growth rate was excruciatingly slow (about 0.001 inches per day), 
Spezia had to sustain his process for six or more months to get crystals of this size.458   
 
 
Figure 40: Giorgio Spezia’s 
Autoclave, Photograph of 
(Reprinted, by permission of Elsevier, from 
Fumiko Iwasaki and Hideo Iwasaki, 
“Historical Review of Quartz Crystal Growth,” 
Journal of Crystal Growth 237-239 (2002): 
820-827, Figure 1. ©2002 Elsevier) 
 
                                                 
458 Ernest Buehler, Method of Growing Quartz Crystals, U. S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,785,058, Filing 
Date: 28 April 1952; Issue Date: 12 March 1957.  See also Danforth R. Hale, "The Laboratory Growing of 
Quartz," Science 107, no. 2781 (16 April 1948): 393-94. 
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Figure 41: Cross-Section of 
Spezia’s Autoclave for 
Implementing the Hydrothermal 
Method of Crystal Growth 
(Reprinted, by permission of Elsevier, 
from Fumiko Iwasaki and Hideo 
Iwasaki, “Historical Review of Quartz 
Crystal Growth,” Journal of Crystal 
Growth 237-239 (2002): 820-827, 
Figure 2.  ©2002 Elsevier). 
 
 
Nacken, beginning his cultured quartz research in 1930s Germany, also chose the 
hydrothermal method.  However, he introduced some important modifications to Spezia’s 
process that allowed him to grow perfect crystals of one inch diameter, far larger than any 
that had ever been grown artificially, in less time than it took Spezia to grow his ¼-inch 
crystals.  Nacken’s growth process was very fast, but it was not continuous, requiring a 
recharging of the autoclave every twenty-four hours.  Nevertheless, many saw the process 
as holding great promise.  Most importantly, it seemed capable of producing crystals of 
sufficient size for use in the manufacture of QCU wafers.  Wagering that further research 
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would improve Nacken’s new process, the Nazi government allocated funds in 1943 for 
the creation of a National Hydrothermal Institute.  Also, Germany’s Telefunken 
Company applied for patents on Nacken’s refined hydrothermal method and began 
constructing a plant for the large-scale production of artificial quartz.459  Only Germany’s 
defeat in May 1945 prevented the fulfillment of these plans.   
 Upon meeting with Nacken in the summer of 1945, Sawyer was deeply impressed 
with his growth of one inch diameter crystals.  Yet, he also realized that Nacken’s 
process was not yet to the point where cultured quartz could compete commercially with 
natural quartz.  In his estimation, “at least one year” would be required to bring the 
process to commercial viability.460  Unhampered by intellectual property concerns, 
Charles Sawyer and another Scientific Consultant, Dr. Allyn Swinnerton, gathered all the 
patent applications and other technical documentation they could find related to German 
artificial quartz growth.  Swinnerton, a geology professor at Ohio’s Antioch College and 
cross-state neighbor of Sawyer’s, possessed valuable scientific knowledge of quartz that 
dovetailed nicely with Sawyer’s industrial knowledge.  Armed with German quartz 
documents and detailed notes of interviews with Nacken and other scientists, the two men 
returned home convinced that their findings would ensure the U.S. quartz crystal 
industry’s continued growth. 
 
 
 
                                                 
459 Technical (U.S Army) Field Information Agency, Office of the Military Government for Germany (US), 
FIAT Final Report on the Interrogation of German Scientists Regarding Quartz Crystals and Other 
Piezoelectric Materials, Report 641, by Allyn C. Swinnerton, (1945). 
460 Folder 4, Box 10, Series II, Charles Baldwin Sawyer Collection, Department of Special Collections, 
Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH. 
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8.3  Post-War organization of cultured quartz research 
 With German quartz crystal “secrets” now in the hands of the Allies, researchers 
began jockeying for position, competing for funds to extend Nacken’s quartz growth 
research.  The first group out of the box was English rather than American.  The research 
team of N. and W.A. Wooster, with the Brooklyn Crystallographic Laboratory of 
Cambridge, England, had begun independently investigating hydrothermal methods of 
quartz growth prior to the war’s end.  In March 1946, the team published results showing 
that it had achieved quartz growth using a method very similar to Nacken’s.461  Like 
Nacken, this team also experienced problems with sustaining growth, but the independent 
replication of Nacken’s results was an important first step in moving the research 
forward.  This work led to Wooster and Wooster soon receiving the support of the British 
firm General Electric Company (GEC), Ltd., which continued to support their quartz 
growth research for a number of years.462 
 In the U.S., a group at Bell Telephone Laboratories (BTL) headed by A.C. Walker 
was the first to begin work on the culturing of quartz crystal.  Walker, a physical chemist 
with a Yale Ph.D., had developed during World War II methods for growing synthetic 
piezoelectric crystals.  One of these crystals, ethylenediamine tartrate (EDT), turned out 
to be a very effective replacement for natural quartz in AT&T’s multiplex telephony 
wave filters.  But, because of its unique properties, natural quartz remained essential in 
the production of QCU’s, which Western Electric, AT&T’s manufacturing arm, 
continued to manufacture for use in broadcast radio transmitters.  With the end of the 
war, BTL sent some investigators to Germany as part of the TIIC post-war intelligence 
                                                 
461 Nora Wooster and W. A. Wooster, "Preparation of Synthetic Quartz," Nature 157, no. 3984 (9 March 
1946): 297. 
462 C.S. Brown et al., "Growth of Large Quartz Crystals," Nature 167, no. 4258 (9 June 1951): 940-41. 
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effort.  One of these, a Mr. J. R. Townsend, collected information on Nacken’s quartz 
experiments independent from that of Sawyer and Swinnerton.463  Walker used this 
information, as well as the government reports published by Swinnerton and Sawyer, to 
launch BTL’s cultured quartz project in March 1946.    
The U.S. Army Signal Corps, unwilling to leave American cultured quartz 
research solely in BTL’s hands, soon established its own program, organized and 
managed by the Fort Monmouth, New Jersey-based Signal Corps Engineering 
Laboratories (SCEL).  The Labs’ limited research and production facilities meant that the 
bulk of the research would be performed by university and industry groups on a 
contractual basis.  SCEL personnel would make funding decisions as well as coordinate 
the overall research effort.  To this end, the Signal Corps announced at the 1946 annual 
meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science that it was 
launching a new frequency control research program, whereby researchers could apply 
for multi-year funding.464  Designed to sponsor research related to any aspect of 
frequency control technology, the SCEL program supported investigations on a wide 
range of topics in addition to quartz crystal growth, including the fabrication of QCUs, 
oscillator circuitry, the chemical and physical properties of quartz crystal, and the 
synthesis of non-quartz piezoelectric crystal types, such as tourmaline and nepheline.465  
The last topic in this list hedged against the possible failure of the quartz crystal growth 
project, for despite the limited successes of Nacken in Germany and the Wooster team in 
England, no one was certain that further research would yield a commercially-viable 
                                                 
463 Ernest Buehler and A.C. Walker, "Growing Quartz Crystals," The Scientific Monthly 69, no. 3 
(September 1949): 148-55. 
464 Danforth R. Hale, "The Laboratory Growing of Quartz," Science 107, no. 2781 (16 April 1948): 393-94. 
465 Arthur Ballato, "Introduction to the Historical Section" (50th IEEE International Frequency Control 
Symposium, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Forth Monmouth, NJ, June 1996), 4-23.  See Appendix. 
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production process.  Considerable risk was involved, as is always the case with 
exploratory research. 
 The first organizations to apply for and receive SCEL cultured quartz research 
contracts were the Brush Development Company, led by Charles Sawyer, and Antioch 
College, Allyn Swinnerton’s home institution.466  Clearly, Sawyer and Swinnerton 
leveraged their Scientific Consultant positions with the TIIC to win these contracts.  
Antioch’s task was to extend Nacken’s laboratory work by determining the optimum 
conditions for controlled quartz growth and by developing a theory explaining the 
mechanism of hydrothermal crystal growth.467  Brush was to then use this knowledge to 
develop a scalable and economical quartz production process. 
 Leading the research effort at Brush Development were two men – Hans Jaffe, a 
German Jew with a Ph.D. in crystal physics from the University of Goettingen, and 
Danforth Hale, an American whose previous positions included chemistry professor at a 
small college and research chemist for RCA.468  Emigrating to the U.S. in 1935, Jaffe had 
the good fortune to meet Walter Cady, who agreed to hire him as a lab assistant in the 
Wesleyan University Physics Lab.469  Impressed with his abilities, Cady soon promoted 
Jaffe to Assistant Professor, a position he held until 1940.  During his five years at 
Wesleyan, Jaffe ably assisted Cady in generating and organizing data for his forthcoming 
book on piezoelectricity.470  In 1940, he left academia to take a position with Brush 
                                                 
466 SCEL Annual Report for FY 1947, SCEL Annual Reports, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories 
Collection, Historical Files of Fort Monmouth, Fort Monmouth, NJ. 
467 James F. Corwin and A.C. Swinnerton, "The Growth of Quartz in Alkali Halide Solutions," Journal of 
the American Chemical Society 73, no. 8 (19 August 1951): 3598-601. 
468 Rudolf Bechmann and Danforth R. Hale, "Electronic Grade Synthetic Quartz," Brush Strokes 4, no. 1 
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469 See Chapters 2, 4, and 5 for more on Walter Cady. 
470 Walter Guyton Cady, Piezoelectricity; An Introduction to the Theory and Applications of 
Electromechanical Phenomena in Crystals (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946).  This book was Cady’s 
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Development in Cleveland, where he began researching synthetic substitutes for Rochelle 
Salt.471  In 1946, Brush management tapped Jaffe to head the company’s new cultured 
quartz project.  It was also at this time that Hale left RCA to join Brush.  For the next ten 
years or so, the two men worked closely with Swinnerton at nearby Antioch College on 
the culturing of quartz crystal. 
 To help manage and coordinate the numerous frequency control projects that it 
sponsored, the SCEL sponsored and organized a frequency control symposium in 1947.  
Held at the Labs’ headquarters in Fort Monmouth, this meeting brought together 
representatives from the War and Navy departments, universities and firms holding 
research contracts, and members of the new Joint Research and Development Board 
(JRDB), created by Vannevar Bush and Lloyd Berkner in 1946 to succeed the Office of 
Scientific Research and Development (OSRD).472  This board reviewed Department of 
War and Navy research projects “in order to avoid duplication” as well as to “filter out 
and terminate mediocre or wasteful efforts.”473  Despite the heavy military representation 
at the first symposium, the proceedings were largely free of secrecy.  In fact, SCEL 
research policy explicitly stipulated that “research programs be conducted with a 
minimum of security restrictions in order to permit interchange of information and 
                                                                                                                                                 
magnum opus and, upon its publication in 1946, quickly became the “Bible” of piezoelectric crystal 
engineering. 
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freedom of work.”474  The stated aims of this policy were to minimize time delays in 
applying new technologies to military equipment and to make the new knowledge gained 
generally available to the research community.475 
 Over the next several years, the GEC, BTL, and SCEL cultured quartz research 
efforts progressed independently.  The team of Wooster and Wooster continued to head 
the British research effort, but the financial support and resources of GEC greatly 
expedited their work.  The BTL research team soon grew to include researchers Ernest 
Buehler and R. A. Laudise.476  Along with Walker, these three men worked full-time on 
the culturing of quartz.  As for the SCEL, the success of its first frequency control 
symposium persuaded the Labs to make it an annual event.   
 
8.4  The nature of cultured quartz research 
 Cultured quartz research proceeded slowly through the late 1940s and early 
1950s, not for lack of finances or focused effort, but simply because of the newness of the 
field and the enormous amount of work required.  Theory was of very little help to 
researchers, largely because there was an insufficient base of experimental data on 
cultured quartz growth.  Furthermore, as has already been mentioned, success was far 
from guaranteed.  No one knew for sure that further research would yield a rapid and 
scalable process for culturing quartz crystal.  Yet, the Zeitgeist within the scientific and 
technical communities just after World War II was, if anything, can-do.  The remarkable 
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technological achievements of the war had given many engineers the feeling that just 
about anything could be accomplished if enough resources were provided. 
 Though generous resources were certainly provided for cultured quartz research, 
many technical problems proved frustratingly stubborn.  This was not open-ended, blue 
sky research; rather, it had a definite goal – to grow large, high quality quartz crystals 
rapidly and with high yield (i.e., the growth process would yield very little waste 
product).  No one, however, knew just how to get there. 
 Because of the prior successes of Spezia and Nacken, all major post-WWII quartz 
research teams decided to focus their efforts on the hydrothermal method of crystal 
growth.  Though other methods existed, this one was seen as providing the best chance of 
success.  But the hydrothermal method, as described earlier, encompassed a bewildering 
array of variable process parameters, such as autoclave temperature and type of solvent 
solution: there was no single correct way to implement the method.  Furthermore, the 
process parameters were interdependent, and no one knew the precise relationship 
between each parameter and crystal growth rate or crystal quality.  Painstaking 
experimentation – the systematic varying of each process parameter and observation of 
results – was the only way to discover these relationships.   
 Of all the process parameters of the hydrothermal method, two stood out as 
particularly consequential.  These were temperature variation within the autoclave, and 
nutrient material.  Concerning temperature variation, there were basically two options 
available, the temperature differential method and the isothermal method.  Spezia 
pioneered the first, in which a heating element was applied to one end of the autoclave, 
the other end remaining unheated.  This set up a temperature differential within the 
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autoclave, giving rise to convection currents in the solvent solution.  Nacken consciously 
rejected Spezia’s temperature variation technique, instead pioneering the isothermal 
method in which the entire autoclave is heated to a uniform temperature. 
 The choice of temperature differential or isothermal was far from arbitrary; the 
two scientists chose between these two based upon the nutrient material available to 
them.  Spezia chose crushed quartz crystal, while Nacken chose fused silica, also known 
as vitreous quartz, fused quartz, or, most commonly, glass.  These two materials are both 
forms of silicon dioxide (SiO2), the only chemical difference being that the atoms of the 
first are organized into a single crystal lattice, while the atoms of the later are fused 
together in an amorphous manner.  Spezia, working in Italy around the turn of the 
century, a time of relative peace, knew that large, flawless quartz crystals were relatively 
rare in nature, but he would have had no reason to question the availability in general of 
quartz crystal, particularly the smaller, flaw-ridden kind common in granite.  Nacken, 
however, faced a very different circumstance.  Since wartime Germany’s supply of quartz 
crystal was quite limited, Nacken capitalized on the fact that fused quartz, which is the 
primary ingredient of common sand, is among the most abundant of all naturally 
occurring materials.  Nazi Germany, even at the height of its procurement problems, 
would not have had trouble securing abundant quantities of fused quartz.   
When performing his pioneering temperature differential experiments, Spezia 
placed his crushed quartz nutrient in the top of the autoclave and the crystal seed beneath 
this.  He then applied heat to the autoclave’s top, thereby dissolving the crushed quartz in 
the solvent solution.  This dissolved quartz slowly diffused down to the crystal seed, 
where the slightly cooler temperatures transformed the enriched solvent into a 
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supersaturated solution, thus facilitating the deposition of the dissolved quartz onto the 
seed.  Essentially, this process transformed a multitude of tiny, flaw-riddled crystals into 
one large flawless crystal, as shown in Figure 42.  It was crucial that the crystal seed be 
placed at the cooler end of the autoclave; otherwise, the seed itself might begin to 
dissolve in the solvent.  As discussed earlier, Spezia achieved very slow growth rates 
with this process, but by sustaining it for as long as six months, he could grow sizable 
crystals.     
 
 
Figure 42: A Large, Flawless 
Cultured Quartz Crystal 
(Reprinted by permission from Macmillan 
Publishers Ltd: Nature, Brown, Kell, 
Thomas, Wooster, and Wooster, “Growth of 
Large Quartz Crystals,” 167, no. 4258, 9 
June 1951: 940-941), ©1951) 
 
 
Nacken, however, was not satisfied with Spezia’s temperature differential method 
because of its dependence upon natural quartz crystal as the nutrient.  Quartz crystal, 
even in crushed form, was in short supply in Nazi Germany.  Nacken wanted a more 
accessible nutrient material.  He therefore used fused silica, a substance that Germany, or 
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any other nation for that matter, would have no trouble procuring.  Yet the temperature 
gradient method did not work particularly well with it.  Through much research, Nacken 
ingeniously exploited the large difference in the solubilities of quartz crystal and fused 
silica.  He found that near the critical point of water (374.2oC, 218 Atmospheres), the 
solubility of fused silica is much greater than that of quartz crystal.  Thus, as Nacken 
heated his autoclave to a uniform temperature, the fused silica nutrient rapidly dissolved, 
creating a supersaturated solvent solution well before the quartz crystal seed itself was in 
danger of dissolving.  As the seed was bathed in the supersaturated solution, rapid 
deposition (i.e., seed growth) occured.   
 But Nacken ran into a thorny problem with his isothermal method.  As captured 
German reports indicated, seed growth rates within the first several hours of autoclave 
heating were remarkably high, but could not be sustained.  In fact, all seed growth came 
to a virtual halt within twenty-four hours.  At this point, the only thing to do was bring 
the autoclave back to room temperature, drain it, refill it with fresh solvent and nutrient 
material, and restart the process with the seed preserved from the former growth cycle.  
Through the laborious process of refreshing the autoclave every day for many weeks, 
Nacken was able to grow his one inch diameter quartz crystals. 
 Thus, in 1946, as the post-WWII quartz research teams began their work, the 
knowledge of hydrothermal quartz growth could be broadly summarized as follows.  
Spezia’s method of using the temperature gradient technique with a nutrient of crushed 
quartz crystal yielded seed growth that could be sustained for months, but at an extremely 
slow growth rate.  On the other hand, Nacken’s use of the isothermal technique with a 
nutrient of fused silica yielded seed growth at a far faster rate, but the growth could be 
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sustained for only a day or so.  The trick, of course, was to devise a method that 
combined Nacken’s growth rate with Spezia’s sustainability of growth.   
Researchers were well aware that process parameters of the hydrothermal method 
other than temperature variation and nutrient material also affected cultured quartz 
growth.  Among these were autoclave size and shape, whether or not to artificially agitate 
the autoclave contents during crystal growth, composition and concentration of solvent 
solution, whether or not various impurities should be added to the solvent solution, the 
cut or crystal lattice orientation of the seed crystal, and the autoclave’s internal 
temperature-pressure operating point.  The precise effect of any of these parameters on 
crystal growth was largely an open research question in 1946. 
 Surveying the state of things, the Wooster and BTL teams independently decided 
to use Nacken’s isothermal technique as a starting point, reasoning that it would be easier 
devising ways to sustain Nacken’s process than figuring out how to accelerate Spezia’s.  
After all, at this time no one was quite sure what halted isothermal crystal growth after 
only a day.  Perhaps the problem would be easily identified and solved.  Not far into their 
research, however, the teams ran into the same wall that Nacken had encountered – 
though initial growth rates were very rapid, all crystal growth abruptly stopped within 
sixteen to twenty-four hours of heating the autoclave.  Neither team was able to surmount 
this technical barrier. 
 
8.5  The Brush Development Company makes a breakthrough 
Meanwhile, the Brush and Antioch team, which began its research in early 1947, 
had the benefit of learning from Wooster and BTL’s difficulties.  Danforth Hale of Brush 
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decided to start with Spezia’s temperature gradient method, wagering that he could find a 
way to accelerate growth.  Rather than simply replicate Spezia’s experimental setup, Hale 
made a simple but very important modification.  As shown in Figure 43, he hung the 
crystal seed at the top, placed the nutrient material in the bottom, and applied heat only to 
the autoclave’s base, essentially inverting Spezia’s setup.  This simple change, along with 
using a sodium carbonate solution and raising the autoclave’s internal temperature and 
pressure, resulted in a 26% increase in quartz growth rate.477  By the end of 1948, Hale 
had used his method to grow a flawless 1.5” diameter quartz crystal, the largest yet 
produced in a laboratory.478 
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Figure 43: Autoclave Setup Similar to That 
Developed by Danforth Hale of Brush 
Development Company 
(From Ernest Buehler and A.C. Walker, “Growing 
Quartz Crystals,” The Scientific Monthly 69, no. 3, 
(September 1949): 150 pp: 148-155.  Reprinted with 
permission from AAAS.) 
 
 
Hale’s simple inversion of Spezia’s autoclave represented a fundamental 
evolution in scientific understanding.  To Spezia’s way of thinking, the nutrient material 
(i.e., crushed quartz crystal) should be held at the top of the autoclave.  Once dissolved by 
the applied heat, the nutrient would naturally fall, via gravity, down to the crystal seed at 
the autoclave’s base.  What Spezia, along with everyone else in the scientific community, 
did not understand in the first decade of the 20th century were the processes of natural 
convection and molecular diffusion.  As became evident with scientific discoveries made 
in the 1920s and ‘30s, the only natural mechanism for transporting dissolved nutrient 
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from autoclave top to base in Spezia’s setup was molecular diffusion, a tediously slow 
process.  By the time of Hale’s experiments, it was well known that heating a vertical 
column of fluid from the bottom makes the lower fluid less dense than the higher, 
creating an upward buoyancy force.  The result, called natural convection, is bulk 
movement of the fluid from base to top, with cooled fluid returning to the base along the 
sides of the vertical column.  Natural convection, which requires the presence of a 
gravitational field, is a much more rapid process than diffusion, meaning that dissolved 
nutrient is transported to the crystal seed at a much higher speed.479  Developments in 
atomic physics and thermodynamics in the first half of the 20th century changed the way 
that scientists looked at the world.  Hale was a beneficiary of these developments.  What 
to him seemed a very reasonable autoclave setup probably never occurred to Spezia forty 
years earlier. 
Hale’s findings, first published in 1948 in the journal Science, greatly influenced 
the BTL and Wooster research teams, both who promptly abandoned their isothermal 
experiments to focus on temperature gradient crystal growth.  In 1949, Walker and the 
BTL team replicated and then bested Hale’s results by realizing three modifications: 
substituting sodium hydroxide for sodium carbonate as the solute; increasing the 
temperature differential from autoclave base to top; and raising the autoclave’s internal 
pressure from 200-300 atmospheres to around 1000 atmospheres.480  Realizing the last of 
these modifications required developing a new autoclave design that could withstand 
                                                 
479 A. F. Mills, Heat and Mass Transfer (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1995), 293. 
480 Ernest Buehler and A.C. Walker, "Growing Quartz Crystals," The Scientific Monthly 69, no. 3 
(September 1949): 148-55. 
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high internal pressures.481  The development of such a device proved to be a significant 
engineering challenge. 
 
8.6  Bell Telephone Laboratories develops the high-pressure autoclave 
If Hale’s inversion of Spezia’s setup represents the single most important 
development in post-WWII cultured quartz research, BTL’s development of the high-
pressure autoclave is a close second.482  While attempting to improve on the Brush crystal 
growth technique, A. C. Walker learned of recent geological research on the relationship 
between gas solubility and gas density.483  This research showed that the solubility of 
silica began progressively increasing at around 1000 atmospheres.484  Walker reasoned 
that if he could raise an autoclave’s internal pressure to this level, the increased solubility 
of silica might produce a richer nutrient solution, thus accelerating crystal growth.  But 
higher autoclave pressures could be quite dangerous.  At one point, while testing a new 
autoclave temperature control unit, BTL researchers accidentally allowed the chamber’s 
internal pressure to rise above 1350 atmospheres.  The device exploded, destroying the 
insulated furnace that held it.  No researchers were injured, but the accident highlighted 
the urgent need for an improved autoclave design.485 
BTL received vital help from others in developing its new autoclave.  Prior to 
learning of Hale’s success at Brush Development and while still experimenting with the 
                                                 
481 Mean sea level atmospheric pressure is approximately one atmosphere.   
482 A.C. Walker and E. Buehler, "Growing Large Quartz Crystals," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry 
42, no. 7 (July 1950): 1369-75.  “Perhaps the most important factor in the success of this work has been the 
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483 A.C. Walker, "Hydrothermal Synthesis of Quartz Crystals," Journal of the American Ceramic Society 
36, no. 8 (August 1953): 250-56. 
484 Ibid. ( 
485 A.C. Walker and E. Buehler, "Growing Large Quartz Crystals," Industrial and Engineering Chemistry 
42, no. 7 (July 1950): 1369-75. 
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isothermal method, BTL had been using an autoclave with internal dimensions of only 1 
inch diameter and 1 inch depth.  Once the decision was made to move to the temperature 
gradient method, BTL received important information from Brush on its autoclaves.  
Namely, Brush had been using a 1 inch diameter and 12 inch deep autoclave constructed 
of welded steel and employing a 0.5 inch thick steel wall surrounding the growth 
chamber.  BTL took this design, fortified it with additional features, and added a pressure 
release valve for safety.  The resulting autoclave design, illustrated in Figure 44, could 
generate and maintain an internal pressure in the neighborhood of 1000 atmospheres for 
weeks or even months.  
 
 
 
Figure 44: Cross-Section of High-Pressure Autoclave 
Developed at Bell Telephone Labs, Circa Late 1940s 
(Reprinted, by permission of Wiley-Balckwell Publishers, from A.C. 
Walker, “Hydrothermal Synthesis of Quartz Crystals,” Journal of the 
American Ceramic Society 36, no. 8 (August 1953): 250-256.) 
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Walker considered his BTL research team’s success with the high-pressure 
temperature gradient crystal growth method a turning point in cultured quartz research.  
Writing in 1949, he stated, “It is still too early in the development to quantitatively relate 
temperature gradient, size of nutrient material, and bomb dimensions to growth rate, but 
these factors can be correlated, and sufficient progress has been made so that it is clear 
that large perfect quartz crystals weighing up to one pound or more may be grown at 
commercially practicable rates under reproducible conditions.”486  (Italics are mine.)  In 
other words, BTL had demonstrated the technical feasibility of cultured quartz growth.  
In recognition of his achieving “controlled growth of piezoelectric crystal in sizes 
suitable for commercial and military use,” the Franklin Institute awarded its Louis 
Edward Levy Medal to Walker in 1951.487  But technical feasibility was only the first 
step in replacing natural with cultured quartz in the marketplace.  Engineers still had to 
work out quantitative relationships between the hydrothermal method’s many process 
parameters.  Beyond that, BTL’s successful laboratory procedure had to be converted into 
a scalable and efficient production process.  Furthermore, such a process had to be 
implemented on a large enough scale such that sufficient economies of scale could be 
realized, making cultured quartz affordable.  Finally, customers had to be convinced that 
cultured quartz was functionally identical to natural quartz.  Of course, there was no 
guarantee that any of these things would happen.  In particular, the economic feasibility 
of cultured quartz remained very much in doubt.   Brush and BTL’s laboratory growth of 
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cultured quartz was essentially a scientific achievement, and a very limited one at that.  
The economic and social achievement of replacing natural with cultured quartz in the 
marketplace was another matter altogether.  If possible, it would require many more years 
of continued Signal Corps investment and engineering research. 
 
8.7  The Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories organizes a parallel approach to the 
cultured quartz problem 
 
In 1950, the SCEL invited BTL to present its cultured quartz progress to the 
Fourth Annual Frequency Control Symposium.  Since 1947, the symposium had 
continued to grow each year; by 1950, it was quickly becoming an international mecca 
for all things frequency control.  BTL’s presentation that year lasted only fifteen minutes, 
but it led to the Labs’ receiving a cultured quartz contract.  The SCEL offered this 
contract not because BTL needed the money to continue its research.  As is well-known, 
BTL was at this time the premier industrial R&D lab in the U.S., generously funded 
through AT&T’s government-protected monopoly on telephony.  But the SCEL wanted 
to direct all U.S. cultured quartz research, eliminating duplications of effort and realizing 
as quickly as possible a commercially viable cultured quartz industry.   
To this end, the SCEL implemented a division of labor between BTL and Brush 
Development, with each team working on a different variant of temperature gradient 
crystal growth.  This was in accordance with one of the Research and Development 
Board’s explicit policies.  “Truly fundamental scientific endeavor appears to thrive best 
under competition, and parallel (not identical) approaches to the same problem is often 
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most beneficial and gives a greater assurance of ultimate success.”488  Undoubtedly, this 
policy was based, at least in part, on the OSRD’s success during WWII with this 
approach, particularly the multiple and simultaneous paths pursued in realizing the 
atomic bomb.489   
The SCEL’s cultured quartz division of labor was quite simple.  Brush 
Development was to focus on low to medium pressure (81-340 atm) crystal growth, while 
BTL would investigate high pressure (816-1020 atm) growth.  The logic of this division 
stemmed from uncertainty as to what pressure would yield the best balance between 
crystal growth rate, crystal quality, yield of crystal growth per quantity of nutrient, and 
cost.  Lower pressures tended to yield high quality, clear crystals and a high yield for low 
to moderate cost.  This was often accompanied, however, by slower growth rates.  Higher 
pressures, though producing more rapid growth rates, were harder to control and tended 
to produce an effect called spurious crystallization or self-nucleation, in which tiny quartz 
crystals would form throughout the autoclave chamber.  This effect was highly 
undesirable because of the low yields that resulted.  Furthermore, the capital costs for 
high pressure crystal growth were considerably more than for low or medium pressure 
growth.  Not only did the autoclaves have to be larger and thicker, but they often had to 
be given their own insulated rooms or cells in case of explosion.   
The research at Brush and BTL now proceeded along parallel lines, and both 
teams continued to encounter difficulties.  Progress was slow, in part because each trial 
                                                 
488 SCEL Annual Report for FY 1949, 74, SCEL Annual Reports, Signal Corps Engineering Laboratories 
Collection, Historical Files of Fort Monmouth, Fort Monmouth, NJ. 
489 The Manhattan Project involved the simultaneous pursuit of two possible fissile materials, plutonium 
and uranium-235, as well as two separate procedures for generating uranium-235.  See, for example, pages 
381-416 of Thomas Parke Hughes, American Genesis: a century of invention and technological 
enthusiasm, 1870-1970 (New York: Viking, 1989). 
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run of crystal growth lasted anywhere from ten days to several months.  Both teams ran 
many simultaneous trials, with a particular process parameter systematically varied 
across the trials.  Another complicating factor was the interdependence of process 
parameters; it was impossible to vary one process parameter, say, solution concentration, 
without affecting others.  General qualitative relations between any one parameter and 
the crystal growth rate were gradually discerned as researchers accumulated data, but 
precise quantitative relations – the kind that engineers need to optimize production 
processes – were far harder to determine.490 
The researchers at Brush and BTL were stepping gingerly into a technological 
terrain in which little was known with certainty.  As is always the case with exploratory 
research, developments that initially appeared promising were later viewed as dead ends 
or boondoggles.  One case in point was the dual-chamber rocking autoclave, designed by 
Brush Development and filed with the U.S. Patent Office in 1950.491  Illustrated in Figure 
45, this apparatus, an attempt to improve on BTL’s high-pressure autoclave design, 
divided the traditional single autoclave chamber into two separate chambers connected by 
two narrow channel pipes.  One chamber, called the “silica-dissolving” chamber, 
contained raw nutrient material while the other, known as the quartz-growing chamber, 
contained the seed crystal.  Warm nutrient-enriched solution was to pass from the silica-
dissolving to the quartz-growing chamber via one channel pipe, while cooled nutrient-
depleted solution would return to the silica-dissolving chamber via another pipe.  By 
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allowing the entire apparatus to be periodically tilted or rocked in one direction and then 
another, a steady flow of nutrient solution throughout the autoclave was maintained. 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Dual-Chamber Rocking Autoclave, Developed by Brush 
Development Company, Circa 1950 
(Source: U.S. Patent Office, Patent No. 2,675,303 ) 
 
 
Initial results for the dual-chamber rocking autoclave were encouraging.  It 
accelerated crystal growth and improved yield.  Yet this performance came at a high cost; 
the new autoclave was considerably more expensive than the single-chamber design.  A 
cost benefit study conducted in 1955 indicated that the single-chamber autoclave, despite 
its slower and less efficient growth, was roughly 40% more cost-efficient than the dual-
 292 
chamber rocking autoclave.492  Brush thus abandoned the new autoclave, writing it off as 
a high but perhaps unavoidable cost of doing research.   
 
 
8.8  SCEL selects Brush Development to construct a cultured quartz pilot plant 
By 1951, the Signal Corps was confident enough in the medium-pressure research 
results obtained at Brush to begin funding construction of a pilot plant.  While BTL’s 
growth rates remained higher than Brush’s, the former’s high-pressure growth process 
was, as stated earlier, much more expensive than medium-pressure growth.  Thus, the 
Signal Corps considered Brush’s process the more economically feasible of the two.   
Brush broke ground on its cultured quartz pilot plant near company headquarters 
in Bedford, Ohio, a suburb of Cleveland.  Construction was completed by the fall of 
1953, and the Signal Corps awarded the company a one-year “industrial preparedness 
study” contract, according to which Brush would deliver five hundred pounds of cultured 
quartz to the Corps in exchange for $120,000, or $240 per pound of quartz.  Over the 
coming year, as the Corps received cultured quartz shipments from Brush, it forwarded 
them on to on to QCU manufacturers around the country for evaluation.493  In all, fifteen 
firms received this experimental quartz, with more than half the total amount 
concentrated among five firms – the Standard Piezo Company and the Hunt Corporation, 
                                                 
492 Brush Laboratories Company, President’s Report, July 1955, Folder 6, Box 2, Series III, Charles 
Baldwin Sawyer Collection, Department of Special Collections, Kelvin Smith Library, Case Western 
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493 Hans Jaffe et al., “October 1953 Quartz Update,” Folder “R&D Committee Minutes – 1953 (I),” Box 23, 
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both of Carlisle, Pennsylvania; Bliley Electric of Erie, PA; the James Knight Company of 
Sandwich, Illinois; and Western Electric.494   
Brush didn’t assume that all QCU manufacturers would love its cultured quartz.  
Anticipating that some customers might continue to prefer natural Brazilian quartz, the 
company hired Dr. Rudolf Bechmann in 1953 to conduct scientific comparisons of the 
two.495  Bechmann, the former head of Telefunken’s Crystal Laboratory in Nazi 
Germany, immigrated to England after the war, where he worked for several years with 
the British Post Office Research Station in London studying the piezoelectric properties 
of various synthetic materials.  His coming to Brush brought the company the 
mathematical sophistication and theoretical brilliance for which German science had 
become well known.  Bechmann’s research findings revealed small differences in the 
frequency-temperature behavior of Brush’s cultured versus natural quartz, but these 
differences would have been largely invisible to most users.496  In confirmation of 
Bechmann’s work, those receiving evaluation shipments from the Signal Corps were 
pleased, not detecting any noticeable performance difference between natural and the 
new quartz.  The price difference was, however, another matter. 
Brush’s pilot plant project proceeded without any major delays, but economics 
continued to concern some project leaders.  In early 1955, when Western Electric was 
paying $27.50 per pound for raw natural Brazilian quartz crystal, Brush was preparing to 
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introduce its cultured quartz into the marketplace at $52.50 per pound.497  While the 
military may have been willing to purchase at such a price, the company didn’t have a 
chance with the private commercial sector unless its salesmen could demonstrate to 
customers some inherent superiority of cultured over natural quartz.  As it turned out, this 
wasn’t difficult to do. 
 
8.9  Brush sells its cultured quartz 
Brush engineers and salesmen stressed to potential customers that cultured quartz 
had the same advantage over natural quartz that all artificially produced materials have 
over their natural counterparts.  Namely, artificially grown quartz could be tailored to a 
customer’s specific needs.  Initially this simply meant that the quartz could be grown to a 
size and shape that would accommodate the customer’s blanks.  “Blank” was the term 
used for the sliced quartz wafer, shown in Figure 46, employed in making one QCU.  By 
purchasing grown quartz crystals of varying sizes and shapes, customers were able to 
maximize the number of blanks that could be cut from a single crystal, thus minimizing 
scrap quartz.  On the other hand, Brush was sure to emphasize that with natural crystals, 
one was never sure how many useful blanks a particular crystal would yield.  In other 
words, pound for pound, cultured quartz could always be grown to yield more blanks 
than natural quartz, saving customers money and reducing unusable scrap quartz.  
Writing in 1948, Danforth Hale estimated that, depending upon the quality of raw quartz 
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that cultured quartz was replacing, reductions in scrap quartz of around 20% could be 
expected.498   
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Slab of Large Cultured Quartz Crystal, Shown with 
Rectangular and Circular Blanks 
(Personal photograph of Richard J. Thompson, Jr.  Reprinted by permission.  
thompsor@strose.edu) 
 
 
But Brush also stressed that the made-to-order nature of cultured quartz could 
potentially mean much more than a reduction in scrap material.  As Rudolf Bechmann’s 
research from the mid-1950s showed, the addition of trace amounts of other elements, 
such as germanium dioxide, to the growth solution would modify the frequency-
                                                 
498 Danforth R. Hale, "The Laboratory Growing of Quartz," Science 107, no. 2781 (16 April 1948): 393-94. 
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temperature characteristic of cultured quartz.499  For some specialized applications, this 
would be desirable.  Despite the promise of this technique, years of additional research 
would be required to perfect it.  But once perfected, it would allow users to customize 
cultured quartz, optimizing technical performance for different uses. 
By the time Brush offered its cultured quartz for sale in 1955, several QCU 
manufacturers, including Western Electric, Bliley Electric, and the James Knight 
Company were willing to buy at the initial asking price of $52.50 per pound.500  While 
still more expensive than natural quartz, Brush’s quartz was considerably more affordable 
than BTL’s.  No cost data is available for the latter since neither BTL nor Western 
Electric ever sold its quartz commercially, but BTL’s high-pressure hydrothermal process 
was undoubtedly much more expensive than Brush’s medium-pressure process.  
Nevertheless, AT&T began funding construction of a high-pressure pilot plant in the 
mid-1950s, hoping to use the resulting quartz in the Bell System’s multiplex telephony 
wave filters (see Chapter 6).  Operated by Western Electric, the plant succeeded in 
demonstrating large-scale, high-pressure production of cultured quartz by late 1958.501  
Perhaps more of a technical feat than Brush’s accomplishment, Western Electric’s quartz 
was nevertheless too expensive to compete with Brush’s.  Its chief advantage was rapid 
turnaround.  This would have certainly been desirable for the military during wartime.  
But for the commercial marketplace, rapid turnaround was not enough of an advantage to 
justify the extra cost. 
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The customers buying Brush’s cultured quartz in the mid-1950s were for the most 
part using it to fabricate QCU’s for civilian applications: broadcast radio transmitters and 
two-way radios for airline, police, emergency responder, taxi, and railroad use.  The total 
civilian market for QCU’s at this time was an estimated 750,000 units per year, with the 
vast majority of QCU’s still using natural Brazilian quartz.502  But a new civilian 
application was emerging that, according to Brush estimates, had the potential to expand 
the QCU market by a factor of ten.503  This application was color television. 
David Sarnoff, head of RCA, had set color television as one of his company’s 
goals even before World War II.  Delayed by the war and the subsequent Korean War, 
RCA finally began to realize this goal in 1953.  It was in this year that the National 
Production Authority lifted its wartime ban on color television production.  Also in this 
year, the FCC adopted a color TV transmission standard specifying that each television 
set was to internally generate a frequency of 3.579545 MHz +/- 10 Hz for separating 
control and color information in the received broadcast signal.504  The only device known 
at this time to be capable of generating such a precise and accurate frequency was the 
QCU.  Therefore, every color TV set produced in the U.S. would have to contain at least 
one QCU.  This was just the kind of application – one requiring tens of thousands of 
identical quartz wafers – that Brush needed in order to realize economies of scale in its 
production of cultured quartz.  Indeed, color television promised to be the “Model T” of 
QCU applications.  But the growth rate for this new market failed to meet Sarnoff’s bold 
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prediction of five million color sets by 1958.505  Nevertheless, once growth did take off in 
the 1960s, most of the QCUs in color TV sets were made from cultured rather than 
natural quartz. 
 
 
8.10  “…the end of ten years of happy struggle with synthetic quartz” 
 In May of 1956, the SCEL held its 10th Annual Frequency Control Symposium at 
an Asbury Park, New Jersey hotel.  The annual meeting had grown rapidly through the 
early 1950s, requiring the move from Fort Monmouth to nearby Asbury Park.  Not only 
had it size grown, but so had the diversity of participants.  The first few symposia saw a 
largely domestic audience.  But in 1956, “representatives of governmental agencies and 
commercial organization from Australia, Belgium, Canada, England, France, Germany, 
and the Netherlands” also attended the symposium.506  If the annual meeting had ever 
been cloaked in concerns for national security, that time had clearly passed.  Its attendee 
list now comprised an international elite group of representatives from government, 
industry, and academia.   
At the 10th Symposium, Danforth Hale of Brush Development gave a final report 
on his firm’s quartz work.  “This Symposium marks the end of ten years of happy 
struggle with synthetic quartz.”507  Brush’s Bedford Pilot Plant had produced more than 
2000 pounds of synthetic quartz under SCEL contracts.  Some of the crystals produced 
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were as large as 3 pounds, and some of the crystal batches had produced as many as 190 
individual crystals weighing a total of nearly 100 pounds.  Never had cultured quartz 
been produced on such a scale.  Hale went on to compare his company’s quartz with 
natural quartz.  “The total cost of the synthetic [sic] quartz produced [at Bedford] has 
been admittedly a little high.”  Indeed, the Signal Corps had invested at least $620,000, or 
$300 per pound, in Brush’s cultured quartz program.508  But Hale continued.  
“Nevertheless, because of high quality, advantageous shape, uniformity of product, 
freedom from twinning, … synthetic [sic] quartz is believed to be nearly competitive with 
natural Brazilian quartz.”509  “Nearly” competitive was correct, for cultured quartz’s 
selling price remained significantly higher than that of natural quartz.  Even so, as already 
mentioned, several QCU manufacturers had expressed interest in Brush’s product.  Hale 
ended his report by stating that Brush had closed its Bedford Pilot Plant in March 1956 
and was awaiting disposition orders from the Signal Corps Supply Agency.  The 
company would not be moving into full commercial production of cultured quartz. 
 Brush’s decision to close its pilot plant and withdraw from the cultured quartz 
business reflected both the termination of its Signal Corps quartz contracts and recent 
changes in ownership at the company.  In 1952, both the Brush Development Company 
and the Brush Beryllium Company had merged with the Cleveland Graphite Bronze 
Corporation to form the Clevite Corporation of Cleveland, OH.  Brush Development’s 
name was changed to Brush Electronics, which became a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
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Clevite.  As long as SCEL contracts continued to subsidize the company’s quartz 
research, the new Clevite leadership was happy to let the cultured quartz work continue.  
But in 1955, as this work was drawing to a close, the company faced a decision.  It could 
go commercial with cultured quartz, scaling up to full production at the Bedford Pilot 
Plant and hoping that quartz profits would offset the loss of SCEL contracts, or it could 
withdraw from the business altogether, closing the Bedford plant and selling it off.   
 
8.11  The birth of Sawyer Research Products 
By the summer of 1955, some within the company had begun expressing doubts 
as to the profit potential of cultured quartz.510  In addition, Charles Sawyer wasn’t getting 
along all that well with some of the Clevite leadership.  His reputation as an effective 
scientist-engineer was acknowledged by all, but some were questioning his managerial 
skills because of his “slowness in getting things through to commercialization”511  and his 
occasional failure to “get along with people.”512  There was also the matter of Sawyer’s 
age.  He turned 60 in 1955; to the new Clevite management, he represented the old guard.  
The company wanted new ideas and fresh talent. 
 Charles Sawyer was not without supporters at Clevite, particularly among long-
time Brush Development managers.  In the spring of 1956, one manager, Harry Dodds, 
expressed to Sawyer his feeling that Clevite’s new leadership was ruining the company’s 
Research Center.513  Before long, the two were looking at industrial real estate east of 
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downtown Cleveland.  Very quickly, within a matter of six weeks, the two hatched a plan 
to buy out Clevite’s quartz holdings, including all relevant patents, and start their own 
firm.514  Named Sawyer Research Products (SRP), Inc., the firm’s primary objective 
would be to commercialize cultured quartz.  The plan apparently encountered little to no 
opposition from Clevite, for Sawyer purchased a site for his new company in late summer 
of that year.515  Relieved at Clevite’s response, Sawyer’s new venture allowed him a 
graceful exit from an intractable situation.  As he wrote in his personal journal, “it was 
my only escape.”516 
 Sawyer Research Products didn’t take long to get off the ground.  Within two 
years of purchasing a site, the new company was selling cultured quartz for $27.50 per 
pound, a 47% drop from Clevite’s 1955 price of $52.50.517  This no doubt reflected the 
slow but sure growth of the color television market as well as the continued growth of the 
two-way radio market.  Other markets for cultured quartz continued to emerge, as 
evidenced by the industrial diversity of attendees at the 1959 Annual Frequency Control 
Symposium.  Among the industries represented were aircraft manufacturing, radio 
(broadcast and two-way), telephone, watch manufacturing, and space exploration.518  
SRP supplied cultured quartz to all of these industries, dominating the U.S. cultured 
quartz market.   
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 By the late 1960s, cultured quartz had replaced natural quartz in most 
applications.519  Additionally, SRP had begun supplementing crushed quartz crystal with 
scrap cultured quartz as the material in its production process.  But still, much crushed 
crystal continued to come from Brazil.  In the early 1970s, BTL researchers reassessed 
the known North American sources of quartz and determined that these were sufficient 
for providing nutrient material, finally bringing America’s long dependence on Brazilian 
quartz to an end.520 
 As the popularity of consumer electronics and computers grew throughout the 
remainder of the 20th century, frequency control applications of quartz crystal continued 
to increase.  Any device requiring precise control of frequency or time, be it a color 
television, a VCR, an electronic wristwatch, a personal computer, or a cell phone, needed 
at least one QCU.  By the late 1990s, the annual market for quartz crystal devices had 
reached roughly two billion units, representing a market value of approximately $1.2 
billion.521  By 2000, cultured quartz ranked “second only to silicon in the quantity of 
single crystal materials produced for all electronic applications,” and roughly 2500 to 
3500 tons of cultured quartz crystals were being grown per year.522  The majority of these 
crystals are grown in Japan and China, with only about 10% of the world’s supply being 
                                                 
519 M. D. Fagen, A History of Engineering and Science in the Bell System, 7 vols. (New York: Bell 
Telephone Laboratories, 1985).  Volume VI, Chapter 6, 277. 
520 Ibid.  Volume IV, 532. 
521 John Vig, "Quartz Crystal Resonators and Oscillators for Frequency Control and Timing Applications - 
A Tutorial" [PowerPoint] 1999, U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command, Fort Monmouth, NJ.  
Slide 1-2. 
522 Gary R. Johnson, "History of the Industrial Production and Technical Development of Single Crystal 
Cultured Quartz" (International Frequency Control Symposium and Exhibition, Montreal, Canada, 2004).  
See Abstract.  See also John Vig and Arthur Ballato, "Frequency Control Devices," in Ultrasonic 
Instruments and Devices - Reference for Modern Instrumentation, Techniques, and Technology, ed. 
Emmanuel P. Papadakis (New York: Academic Press, 1999), 638. 
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produced in the U.S.523  Thus, as has happened with so many other American 
technological innovations, the cultured quartz industry that began in the U.S. in the 1940s 
and 1950s has, for the most part, moved overseas.  Even so, through the later 20th century 
and up to the present, no American firm has ever rivaled SRP’s position as the largest 
U.S. producer of cultured quartz.524 
 Today, the technique of cultured quartz production remains largely the same as it 
was in the late 1950s.  Of course, certain aspects of the hydrothermal method have been 
refined, such as the addition of impurities to the solvent solution to slightly modify 
performance characteristics, techniques for accelerating the dissolution of the solid 
nutrient material as the autoclave heats, and the precise measurement and monitoring of 
internal autoclave temperatures by means of robust thermocouples.  But the basic 
methods developed by Brush, the low and medium-pressure method, and by BTL, the 
high-pressure method, are still in use today.  The apparatus involved have remained 
largely the same as well.  As can be seen in Figure 47, autoclaves used by SRP today 
follow the basic design patented by BTL in 1950, and shown earlier in Figure 44.525  This 
is evidence not so much of stagnation in the field of cultured crystal growth.  To the 
contrary, the hydrothermal method of crystal growth has continued to evolve, albeit at a 
slower pace than in the pioneering post-WWII years.  Rather, this is evidence of the 
lasting contributions made by SCEL-supported research in the 1940s and ‘50s.   
                                                 
523 Gary R. Johnson, "History of the Industrial Production and Technical Development of Single Crystal 
Cultured Quartz" (International Frequency Control Symposium and Exhibition, Montreal, Canada, 2004).  
Section IX. 
524 Ibid. 
525 Sawyer Research Products, Technical Brief: Hydrothermal Growth of Quartz. [PDF File] (Accessed 15 
March 2007) available from 
http://www.sawyerresearch.com/Tech%20Brief/Quartz_growth_tech_brief.pdf; Internet. 
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Figure 47: Cross-Sectional Diagram of Modern 
Autoclave, Circa 2000 
(Reprinted, by permission of Sawyer Technical Meterials, 
from Technical Brief, 
http://www.sawyerresearch.com/Tech%20Brief/Quartz_gro
wth_tech_brief.pdf.  Accessed 7 February 2009.) 
 
 
8.12  Conclusions 
 The story of the genesis and development of the cultured quartz industry is, above 
all, a tale of military patronage.  Emerging from World War II, American leaders had 
become believers in the power of technology and in the might of American industry.  The 
U.S. now looked to its technological superiority for leverage when dealing with its 
enemies, most notably the Communist Soviet Union.  Wartime military-sponsored 
research had produced or greatly improved an impressive array of technologies: radar, 
microwaves, the atomic bomb, the digital computer, jet aircraft, and, as seen in the 
previous chapter, millions of quartz crystal units, each adhering to a frequency control 
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tolerance on the order of 0.02%.526  After the war, escalating tensions between America 
and the Soviet Union and America’s faith in military-sponsored technology pushed the 
nation into a state of permanent peacetime mobilization.527  The Army Signal Corps’ 
sponsorship of frequency control technology in general and cultured quartz research in 
particular was a prime example of this mobilization.  
What would have become of American quartz crystal technology had not the 
Signal Corps paid the bill for cultured quartz R&D?  Of course, we can only speculate.  
Had not the Signal Corps sponsored cultured quartz R&D, Bell Labs would probably 
have continued its cultured quartz research, but it is very doubtful that cultured quartz 
would have replaced natural quartz as soon as it did.  Brush would probably not have 
entered the cultured quartz area, given the high costs of the research and Brush’s 
inexperience with natural quartz.  This would have given Bell Labs a monopoly on 
cultured quartz.  As with the transistor, anti-monopoly pressures would have forced Bell 
to make its quartz technology available to others through licensing.   But again, all of this 
would have probably happened much slower had not the Signal Corps invested in 
cultured quartz. 
Why did the Corps invest in cultured quartz when it did?  In essence, it was the 
perceived urgency of national security considerations.  The Army had narrowly dodged a 
bullet during World War II, when the supply of natural quartz almost dried up.  Natural 
quartz had become so valuable and scarce only because of Roger Colton’s bold move to 
                                                 
526 "Proceedings of the 10th Annual Frequency Control Symposium", (Asbury Park, NJ, 1956).  See the 
Welcoming Address by Colonel C. W. James, Director of Components Department, Signal Corps 
Engineering Labs. 
527 Alex Roland, The Military-Industrial Complex, ed. Pamela O. Long and Robert C. Post, Historical 
Perspectives on Technology, Society, and Culture (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 
2001). 
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commit Army communications to crystal-control early in the war.  Thus, we can 
plausibly draw a fairly direct connection between Colton’s decision in 1940 to adopt 
crystal-control and the emergence of a commercially viable cultured quartz industry in 
the late 1950s.   
Given the national security concerns surrounding quartz crystal during the war, 
the lack of secrecy around the Signals Corps’ frequency control symposia begun in 1947 
may strike us as odd and even a little reckless.  Why were these symposia as open as they 
were?  The SCEL was committed to openness and free flow of information when state 
secrets were not in danger of being disclosed.  It was felt that such openness would 
ultimately result in more and better technology, particularly when the technology 
involved was “dual-use,” having both military and civilian applications.528  The scientific 
community had long practiced such openness, in part because the economic stakes 
involved were usually not nearly as great as with patentable technologies.  But such 
openness was not usual for military-sponsored technology. 
Furthermore, in the case of cultured quartz, the Army Signal Corps was primarily 
concerned with securing a stable and reliable supply of radio grade quartz for the U.S., 
not in denying this to other nations.  For the U.S., this meant developing the ability to 
artificially grow cultured quartz.  For other nations not facing a shortage of natural 
quartz, cultured quartz would be unnecessary.  In particular, information obtained by 
Charles Sawyer and Allyn Swinnerton during their post-war TIIC trips suggested that the 
Soviet Union might have abundant supplies of natural quartz.529  The Ukraine was known 
to have significant natural quartz deposits, though the quality of these deposits was in 
                                                 
528 Ibid., 23. 
529 Swinnerton learned that Germany had begun importing quartz crystal from the Ukraine once its 
Brazilian source was blocked. 
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question.  Even so, there was the very real possibility that the Soviet Union had more 
than enough natural quartz with which to build QCUs.  Thus, any effort expended in 
keeping cultured quartz knowledge hidden from the Soviets might have been wasted. 
 The story of cultured quartz also illustrates the role played by American 
intelligence teams at the end of World War II in stimulating American post-war industrial 
growth.  These teams proved to be of inestimable value in certain areas of technology, 
such as rocketry.  And immediately following the war, there was much hubbub in the 
American press regarding the “secrets by the thousands” that these teams had obtained 
from German scientists and engineers.530  But for cultured quartz, the role was more 
modest.  As this chapter has shown, the isothermal crystal growth method developed by 
Richard Nacken in Germany in the 1930s and early ‘40s was seriously flawed.  In fact, 
the final methods developed by Brush and BTL bore more resemblance to Giorgio 
Spezia’s temperature differential method than to Nacken’s.  Nevertheless, Nacken’s 
work, as uncovered by TIIC consultants Charles Sawyer and Allyn Swinnerton, 
convinced American and British researchers that cultured quartz could be grown in 
volume and made commercially competitive with natural Brazilian quartz.  This was 
important, for believing that something can be accomplished is the crucial first step 
toward accomplishing it.  Beyond this vital contribution, Nacken’s method turned out to 
be more of a decoy or distraction than an aid in realizing the commercial production of 
cultured quartz.   
 The story of the final replacement, in the late 1950s and 1960s, of natural 
Brazilian quartz by cultured quartz reveals an interesting dialogue over the benefits of 
artificial over naturally occurring materials.  Throughout the 1930s and ‘40s, many 
                                                 
530 C. Lester Walker, "Secrets By The Thousands," Harper's, October 1946. 
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research teams had attempted to develop synthetic materials that could replace natural 
quartz as used in QCU’s.  None succeeded, because none was able to replicate the unique 
electrical characteristics of natural quartz, namely its extremely high frequency 
selectivity. (See Chapter 5.)  Of course, this led some to speculate that man would never 
be able to improve on nature in this case; the long-time span, presumably thousands or 
even millions of years, and unique geologic conditions required to form natural quartz in 
the earth’s crust were, some argued, the only way to realize natural quartz’s electrical 
properties.  Those who refused to buy this argument, including Richard Nacken, gave up 
on synthetic materials and finally resorted to attempting, as had Spezia, to replicate the 
earth’s geologic conditions in the confines of a small, hermetically-sealed laboratory 
apparatus.  Much to their delight, these researchers learned that the process of quartz 
growth could be accelerated by varying temperature, pressure, and other process 
parameters. 
 Nevertheless, cultured quartz inevitably differed slightly from natural quartz.  
But, as this chapter has shown, getting QCU manufacturers to accept cultured quartz was 
not difficult, once its technical performance was shown to be nearly identical to that of 
natural quartz.  Moreover, manufacturers and end users began to prefer cultured quartz 
because of its made-to-order nature, which reduced waste, allowed customers to specify 
technical characteristics, and ultimately, after economies of scale had been achieved, 
lowered the cost of QCU’s.   
Finally, in closing this chapter, we can better understand the significance of the 
development of cultured quartz by comparing and contrasting it with another materials 
science innovation from the mid-20th century – single-crystal semiconductors, 
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particularly silicon.531  Of primary importance is the issue of patronage.  As this chapter 
has illustrated, the development of cultured quartz in the post-war years depended 
heavily, but not exclusively, upon military patronage – specifically, Signal Corps 
contracts.  The commercial promise of the nascent two-way radio and color television 
markets enticed BTL to undertake cultured quartz research without an SCEL contract, but 
even BTL eventually came under the Signal Corps’ patronage as its research progressed.  
For semiconductor crystals, the dependence upon military patronage was less dominant.  
It was military funding during the war that led to the production of extremely pure ingots 
(i.e., polycrystalline masses) of silicon.  Single-crystal silicon growth, however, which 
was crucial for the improvement of early transistor performance, emerged from internal 
Bell Labs research rather than from military contracts.  Thus, silicon as a basis for 
semiconductor technology was developed through both public and private funding. 
Also of importance are the general types of innovations represented by cultured 
quartz and single-crystal semiconductors – whether their influence on technology was 
radical or conservative; whether they provided entirely new functionalities, or simply 
performed an existing function more efficiently, faster, or at a higher performance level.  
After World War II, the scarcity of high-quality natural quartz represented the major 
obstacle or bottleneck to full-scale industrialization of quartz crystal technology.532  The 
innovation of cultured quartz removed this bottleneck, allowing industrialization to 
                                                 
531 The information on semiconductors in this section is drawn from three sources.  Michael Riordan and 
Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire: The Birth of the Information Age, First ed., Sloan Technology Series (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).  Ernest Braun and Stuart MacDonald, Revolution in Miniature: 
The History and Impact of Semiconductor Electronics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 
1978).  Christopher Lecuyer and David C. Brock, "The Materiality of Microelectronics," History and 
Technology 22, no. 3 (September 2006): 301-25. 
532 If we were to view the quartz crystal unit (QCU) as a technological system, then the scarcity of quartz 
could be characterized, in the terminology of Thomas Hughes, as a “reverse salient.”  It seems to me, 
however, that framing the QCU as a system is a misuse of the word “system.”   I’ve therefore chosen to use 
the metaphor of the bottleneck to characterize the scarcity of quartz. 
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proceed unabated.  We may therefore characterize this innovation as one of natural 
resource replacement, cited by Nathan Rosenberg in an influential article as one of the 
most common “inducement mechanisms” in the history of technological change.533  
Cultured quartz was not a radical innovation in the sense of creating new capabilities that 
never existed before.  It simply allowed a technological trend to continue in the face of 
changing natural resource availability.  Furthermore, cultured quartz was and is, for the 
most part, chemically no different from natural quartz.  The process of growing cultured 
quartz is even very similar to the geologic process that produces natural quartz, the 
primary difference being that the former takes place in a controlled laboratory 
environment.  Thus, cultured quartz is not a new material, but rather a replication of an 
existing material.  The innovation of single-crystal silicon was completely different.  This 
was in every sense a radical innovation.  To begin with, single-crystal silicon does not 
exist in nature.  It was, when developed in the 1940s, a completely new material, not a 
replication of a naturally-occurring material.  Second, single-crystal silicon made possible 
the development of solid-state devices (e.g., the field-effect transistor) that had a 
revolutionary impact on the world of electronics.  Without them, radios, amplifiers, and 
computers would still depend on bulky and energy-consuming vacuum tubes. 
Lastly, there are the growth trajectories of cultured quartz and single-crystal 
semiconductors.  There is a great deal of overlap here.  Since QCUs and silicon devices 
are amenable to miniaturization and mass production, they both helped strengthen the 
20th century technological imperative toward “smaller, faster, cheaper” devices and 
products.  Where QCUs were once used in vacuum tube radios, they have remained, the 
                                                 
533 Nathan Rosenberg, "The Direction of Technological Change: Inducement Mechanisms and Focusing 
Devices," Economic Development and Cultural Change 18, no. 1 (January 1969): 1-24.   
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only significant change being that they have become smaller.  At the same time, bulky 
tubes have been replaced by tiny silicon transistors.  Furthermore, the rise of digital 
technologies again called for both QCUs and silicon devices.  In particular, personal 
computers and mobile telephones have made heavy use of both technologies.  Thus, the 
demands for cultured quartz and single-crystal silicon have risen together over the past 
century, such that these materials are today the top two single-crystal materials produced 
for electronics use. 
In sum, we see that cultured quartz and single-crystal semiconductors both 
benefited from military patronage in the middle decades of the 20th century.  
Furthermore, their growth trajectories through the later half of the century mirrored one 
another, largely due to the rise of digital electronic devices, most of which require one or 
more QCU’s to provide precise timekeeping.  But the development of single-crystal 
semiconductors radically transformed the world of electronics, while the development of 
cultured quartz played a more modest role by allowing the development of electronics to 
proceed along a direction established by other forces.  Even so, had cultured quartz never 
reached the stage of commercialization, electronics in the later 20th century may well 
have taken a different course.  What that course might have been lies more in the domain 
of science fiction than of history.   
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CHAPTER 9: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
How do we make sense of the thoroughgoing technological changes recounted in 
this history of quartz crystal technology, beginning with the Curie brothers’ discovery of 
the piezoelectric effect and concluding with the establishment of the cultured quartz 
industry?  Many large-scale social forces can be pointed to.  The rise of science-based 
industry in late-19th century Germany and its spread to the U.S. in the early 20th century, 
the enormous appetite of the industrialized nations for electronic media, the competitive 
and vigorous business climate of early 20th century America, the tremendous productive 
and creative forces unleashed by two world wars in which technology played an essential 
role – these were undoubtedly important factors creating conditions that favored the 
development of quartz crystal technology.  Yet one factor, often overlooked and perhaps 
more important than all others, helps account for the technological growth seen in the 
previous seven chapters.  This factor is the formation of a technological community, i.e. a 
group of technological practitioners actively involved in developing, advancing, and 
refining a particular technology.534  Such a community is bigger than any single company 
or corporation, bigger than any single scientific or engineering discipline, bigger than any 
one nation or social group.  The fabric holding together a technological community is 
                                                 
534 The literature on technological communities lies mostly within the disciplines of history of technology 
and R&D management.  What follows is a sampling.  Edward W. Constant II, "The Social Locus of 
Technological Practice: Community, System, or Organization?," in The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology, ed. Wiebe E. Bijker, 
Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 223-42.  Peter Weingart, 
"The Structure of Technological Change: Reflections on a Sociological Analysis of Technology," in The 
Nature of Technological Knowledge: Are Models of Scientific Change Relevant?, ed. Rachel Laudan, 
Sociology of the Sciences Monographs (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984), 115-
42.  Andrew Van de Ven, "A community perspective on the emergence of innovations," Journal of 
Engineering and Technology Management 10 (1993): 23-51.  Leonard H. Lynn, N. Mohan Reddy, and 
John D. Aram, "Linking technology and institutions: the innovation community framework," Research 
Policy 25 (1996): 91-106.  Koenraad Debackere and Michael A. Rappa, "Technological Communities and 
the diffusion of knowledge: a replication and validation," R&D Management 24, no. 4 (1994): 355-71. 
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woven from personal relationships, university/corporate/government partnerships, 
competitive relationships between rival firms, scientific and engineering societies, 
amateur-based organizations and, most of all, common devotion to a particular 
technology, such as the automobile, radio, or in this case, resonant quartz crystal devices. 
The remarkable technological changes witnessed in quartz crystal technology 
between the First World War and the 1950s would not have occurred without the 
formation of a vibrant technological community.  To see this, we need to first review the 
growth of this technology.  There are at least two metrics with which this growth can be 
measured.  The metric emphasized throughout this study is patenting activity, the number 
of patents issued in a particular technological area over a given time.  The second metric 
is market penetration, the number or percentage of potential customers for a given 
technological product that are actually using the product.  These two metrics highlight 
different aspects of the growth of quartz crystal technology.  By using them together, we 
arrive at a multi-dimensional view of technological growth. 
 
Using patenting activity to measure technological growth reflects the fact that 
technology has a specialized knowledge base.  The “growth” of a technology occurs 
when this knowledge base expands by accumulating over time. Technological knowledge 
can accumulate in several ways – by being passed down from generation to generation 
through person-to-person apprenticeships or educational institutions, by being recorded in 
journal articles or patent disclosures, or by simply being embodied in technological 
artifacts that are preserved over time.  For the historian relying on written sources, journal 
articles and patent disclosures are particularly useful indicators of technological activity.  
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Journal articles tend to favor scientific discoveries rather than technological inventions 
since the author(s) cannot exclude others from using the disclosed knowledge once 
published.  Patent disclosures, on the other hand, reveal patentable inventions, i.e. 
technological knowledge that is new, directly useful, and non-obvious in light of the 
existing knowledge base.  Furthermore, patents, because they transfer to their owners the 
temporary right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the disclosed invention, 
act as economic instruments.  Thus, patents reflect both the knowledge base and the 
economic incentives of a particular technology. 
Some scholars of innovation have suggested that the cumulative patent numbers 
for a given technological area should follow a logistic curve, as shown in Figure 48, over 
the life cycle of that technology.535  The notable elements of this curve are initial period 
of exponential growth followed by a stretch of linear, stable growth.  Some scholars have 
referred to this linear period as “normal technology,” after Thomas Kuhn’s description of 
“normal science” in which scientists are busy working out the myriad implications of a 
new scientific paradigm.536  In the case of “normal technology,” technologists are 
engaged in refining a technology and finding new applications for it.  Finally, the logistic 
curve of Figure 48 ends with a gradual decline in activity, presumably brought on either 
by the exhaustion of technological possibilities or by the appearance of an alternative, 
superior technology.   
                                                 
535 To the author’s knowledge, the first person to use the logistic curve to describe scientific or 
technological growth was sociologist of science Diana Crane.  See Diana Crane, Invisible Colleges: 
Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). 
536 For example, see Edward W. Constant II, The Origins of the Turbojet Revolution, ed. Thomas P. 
Hughes, Johns Hopkins Studies in the History of Technology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1980).  Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1962). 
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 Figure 49 shows the actual growth in quartz crystal patents measured over the 
forty year period covered in this study.  Note that it bears only a slight resemblance to 
Figure 48.  The first noticeable difference is that the upper bend of the S-curve is missing, 
indicating that quartz crystal technology, as measured by patenting activity, was still 
actively growing in the late 1950s.  When this study was begun, 1959 was chosen as the 
cut-off point because it appeared on the surface that most major quartz crystal 
innovations, including the development of cultured quartz, had occurred by this time.  
Thus, it was guessed that quartz patenting activity might be in decline by 1960.  Clearly, 
Figure 49 shows that this was not the case.  Perhaps a future study will trace the evolution 
of quartz crystal technology from 1960 up to the present. 
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Figure 48: Ideal Logistic Curve of Cumulative Quartz Crystal Patent Growth 
between 1918 and 1959 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 
Notice also from Figure 49 that growth spurts are present at two points in the 
curve, one around 1926-1927 and another around 1942-1946.  These spurts in patenting 
activity correspond respectively to the period during which the technique of quartz 
crystal-control was being applied to broadcast radio transmitters and to the period during 
which millions of QCUs were being produced for use in Army Signal Corps field 
transceiver radio units.  Explaining these two growth spurts is one of the principal 
purposes of this chapter, yet we must first look at quartz crystal technological growth 
from a second perspective. 
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Figure 49: Actual Curve of Cumulative Quartz Crystal Patent Growth between 1918 
and 1959 
(Note: Only patent applications that resulted in issued patents are shown.  Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 
 Technological growth may also be measured by using market penetration, i.e. the 
number or percentage of potential customers for a given technological product that are 
actually using the product.  This metric is perhaps intuitively more appealing than 
patenting activity.  After all, can a particular technology really be characterized as 
“growing” if no one is actually using it?  However, despite its appeal, market penetration 
has a problem.  It is difficult to measure, particularly in hindsight.  Not only is measuring 
the number of actual users of a technology difficult, but estimating the number of 
potential users is well night impossible.  Nevertheless, and in light of these difficulties, it 
is possible to use the scattered production and usage data gathered in this study to obtain 
an order-of-magnitude estimate for the numbers of resonant quartz crystal devices in use 
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between 1880 and 1959.  Table 4 shows these estimates and breaks the time period of this 
study into seven distinct phases: scientific discovery and theory-building, invention and 
experimentation, broadcast radio, amateur radio and telephony, wartime mass production, 
military surplus and artificial quartz research, and cultured quartz.  Figure 50 shows this 
data is graphical form.   
 
Table 4: The Approximate Number of Resonant Quartz Crystal Devices In 
Use Between 1880 and 1959 
Year Ranges Approximate No. of 
Resonant QCUs in Use 
Phase 
1880-1916 0 Scientific Discovery and 
Theory-Building 
1917-24 10 Invention and Experimentation 
1925-31 1,000 Broadcast Radio 
1932-41 100,000 Amateur Radio and Telephony 
(Quartz Wave Filters) 
1942-45 10,000,000 Wartime Mass Production 
1946-56 10,000,000 Military Surplus and Artificial 
Quartz Research 
1957-59 100,000,000 Cultured Quartz 
(Table created by author.) 
 
 
 
Unlike Figure 49, Figure 50 lacks detail and thus must be interpreted more 
cautiously.  The growth spurts of the former figure are not noticeable in the latter.  What 
we can conclude from the latter is that the absolute number of resonant quartz crystal 
devices in use increased exponentially while the rate of exponential growth gradually 
declined throughout four decades.  This is not surprising, for the more widely a 
technology is adopted, the more difficult it is to sustain the initially high growth rates, but 
what is perhaps most remarkable about Figure 50 is that the number of quartz devices in 
use increased roughly by a factor of 10 million over four decades.  This reflects some of 
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the basic characteristics of quartz crystal devices.  They are generally inexpensive, can be 
produced using automated mass production techniques, are used as components in larger 
technological products or systems, and were eventually found to be essential to three of 
the most important communications technologies of the 20th century – telephony, radio, 
and television.  However, quartz crystal devices could never have been produced and 
adopted on such a large scale without an underlying technological knowledge base. 
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Figure 50: Estimated Number of Resonant Quartz Crystal Devices in Actual Use 
between 1920 and 1959 
(Figure created by author.) 
 
 
 As evidenced by the large number of patents specifying QCU production 
techniques that were issued between 1920 and 1960, the massive numbers of quartz 
devices represented in Figure 50 could not have been produced without the technological 
knowledge presented in Figure 49.  Yet, bodies of technological knowledge do not appear 
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fully formed ex nihilo.  They form over time, and they are created principally in the 
context of technological community.  This is precisely why the growth of quartz crystal 
technology in general and the two growth spurts of Figure 49 in particular cannot be 
understood without understanding the role played by technological community. 
The first growth spurt of Figure 49 represents the initial application of “crystal-
control,” the technique of using a resonant quartz crystal to control a radio transmitter’s 
frequency, to broadcast radio.  To be sure, the U.S. government played a decisive role in 
stimulating this burst of patenting activity by imposing frequency adherence regulations 
on all licensed broadcasters, but the burst could have never occurred had a foundation for 
quartz crystal innovation not already been laid in the preceding years.  Furthermore, the 
germ of a quartz crystal technological community was already in place well before the 
1927 appearance of FRC regulation.  By the end of the “invention and experimentation” 
phase, Walter Cady, George Washington Pierce, the Naval Research Laboratory, the 
General Radio Company, Bell Telephone Laboratories, and John Dellinger of the Bureau 
of Standards were all actively developing resonant quartz crystal devices.  Either through 
personal friendship, involvement in the National Research Council during World War I, 
business relationships, or through membership in the Institute of Radio Engineers, all 
were aware of each other’s work, thus forming something of a nascent technological 
community.  When the FRC announced General Order No. 7 in April 1927, this 
community was prepared to generate the new technical knowledge needed to make strict 
frequency adherence a reality, resulting in the first patenting growth spurt of Figure 49.  
Yes, the role played by the FRC here was critical; without it, the demand for quartz 
crystal devices would not have existed and quartz inventors would have acted in other 
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areas of technology.  But no less important was the small social network created by 
individual inventors, companies, and government researchers in the years leading up to 
1927. 
In the midst of the so-called “broadcast radio” phase of 1925 to 1931, the small 
community of engineers and scientists interested in quartz devices were quick to develop 
techniques and devices that allowed broadcast stations to comply with new FRC 
regulations.  Yet, regulation exposed a major weakness in the still-young broadcasting 
industry.  In order to make regulation work, broadcasters needed access to professional 
radiofrequency testing services.  This need was soon filled as technically-minded 
entrepreneurs founded testing firms, adding at the same time another dimension to the 
growing quartz technological community.  Also during this period, government and 
industry leaders such as John Dellinger, R. H. Marriott, and C. W. Horn worked through 
the I.R.E. to advise the FRC on radio policy.  Their advice regarding crystal-controlled 
frequency adherence culminated in the 1931 passage of General Order No. 116, which 
ensured that all licensed broadcast stations would employ sophisticated quartz crystal 
instruments in their transmitter rooms.  Here was an example of one particularly powerful 
segment of the growing quartz crystal community working to, as it saw it, benefit both 
the general public, in the form of clearer radio reception, and radio engineers, in the form 
of a guaranteed market for advanced radio instrumentation. 
The second growth spurt of Figure 49 represents the mass production of tens of 
millions of QCUs in support of the Allies during World War II.  These QCUs were used 
in both “crystal-controlled” transmitters as well as in push-button receivers, giving Allied 
troops reliable, instantaneous communications without the burden of tedious tuning 
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mechanisms.  As in 1927, government intervention was critical here in stimulating 
patenting activity.  In this case, the Army Signal Corps chose to adopt quartz crystal 
control for many of its field transceiver radio units, creating almost overnight a level of 
demand for QCUs that dwarfed pre-war levels.  Yet, as important as this decision was, 
the activities of the quartz crystal technological community over the preceding decade 
made the wartime growth spurt possible.  During the 1930s, as tens of thousands of radio 
amateurs in the U.S. alone experimented with crystal control, numerous small QCU 
manufacturing firms such as Bliley Electric, CTS-Knights, Scientific Radio Products and 
Monitor Products sprang up to serve them.537  These firms were an important addition to 
the quartz technological community.  Among their innovative contributions was one that 
proved to be highly influential during the quartz shortage of the war – the use of ¼” 
rather than 1” quartz wafers in QCUs.  Also important during the 1930s was the AT&T-
sponsored research on quartz wave filters and zero temperature coefficient crystal cuts.  
Though no organizations existed during the 1930s that were dedicated exclusively to 
quartz crystal technology, most enthusiasts connected with each other through 
membership in either the Institute of Radio Engineers (for professional engineers) or the 
American Radio Relay League (for amateurs).  This social network gave the Signal Corps 
a starting point for ramping up wartime QCU production to unprecedented levels. 
During World War II, the “wartime mass production” phase of quartz crystal 
device history, the quartz technological community responded to the Army’s demand 
with not only millions of QCUs, but also with new methods of QCU production.  Indeed, 
during the war, nearly 50% of all quartz-related patents were for QCU fabrication 
                                                 
537 Patrick R. J. Brown, "The Influence of Amateur Radio on the Development of the Commercial Market 
for Quartz Piezoelectric Resonators in the United States" (Proceedings of the 50th Annual IEEE Frequency 
Control Symposium, U.S. Army Research Laboratory, Forth Monmouth, NJ, 5-7 June 1996), 58-65. 
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methods.  (See Figure 7 of Chapter 3.)  The war also gave the quartz crystal community 
visibility among the broader engineering profession.  The I.R.E. formed the Committee 
on Piezoelectric Devices in recognition of the importance of quartz and other 
piezoelectric materials to modern technology.  For the first time, an engineer or 
researcher interested in quartz devices could look in a special issue of the Proceedings of 
the I.R.E. each year to find all relevant peer-reviewed articles published over the 
preceding twelve months.  What had once been an esoteric and underappreciated branch 
of radio engineering was now coming into its own. 
The post-war years saw the quartz technological community blossom into a full-
blown research community, complete with annual symposia and steady government 
funding.  The justification for this abundance of research resources was the Brazilian 
quartz supply crisis of the war years.  A substitute for Brazilian quartz was needed if the 
Army Signal Corps was to continue its reliance on the technique of quartz crystal-control.  
During these immediate post-war years, the quartz technological community took on a bit 
of the flavor of a scientific community.  Though patents continued to be highly valued, 
journal publications increased in importance and the annual symposia tended to give the 
community a more collegial atmosphere than in the past.  The Brush Development 
Company, Bell Telephone Laboratories, and many university research groups were major 
creative contributors during this period.  During the mid-1950s, the Signal Corps-
sponsored research culminated in development of a scalable method for culturing (i.e. 
growing) large and flawless quartz crystals from crushed quartz, but only after the Corps 
had spent well over $1 million supporting artificial quartz research.  
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This study has provided a glimpse into the growth of a technological community, 
from its humble beginnings as a few scattered individuals to its consolidation after World 
War II as a permanent fixture in the so-called “military-industrial complex.”  We have 
seen that this community was heterogeneous in that it comprised university researchers, 
amateur radio enthusiasts, government bureaucrats, company presidents, and engineers 
working for firms both very large and very small.  As such, the quartz crystal community 
was typical of most technological communities, which tend to be far more heterogeneous 
than, say, scientific communities.  We’ve also seen that the quartz community was agile 
and flexible, responding quickly to new market incentives such as the broadcast radio 
market of the 1920s or the amateur radio and long-distance telephony markets of the 
1930s.  Yet we’ve also seen that the quartz community responded most favorably to 
centralized order.  The most ordered periods during this study were the late 1920s period 
of FRC regulation, the World War II period, and the post-war cultured quartz research 
effort.  In all three periods, and especially the first two, patenting activity was high and 
quartz crystal devices were finding their way into customers’ hands.  Thus, we see that, in 
contrast to the notion that technology thrives best in an unregulated and unstructured 
marketplace, the quartz community benefited from what some have called 
“superstructure,” the organizations and institutions that coordinate the activities of 
“substructure” players – the individuals, companies, and government researchers that 
actually invent and innovate.538 
Before closing this discussion of the role of technological community in 
technological growth, a consideration of the differences between Figures 48 and 49 may 
                                                 
538 For more on the superstructure/substructure framework of technological communities, see Leonard H. 
Lynn, N. Mohan Reddy, and John D. Aram, "Linking technology and institutions: the innovation 
community framework," Research Policy 25 (1996): 91-106. 
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prove insightful.  These two figures are clearly different; Figure 48 is the idealized 
logistic curve, while Figure 49 is essentially linear with the exception of two small but 
noticeable growth spurts.  This study was begun with the expectation that the latter figure 
would more or less conform to the shape of the former.  But, given the a priori definitions 
of this study, it now appears that it would have been highly unlikely for these two figures 
to match.  The reason for this is fairly simple.   
It now appears that, as far as technological growth is concerned, the logistic curve 
of Figure 48 is capable of describing the growth of successful and specific technological 
products or techniques but not the growth of broad areas of technology (e.g., quartz 
crystal technology).  In light of this interpretation, we can view the two “growth spurts” 
of Figure 49 as mini logistic curves, connected by the steady linear growth characteristic 
of “normal technology.”539  That is, the logistic curve likely comes very close to 
describing the application of quartz crystal-control to broadcast transmitters in the late 
1920s.  In 1925, no licensed broadcast transmitters utilized crystal control; by 1932, they 
all used crystal control.  The growth between these two points, if examined closely, is 
very likely to match the logistic curve.  The same analysis applies to Army Signal Corps 
radio sets during the Second World War.  However, it now appears to have been a 
mistake to assume that this growth pattern would apply to all of resonant quartz crystal 
technology.   
For the logistic curve to accurately describe growth, there has to be a saturation 
point (e.g., 100% market saturation) beyond which growth cannot occur.  Broad areas of 
technology such as that chronicled in this study do not necessarily have a saturation 
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point.  If they prove successful in one application (e.g., radio), they will almost certainly 
be tried in others (e.g., telephony, television, computers).  This is exactly what happened 
with resonant quartz crystal devices, which is why there is no downward turn toward the 
top of Figure 49.  From this perspective, we can see that the growth of quartz crystal 
technology was essentially the discovery of new applications – first frequency standards, 
then broadcast radio, telephony, two-way radio, color television, and computers.  Thus, 
we can generally expect the growth pattern for broad areas of technology, as measured by 
patenting activity, to be essentially a straight line punctuated intermittently by mini 
logistic curves whenever a new application of that technology or technique is found. 
 
Though the primary conclusion of this study speaks to technological community 
and the growth of technological knowledge, a number of more specific conclusions have 
been reached.  Among these is the role of independent inventors in the early 20th century.  
This study has clearly shown that independent inventors, most notably Walter Cady and 
George Washington Pierce, played a significant role in the early development of resonant 
quartz technology.  Several factors made this possible, beginning with the fact that early 
quartz crystal inventions did not require great investments of capital or manpower.  Both 
Cady and Pierce had been introduced to quartz technology through the anti-submarine 
warfare research of World War I.  The war and this work ended, however, before the full 
potential of quartz could be realized.  From this brief apprenticeship in quartz technology, 
Cady and Pierce were able, on their own and with limited resources, to develop the piezo-
resonator, the piezo-oscillator, and the Pierce oscillator.  As professors at colleges with 
well-endowed science departments, both men had access to an electronics laboratory, 
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with its associated instrumentation, as well as a machine shop for grinding and polishing 
crystals.  Furthermore, a professorship gave them the time and the freedom to pursue this 
line of research before any private firms were willing to invest in it.    
Since Cady and Pierce both taught at private institutions, and since their quartz 
research was not supported with any government funds, the patents they took on their 
inventions were their own.  Ironically, both men employed the legal services of the same 
patent attorney, a Mr. David Rines of Boston, MA, yet they obtained very different 
outcomes when attempting to profit from their patents.  Cady, becoming mired in an 
infringement battle with AT&T that threatened to drag on for years and deplete him 
financially, sold his crystal patents to RCA for $50,000 in 1925, the equivalent of 
$500,000 in 2005.540  RCA, with Mr. Rines’ legal assistance, continued the case against 
AT&T for decades, finally vindicating Cady’s original patents.  Pierce was more 
fortunate.  Able to hold on to his patent for the crystal-controlled oscillator, he reaped a 
handsome income through licensing fees.541   
The difference in Cady’s and Pierce’s outcomes was due largely to the two men’s 
prior patent experiences.  Cady had taken out few, if any, patents prior to 1920 and could 
not have been considered at that time an experienced inventor.  Pierce, on the other hand, 
had obtained thirteen patents prior to his oscillator patent.  All of these were 
commercially viable and none were seriously contested in court.542  In fact, Pierce had 
profited quite handsomely from several of these patents, enough such that his financial 
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541 Dictionary of Scientific Biography (1974), s.v. "Pierce, George Washington."  “Less typically, Pierce 
became wealthy through his patents, some of which he exploited vigorously, and usually successfully, in 
the face of interference suits by large corporations.” 
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situation was comfortable and secure, particularly for a college professor.  Thus, Pierce 
didn’t shirk from defending his oscillator patent when AT&T filed an infringement suit 
against him.  After twelve long years of litigation with the communications giant, he 
emerged victorious.  The experience, confidence, and financial security that Pierce had 
gained from his earlier patents were crucial contributing factors to this success.   
The fact that both Cady and Pierce owned their patents and were free to either 
license or sell them had important consequences for the future development of quartz 
crystal technology.  For one, it prevented AT&T from monopolizing the technology.  The 
firm sued both inventors, but was ultimately unsuccessful in litigation.  Cady, perhaps 
wanting to limit AT&T’s power, sold his patents to AT&T’s principal competitor of the 
time, RCA.  Pierce, for his part, refused to grant AT&T an exclusive license on his 
oscillator patent, though the company probably entreated him to do so.  The consequence 
was that, for at least several decades, quartz crystal technological contributions were 
made by many – large firms (RCA, AT&T), small firms (Bliley Electric, General Radio), 
government research laboratories (Naval Research Laboratory), and even individual 
inventors (see Chapter 3).  The competition engendered by the openness of quartz 
technology was likely a major stimulant to inventive activity. 
The inventions of Cady and Pierce were radical inventions in that they ended up 
launching an industry.  As historian Thomas Hughes has pointed out, during the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, radical inventions were generally the products of independent 
inventors.543  Yet, the intellectual property world inhabited by Cady and Pierce no longer 
exists.  As the 20th century progressed, research universities began requiring their faculty 
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to sign IP agreements that yielded ownership of any patentable inventions to the 
university.544  Furthermore, the trend in R&D throughout the 20th century was toward 
greater and greater capital investment requirements.  It is difficult to imagine many areas 
of technology today that are as inexpensive to investigate as was early quartz crystal 
technology.  Thus, these two developments – changes in university IP policies and the 
increasing costs of R&D – were among the most important factors contributing to the 
decline of independent inventors in the 20th century.  Even so, there is still room for 
independent inventors, particularly in cutting-edge technologies that have not yet reached 
the mainstream.  
Another set of conclusions reached in this study has to do with materials science, 
more specifically with the scenarios that encourage scientists and engineers to either 
better understand the properties of existing materials or to develop altogether new 
materials.  There seem to be at least five such scenarios, all of which are drawn from the 
history of quartz crystal technology.  The first scenario, which we can call scientific 
prediction, is where scientific theory predicts a previously unmeasured or undetected 
property of a natural or man-made material.  This occurred with the Curie brothers’ 
discovery of the piezoelectric effect, which had been suggested by previous studies of 
pyroelectricity.  The second scenario, development of auxiliary technologies, is where the 
development of one or more auxiliary technologies encourages scientists and engineers to 
try new things with a known material.  During World War I, Constantin Chilowsky and 
Paul Langevin, upon learning of the availability of high-frequency, low-noise amplifiers, 
were able to dream of using piezoelectric quartz crystal in a way that had heretofore been 
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impossible.  The appearance of every fundamentally new technology, such as vacuum 
tube amplifiers, encourages technologists to re-examine assumptions about the materials 
with which they work. 
The third scenario leading to materials science developments, which we will call 
the performance bottleneck or reverse salient, occurs when a device or machine built with 
a certain material is not performing adequately, and it is determined that the material 
itself is the principal factor limiting performance.545  During the 1930s, BTL researchers 
dissatisfied with the performance of QCUs and quartz wave filters operating over wide 
temperature ranges investigated different angles at which wafers were cut from raw 
quartz blocks.  This work resulted in the development of the breakthrough zero 
temperature coefficient crystal cut.  Later, during WWII, the ageing problem with mass-
produced QCUs led to the widespread adoption of the acid-etching process for producing 
quartz wafers. 
A fourth scenario, identified by Nathan Rosenberg in a seminal 1969 paper, is a 
sudden and permanent disruption in the supply of, or a significant increase in the cost of, 
a natural resource or material.546  This disruption often occurs during wartime, as normal 
trade routes are disrupted and supply shortages become critical to a nation’s survival.  As 
mentioned in Chapter 7, this scenario occurred several times to Germany during the 19th 
and 20th centuries, leading them to develop many important synthetic materials.  The 
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threatened disruption of Brazilian quartz crystal supplies during WWII provided the 
impetus for the post-war development of cultured quartz. 
The fifth and final scenario is perhaps the simplest.  This occurs when a scientists 
or engineer is simply driven by curiosity to better understand a strange material.  Walter 
Cady’s WWI research on Rochelle Salt and quartz crystal led him to become fascinated 
by the unique resonance property exhibited by quartz.  He continued his research even 
after the conclusion of the war.  His motive seems to have been nothing more than 
wanting to understand how this material behaved.  Yet it was while conducting this 
research that Cady conceived of using quartz crystal as a precise frequency standard.  
Thus, though it may seem naïve or too simplistic, it does seem that genuine curiosity still 
drives at least some materials science developments. 
 
In reviewing the rise of quartz crystal technology in the 20th century, how can we 
account for its remarkable success?  In the time period covered by this study, we have 
seen that the fate of electronic communications was the fate of quartz crystal.  As radio, 
telephony, and later television rose in importance, so rose the importance of quartz.  The 
reason for this shared fate is easy to discern.  In democratic, free market societies, as the 
owners of electronic communications systems sought to make them available to more and 
more people, the capacity of these systems had to expand.  For most of the forty year 
period from 1918-1959, the principal technique engineers used to give multiple users 
access to a single communication medium, such as the airwaves for radio or a coaxial 
cable for telephony, was frequency division multiplexing, also known as frequency 
division multiple access (FDMA).  Since FDMA works by assigning individual users a 
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single frequency or band of frequencies, devices that can generate and detect frequencies 
with extreme precision and stability permit the frequency spectrum to be used more 
efficiently, allowing more users to access a communication medium.  Quartz oscillators 
and wave filters did exactly this; they enabled the generation and detection of very high 
electrical frequencies such that these frequencies could be precisely known and that they 
would stay where they were initially set, not drifting into other frequency bands.  Other 
techniques for giving multiple users access to a single communication medium, such as 
time-division and code-division multiple access (TDMA and CDMA, respectively), have 
been used and are still widely used today, particularly in computer networking.  
Nevertheless, FDMA remains the dominant multiple access technique for broadcast 
communications. 
Since 1959, two other major technologies, affordable electronic wristwatches and 
digital computing, have allowed the importance of resonant quartz crystal technology to 
continue rising.  In the late 1960s, techniques were developed that allowed engineers to 
affordably place tiny quartz wafers in battery-powered wristwatches, yielding 
unprecedented accuracy at a low price.547  In the 1970s and early 1980s, power digital 
computing technology became cheap enough to begin placing computers in everything 
from cars to home appliances.  High-speed digital technologies require precise 
synchronization of a variety of signals and processes, and precise synchronization 
requires precise timekeeping.  Quartz crystals are used to provide this precise 
timekeeping in every digital computing device in use today, from PCs to cell phones and 
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from GPS units to digital watches.  Thus, the ubiquity of quartz crystal technology is not 
likely to change anytime soon. 
In closing this study, we return to a fascinating statement made by Alfred 
Goldsmith, Chief Broadcast Engineer for RCA, in 1928 and quoted at the beginning of 
Chapter 4.  “It is indeed most fortunate that just when extremely accurate frequency 
control is becoming so necessary to radio, the instrumentalities for it should become 
available.  It may be that this is putting the cart before the horse and explaining how 
remarkable it is that great rivers always flow past large cities.  Perhaps the modern desire 
and need and application of constant frequency is the result of the crystal oscillator and 
similar high precision frequency control devices.”548  Goldsmith had it only partly right; 
viewing the timing of the appearance of accurate frequency instruments as a fortunate 
coincidence was certainly putting the cart before the horse, but the appearance of the 
crystal oscillator did not in any way create the “modern desire and need for application of 
constant frequency.”    
The desire for constant frequency that first appeared in the 1920s was a 
consequence of several things: a national radio broadcasting system with no artificial 
limit on the number of broadcast stations; the large geographic size of the U.S., requiring 
many stations to reach all potential listeners; the decision to use frequency-division 
multiplexing to apportion access to the over-the-air broadcast spectrum; and, most 
fundamentally, the inherent instability of high-frequency vacuum tube amplifiers and 
oscillators of the 1920s.  In fact, it was the desire for constant frequency, first recognized 
by Walter Cady and George Washington Pierce, that stimulated efforts to develop and 
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refine the quartz oscillator.  In the final analysis, however, these efforts, and the efforts of 
all quartz crystal inventors, would have been little more than the isolated actions of 
individual inventors without the formation and growth of a vibrant and heterogeneous 
technological community.  Indeed, the knowledge underlying quartz crystal technology, 
as represented by more than a thousand related patents issued during the forty year span 
of this study, was as much a product of community as of the hard work and insights of 
individuals. 
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